The record of a debt against an administrator in one state is
not sufficient evidence of the debt against an administrator of the
same estate in another state.
The case of
Stacy v.
Thrasher, 6 How. 44, examined and affirmed.
In this case, even if there were other evidence of a demand, it
would be for a debt upon open account, which would be barred by the
statute of limitations in Mississippi, and therefore the decree of
the circuit court, dismissing the bill, is affirmed.
The case was this.
Joseph Meek, a citizen and resident of Davidson County, State of
Tennessee, died on the 12th of February, 1838, leaving property in
the States of Tennessee and Mississippi. He left three children,
namely: James L. Meek, Joseph Meek, and a daughter, who was married
to John Munn.
Jesse Meek, the brother of the deceased, was appointed his
administrator in both states, namely, in Mississippi on the 30th
February, 1838, and in Tennessee in September, 1838.
The estate in Tennessee was insolvent, and in November 1840, a
bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Franklin, in the State of
Tennessee, by Jesse, the administrator, and by John Munn and wife,
alleging the insolvency of the estate and praying for its
administration according to the laws of that state in case of
insolvent estates. To this bill the creditors were made parties
defendants. The minor sons were also made defendants by their
guardian.
Jesse Meek's letters of administration in Mississippi were
revoked on 28th December, 1841, and John Munn appointed
Page 59 U. S. 17
on the same day administrator
de bonis non. He
continued to administer until 12th February, 1849, and on the next
day James L. Meek was appointed in his place.
In the progress of the administration in insolvency in
Tennessee, the claim of N. and J. Dick and Co., the surviving
partners of which firm were the appellants, for $21,460.80 was
presented to the clerk and master, who had been directed by the
court to report on the debts filed against the estate. The claim
was allowed for $20,445.67, which report was confirmed by the
court. Upon this claim, Dick and Co. received two sums -- namely
one of $300 and the other of $1,987.13.
On the 29th of August, 1850, Hill and McLean as surviving
partners of the firm of Dick and Co., filed their bill in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
Mississippi against James L. Meek, as administrator, which was
afterwards so amended as to be against said Meek in his individual
capacity, and also against Joseph Meek, one of the heirs.
The only evidence relied upon by the complainants was a
transcript of the record from the chancery court of Tennessee.
The circuit court dismissed the bill, and the complainants
appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Hill and McLean sued James L. Meek, administrator of
Page 59 U. S. 18
Joseph Meek, by bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District of Mississippi for upwards
of $20,000, alleged to be due the complainants by Joseph Meek at
the time of his death.
He died in February, 1838, and was then domiciled in Davidson
County, Tennessee. In September, 1838, Jesse Meek was appointed
administrator of Joseph Meek's estate in said county. In November,
1840, the estate was alleged to be insolvent, and a bill was filed
in the chancery court exercising jurisdiction in Davidson County by
Jesse Meek, the then administrator, and John Munn and his wife, who
was a daughter of Joseph Meek, setting forth the insolvency and
praying for judicial administration of the assets among the
creditors of the deceased according to the statute of that state.
To this bill the creditors were the proper defendants, and entitled
to share the assets ratably. The other children of the deceased
were also made defendants, and acted by their guardian.
Nathaniel and James Dick and Co. presented a claim for allowance
of $21,445, and which was allowed by the chancery court in May
1846, and about $2,000 of it was afterwards paid out of the assets
distributed, and for the balance remaining unpaid the present bill
was filed, seeking a discovery of assets from the administrator in
Mississippi, and payment therefrom.
The evidence relied on to sustain the suit and establish the
demand was a copy of the record from the Chancery Court of
Tennessee, and the principal question is whether this proceeding
bound the administrator or affected the assets in Mississippi.
There is one circumstance worthy of explanation. Jesse Meek
administered in Mississippi, 30 February, 1838, on Joseph Meek's
estate, but his letters were revoked in 1841, and John Munn was
appointed administrator
de bonis non, and afterwards James
L. Meek was appointed, and superseded Munn, and James L. is here
sued.
During the contest in the Tennessee court, when Dick and Co.
established their demand, Jesse Meek was the Tennessee
administrator, and Munn and Joseph L. Meek were successively
administrators in Mississippi.
These administrations were independent of each other; the
respective administrators represented Meek, the deceased intestate,
by an authority coextensive only with the state where the letters
of administration were granted, and had jurisdiction of the assets
there, and were accountable to creditors and distributees according
to the laws of the state granting the authority. No connection
existed or could exist between them, and therefore a recovery
against the one in Tennessee was no evidence against the other in
Mississippi.
Stacy v.
Thrasher, 6 How. 44, lays down this distinct
rule.
Page 59 U. S. 19
But if there was evidence of the demand, as alleged and which we
do not doubt exists, yet it is only evidence of an open account
existing at the time of Joseph Meek's death in 1838, and therefore
subject to be barred by the act of limitations in Mississippi
barring such claims if suit is not brought to enforce them within
three years next after the cause of action accrued. The answers of
the administrator and heirs of Joseph Meek rely on the act of
limitations as a bar to relief, and which bar would necessarily be
allowed if the cause was remanded, so that further evidence might
be introduced. As it now stands, however, there is no evidence of
the demand, and therefore we order that the decree of the circuit
court shall be
Affirmed.
