The first clause of the second section of the fourth article of
the Constitution provides that "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states."
The Court will not describe and define these privileges and
immunities in a general classification, preferring to decide each
case as it may come up.
The law of Louisiana gives a community of acquets or gains
between married persons, where the marriage is contracted within
the state, or where the marriage is contracted out of the state,
and the parties afterwards go there to live.
The privilege thus conferred upon the wife does not extend, by
virtue of the clause in the Constitution above quoted, to a
native-born citizen of Louisiana who was married while under age in
the State of Mississippi, in which state was her domicile together
with her husband during the continuance of the marriage. Land in
Louisiana, acquired by the husband during the marriage, was not
subject to the Louisiana law in respect to the community of acquets
or gain.
This right was one which attached to the contract of marriage,
which the State of Louisiana had a right to regulate. and was not
one of the personal rights of a citizen within the meaning of the
Constitution.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE CURTIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the course of proceedings which were had in Louisiana under
the laws and in the courts of that state to determine the rights of
parties interested in the succession of Henry L. Conner, deceased,
a citizen of the State of Mississippi, his widow, who is the
plaintiff in error in this case, filed in the District Court of the
Tenth Judicial District of the State of Louisiana a petition
claiming to be entitled to her rights of marital community as they
exist under the laws of that state. These rights having
Page 59 U. S. 592
been denied by the district court, an appeal was prosecuted to
the supreme court, and it was there held that inasmuch as the
marriage through which the appellant claimed was not in fact
contracted in Louisiana nor in contemplation of a matrimonial
domicile in that state, and the spouses had never resided therein,
the wife was not a partner in community with the husband by force
of the laws of Louisiana.
On this writ of error it neither is nor can be denied that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana has correctly declared and applied the
law of that state to this case. But it is insisted that this law
deprives the plaintiff in error, a citizen of the State of
Mississippi, of one of the privileges of a citizen in the State of
Louisiana, and therefore is in contravention of the first clause of
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which
provides that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states."
It appears upon the record that this question was raised by the
pleadings, and presented to and decided by the highest court of the
state; it is therefore open here, upon this writ of error, for
final determination by this Court under the twenty-fifth section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85.
It appears that the plaintiff in error, though a native-born
citizen of Louisiana, was married in the State of Mississippi,
while under age, with the consent of her guardian, to a citizen of
the latter state, and that their domicile during the duration of
their marriage was in Mississippi. But while it continued, the
husband acquired a plantation and other real property in Louisiana.
If the marriage had been contracted in Louisiana, the code of that
state, then in force, Code of 1808, art. 3, ยง 4, would have
superinduced the rights of community. And at the time when the
property in question was purchased by the husband, in 1841, the
code of 1825, then in force, contained the following articles:
"Art. 2369. Every marriage contracted in this state
superinduces, of right, partnership or community of acquets or
gains, if there be no stipulation to the contrary."
"Art. 2370. A marriage contracted out of this state between
persons who afterwards come here to live is also subjected to the
community of acquets with respect to such property as is acquired
after their arrival."
And it is insisted that as these articles gave to what is termed
in the argument a Louisiana widow the right of marital community,
the laws of the state could not constitutionally deny, as it is
admitted they did in fact deny, the same rights to all widows,
citizens of the United States, though not married in
Page 59 U. S. 593
Louisiana or residing there during the marriage and while the
property in question was acquired.
In other words, that as the laws of Louisiana provide that a
contract of marriage made in that state, or the residence of
persons there in the relation created by marriage, shall give rise
to certain rights on the part of each in property acquired within
that state, by force of the article of the Constitution above
recited, all citizens of the United States, wherever married and
residing, obtain the same rights in property acquired in that state
during the marriage. We do not deem it needful to attempt to define
the meaning of the word "privileges" in this clause of the
Constitution. It is safer and more in accordance with the duty of a
judicial tribunal to leave its meaning to be determined in each
case upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied
therein. And especially is this true when we are dealing with so
broad a provision, involving matters not only of great delicacy and
importance, but which are of such a character that any merely
abstract definition could scarcely be correct and a failure to make
it so would certainly produce mischief.
It is sufficient for this case to say that according to the
express words and clear meaning of this clause, no privileges are
secured by it except those which belong to citizenship. Rights
attached by the law to contracts by reason of the place where such
contracts are made or executed, wholly irrespective of the
citizenship of the parties to those contracts, cannot be deemed
"privileges of a citizen" within the meaning of the
Constitution.
Of that character are the rights now in question. They are
incidents engrafted by the law of the state on the contract of
marriage. And in obedience to that principle of universal
jurisprudence which requires a contract to be governed by the law
of the place where it is made and to be performed, the law of
Louisiana undertakes to control these incidents of a contract of
marriage made within the state by persons domiciled there, but
leaves such contracts made elsewhere to be governed by the laws of
the places where they may be entered into. In this there is no
departure from any sound principle, and there can be no just cause
of complaint.
The law of the state further provides that if married persons
come to Louisiana to reside, and acquire property there during such
residence, they shall be deemed nuptial partners in respect to such
property; but if the domicile of the marriage continues out of
Louisiana, the relative rights of the married persons may be
regulated by the laws of the place of such domicile even in respect
to property acquired by one of them in Louisiana.
Page 59 U. S. 594
That the first of these rules, which extends the laws of the
state to married persons coming to reside and acquiring property
therein, is a proper exercise of legislative power has not been
questioned. But it is insisted that the last, which leaves the
rights of nonresident married persons in respect to property in
Louisiana to be governed by the laws of their domicile, deprives
the wife of her rights as a citizen in property acquired by the
husband during marriage in Louisiana. The answer to this has been
already indicated. The laws of Louisiana affix certain incidents to
a contract of marriage there made or there partly or wholly
executed, not because those who enter into such contracts are
citizens of the state, but because they there make or perform the
contract. And they refuse to affix these incidents to such
contracts, made and executed elsewhere, not because the married
persons are not citizens of Louisiana, but because their contract
being made and performed under the laws of some other state or
country, it is deemed proper not to interfere, by Louisiana laws,
with the relations of married persons out of that state. Whether
persons contracting marriage in Louisiana are citizens of that or
some other state or aliens, the law equally applies to their
contract, and so whether persons married and domiciled elsewhere be
or be not citizens or aliens, the law fails to regulate their
rights. The law does not discriminate between citizens of the state
and other persons; it discriminates between contracts only. Such
discrimination has no connection with the clause in the
Constitution now in question. If a law of Louisiana were to give to
the partners
inter sese certain peculiar rights, provided
they should reside within the state and carry on the partnership
trade there, we think it could not be maintained that all
co-partners, citizens of the United States, residing and doing
business elsewhere, must have those peculiar rights by force of the
Constitution of the United States any more than it could be
maintained that, because a law of Louisiana gives certain damages
on protested bills of exchange, drawn or endorsed within that
state, the same damages must be recoverable on bills drawn
elsewhere in favor of citizens of the United States.
The rights asserted in this case before the supreme court of
Louisiana are not privileges of citizenship; consequently, there is
no error in the judgment of that court, which is hereby
Affirmed.