Where a case in chancery was referred to a master to state
accounts between the plaintiffs and defendants to ascertain how
much property remained in the hands of the latter, and how much had
been sold, with the prices, to make allowances to the defendants
for payments made or encumbrances discharged, and to ascertain what
might be due from either defendant to the plaintiffs, this was not
such a final decree as could be appealed from to this Court.
Although the decree settles the equities of the bill, yet the
amount to be distributed amongst the parties depends upon the facts
to be reported by the master, and until the allotment to each one
of the share to which he might be entitled, the decree cannot be
considered as final.
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
During the opening argument of this case, doubts were suggested
whether the decree of the circuit court was final within the act of
congress, and the attention of the Court was directed to that
question.
The complainants filed their bill in the circuit court, claiming
as heirs a part of the property of Joseph and Lavinia Erwin,
deceased. Erwin died in 1829, in the Parish of Iberville, having
made his will in 1828. His property, real and personal, was much
embarrassed, the persons claiming an interest in the succession
were numerous, and from the loose manner in which the property was
managed by the testator in his lifetime and by those who succeeded
him great difficulty was found in the distribution of the
estate.
The circuit court, having ascertained the heirship of the
claimants and their relative rights in the succession, referred the
matter to a special master,
"to take an account of the successions of the said Joseph Erwin,
Sr., Joseph Erwin, Jr., and Lavinia Erwin insofar as it may be
necessary to state the accounts between the plaintiffs and the
heirs at law, defendants in this suit, to ascertain the property in
kind that remains in the possession and control of either of the
defendants, except Adams and Whiteall, as aforesaid -- what has
been sold and the prices of the same and the profits thereof -- and
he will report all the encumbrances that have been discharged by
either of the defendants on the same, and make to them all just
allowances for payments and permanent and useful improvements and
just expenses, and to ascertain what may be due to the said
plaintiffs from either defendant, and the said master may make a
special report of any matters that may be requisite to a full
adjustment of the questions in the cause."
By the 22d section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 it is provided
that final decrees of the circuit court where the amount in
controversy exceeds two thousand dollars may be brought before this
Court by an appeal. The law intended that one appeal should settle
the matter in controversy between the parties, and this would be
the result in all cases where the appeal is taken on a final decree
unless it should be reversed or modified by this Court.
The cases are numerous which have been dismissed on the ground
that the appeals were taken from interlocutory decrees. In
Perkins v.
Fourniquet, 6 How. 206, it was held,
"Where the circuit court decreed that the complainants were
entitled to two-sevenths of certain property and referred the
matter to a master
Page 59 U. S. 201
in chancery to take and report an account of it, and then
reserved all other matters in controversy between the parties until
the coming in of the master's report,"
was not a final decree on which an appeal could be taken. And in
the same volume,
47 U. S. 209,
Pulliam v. Christian, where
"a decree of the circuit court setting aside a deed made by a
bankrupt before his bankruptcy, directing the trustees under the
deed to deliver over to the assignee in bankruptcy all the property
remaining undisposed of in their hands, but without deciding how
far the trustees might be liable to the assignee for the proceeds
of sales previously made and paid away to the creditors, directing
an account to be taken of these lastmentioned sums in order to a
final decree"
was held not to be a final decree, and the appeal was
dismissed.
The above cases are sufficient to show the grounds on which
appeals in chancery are dismissed. To authorize an appeal, the
decree must be final in all matters within the pleadings, so that
an affirmance of the decree will end the suit. To apply this test
in all cases cannot be difficult.
In no legal sense of the term is the decree now before us a
final one. The basis of the decree, embracing the equities in the
bill, is found, but the distribution among the parties in interest
depends upon the facts to be reported by the master. It is his duty
under the interlocutory decree to balance the equities by
ascertaining what has been expended on the property, and what has
been received by each of the claimants, and also every other matter
which should have a bearing and influence in the distribution of
the property. Until the court shall have acted upon this report and
sanctioned it, giving to each of the devisees his share of the
estate under the will, the decree is not final.
There may be cases in which the attention of the court has not
been drawn to the character of the decree appealed from, but such
an inadvertence cannot constitute an exception to the rule. The
decision of the court, under the law, establishes the rule which
must govern in appeals from the circuit courts.
The case of
Whiting v. Bank of the United
States, 13 Pet. 6, is supposed to conflict with the
above rule, but that was a decree of foreclosure and sale of the
mortgaged premises. This was held to be a final decree, the order
for sale having an effect similar to that of an execution on a
judgment.
The case of
Michaud v.
Girod, 4 How. 503, was an interlocutory decree in
the circuit court, and which case, being appealed, was heard and
decided by this Court. But from the report there appears to have
been no exception taken to the appeal, and it may be presumed to
have escaped the notice of the Court.
Page 59 U. S. 202
The case of
Forgay v.
Conrad, 6 How. 201, was an appeal from an
interlocutory decree which was sustained, though objected to. But
this decision was made under the peculiar circumstances of that
case. The decree was that certain deeds should be set aside as
fraudulent and void; that certain lands and slaves should be
delivered up to the complainant; that one of the defendants should
pay a certain sum of money to the complainant; that the complainant
should have execution for these several matters; that the master
should take an account of the profits of the lands and slaves, and
also an account of certain money and notes, and then said decree
concluded as follows,
viz.: "And so much of said bill as
contains or relates to matters hereby referred to the master for a
report is retained for further decree in the premises" &c.
It will be observed that two deeds for lots in New Orleans were
declared to be null and void, and certain slaves owned by Forgay,
one of the appellants, were directed to be sold on execution, as
also the real estate and the proceeds distributed among the
bankrupt's creditors, and if the defendants principally interested
could not take an appeal until the return of the master, their
property, under the decree, would have been disposed of beyond the
reach of the appellate court, so that an appeal would be useless.
This was the principal ground on which the appeal was sustained,
although it was stated that this part of the decree was final.
The Court said:
"The decree upon these matters might and ought to have awaited
the master's report, and when the accounts were before the court,
then every matter in dispute might have been adjudicated in one
final decree, and if either party thought himself aggrieved, the
whole matter would be brought here and decided in one appeal, and
the object and policy of the acts of congress upon this subject
carried into effect."
The decree before us is not final; consequently it must be
Dismissed.