NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–248
_________________
PHILIP E. BERGER, et al., PETITIONERS
v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP,
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[June 23, 2022]
Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the
Court.
At the heart of this lawsuit lies a challenge to
the constitutionality of a North Carolina election law. But the
merits of that dispute are not before us, only an antecedent
question of civil procedure: Are two leaders of North Carolina’s
state legislature entitled to participate in the case under the
terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)?
I
A
Within wide constitutional bounds, States are
free to structure themselves as they wish. Often, they choose to
conduct their affairs through a variety of branches, agencies, and
elected and appointed officials. These constituent pieces sometimes
work together to achieve shared goals; other times they reach very
different judgments about important policy questions and act
accordingly. This diffusion of governmental powers within and
across institutions may be an everyday feature of American life.
But it can also pose its difficulties when a State’s laws or
policies are challenged in federal court.
Suppose someone seeks to attack a state law on
the ground that it is inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.
Generally, States themselves are immune from suit in federal court.
See
Sossamon v.
Texas,
563 U.S.
277, 284 (2011). So usually a plaintiff will sue the individual
state officials most responsible for enforcing the law in question
and seek injunctive or declaratory relief against them. See
Ex
parte Young,
209 U.S.
123, 159–160 (1908). Despite the artifice, of course, a State
will as a practical matter often retain a strong interest in this
kind of litigation. After all, however captioned, a suit of this
sort can implicate “the continued enforceability of [the State’s]
own statutes.”
Maine v.
Taylor,
477 U.S.
131, 137 (1986). To defend its practical interests, the State
may choose to mount a legal defense of the named official
defendants and speak with a “single voice,” often through an
attorney general.
Virginia House of Delegates v.
Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at
5).
Still, not every State has structured itself
this way. Some have chosen to authorize multiple officials to
defend their practical interests in cases like these. See
ibid. North Carolina falls into this camp. The State’s
attorney general wields some authority to represent individual
official defendants in federal litigation. See
Martin v.
Thornburg, 320 N. C. 533, 545–546,
359 S.E.2d 472, 479 (1987); N. C. Const., Art. III,
§§ 7(1), (2) (establishing the office of attorney general and
declaring that his “duties shall be prescribed by law”). But North
Carolina’s General Assembly has also empowered the leaders of its
two legislative houses to participate in litigation on the State’s
behalf under certain circumstances and with counsel of their own
choosing. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2 (2021).
The reasons why a State might choose to proceed
this way are understandable enough. Sometimes leaders in different
branches of government may see the State’s interests at stake in
litigation differently. Some States may judge that important public
perspectives would be lost without a mechanism allowing multiple
officials to respond. It seems North Carolina has some experience
with just these sorts of issues. More than once a North Carolina
attorney general has opposed laws enacted by the General Assembly
and declined to defend them fully in federal litigation. See,
e.g.,
North Carolina v.
North Carolina State
Conference of NAACP, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (Roberts,
C. J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (slip op.,
at 2); App. 79; see also N. Devins & S. Prakash, Fifty
States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty
To Defend, 124 Yale L. J. 2100, 2152, n. 217, 2187 (2015).
B
The facts of this case also illustrate how
divided state government can lead to disagreements over the defense
of state law in federal court. In November 2018, the people of
North Carolina amended the State Constitution to provide that
“[v]oters offering to vote in person shall present photographic
identification [(photo ID)].” Art. VI, § 2(4). The people
further provided that “[t]he General Assembly shall enact general
laws governing the requirements of such photographic
identification, which may include exceptions.”
Ibid.
Consistent with that directive, the General Assembly eventually
approved Senate Bill 824 (S. B. 824). 2017 Gen. Assem., 2018
Reg. Sess. Under that law’s terms, those seeking to vote must do
one of three things: present an acceptable photo ID, complete a
provisional ballot and later produce a photo ID, or submit a form
explaining why they cannot present a photo ID. See N. C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 163A–1145.1(a), (c), (d), as added by
§ 1.2(a), 2018 N. C. Sess. Laws 144, pp. 73–74. Photo ID
cards are available free of charge in each of the State’s 100
counties without the need for corroborating documentation.
§ 163A–869.1, as added by § 1.1(a),
id., at 72–73.
After the law’s passage, the Governor vetoed the bill, the General
Assembly responded by overriding that veto, and S. B. 824 went
into effect on December 19, 2018.
The next day, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sued the Governor and the
members of the State Board of Elections (collectively, Board). The
Governor appoints the Board’s members and may remove them under
certain circumstances. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 143B–16, 163–19, 163–40. In its lawsuit, the NAACP alleged
that S. B. 824 offends the Federal Constitution. The State’s
attorney general assumed responsibility for defending the Board.
See § 114–2. Like the Governor, the attorney general is an
independently elected official. See N. C. Const., Art. III,
§ 7(1). Much like the Governor, too, while serving as a state
senator the attorney general voted against an earlier voter-ID law
and filed a declaration in support of a legal challenge against it.
See
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 337–338, 357–359 (MDNC
2014).
Soon, the speaker of the State House of
Representatives and president pro tempore of the State Senate
(legislative leaders) moved to intervene. App. 52. They noted that
North Carolina law expressly authorizes them “to intervene on
behalf of the General Assembly as a party in any judicial
proceeding challenging a North Carolina statute or provision of the
North Carolina Constitution.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 1–72.2(b). They observed that, in cases of this sort, state
law further provides that “both the General Assembly and the
Governor constitute the State of North Carolina.” § 1–72.2(a).
And the legislative leaders suggested that, without their
participation, important state interests would not be adequately
represented in light of the Governor’s opposition to S. B.
824, the Board’s allegiance to the Governor, and the attorney
general’s opposition to earlier voter-ID efforts. App. 65–70.
Finally, the legislative leaders pointed to parallel state-court
proceedings in which they claimed the Board had offered only a
“tepid” defense of S. B. 824.
Id., at 127,
n. 1.
The District Court denied the motion to
intervene
. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP
v
. Cooper, 332 F.R.D. 161 (MDNC 2019). In doing so,
the court applied a “presumption” that the legislative leaders’
interests would be adequately represented by the Governor and Board
and their legal representative, the attorney general.
Id.,
at 168–170. On the court’s view, the legislative leaders might
someday have an interest sufficient to warrant intervention if the
existing parties refused to offer any defense of S. B. 824.
Id., at 166. But because nothing like that had yet happened,
the District Court denied the motion to intervene without prejudice
to renewal later.
Id., at 172–173.
In time, the legislative leaders took up the
District Court’s offer to renew their motion. They pointed to this
Court’s intervening decision in
Bethune-Hill, which
“clarified” that legislative leaders sometimes may be legally
entitled to intervene and represent “the interest of
the
State in defending the constitutionality of ” a state law.
App. 159. They also updated the District Court on the Board’s
conduct in state-court proceedings. There, the Board had conceded
that its “ ‘primary objective’ ”
wasn’t defending
S. B. 824, but obtaining guidance regarding which law it would
need to enforce in an upcoming election (S. B. 824 or
preexisting law).
Id., at 156. Seizing on this concession,
the state-court plaintiffs argued that even the Board did not think
it would ultimately prevail on the merits.
Id., at 157. In
the end, however, the District Court was unmoved by these
developments. It denied the legislative leaders’ renewed motion and
addressed
Bethune-Hill only in a footnote stating that the
decision did not “change the calculus.”
North Carolina State
Conference of NAACP v.
Cooper, 2019 WL 5840845, *2,
n. 3 (MDNC, Nov. 7, 2019).
As the federal litigation proceeded without the
legislative leaders, the NAACP sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the Board from enforcing S. B. 824 in upcoming
elections. By this point, the District Court had dismissed the
Governor from the suit. Only the Board members, represented by the
attorney general, remained as defendants. In support of its motion
for injunctive relief, the NAACP offered five expert reports. In
reply, the Board did not oppose the motion on timeliness grounds
even though the NAACP had waited nine months before seeking what it
described as critical emergency relief. See App. 311–313;
Memorandum of Law in No. 1:18–cv–1034 (MDNC, Sept. 17, 2019), ECF
Doc. 73. Nor did the Board produce competing expert reports.
Instead, it supplied a single affidavit from its executive director
and stressed again the need for clarity about which law to apply.
App. 312. Once more unsatisfied with the vigor of the Board’s
response, the legislative leaders sought to lodge an
amicus
brief, five expert reports, and several other declarations. At the
end of the day, however, the District Court refused to consider the
amicus brief and accompanying materials, struck them from
the record, and granted a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of S. B. 824.
North Carolina State Conference
of NAACP v.
Cooper, 430 F. Supp. 3d 15, 54 (MDNC
2019).
C
The Fourth Circuit took up the District
Court’s preliminary injunction and intervention rulings in separate
appeals before separate panels. While these appeals were pending,
the Board did not seek an interim stay of the District Court’s
preliminary injunction. Apparently, it chose not to do so “due to
the disruptive effect such relief would have had on” election
administration. App. 366, n. 8. As a result, S. B. 824 was not
enforced during the State’s March 2020 primary election.
In the appeal concerning the District Court’s
preliminary injunction ruling, the legislative leaders sought leave
to intervene and the Fourth Circuit granted their motion. See Order
in
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
Raymond, No. 20–1092 (CA4, Mar. 27, 2020), ECF Doc. 43.
Meanwhile, the Governor filed an
amicus brief contending
that the District Court had not gone far enough: “[The] preliminary
injunctio[n] should be made permanent, and . . . this
unconstitutional law should never go into effect.” App. 844. After
considering all the submissions before it, a unanimous panel of the
Court of Appeals largely agreed with the legislative leaders and
reversed.
North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v.
Raymond, 981 F.3d 295, 298 (2020). The panel held that the
District Court had abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary
injunction because the record contained insufficient evidence to
show that S. B. 824 violated the Federal Constitution. In
particular, the panel explained that North Carolina’s law “is more
protective of the right to vote than other states’ voter ID laws
that courts have approved.”
Id., at 310. Later, the Court of
Appeals denied rehearing en banc; no judge noted a dissent. Any
further District Court proceedings were thus left to unfold without
a preliminary injunction in place.
Separately and hoping to participate in those
future proceedings, the legislative leaders asked another panel of
the Fourth Circuit to vacate the District Court’s decision denying
their motion to intervene. The legislative leaders stressed that
state law expressly authorizes them to participate in cases like
this one, and they argued that they satisfied all the requirements
for intervention as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2). For its part, the Court of Appeals again agreed
with the legislative leaders, this time holding that the District
Court had erred when denying them leave to intervene. 970 F.3d 489,
503–504, 506 (2020).
Eventually, however, the Fourth Circuit decided
to rehear the matter en banc and changed course. A nine-judge
majority ruled that the legislative leaders were not entitled to
intervene in District Court proceedings because they could not
overcome a “heightened presumption” that the Board already
“adequately represented” their interests. 999 F.3d 915, 927,
932–934 (2021). Six judges dissented. Among other things, the
dissenters suggested that the majority had erred by “ignor[ing]
North Carolina’s law requesting two agents in cases challenging the
constitutionality of its duly-enacted statutes” and by “setting the
bar for the Intervenors to clear too high.”
Id., at 945
(opinion of Quattlebaum, J.); see also
id., at 939 (opinion
of Wilkinson, J.);
id., at 941 (opinion of Niemeyer,
J.).
The legislative leaders responded by petitioning
this Court to review the Fourth Circuit’s en banc ruling. We agreed
to hear the matter in order to resolve disagreements among the
circuits about the proper treatment of motions to intervene in
cases like this one. 595 U. S. ___ (2021).
II
Our starting point lies in Rule 24(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As relevant here, the Rule
provides that a “court must permit anyone to intervene” who, (1)
“[o]n timely motion,” (2) “claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is
so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,” (3)
“unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”
Everyone before us agrees that the legislative leaders’ motion to
intervene was timely. The only disagreements we face concern the
Rule’s two remaining requirements.
A
We focus first on the question whether the
legislative leaders have claimed an interest in the resolution of
this lawsuit that may be practically impaired or impeded without
their participation. No one questions that States possess “ ‘a
legitimate interest in the continued enforce[ment] of [their] own
statutes.’ ”
Cameron v.
EMW Women’s Surgical Center,
P. S. C., 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op.,
at 8) (quoting
Taylor, 477 U. S., at 137). No one
questions that States may organize themselves in a variety of ways.
After all, the separation of government powers has long been
recognized as vital to the preservation of liberty, and it is
through the power to “structure . . . its government, and
the character of those who exercise government authority, [that] a
State defines itself as a sovereign.”
Gregory v.
Ashcroft,
501 U.S.
452, 460 (1991). Nor does anyone question that, when a State
chooses to allocate authority among different officials who do not
answer to one another, different interests and perspectives, all
important to the administration of state government, may emerge.
See,
e.g.,
Brnovich v.
Democratic National
Committee, 594 U. S. ___ (2021) (Arizona’s secretary of
state and attorney general took opposite sides).
Appropriate respect for these realities suggests
that federal courts should rarely question that a State’s interests
will be practically impaired or impeded if its duly authorized
representatives are excluded from participating in federal
litigation challenging state law. To hold otherwise would not only
evince disrespect for a State’s chosen means of diffusing its
sovereign powers among various branches and officials. It would not
only risk turning a deaf federal ear to voices the State has deemed
crucial to understanding the full range of its interests. It would
encourage plaintiffs to make strategic choices to control which
state agents they will face across the aisle in federal court. It
would tempt litigants to select as their defendants those
individual officials they consider most sympathetic to their cause
or most inclined to settle favorably and quickly. All of which
would risk a hobbled litigation rather than a full and fair
adversarial testing of the State’s interests and arguments.
Nor are state interests the only interests at
stake. Respecting the States’ “plan[s] for the distribution of
governmental powers” also serves important national interests.
Mayor of Philadelphia v.
Educational Equality League,
415 U.S.
605, 615, n. 13 (1974). It better enables the States to
serve as a “balance” to federal authority.
Bond v.
United
States,
564 U.S.
211, 221 (2011). It permits States to accommodate government to
local conditions and circumstances. See
ibid. And it allows
States to serve as laboratories of “innovation and experimentation”
from which the federal government itself may learn and from which a
“mobile citizenry” benefits.
Gregory, 501 U. S., at
458. Finally, a federal court tasked with testing the
constitutionality of state law wields weighty “authority over a
State’s most fundamental political processes.”
Alden v.
Maine,
527 U.S.
706, 751 (1999). Permitting the participation of lawfully
authorized state agents promotes informed federal-court
decisionmaking and avoids the risk of setting aside duly enacted
state law based on an incomplete understanding of relevant state
interests.
This Court’s teachings on these scores have been
many, clear, and recent. Earlier this Term in
Cameron, we
explained that a State is free to “empowe[r ] multiple
officials to defend its sovereign interests in federal court.” 595
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Three Terms ago in
Bethune-Hill, we observed that “ ‘a State must be able
to designate agents to represent it in federal court’ ” and
may authorize its legislature “to litigate on the State’s behalf,
either generally or in a defined set of cases.” 587 U. S., at
___–___ (slip op., at 4–5). “[T]he choice belongs to” the sovereign
State.
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). In
Hollingsworth
v.
Perry, this Court stressed that “state law may provide
for other officials,” besides an attorney general, “to speak for
the State in federal court” as some States have done for their
“presiding legislative officers.”
570 U.S.
693, 710 (2013). And in
Karcher v.
May, this
Court held that two state legislative leaders “authori[zed] under
state law to represent the State’s interests” in federal court
could defend state laws there as parties.
484 U.S.
72, 75, 81–82 (1987).
These principles and precedents are dispositive
here. North Carolina has expressly authorized the legislative
leaders to defend the State’s practical interests in litigation of
this sort. State law provides that “[t]he Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, as
agents of the State, by and through counsel of their choice,”
“shall jointly have standing to intervene on behalf of the General
Assembly as a party in any judicial proceeding challenging a North
Carolina statute or provision of the North Carolina Constitution.”
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1–72.2(b). Even beyond these
instructions, the State has made plain that it considers the
leaders of the General Assembly “necessary parties” to suits like
this one. § 120–32.6(b).
Tellingly, the Board seems to agree that, if
North Carolina law authorizes participation by the legislative
leaders on behalf of the State, a federal court should find the
interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) satisfied. Brief for State
Respondents 20, 28. The Board submits only that, in fact, North
Carolina law does not afford the legislative leaders that
authority.
Id., at 49–50. But while we are hardly the final
arbiters of North Carolina law, the Board’s argument seems more
than a little difficult to square with the express statutory
language above. One of these provisions is even entitled, “General
Assembly Acting on Behalf of the State of North Carolina in Certain
Actions.” § 120–32.6(b). It provides that the legislative
leaders may defend state laws “as agents of the State.”
Ibid.
Retreating, the Board argues alternatively that
the statutes authorizing the legislative leaders to participate
here violate the State Constitution by usurping authority vested in
the executive branch. Brief for State Respondents 50–55; N. C.
Const., Art. I, § 6. But the Board’s logic is hard to follow
given its concession that the legislative leaders
may
intervene permissively under Rule 24(b), and likely as a matter of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general ceases to
represent the Board. Brief for State Respondents 2, 48, 55. Nor,
for that matter, does the Board identify anything to support its
suggestion that the State’s executive branch holds a constitutional
monopoly on representing North Carolina’s practical interests in
court. Instead, the parties direct us to a provision stating that
the General Assembly may determine the scope of the attorney
general’s powers. See N. C. Const., Art. III, § 7(2);
Bailey v.
State, 353 N. C. 142, 152–153, 540
S.E.2d 313, 320 (2000). And, as we have seen, while the General
Assembly has afforded the attorney general considerable authority,
it has also reserved to itself some authority to defend state law
on behalf of the State. See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 120–32.6(b). In fact, it seems the General Assembly has
sometimes even entrusted the defense of state interests to private
persons. See § 1–608(b) (permitting private citizens to bring
false-claims actions “for the State”).
The NAACP offers a different reply. It points
out that Rule 24(a)(2) permits intervention only by “new” parties.
And, it submits, the legislative leaders are already effectively
“existing” parties to this suit challenging the enforcement of
state law. Brief for NAACP Respondents 12–14. But whatever other
problems may attend this argument, it rests on a premise that is
both formally and functionally mistaken. As a formal matter and
consistent with principles of sovereign immunity, the NAACP has not
sued the State. Only state officers are or may be “parties”
here—and, so far, the legislative leaders are not among them. See
Young, 209 U. S., at 159–160. Functionally, of course,
this suit implicates North Carolina’s sovereign interests
regardless of the named parties. See Part I–A,
supra. Yet,
contrary to the premise implicit in the NAACP’s argument, a
plaintiff who chooses to name this or that official defendant does
not necessarily and always capture all relevant state interests.
Instead and as we have seen, where a State chooses to divide its
sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their
participation in a suit challenging state law, a full consideration
of the State’s practical interests may require the involvement of
different voices with different perspectives. To hold otherwise
would risk allowing a private plaintiff to pick its preferred
defendants and potentially silence those whom the State deems
essential to a fair understanding of its interests.
B
The only remaining question we face concerns
adequacy of representation. Interpreting Rule 24(a)(2), lower
courts have adopted a variety of tests for evaluating whether an
existing defendant already “adequately represent[s]” the same
interests a proposed intervenor seeks to vindicate. In this case,
both the District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals applied a
“presumption” that the Board adequately represented the legislative
leaders’ interests and held that the leaders could not overcome
this presumption. 999 F. 3d, at 934;
Cooper, 332
F. R. D., at 171.
Once more, we cannot agree. As an initial
matter, Rule 24(a)(2) promises intervention to those who bear an
interest that may be practically impaired or impeded “unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.” In some
cases, too, this Court has described the Rule’s test as presenting
proposed intervenors with only a minimal challenge.
Take
Trbovich v.
Mine Workers, in
which this Court addressed a request to intervene by a private
party who asserted a related interest to that of an existing
government party.
404 U.S.
528 (1972). There, the Secretary of Labor sued to set aside a
union election. The same union member who filed the administrative
complaint that triggered the Secretary’s suit sought to intervene
under Rule 24(a).
Id., at 529–530. At a high level of
abstraction, the union member’s interest and the Secretary’s might
have seemed closely aligned. Even so, this Court rejected the
Secretary’s suggestion that he should be presumed an adequate
representative of the union member’s interests “unless the court
. . . find[s] that the Secretary has failed to perform
his statutory duty.”
Id., at 538. The Court acknowledged
that the Secretary’s and the union member’s interests were
“related,” but it emphasized that the interests were not
“identical”—the union member sought relief against his union, full
stop; meanwhile, the Secretary also had to bear in mind broader
public-policy implications.
Id., at 538–539. Rather than
endorse a presumption of adequacy, the Court held that a movant’s
burden in circumstances like these “should be treated as minimal.”
Id., at 538, n. 10.
To be sure, some lower courts have suggested
that a presumption of adequate representation remains appropriate
in certain classes of cases. But even taken on their own terms,
none of these presumptions applies to cases like ours. For example,
the Fourth Circuit has endorsed a presumption of adequate
representation where a member of the public seeks to intervene to
defend a law alongside the government. See 999 F. 3d, at
932–933. There, the Fourth Circuit has reasoned, a court may
presume that legally authorized government agents will adequately
represent the public’s interest in its chosen laws. Here, by
contrast, the legislative leaders are
among those North
Carolina has expressly authorized to participate in litigation to
protect the State’s interests in its duly enacted laws.
Id.,
at 951 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
Similarly, some lower courts have adopted a
presumption of adequate representation in cases where a movant’s
interests are identical to those of an existing party. See 7C
C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1909 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) (Wright & Miller).
But even the Board concedes that this presumption applies only when
interests “overla[p] fully.” Brief for State Respondents 26. Where
“the absentee’s interest is similar to, but not identical with,
that of one of the parties,” that normally is not enough to trigger
a presumption of adequate representation. 7C Wright & Miller
§ 1909. And again, a presumption like that holds no purchase
here. North Carolina has authorized different agents to defend its
practical interests precisely because, thanks to how it has
structured its government, each may be expected to vindicate
different points of view on the State’s behalf. For a federal court
to presume a full overlap of interests when state law more nearly
presumes the opposite would make little sense and do much violence
to our system of cooperative federalism. In cases like ours, state
agents may pursue “related” state interests, but they cannot be
fairly presumed to bear “identical” ones.
Trbovich, 404
U. S., at 538.
In the end, to resolve this case we need not
decide whether a presumption of adequate representation might
sometimes be appropriate when a private litigant seeks to defend a
law alongside the government or in any other circumstance. We need
only acknowledge that a presumption of adequate representation is
inappropriate when a duly authorized state agent seeks to intervene
to defend a state law. In its en banc decision, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that “a proposed intervenor’s governmental status makes a
heightened presumption of adequacy more appropriate, not less.” 999
F. 3d, at 933; accord,
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc.
v.
Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 801 (CA7 2019). But, respectfully,
that gets things backward. Any presumption against intervention is
especially inappropriate when wielded to displace a State’s
prerogative to select which agents may defend its laws and protect
its interests. Normally, a State’s chosen representatives should be
greeted in federal court with respect, not adverse presumptions. If
the intervenor in
Trbovich faced only a “minimal” burden, it
cannot be that duly designated state agents seeking to vindicate
state law should have to clear some higher hurdle.
Setting aside the lower courts’ erroneous
presumptions, the proper resolution of today’s case follows
quickly. Casting aspersions on no one, this litigation illustrates
how divided state governments sometimes warrant participation by
multiple state officials in federal court. See 999 F. 3d, at
939–941 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Recall just some of the facts
of this case. See Parts I–B and I–C,
supra. When confronted
with a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Board declined to
offer expert-witness affidavits in support of S. B. 824, even
though its opponent offered many and the legislative leaders sought
to supplement the record with their own. After the District Court
issued its (ultimately overturned) injunction, the Board declined
to seek a stay. That tactical choice, motivated by the Board’s
overriding concern for stability and certainty, meant that the
State could not enforce its new law during a statewide election.
Throughout, Board members have been appointed and potentially
removable by a Governor who vetoed S. B. 824 and who filed his
own briefs in this litigation calling the law “unconstitutional”
and arguing that it “should never go into effect.” See
supra, at 6. And at all times, the Board has been
represented by an attorney general who, though no doubt a vigorous
advocate for his clients’ interests, is also an elected official
who may feel allegiance to the voting public or share the Board’s
administrative concerns.
The legislative leaders seek to give voice to a
different perspective. Their “primary objective” is not clarifying
which law applies. See
supra, at 5. They are not burdened by
misgivings about the law’s wisdom. If allowed to intervene, the
legislative leaders say, they will focus on defending the law
vigorously on the merits without an eye to crosscutting
administrative concerns. And, they add, the differences between
their interest and the Board’s in this case demonstrate
why
state law empowers them to participate in litigation over the
validity of state legislation—alive as it is to the possibility
that different branches of government may seek to vindicate
different and valuable state interests. Perhaps recognizing all
this, the Fourth Circuit itself allowed the legislative leaders to
intervene in the appeal from the District Court’s preliminary
injunction ruling. The same result should follow here.
By way of reply, the NAACP—but not the
Board—worries that allowing the legislative leaders to intervene
could “make trial management impossible.” Brief for NAACP
Respondents 26; but see Tr. of Oral Arg. 64 (noting that the Board
has “no problem litigating alongside” the legislative leaders). We
are not insensitive to the concern. In some other case, a
proliferation of motions to intervene may be a cause for caution.
At some point, too, it may be that the interests of existing
parties will come to overlap fully with the interests of any
remaining proposed intervenor.
But that case is not this case. Not only do the
legislative leaders bring a distinct state interest to bear on this
litigation. No one has suggested that a cascade of motions lies on
the horizon here. Recall that the NAACP initially named the
Governor as a defendant. Absent his eventual dismissal from this
litigation, the Governor might have been able to hire his own
outside counsel while the attorney general continued to represent
the Board. See
Martin, 320 N. C., at 547–548, 359
S. E. 2d, at 480. Introducing the legislative leaders and
their counsel after the Governor’s departure may not represent a
neat one-for-one swap. But litigation on this scale is hardly
inconsistent with what the Board and the NAACP originally
anticipated.
Nor is it unusual. In matters ranging from
civil-rights actions to suits testing the constitutionality of
state or federal legislation, federal courts routinely handle cases
involving multiple officials sometimes represented by different
attorneys taking different positions. See,
e.g.,
Whole
Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 595 U. S. ___ (2021);
Brnovich, 594 U. S. ___;
United States v.
Windsor,
570 U.S.
744 (2013);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,
497 U.S.
547 (1990);
Buckley v.
Valeo,
424 U.S. 1
(1976) (
per curiam). This Court even hears cases in
which officials from a single State have sued each other in federal
court. See,
e.g.,
Virginia Office for Protection and
Advocacy v.
Stewart,
563 U.S.
247 (2011). Whatever additional burdens adding the legislative
leaders to this case may pose, those burdens fall well within the
bounds of everyday case management.[
1]*
*
Through the General Assembly, the people of
North Carolina have authorized the leaders of their legislature to
defend duly enacted state statutes against constitutional
challenge. Ordinarily, a federal court must respect that kind of
sovereign choice, not assemble presumptions against it. Having
satisfied the terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2),
North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in
this litigation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit is
Reversed.