Where there was an administration upon the estate of an
intestate in Kentucky, the surety in the administration bond and a
portion of the distributees residing there, the court of that place
had jurisdiction over the subject matter, and where the principal
defendant, although residing out of the state, voluntarily appeared
and answered a bill filed against him, the jurisdiction of the
court was complete, and it had a right to pass a decree in the
premises.
If several claimants of portions of an estate unite in filing a
bill, this does not make it multifarious. The authorities upon this
subject examined.
Page 59 U. S. 254
In this case, this Court has already decided the point.
See 17 How.
58 U. S. 4-5.
The court in Kentucky having rendered a decree for the
complainants, they had a right to file a bill in Iowa to enforce
this decree.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 59 U. S. 255
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, although upon the record a good deal extended in
volume, is in effect narrowed to the questions of law arising upon
the pleadings.
The facts of the case, so far as a statement of these is
necessary to an accurate comprehension of the legal questions
discussed and decided, were as follows:
In the year 1839, a portion of the appellees, as heirs and
distributees of John Goldsbury, by their bill filed in the Circuit
Court for Grayson county, in the State of Kentucky, alleged that
their ancestor died in Nelson County, in the state aforesaid,
intestate, leaving a widow, Eleanor Goldsbury, and four children --
three daughters, Elizabeth, Nancy, and Mary, and one son, Bennett
Goldsbury -- all these children infants at the time of their
father's death. That John Goldsbury died possessed of one male and
one female slave, and of other personal property, and perfectly
free from debt. That the widow Eleanor Goldsbury, who was
appointed
Page 59 U. S. 256
the administratrix of her husband, and as such took possession
of the estate within a year from the period of his death,
intermarried with one James Shields, in conjunction with whom she
had continued to hold the entire estate, and to apply it to their
exclusive use, without having made any settlement or distribution
thereof. The bill further charged, that Shields and wife, after
enjoying the services and hires of the male slave for several
years, had ultimately sold him, and that, in the year 1818, they
removed from Kentucky to the State of Missouri, carrying with them
the female slave belonging to the estate of John Goldsbury,
together with her descendants, seven in number, and of great value;
that upon application so said Shields and wife, for a surrender of
those slaves, and for an account of the estate of John Goldsbury,
so possessed and used by them, this request was refused, and that,
by a fraudulent confederacy between Shields and wife, and John G.
Shields, their son, and Henry Yates, their son-in-law, the slaves
had by the son and son-in-law been secreted, carried off and sold,
in parts unknown to the complainants, and the other personal estate
of John Goldsbury fraudulently disposed of in like manner. The bill
also made defendants the representatives of the surety of Eleanor
Goldsbury, in her bond given as administratrix of her first
husband. The bill also made defendants though not in an adversary
interest, Isaac Thomas, and Mary, his wife, Elizabeth, John and Ann
Goldsbury, which said Elizabeth, John, and Ann, are the infant
children of Bennett Goldsbury, son of John Goldsbury, deceased.
After the filing of the bill in this case, it appearing to the
satisfaction of the court that James Shields, and Eleanor, his
wife, Elizabeth, John, and Ann Goldsbury, John Shields, and Henry
Yates, were not inhabitants of the State of Kentucky, there was, on
the 25th of December, 1839, under the authority of the statute of
Kentucky with reference to absent defendants, issued by the court
what is termed a warning order, by which the absent defendants were
required to appear at the next April term of the court, and answer
the complainants' bill.
Afterwards, namely, on the 28th of April, 1840, the absent
defendants still not appearing, under the like authority of the law
of the state, the clerk of the court, by its order, filed on behalf
of those defendants a traverse denying the allegations of the
complainants' bill.
Subsequently to this proceeding, namely, on the 30th of October,
1841, the said John G. Shields filed his answer to the
complainants' bill, thereby recognizing as to himself personally
the jurisdiction of the court.
Upon these pleadings, the cause after an examination of
witnesses,
Page 59 U. S. 257
and upon a report of the master, came to a hearing before the
circuit court, and this tribunal decreed against the representative
of the surety in the administration bond of Mrs. Goldsbury,
afterwards, Mrs. Shields, and against James Shields her husband,
she having departed this life, John G. Shields, the son, and Henry
Yates, the son-in-law, in favor of the heirs and distributees of
John Goldsbury, the portions reported to be due to them
respectively of the general effects of John Goldsbury, deceased,
and of the values and hires of the slaves. Upon an appeal taken
from this decree to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, it being the
opinion of the latter that, under the circumstances, the surety in
the administration bond should not be charged, and also that an
amount equal to the price of the slave Mat, sold by the
administratrix had her husband, and to the hires of the remaining
slaves, had been properly applied to the dower of the widow and to
the use of the heirs of John Goldsbury, it ordered the decree of
the circuit court to be reformed in conformity with the opinion of
the supreme court. By a final decree of the Circuit Court of
Grayson county, made on the 28th day of October, 1846, the bill as
to the representative of the surety in the administration bond was
dismissed, and the defendants, James Shields, John G. Shields, and
Henry Yates, and each of them, who had, by fraudulent combination,
secreted and carried off, and disposed of the descendants of the
female slave, originally the property of John Goldsbury, were
decreed and ordered to pay to the heirs of said John Goldsbury
severally, the amounts ascertained to be due to them as their
respective and separate portions of the value of the slaves thus
fraudulently disposed of, without any allowance for the hires of
those slaves.
To obtain the benefit of this last decree, the suit now before
us was instituted in the names of the appellees, Isaac Thomas and
Mary, his wife, Uriah Pirtle and Nancy, his wife, citizens of the
State of Kentucky, and John B. Goldsbury, a citizen of the State of
Missouri, the said Mary Thomas, and Nancy Pirtle, and John B.
Goldsbury, being heirs and distributees of John Goldsbury,
deceased, against John G. Shields, a citizen of the State of Iowa.
The bill refers to the proceedings in the Kentucky suit, which
proceedings are set forth
in extenso as an exhibit in this
cause; it further assigns as a reason for the nonjoinder of a
portion of the heirs of John Goldsbury as defendants the fact that
their residence precluded as to them the jurisdiction of the
District Court of Iowa. It sets out the sums of money severally and
specifically decreed to the complainants by the Circuit Court of
Grayson county, Kentucky, and prays that the defendant, John G.
Shields, may be compelled to perform that decree by
Page 59 U. S. 258
the payment to the complainants respectively the sums so awarded
them, and concludes with a prayer for general relief.
By an amendment to the original bill in this case, the several
heirs and distributees of John Goldsbury, residing in the State of
Missouri, beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court of Iowa,
and who, for that reason, were not made defendants by the original
bill, were admitted as complainants in this suit and united in the
prayer for enforcing the decree in their favor, as rendered by the
Circuit Court of Grayson County, Kentucky.
To the original and amended bills in this case, the defendant,
John G. Shields, interposed a demurrer, which having been overruled
and the demurrant abiding by his demurrer and declining to answer
over, the District Court for the District of Iowa, on the 17th day
of January, 1854, adjudged and decreed to the complainants the sums
respectively awarded to them by the Circuit Court of Grayson
County, Kentucky, as against the defendant, John G. Shields, with
interest upon those several sums from the 28th day of October,
1846, the date of the decree in the circuit court.
Upon an appeal from the District Court of Iowa, several points
arising upon the demurrer and discussed and adjudged by that court
are presented for consideration here. Amongst the objections
insisted upon, that which stands first in the natural order is the
alleged want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of Kentucky
either over the subject matter or the parties embraced in the
proceedings in that court.
In this objection no force is perceived. The subject matter of
the suit was the settlement of the estate of an intestate who lived
and died within the limits of the court's authority, within which
limits the qualification of the administratrix of the intestate,
the appraisement of his estate, and the recording of that
appraisement had taken place; within which also was the residence
of the surety in the administration bond, and of a portion of the
distributees -- both plaintiffs and defendants asserting before
that court their interest in the estate. The court, as one vested
with general equity powers, could act either
in personam
or
in rem, as to persons or property within the state.
Under the laws and the practice in the State of Kentucky already
referred to, proceedings are authorized and prescribed in suits in
equity against absent defendants, which proceedings, when regularly
observed, are held within the state to be binding absolutely. With
respect to absent defendants, such proceedings could be considered
as binding beyond the limits of the state in instances only in
which those defendants should have been legally and personally
served with process or in which they should have voluntarily
submitted themselves as parties. In the
Page 59 U. S. 259
suit in the state court, the subject matter of the controversy,
as well as a portion of the parties, both plaintiffs and
defendants, being confessedly within its cognizance, no ground for
exception to the jurisdiction could exist as to these. The
defendant, John G. Shields, when he voluntarily entered his
appearance and answered the bill, placed himself in the same
predicament with the other parties regularly before the court, and
could not afterwards except to the jurisdiction upon the ground of
his nonresidence. The decree therefore, so far as this exception is
designed to affect it, cannot be impeached.
The objection which seems to follow next in order is one leveled
at the frame of the bill in the district Court of the United
States, irrespective of the justice or regularity of the
proceedings in the state court. This objection is that the bill
filed in the District Court of Iowa is multifarious by embracing in
one suit interests and causes of action in themselves separate and
disconnected, and therefore such as it was improper to include in
one bill.
There is perhaps on rule established for the conducting of
equity pleadings, with reference to which, whilst as a rule it is
universally admitted, there has existed less of certainty and
uniformity in application than has attended this relating to
multifariousness. This effect, flowing, perhaps inevitably, from
the variety of modes and degrees of right and interest entering
into the transactions of life, seems to have led to a conclusion
rendering the rule almost as much an exception as a rule, and that
conclusion is that each case must be determined by its peculiar
features. Thus, Daniel, in his work on chancery Practice vol. 1,
384, quoting from Lord Cottenham, says:
"It is impossible, upon the authorities, to lay down any rule or
abstract proposition as to what constitutes multifariousness which
can be made universally applicable. The cases upon the subject are
extremely various, and the court, in deciding upon them, seems to
have considered what was convenient in particular cases, rather
than to have attempted to lay down an absolute rule. The only way
of reconciling the authorities upon the subject is by adverting to
the fact that although the books speak generally of demurrers for
multifariousness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into
two distinct kinds. Frequently, the objection raised, though termed
multifariousness, is in fact more properly misjoinder -- that is to
say, the cases or claims united in the bill are of so different a
character that the court will not permit them to be litigated in
one record. But what is more familiarly understood by the term
multifariousness, as applied to a bill, is where a party is able to
say he is brought as a defendant
Page 59 U. S. 260
upon a record with a large portion of which, and of the case
made by which, he has no connection whatever."
Justice Story, in his compilation upon equity pleading, defines
multifariousness in a bill to mean "the improperly joining in one
bill distinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding
them." And the example by which he illustrates his definition is
thus given:
"the uniting in one bill several matters perfectly distinct and
unconnected against one defendant, or the demand of several matters
of a distinct and independent nature, against several defendants in
the same bill."
Sir Thomas Plumer, V.C., in allowing a demurrer which had been
interposed by one of several defendants to a bill on the ground
that it was multifarious, remarks that
"the court is always averse to multiplicity of suits, but
certainly a defendant has the right to insist that he is not bound
to answer a bill containing several distinct and separate matters
relating to individuals with whom he has no connection."
Brooks v. Lord Whitworth, 1 Mad.Ch. 57.
Justice Story closes his review of the authorities upon this
defect in a bill, with the following remark:
"The conclusion to which a close survey of all the authorities
will conduct us seems to be that there is not any positive
inflexible rule as to what, in the sense of a court of equity,
constitutes multifariousness which is fatal to a suit on
demurrer."
To bring the present case to the standard of the principles
above stated, the appellees are seeking a subject their title to
which is common to them all, founded in the relation they bear to a
common ancestor. The different portions or shares into which the
subject may be divisible amongst themselves can have no effect upon
the nature or character of their title derived as above mentioned,
and which in its character is an unit and cannot be objected to for
inconsistency or diversity of any kind. They seek an account and
the recovery of a subject claimed by their common title, or an
equivalent for that subject, against persons charged with having by
fraudulent combination withheld and diverted that subject and who,
by such combination and diversion, rendered themselves equally,
jointly, and severally liable therefor. Upon the face of this
statement it would be consistent neither with justice nor
convenience nor consistent with the practice to turn the appellees
round to an action or actions at law for any aliquot parts of each
upon a division of this subject claimed under their common title,
and which aliquot portions would have to be ascertained by an
account which would not depend upon the question of liability of
the defendants. The like principles and considerations would, in
every case of equal responsibility in several persons, instead of
condemning, commend, and in a court of equity would command,
wherever practicable, a common proceeding against all to whom such
responsibility extended.
Page 59 U. S. 261
But in truth the question raised upon this point on the demurrer
seems to have been virtually if not directly concluded by this
Court upon this very record. At the December term, 1854, of this
Court, a motion was made by a portion of the appellees to dismiss
this appeal upon the following grounds:
In the decree in favor of the distributees in Kentucky, the
court having designated the shares of the whole amount recovered
which would belong to each distributee, and the District Court of
Iowa having adopted the same rate of distribution in enforcing the
decree of the Kentucky court, by which rate it appeared that none
of the distributable portions amounted to the sum of $2,000, those
distributees, with the view, no doubt, of hastening the termination
of this controversy and of obtaining immediately the benefit of the
decree in their favor, moved this Court for a dismission of this
cause upon the ground that the sum in controversy between the
appellant and the persons submitting that motion was less than
$2,000, and therefore insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction.
The chief justice, in the opinion denying the motion to dismiss,
uses this language:
"The whole amount recovered against Shields in the proceeding in
Iowa exceeds $2,000, but the sum allotted to each representative
who joined in the bill was less, and the motion is made to dismiss
upon the ground that the sum due to each complainant is severally
and specifically decreed to him, and that the amount thus decreed
is the sum in controversy between each representative and the
appellant, and not the whole amount for which he has been held
liable. But the court thinks the matter in controversy in the
Kentucky court was the sum due to the representatives of the
deceased collectively, and not the particular sum to which each was
entitled when the amount due was distributed among them according
to the laws of the state. They all claimed under one and the same
title. They had a common and undivided interest in the claim, and
it was perfectly immaterial to the appellant how it was divided
among them. He had no controversy with either of them on this
point, and if there was any difficulty as to the proportions in
which they were to share, the dispute was among themselves, and not
with him."
Vide 17 How.
58 U. S. 4-5. This
reasoning appears to be conclusive against the defect of
multifariousness imputed to the claim of the appellees in this
case, and we deem it equally so with respect to defendants
sustaining an equal responsibility deducible from one and the same
source.
The remaining objection arising upon the demurrer which we deem
it necessary to consider is that urged against the right of the
appellees to institute proceedings in equity in the State of Iowa
to enforce the decree rendered in their favor by the court in
Kentucky. We can perceive no force in the effort to sustain
Page 59 U. S. 262
this objection by citation of the 7th Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, which provides "That in suits at
common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." This
provision, correctly interpreted, cannot be made to embrace the
established, exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity, nor that
which they have exercised as concurrent with courts of law, but
should be understood as limited to rights and remedies peculiarly
legal in their nature and such as it was proper to assert in courts
of law, and by the appropriate modes and proceedings of courts of
law.
With respect to the character and effects of decrees in
chancery, although they now rank in dignity upon an equality with
judgments at law, it is well known that they were once regarded as
not being matters of record, and that the final process incident to
judgments at law was unknown to and not permitted to courts of
equity; that where such process has been permitted to them, it has
been the result of statutory enactments. But the extension to a
court of equity of the power to avail itself of common law process
cannot be regarded as implying any abridgment of the original
constitutional powers or practice of the former, but as cumulative
and ancillary or as leaving those powers and that practice as they
formerly existed, except as they should have been expressly
restricted. Amongst the original and undoubted powers of a court of
equity is that of entertaining a bill filed for enforcing and
carrying into effect a decree of the same or of a different court,
as the exigencies of the case, or the interests of the parties may
require.
Vide Story's equity Pleading ยงยง 429, 430, 431,
upon the authority of Mitford, Eq.Pl. 95, and of Cooper's Eq.Pl.
98, 99.
In the present case, the appellees were, by the residence of the
appellant in a different state, cut off from the benefit of final
process upon the decree of the state court, which process would not
run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state. They were
left, therefore, to the alternative of instituting either an action
or actions at law upon the decree in their favor or of filing a
bill for enforcing and carrying into effect that decree. Upon the
former mode of proceeding they would have been compelled to
encounter circuity, and most probably the technical exceptions
urged in argument here, founded upon the nature of the decree with
respect to its unity or divisibility. The appellees have elected as
the remedy most beneficial for them, and as we think they had the
right to do, the proceeding by bill in equity to carry into
execution the decree of the state court. We can perceive no just
exception to the jurisdiction of the District Court of Iowa in
entertaining the bill of the appellants,
Page 59 U. S. 263
nor to the measure of relief decreed, nor with respect to the
party against whom that relief has been granted. We therefore order
that the decree of the District Court of Iowa be
Affirmed.