Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, P. S. C., 595 U.S. ___ (2022)
Kentucky’s attorney general and its Secretary of Health and Family Services were defendants in a suit concerning House Bill 454, regulating abortion procedures. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the attorney general, stipulating that the attorney general’s office reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals” and agreed to be bound by the judgment. The district court enjoined HB 454's enforcement.
While an appeal was pending, Kentucky elected a new attorney general, Cameron. Former attorney general Beshear became Governor. Cameron entered an appearance as counsel for the new Secretary. A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed. The Secretary opted not to challenge the decision. The attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the Secretary and to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf, then filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion to intervene.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the attorney general could have filed a notice of appeal, his failure to do so did not mean his motion for intervention should be treated as an untimely notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the attorney general’s interest in defending HB 454 after the Secretary acquiesced. The attorney general sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties. While the rehearing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in the Secretary’s appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have necessitated resolution of that issue. The plaintiffs’ “loss of its claimed expectations around the election of a Governor with a history of declining to defend abortion restrictions is not cognizable as unfair prejudice.”
Supreme Court reverses the Sixth Circuit's denial of the Kentucky attorney general's motion to intervene in the appeal from an injunction barring enforcement of a law regulating abortion procedures.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KENTUCKY v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 20–601. Argued October 12, 2021—Decided March 3, 2022
EMW Women’s Surgical Center and two of its doctors filed a federal suit seeking to enjoin enforcement of Kentucky House Bill 454, legislation regulating the abortion procedure known as dilation and evacuation. Named defendants in EMW’s lawsuit included two Commonwealth officials, the attorney general and the cabinet secretary for Health and Family Services. EMW agreed to dismiss claims against the attorney general without prejudice. The stipulation of dismissal specified that the attorney general’s office reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action” and agreed to be bound by “any final judgment . . . subject to any modification, reversal or vacation of the judgment on appeal.” App. 28–30. The secretary remained in the case and defended the challenged law. After a bench trial, the District Court held that HB 454 unconstitutionally burdens a woman’s right to an abortion and issued a permanent injunction against the law’s enforcement.
The secretary filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, Kentucky elected a new attorney general, petitioner David Cameron, and elected the former attorney general, Andrew Beshear, Governor. Governor Beshear appointed a new secretary for Health and Family Services who continued the defense of HB 454 on appeal. Prior to oral argument before the Sixth Circuit, Attorney General Cameron entered an appearance as counsel for the new secretary. A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The secretary then informed the attorney general’s office that the secretary would not file a petition for rehearing en banc or a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the Sixth Circuit panel’s decision. Two days later, the attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the secretary and to intervene as a party on the Commonwealth’s behalf. The secretary did not oppose that motion, but respondents did. The attorney general also filed a petition for rehearing en banc within the 14-day deadline for an existing party to seek rehearing. The Sixth Circuit denied the attorney general’s motion to intervene. This Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether the Sixth Circuit should have permitted the attorney general to intervene.
Held: The Court of Appeals erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene. Pp. 4–13.
(a) This Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the attorney general’s motion to intervene should have been granted notwithstanding respondents’ contention that the motion was jurisdictionally barred. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506. Respondents concede that a court of appeals generally has jurisdiction to consider a non-party’s motion to intervene in a pending appeal. But respondents assert that a narrow subset of non-parties—those bound by the district court judgment—must file a timely notice of appeal to obtain appellate review and may not circumvent applicable jurisdictional time limits by filing a motion to intervene after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal has passed. Applying this theory, respondents contend that because the attorney general could have filed a notice of appeal but failed to do so within the time allowed by law, his motion for intervention should be treated like an untimely notice of appeal over which the Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction. Pp. 4–7.
(1) No provision of law limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to entertain a motion for intervention filed by a non-party in this way, even assuming that party can be bound by the judgment that is appealed. Unless clear from its language, a statute or rule does not impose a jurisdictional requirement. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 439. Here, respondents cite no provision that deprives a court of appeals of jurisdiction in the way they suggest, and no such supporting language can be found in 28 U. S. C. §2107, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4, or any other provision of law. Pp. 5–6.
(2) This Court refuses to adopt what would essentially be a categorical claims-processing rule barring consideration of the attorney general’s motion. When a non-party enters into an agreement to be bound by a judgment in accordance with the agreement’s terms, it is hard to see why the non-party should be precluded from seeking intervention on appeal if the agreement preserves that opportunity. Here, the attorney general reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action.” That easily covers the right to seek rehearing en banc and the right to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. And that agreement makes clear that the judgment to which the attorney general agreed to be bound was the judgment that emerged after all appellate review concluded. Pp. 6–7.
(b) Turning to the question whether the Court of Appeals properly denied the attorney general’s motion to intervene, the Court notes that no statute or rule provides a general standard to apply in deciding whether intervention on appeal should be allowed. Guided by the “policies underlying intervention” in the district courts, Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 217, n. 10, including the legal “interest” that a party seeks to “protect” through intervention on appeal, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), the Court concludes that the Sixth Circuit erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene. Pp. 7–13.
(1) Resolution of a motion for permissive intervention is committed to the discretion of the court before which intervention is sought, see Automobile Workers, 382 U. S., at 217, n. 10; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b)(1)(a). But a court fails to exercise its discretion soundly when it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, and that is what happened here. The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the Kentucky attorney general’s interest in taking up the defense of HB 454 when the secretary elected to acquiesce. A State “clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes,” Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137, and a State’s opportunity to defend its laws in federal court should not be lightly cut off. The importance of ensuring that States have a fair opportunity to defend their laws in federal court has been recognized by Congress. See 28 U. S. C. §2403(b); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1). These provisions—even if not directly applicable in this case because the secretary remained a party—reflect the weighty interest that a State has in protecting its own laws. Respect for state sovereignty must also take into account the authority of a State to structure its executive branch in a way that empowers multiple officials to defend its sovereign interests in federal court. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___. The unusual course that this litigation took should not obscure the important constitutional consideration at stake. Pp. 7–9.
(2) The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors that bear on all applications for appellate intervention. The panel’s assessment of the timeliness of the attorney general’s motion to intervene was mistaken. While an important consideration, timeliness depends on the circumstances, and the progression of the litigation is “not solely dispositive.” NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366. Here, the most important circumstance relating to timeliness is that the attorney general sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties in the case. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394. Because the attorney general’s need to intervene did not arise until the secretary ceased defending the state law, the timeliness of his motion should be assessed in relation to that point in time. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, distinguished. Pp. 10–12.
(3) The panel’s finding that granting intervention would prejudice respondents was similarly flawed. While the attorney general’s rehearing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in the secretary’s appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have necessitated resolution of that issue. See, e.g., McDonald, 432 U. S., at 394. Moreover, respondents’ loss of its claimed expectations around election of a Governor with a history of declining to defend abortion restrictions is not cognizable as unfair prejudice in the sense relevant here. Pp. 12–13.
831 Fed. Appx. 748, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kagan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kagan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion. |
Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED. Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Kagan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion. |
Argued. For petitioner: Matthew F. Kuhn, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Frankfort, Ky. For respondents: Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, New York, N. Y. |
Reply of Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky submitted. |
Reply of petitioner Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky filed. (Distributed) |
Amicus brief of Federal Courts Scholars submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of Federal Courts Scholars filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al. submitted. |
Brief of respondents EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al. filed. (Distributed) |
CIRCULATED |
Record received from the U.S.C.A. 6th Circuit has been electronically filed. |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 6th Circuit. |
ARGUMENT SET FOR Tuesday, October 12, 2021. |
Brief amici curiae of Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, et al. filed. |
Amicus brief of The States of Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia submitted. |
Amicus brief of Philip E. Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Timothy K. Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives submitted. |
Amicus brief of Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund submitted. |
Brief amici curiae of The States of Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia filed. |
Brief amici curiae of Arizona, et al. filed. |
Brief amicus curiae of Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund filed. |
Brief of Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky submitted. |
Joint Appendix submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky filed. |
Joint appendix filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including June 14, 2021. The time to file respondents' brief on the merits is extended to and including August 13, 2021. |
Motion to extend the time to file (the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits) or (respondent's brief on the merits) granted and the time is extended to and including |
Motion of Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky for an extension of time submitted. |
Motion for an extension of time to file the briefs on the merits filed. |
Petition GRANTED limited to Question 1 presented by the petition. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/26/2021. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/19/2021. |
Reply of petitioner Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondents EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al. in opposition filed. |
Brief amici curiae of The States of Arizona, et al. filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including February 5, 2021. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from December 7, 2020 to February 5, 2021, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 7, 2020) |