SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVID THOMPSON, et al.,
v. HEATHER
HEBDON, Executive Director of the Alaska Public Offices Commission,
et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 19–122. Decided November 25, 2019
Per Curiam.
Alaska law limits the amount an individual can
contribute to a candidate for political office, or to an
election-oriented group other than a political party, to $500 per
year. Alaska Stat. §15.13.070(b)(1) (2018). Petitioners Aaron
Downing and Jim Crawford are Alaska residents. In 2015, they
contributed the maximum amounts permitted under Alaska law to
candidates or groups of their choice, but wanted to contribute
more. They sued members of the Alaska Public Offices Commission,
contending that Alaska’s individual-to-candidate and
individual-to-group contribution limits violate the First
Amendment.
The District Court upheld the contribution
limits and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 909 F.3d 1027 (2018);
Thompson v.
Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1023
(Alaska 2016). Applying Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit
analyzed whether the contribution limits furthered a “sufficiently
important state interest” and were “closely drawn” to that end. 909
F. 3d, at 1034 (quoting
Montana Right to Life Assn. v.
Eddleman,
343 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2003); internal quotation marks omitted).
The court recognized that our decisions in
Citizens United
v.
Federal Election Comm’n and
McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Comm’n narrow “the type of state interest
that justifies a First Amendment intrusion on political
contributions” to combating “actual quid pro quo corruption or its
appearance.” 909 F. 3d, at 1034 (citing
McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 206–207 (2014);
Citizens United v.
Federal Election Comm’n,
558 U.S.
310, 359–360 (2010)). The court below explained that under its
precedent in this area “the quantum of evidence necessary to
justify a legitimate state interest is low: the perceived threat
must be merely more than ‘mere conjecture’ and ‘not . . .
illusory.’ ” 909 F. 3d, at 1034 (quoting
Eddleman,
343 F. 3d, at 1092; some internal quotation marks omitted).
The court acknowledged that “
McCutcheon and
Citizens
United created some doubt as to the continuing vitality of
[this] standard,” but noted that the Ninth Circuit had recently
reaffirmed it. 909 F. 3d, at 1034, n. 2.
After surveying the State’s evidence, the court
concluded that the individual-to-candidate contribution limit
“ ‘focuses narrowly on the state’s interest,’ ‘leaves the
contributor free to affiliate with a candidate,’ and ‘allows the
candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective
campaign,’ ” and thus survives First Amendment scrutiny.
Id., at 1036 (quoting
Eddleman, 343 F. 3d, at
1092; alterations omitted); see also 909 F. 3d, at 1036–1039.
The court also found the individual-to-group contribution limit
valid as a tool for preventing circumvention of the
individual-to-candidate limit. See
id., at 1039–1040.
In reaching those conclusions, the Ninth Circuit
declined to apply our precedent in
Randall v.
Sorrell,
548 U.S.
230 (2006), the last time we considered a non-aggregate
contribution limit. See 909 F. 3d, at 1037, n. 5. In
Randall, we invalidated a Vermont law that limited
individual contributions on a per-election basis to: $400 to a
candidate for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, or other statewide
office; $300 to a candidate for state senator; and $200 to a
candidate for state representative. Justice Breyer’s opinion for
the plurality observed that “contribution limits that are too low
can . . . harm the electoral process by preventing
challengers from mounting effective campaigns against incumbent
officeholders, thereby reducing democratic accountability.” 548
U. S., at 248–249; see also
id., at 264–265 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing that Vermont’s contribution
limits violated the First Amendment);
id., at 265–273
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(agreeing that Vermont’s contribution limits violated the First
Amendment while arguing that such limits should be subject to
strict scrutiny). A contribution limit that is too low can
therefore “prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it
seeks to promote.”
Id., at 249 (plurality opinion).[
1]*
In
Randall, we identified several “danger
signs” about Vermont’s law that warranted closer review.
Ibid. Alaska’s limit on campaign contributions shares some
of those characteristics. First, Alaska’s $500
individual-to-candidate contribution limit is “substantially lower
than . . . the limits we have previously upheld.”
Id., at 253. The lowest campaign contribution limit this
Court has upheld remains the limit of $1,075 per two-year election
cycle for candidates for Missouri state auditor in 1998.
Id., at 251 (citing
Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri
Government PAC,
528 U.S.
377 (2000)). That limit translates to over $1,600 in today’s
dollars. Alaska permits contributions up to 18 months prior to the
general election and thus allows a maximum contribution of $1,000
over a comparable two-year period. Alaska Stat. §15.13.074(c)(1).
Accordingly, Alaska’s limit is less than two-thirds of the
contribution limit we upheld in
Shrink.
Second, Alaska’s individual-to-candidate
contribution limit is “substantially lower than . . .
comparable limits in other States.”
Randall, 548 U. S.,
at 253. Most state contribution limits apply on a per-election
basis, with primary and general elections counting as separate
elections. Because an individual can donate the maximum amount in
both the primary and general election cycles, the per-election
contribution limit is comparable to Alaska’s annual limit and
18-month campaign period, which functionally allow contributions in
both the election year and the year preceding it. Only five other
States have any individual-to-candidate contribution limit of $500
or less per election: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, and
Montana. Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §3(1)(b); 8 Colo. Code Regs.
1505–6, Rule 10.17.1(b)(2) (2019); Conn. Gen. Stat. §9–611(a)(5)
(2017); Kan. Stat. Ann. §25–4153(a)(2) (2018 Cum. Supp.); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A, §1015(1) (2018 Cum. Supp.); Mont. Code Ann.
§§13–37–216(1)(a)(ii), (iii) (2017). Moreover, Alaska’s $500
contribution limit applies uniformly to all offices, including
Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Alaska Stat. §15.13.070(b)(1).
But Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, and Montana all have
limits above $500 for candidates for Governor and Lieutenant
Governor, making Alaska’s law the most restrictive in the country
in this regard. Colo. Const., Art. XXVIII, §3(1)(a)(I); 8 Colo.
Code Regs. 1505–6, Rule 10.17.1(b)(1)(A); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§9–611(a)(1), (2); Kan. Stat. Ann. §25–4153(a)(1); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 21–A, §1015(1); Mont. Code Ann. §13–37–216(1)(a)(i).
Third, Alaska’s contribution limit is not
adjusted for inflation. We observed in
Randall that
Vermont’s “failure to index limits means that limits which are
already suspiciously low” will “almost inevitably become too low
over time.” 548 U. S., at 261. The failure to index “imposes
the burden of preventing the decline upon incumbent legislators who
may not diligently police the need for changes in limit levels to
ensure the adequate financing of electoral challenges.”
Ibid. So too here. In fact, Alaska’s $500 contribution limit
is the same as it was 23 years ago, in 1996. 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws
ch. 48, §10(b)(1).
In
Randall, we noted that the State had
failed to provide “any special justification that might warrant a
contribution limit so low.” 548 U. S., at 261. The parties
dispute whether there are pertinent special justifications
here.
In light of all the foregoing, the petition for
certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded for that court to revisit whether
Alaska’s contribution limits are consistent with our First
Amendment precedents.
It is so ordered.
