SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 19–67
_________________
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
v. EVELYN
SINENENG-SMITH
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 7, 2020]
Justice Thomas, concurring.
I agree with the Court that the Ninth Circuit
abused its discretion in reaching out to decide whether 8
U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally
overbroad. In my view, however, the Court of Appeals’ decision
violates far more than the party presentation rule. The merits of
that decision also highlight the troubling nature of this Court’s
overbreadth doctrine. That doctrine provides that “a law may be
invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”
United States v.
Stevens,
559 U.S.
460, 473 (2010) (quoting
Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party,
552
U.S. 442, 449, n. 6 (2008)). Although I have previously
joined the Court in applying this doctrine, I have since developed
doubts about its origins and application. It appears that the
overbreadth doctrine lacks any basis in the Constitution’s text,
violates the usual standard for facial challenges, and contravenes
traditional standing principles. I would therefore consider
revisiting this doctrine in an appropriate case.
I
This Court’s overbreadth jurisprudence is
untethered from the text and history of the First Amendment. It
first emerged in the mid-20th century. In
Thornhill v.
Alabama,
310 U.S.
88 (1940), the Court determined that an antipicketing statute
was “invalid on its face” due to its “sweeping proscription of
freedom of discussion,”
id., at 101–105. The Court rejected
the State’s argument that the statute was constitutional because it
was “limited or restricted in its application” to proscribable
“violence and breaches of the peace [that] are the concomitants of
picketing.”
Id., at 105. Without considering whether the
defendant’s actual conduct was entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Court concluded that the law was unconstitutional
because it “d[id] not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, swe[pt]
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.”
Id., at 97.
Since then, the Court has invoked this rationale
to facially invalidate a wide range of laws, from statutes enacted
by Congress, see,
e.g., Ashcroft v.
Free Speech
Coalition,
535 U.S.
234 (2002), to measures passed by city officials, see,
e.g., Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
482 U.S.
569 (1987). These laws covered a variety of subjects, from
nudity in drive-in movies,
Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville,
422 U.S.
205 (1975), to charitable solicitations,
Schaumburg v.
Citizens for Better Environment,
444
U.S. 620 (1980), to depictions of animal cruelty,
Stevens,
supra, at 460. And all these laws were
considered unconstitutional not because they necessarily violated
an individual’s First Amendment rights but “because of a judicial
prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence
may cause [some citizens] to refrain from constitutionally
protected [activity].”
Broadrick v.
Oklahoma,
413
U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (emphasis added); see also
Erznoznik,
supra, at 216.
Notably, this Court has not attempted to ground
its void-for-overbreadth rule in the text or history of the First
Amendment. It did not do so in
Thornhill, and it has not
done so since. Rather, the Court has justified this doctrine solely
by reference to policy considerations and value judgments. See
New York v.
Ferber,
458 U.S.
747, 768–769 (1982). It has stated that facially invalidating
overbroad statutes is sometimes necessary because “[ First
Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society,” and thus “need breathing space
to survive.”[
1]
NAACP v.
Button,
371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963). And, in the context of the freedom of speech,
the Court has justified the overbreadth doctrine’s departure from
traditional principles of adjudication by noting free speech’s
“transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those
exercising their rights.”
Dombrowski v.
Pfister,
380 U.S.
479, 486 (1965).
In order to protect this “transcendent” right,
ibid., the Court will deem a statute unconstitutional when,
in “the judgment of this Court[,] the possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and
perceived grievances left to fester because of the possible
inhibitory effects of [the] statut[e].”
Broadrick,
supra, at 612. In other words, the doctrine is driven by a
judicial determination of what serves the public good. But there is
“no evidence [from the founding] indicat[ing] that the First
Amendment empowered judges to determine whether particular
restrictions of speech promoted the general welfare.” Campbell,
Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 Yale L. J. 246, 259
(2017). This makes sense given that the Founders viewed value
judgments and policy considerations to be the work of legislatures,
not unelected judges. See
Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576
U.S. 644, 709 (2015) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, such judgments appear to be the very foundation upon
which this Court’s modern overbreadth doctrine was built.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the overbreadth doctrine
shares a close relationship with this Court’s questionable
vagueness doctrine. See
Johnson v.
United States, 576
U.S. 591, 611–623 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). In
fact, it appears that the Court’s void-for-overbreadth rule
developed as a result of the vagueness doctrine’s application in
the First Amendment context. For example, this Court’s decision in
Thornhill, which is recognized as “the fountainhead of the
overbreadth doctrine,” Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. Ct. Rev. 1,
11, cited a vagueness precedent in support of its overbreadth
analysis. 310 U. S., at 96 (citing
Stromberg v.
California,
283 U.S.
359, 367 (1931)). And the decision expressed concerns regarding
the antipicketing statute’s “vague” terms with “no ascertainable
meaning” and their resulting potential for “discriminatory
enforcement.”
Thornhill,
supra, at 97–98, 100–101;
cf.
Chicago v.
Morales,
527 U.S.
41, 56 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.). As the overbreadth
doctrine has developed, it has “almost wholly merged” with the
vagueness doctrine as applied to “statutes covering [F]irst
[A]mendment activities.” Sargentich, Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 873 (1970). Given
the dubious origins of the vagueness doctrine, I find this shared
history “unsettling.”
Johnson,
supra, at 621 (opinion
of Thomas, J.).
II
In addition to its questionable origins, the
overbreadth doctrine violates the usual standard for facial
challenges. Typically, this Court will deem a statute
unconstitutional on its face only if “no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.”
United States v.
Salerno,
481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987). But the overbreadth doctrine empowers courts
to hold statutes facially unconstitutional even when they can be
validly applied in numerous circumstances, including the very case
before the court.
By lowering the bar for facial challenges in the
First Amendment context, the overbreadth doctrine exacerbates the
many pitfalls of what is already a “disfavored” method of
adjudication.
Washington State Grange, 552 U. S., at
450. “[U]nder our constitutional system[,] courts are not roving
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the
Nation’s laws.”
Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 610–611. But
when a court entertains—or in this case, seeks out—an overbreadth
challenge, it casts aside the “judicial restraint” necessary to
avoid “ ‘premature’ ” and “ ‘unnecessary
pronouncement[s] on constitutional issues.’ ”
Washington
State Grange,
supra, at 450 (quoting
United
States v.
Raines,
362 U.S.
17, 22 (1960)). This principle of restraint has long served as
a fundamental limit on the scope of judicial power. See
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v.
Commissioners of Emigration,
113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885). “[T]here is good evidence that courts [in the
early Republic] understood judicial review to consist [simply] ‘of
a refusal to give a statute effect as operative law in resolving a
case’ ” once that statute was determined to be
unconstitutional.
Johnson,
supra, at 615 (opinion of
Thomas, J.)
(quoting Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 738, 756 (2010)). Thus, our “modern
practice of strik[ing] down” legislation as facially
unconstitutional bears little resemblance to the practices of 18th
and 19th century courts.
Johnson,
supra, at 615
(opinion of Thomas, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933,
936 (2018) (“[F]ederal courts have no authority to erase a duly
enacted law from the statute books”).
Moreover, by relaxing the standard for facial
challenges, the overbreadth doctrine encourages “speculat[ion]”
about “ ‘imaginary’ cases,”
Washington State Grange,
supra, at 450 (quoting
Raines,
supra, at 22),
and “summon[s] forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals,”
United States v.
Williams,
553
U.S. 285, 301 (2008). And, when a court invalidates a statute
based on its theoretical, illicit applications at the expense of
its real-world, lawful applications, the court “threaten[s] to
short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying
the will of the people from being implemented in a manner
consistent with the Constitution.”
Washington State Grange,
supra, at 451.
Collaterally, this Court has a tendency to lower
the bar for facial challenges when preferred rights are at stake.
See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey,
505 U.S.
833 (1992). This ad hoc approach to constitutional
adjudication impermissibly expands the judicial power and
“reduc[es] constitutional law to policy-driven value judgments.”
Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 579 U. S.
___, ___ (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 16). We
ought to “abid[e] by one set of rules to adjudicate constitutional
rights,”
ibid., particularly when it comes to the disfavored
practice of facial challenges.
III
Finally, by allowing individuals to challenge
a statute based on a third party’s constitutional rights, the
overbreadth doctrine is at odds with traditional standing
principles. This Court has long adhered to the rule that “a
litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and
cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties.”
Powers v.
Ohio,
499 U.S.
400, 410 (1991); see also
Clark v.
Kansas City,
176 U.S.
114, 118 (1900);
Owings v.
Norwood’s Lessee, 5
Cranch 344, 348 (1809) (Marshall, C. J.). The Court has
created a “limited” exception to this rule, allowing third-party
standing in certain cases in which the litigant has “a close
relation to the third-party” and there is a substantial “hindrance
to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”
Powers,
supra, at 410–411. Litigants raising
overbreadth challenges rarely satisfy either requirement, but the
Court nevertheless allows third-party standing to “avoi[d] making
vindication of freedom of expression await the outcome of
protracted litigation.”
Dombrowski, 380 U. S., at 487.
As I have previously explained, this Court “has no business
creating ad hoc exceptions so that others can assert rights
that seem especially important to vindicate.”
Whole Women’s
Health,
supra, at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 16).
The overbreadth doctrine’s disregard for the
general rule against third-party standing is especially problematic
in light of the rule’s apparent roots in Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement. Although the modern Court has
characterized the rule as a prudential rather than jurisdictional
matter, see
Craig v.
Boren,
429
U.S. 190, 193 (1976), it has never provided a substantive
justification for that assertion. And the Court has admitted that
this rule against third-party standing is “not always clearly
distinguished from the constitutional limitation[s]” on standing,
Barrows v.
Jackson,
346 U.S.
249, 255 (1953); is “closely related to Art[icle] III
concerns,”
Warth v.
Seldin,
422
U.S. 490, 500 (1975); and even is “grounded in Art[icle] III
limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and
controversies,”
Ferber, 458 U. S., at 767,
n. 20.
These statements find support in a historical
understanding of Article III. To understand the scope of the
Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement, “we must ‘refer
directly to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the
powers of common-law courts.’ ”
Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 2) (quoting
Honig v.
Doe,
484 U.S.
305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). “Common-law courts
imposed different limitations on a plaintiff ’s right to bring
suit depending on the type of right the plaintiff sought to
vindicate.”
Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 2). “In a suit for the violation of a
private right, courts historically presumed that the plaintiff
suffered a
de facto injury [if] his personal, legal rights
[were] invaded.”
Ibid. Personal constitutional rights, such
as those protected under the First Amendment, are “private rights”
in that they “ ‘belon[g] to individuals, considered as
individuals.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting 3 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England *2); see also
Ferber,
supra, at 767 (recognizing “the personal nature of
constitutional rights” as a “cardinal principl[e] of our
constitutional order”); Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and
Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 287 (2008) (listing “ First
Amendment rights” as examples of private rights provided by the
Constitution). Thus, when a litigant challenges a statute on the
grounds that it has violated his First Amendment rights, he has
alleged an injury sufficient to establish standing for his claim,
regardless of the attendant damages or other real-world harms he
may or may not have suffered.
Overbreadth doctrine turns this traditional
common-law rule on its head: It allows a litigant without a legal
injury to assert the First Amendment rights of hypothetical third
parties, so long as he has personally suffered a real-world injury.
See
Broadrick, 413 U. S., at 612. In other words, the
litigant has no private right of his own that is genuinely at
stake. See Woolhandler & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 722–723 (2004); see also Hessick,
93 Cornell L. Rev., at 280–281. At common law, this sort of
“factual harm without a legal injury was
damnum absque
injuria and provided no basis for relief.”
Ibid. Courts
adhered to the “obvious” and “ancient maxim” that one’s real-world
damages alone cannot “lay the foundation of an action
. . . if the act complained of does not violate any of
his legal rights.”
Parker v.
Griswold, 17 Conn. *288,
*302–*303 (1846).
Here, the overbreadth challenge embraced by
respondent on appeal relied entirely on the free speech rights of
others—immigration lawyers, activists, clergy, and even
grandmothers. This is not terribly surprising given that the
overbreadth arguments were developed by
amici organizations
that represent some of these third parties, not by respondent
herself. See
ante, at 7–8. Although it appears respondent
lacked standing on appeal to assert the rights of individuals not
before the court, she did have standing to seek relief for alleged
violations of her own constitutional rights, which she raised
before the Ninth Circuit commandeered her appeal. On remand, the
Court of Appeals will be well within the bounds of its Article III
jurisdiction in considering these narrower arguments.
* * *
The overbreadth doctrine appears to be the
handiwork of judges, based on the misguided “notion that some
constitutional rights demand preferential treatment.”
Whole
Woman’s Health, 579 U. S.
, at ___ (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (slip op., at 14). It seemingly lacks any basis in the
text or history of the First Amendment, relaxes the traditional
standard for facial challenges, and violates Article III principles
regarding judicial power and standing. In an appropriate case, we
should consider revisiting this doctrine.