SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 18–302
_________________
ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PETITIONER
v. ERIK BRUNETTI
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit
[June 24, 2019]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer
joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The Court’s decision today will beget
unfortunate results. With the Lanham Act’s scandalous-marks
provision, 15 U. S. C. §1052(a), struck down as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, the Government will have
no statutory basis to refuse (and thus no choice but to begin)
registering marks containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene
words and images imaginable.
The coming rush to register such trademarks—and
the Government’s immediate powerlessness to say no—is eminently
avoidable. Rather than read the relevant text as the majority does,
it is equally possible to read that provision’s bar on the
registration of “scandalous” marks to address only obscenity,
vulgarity, and profanity. Such a narrowing construction would save
that duly enacted legislative text by rendering it a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech that is permissible in the
context of a beneficial governmental initiative like the
trademark-registration system. I would apply that narrowing
construction to the term “scandalous” and accordingly reject
petitioner Erik Brunetti’s facial challenge.
I
Trademark registration, as the majority notes,
is not required for using, owning, or suing others for infringing a
trademark. Rather, the trademark-registration system is an
ancillary system set up by the Government that confers a small
number of noncash benefits on trademark-holders who register their
marks. See
ante, at 2.
The Government need not provide this largely
commercial benefit at all. Once the Government does provide the
benefit, however, it may not restrict access on the basis of the
viewpoint expressed by the relevant mark. See
ante, at 4–5.
For that reason, the Court concluded in
Matal v.
Tam,
582 U. S. ___ (2017), that §1052(a)’s provision directing the
U. S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to deny registration to
“disparag[ing]” trademarks was unconstitutional. This case centers
on a neighboring set of restrictions: §1052(a)’s provision barring
registration of marks featuring “immoral . . . or
scandalous matter.”
The majority finds viewpoint discrimination here
by treating the terms “scandalous” and “immoral” as comprising a
unified standard that allows messages “aligned with conventional
moral standards” but forbids messages “hostile to” such standards.
See
ante, at 6. While the major- ity’s interpretation of the
statute is a reasonable one, it is not the only reasonable one.
A
As the majority notes, there are dictionary
definitions for both “immoral” and “scandalous” that do suggest a
viewpoint-discriminatory meaning. See
ante, at 5–6. And as
for the word “immoral,” I agree with the majority that there is no
tenable way to read it that would ameliorate the problem. The word
clearly connotes a preference for “rectitude and morality” over its
opposite. See
ante, at 5.
It is with regard to the word “scandalous” that
I part ways with the majority. Unquestionably, “scandalous” can
mean something similar to “immoral” and thus favor some viewpoints
over others. See
ante, at 6. But it does not have to be read
that way. To say that a word or image is “scandalous” can instead
mean that it is simply indecent, shocking, or generally offensive.
See Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 2186 (1944) (Funk
& Wagnalls) (“shocking to the sense of truth, decency,
or propriety; disgraceful, offensive” (emphasis added));
Webster’s New International Dictionary 2229 (1942) (“exciting
reprobation; calling out condemnation”); 9 Oxford English
Dictionary 175 (1933) (“Of the nature of, or causing, a
‘stumbling-block’ or occasion of offence”); 8 Century Dictionary
and Cyclopedia 5374 (1911) (Century Dictionary) (“Causing scandal
or offense; exciting reproach or reprobation; extremely offensive
to the sense of duty or propriety; shameful; shocking”); see also
Webster’s New College Dictionary 1008 (3d ed. 2005) (“shocking or
offensive”). That offensiveness could result from the views
expressed, but it could also result from the way in which those
views are expressed: using a manner of expression that is “shocking
to [one’s] sense of . . . decency,” Funk & Wagnalls
2186, or “extremely offensive to the sense of . . .
propriety,” 8 Century Dictionary 5374.
The word “scandalous” on its own, then, is
ambiguous: It can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas
and offensive manners of expressing ideas), or it can be read
narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression). That alone
raises the possibility that a limiting construction might be
appropriate. But the broader text confirms the reasonableness of
the narrower reading, because the word “scandalous” appears in the
statute alongside other words that can, and should, be read to
constrain its scope.
It is foundational “that a statute is to be read
as a whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or not,
depends on context.”
King v.
St. Vincent’s Hospital,
502 U.S.
215, 221 (1991) (citation omitted). “ ‘Words are not
pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the
setting in which they are used.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting
NLRB v.
Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (CA2 1941)
(L. Hand, J.)). Accordingly, and relatedly, courts should, to the
extent possible, read statutes so that “ ‘no clause, sentence,
or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ”
TRW Inc. v.
Andrews,
534 U.S.
19, 31 (2001).[
1]
Here, Congress used not only the word
“scandalous,” but also the words “immoral” and “disparage,” in the
same block of statutory text—each as a separate feature that could
render a mark unregistrable. See §1052(a).
Tam already
decided that “disparage” served to prohibit marks that were
offensive because they derided a particular person or group. See
582 U. S., at ___ (opinion of Alito, J.) (slip op., at 22)
(“It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a
substantial percentage of the members of any group”);
id.,
at ___ (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (slip op., at 2) (“[A]n applicant
may register a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one”).
That defines one of the three words. Meanwhile, as the majority
explains, the word “immoral” prohibits marks that are offensive
because they transgress widely held moral beliefs. See
ante,
at 5. That defines a second of the three words.
With marks that are offensive because they are
disparaging and marks that are offensive because they are immoral
already covered, what work did Congress intend for “scandalous” to
do? A logical answer is that Congress meant for “scandalous” to
target a third and distinct type of offensiveness: offensiveness in
the mode of communication rather than the idea. The other two words
cover marks that are offensive because of the ideas they express;
the “scandalous” clause covers marks that are offensive because of
the mode of expression, apart from any particular message or
idea.
To be sure, there are situations in which it
makes sense to treat adjoining words as expressing the same or
highly similar concepts (even at the risk of some redundancy). Cf.
Swearingen v.
United States,
161
U.S. 446, 450 (1896) (construing “ ‘obscene, lewd or
lascivious’ ” to have a unified meaning). That is essentially
the approach that the majority takes. See
ante, at
6.[
2] But that is not the
approach that Congress appears to have intended here. For example,
“scandalous” does not serve as a broader catchall at the end of a
list of similar words that all point in one direction.
E.g.,
Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,
537
U.S. 371, 384 (2003). Nor is “scandalous” simply grouped among
a number of closely related terms that help define its meaning.
E.g., Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S.
561, 575 (1995).
The text of §1052, instead, is a grab bag: It
bars the registration of marks featuring “immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter,” as well as,
inter alia, disparaging
marks, flags, insignias, mislabeled wines, and deceased Presidents.
See §§1052(a)–(e). This is not, in other words, a situation in
which Congress was simply being “verbos[e] and proli[x],”
Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC,
562
U.S. 223, 236 (2011), using two synonyms in rapid-fire
succession when one would have done fine. Instead, “scandalous” and
“immoral” are separated by an unrelated word (“deceptive”) and
mixed in with a lengthy series of other, unre- lated concepts. The
two therefore need not be interpreted as mutually reinforcing under
the Court’s precedents. See
Graham County Soil and Water
Conservation Dist. v.
United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S.
280, 288 (2010).
For that reason, while the majority offers a
reasonable reading of “scandalous,” it also unnecessarily and
ill-advisedly collapses the words “scandalous” and “immoral.”
Instead, it should treat them as each holding a distinct,
nonredundant meaning, with “immoral” covering marks that are
offensive because they transgress social norms, and “scandalous”
covering marks that are offensive because of the mode in which they
are expressed.
What would it mean for “scandalous” in §1052(a)
to cover only offensive modes of expression? The most obvious
ways—indeed, perhaps the only conceivable ways—in which a trademark
can be expressed in a shocking or offensive manner are when the
speaker employs obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity.[
3] Obscenity has long been defined by this
Court’s decision in
Miller v.
California,
413 U.S.
15 (1973). See
id., at 24–26. As for what constitutes
“scandalous” vulgarity or profanity, I do not offer a list, but I
do interpret the term to allow the PTO to restrict (and potentially
promulgate guidance to clarify) the small group of lewd words or
“swear” words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly
used around children, and that are prohibited in comparable
settings.[
4] Cf. 18
U. S. C. §1464 (prohibiting “obscene, indecent, or
profane language” in radio communications);
FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S.
726, 746, and n. 22 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.)
(regulator’s objection to a monologue containing various
“four-letter words” was not to its “point of view, but to the way
in which it [wa]s expressed”); 46 CFR §67.117(b)(3) (2018) (Coast
Guard regulation prohibiting vessel names that “contain” or are
“phonetically identical to obscene, indecent, or profane language,
or to racial or ethnic epithets”); see also Jacobs, The Public
Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357, 1416–1417, and
n. 432 (2001) (noting that “swear words” are “perhaps more
than any other categor[y] capable of specific articulation” and
citing one state agency’s list). Of course, “scandalous” offers its
own limiting principle: if a word, though not exactly polite,
cannot be said to be “scandalous”—
e.g., “shocking” or
“extremely offensive,” 8 Century Dictionary 5374—it is clearly not
the kind of vulgarity or profanity that Congress intended to
target. Everyone can think of a small number of words (including
the apparent homonym of Brunetti’s mark) that would, however,
plainly qualify.[
5]
B
A limiting construction like the one just
discussed is both appropriate in this context and consistent with
past precedent. First, while a limiting construction must always be
at least reasonable, there are contexts in which imposing such a
construction is more appropriate than others. The most obvious
example of a setting where more caution is required is in the realm
of criminal statutes, where considerations such as the prohibition
against vagueness and the rule of lenity come into play. See
Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union,
521
U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting that “[t]he severity of criminal
sanctions” can increase First Amendment concerns);
Board of
Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
482 U.S.
569, 575–576 (1987) (declining to apply a limiting construction
to a provision that banned “ ‘ First Amendment
activities’ ” from an airport and noting that the limiting
construction proposed would “ ‘confe[r] on police a virtually
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a
violation,’ ” leading to “ ‘self-evident’ ”
“ ‘opportunity for abuse’ ”). Here, however, the question
is only whether the Government must be forced to provide the
ancillary benefit of trademark registration to pre-existing
trademarks that use even the most extreme obscenity, vulgarity, or
profanity. The stakes are far removed from a situation in which,
say, Brunetti was facing a threat to his liberty, or even his right
to use and enforce his trademark in commerce.
Second, the Court has in the past accepted or
applied similarly narrow constructions to avoid constitutional
infirmities. In
Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire,
315 U.S.
568 (1942), for example, the Court accepted the New Hampshire
Supreme Court’s narrowing of a state statute covering “ ‘any
offensive, derisive or annoying word,’ ”
id., at 569,
to reach only those words that would strike the average person as
being “plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee,”
id., at 573. “[T]hus construed,” this Court
decided, the statute did not violate the right to free speech.
Ibid.; see also
Boos v.
Barry,
485 U.S.
312, 329–330 (1988) (accepting Court of Appeals’ construction
of a statute making it illegal “ ‘to congregate within 500
feet of any [embassy, legation, or consulate] and refuse to
disperse after having been ordered so to do by the police’ ”
to reach only “congregations that are directed at an embassy” and
“ ‘only when the police reason- ably believe that a threat to
the security or peace of the embassy is present’ ”).
In
Frisby v.
Schultz,
487 U.S.
474 (1988), the Court addressed an ordinance that prohibited
“ ‘picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any
individual.’ ”
Id., at 477. The Court construed the
statute to reach only “focused picketing taking place solely in
front of a particular residence.”
Id., at 483. Given that
“narrow scope,” the statute was not facially unconstitutional.
Id., at 488; see also
In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d
1330, 1358 (CA Fed. 2017) (Dyk, J., concurring in judgment) (noting
this Court’s narrow constructions of federal obscenity
statutes).
Taking the word “scandalous” to target only
those marks that employ an offensive mode of expression follows a
similar practice. To be sure, the word could be read more broadly,
thereby sweeping unconstitutionally into viewpoint discrimination.
And imposing a limiting construction is, of course, “not a license
for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.”
United States v.
Albertini,
472
U.S. 675, 680 (1985). But where the Court can reasonably read a
statute like this one to save it, the Court should do so. See
Stern v.
Marshall,
564 U.S.
462, 477–478 (2011);
NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,
301 U.S.
1, 30 (1937).
II
Adopting a narrow construction for the word
“scandalous”—interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity,
and profanity—would save it from unconstitutionality. Properly
narrowed, “scandalous” is a viewpoint-neutral form of content
discrimination that is permissible in the kind of discretionary
governmental program or limited forum typified by the
trademark-registration system.
A
Content discrimination occurs whenever a
government regulates “particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.”
Reed v.
Town
of Gilbert, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6);
see also
Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (“Government regulation of expressive activity
is content neutral so long as it is ‘
justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech’ ”).
Viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content
discrimination” in which “the government targets not subject
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.”
Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995).
While the line between viewpoint-based and
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination can be “slippery,” see
Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental,
83 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 605, 651 (2008), it is in any event clear that
a regulation is not viewpoint discriminatory (or even content
discriminatory) simply because it has an “incidental effect” on a
certain subset of views.
Ward, 491 U. S., at 791. Some
people, for example, may have the viewpoint that society should be
more sexually liberated and feel that they cannot express that view
sufficiently without the use of pornographic words or images. That
does not automatically make a restriction on pornography into
viewpoint discrimination, despite the fact that such a restriction
limits communicating one’s views on sexual liberation in that way.
See
ibid.;
Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S.
41, 48 (1986).
Restrictions on particular modes of expression
do not inherently qualify as viewpoint discrimination; they are not
by nature examples of “the government target[ing] . . .
particular views taken by speakers on a subject.”
Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829. For example, a ban on
lighting fires in the town square does not facially violate the
First Amendment simply because it makes it marginally harder for
would-be flag-burners to express their views in that place. See
R. A. V. v.
St. Paul,
505 U.S.
377, 385 (1992). By the same token, “fighting words are
categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment”
not because they have no content or express no viewpoint (often
quite the opposite), but because “their content embodies a
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary)
mode of
expressing
whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”
Id., at 393; see
id., at 385–386; cf.
Bolger
v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S.
60, 84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“It
matters whether a law regulates communications for their ideas or
for their style”).
A restriction on trademarks featuring obscenity,
vulgarity, or profanity is similarly viewpoint neutral, though it
is naturally content-based.[
6]
See
R. A. V., 505 U. S.
, at 383 (kinds of speech
like “obscenity, defamation, etc.” may “be regulated because of
their constitutionally proscribable content” (emphasis deleted));
see also
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser,
478
U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (treating punishment of “offensively lewd
and indecent speech” as viewpoint neutral);
Pacifica, 438
U. S., at 745–746, and n. 22 (treating regulation of
profane monologue as viewpoint neutral). Indeed, the statute that
the Court upheld in
Chaplinsky itself had been construed to
cover, among other kinds of “disorderly words,” “profanity,
obscenity and threats,” 315 U. S., at 573, despite the fact
that such words had been used in that case to communicate an
expressive message,
id., at 574. To treat a restriction on
vulgarity, profanity, or obscenity as viewpoint discrimination
would upend decades of precedent.[
7]
Brunetti invokes
Cohen v.
California,
403 U.S.
15 (1971), to argue that the restriction at issue here is
viewpoint discriminatory. But
Cohen—which did not employ the
precise taxonomy that is more common today—does not reach as far as
Brunetti wants.
Cohen arose in the criminal context: Cohen
had been arrested and imprisoned under a California criminal
statute targeting disturbances of the peace because he was “wearing
a jacket bearing the words ‘F[***] the Draft.’ ”
Id.,
at 16. The Court held that applying that statute to Cohen because
of his jacket violated the First Amendment.
Id., at 26. But
the Court did not suggest that the State had targeted Cohen to
suppress his view itself (
i.e., his sharp distaste for the
draft), such that it would have accepted an equally colorful
statement of praise for the draft (or hostility toward war
protesters). Rather, the Court suggested that the State had simply
engaged in what later courts would more precisely call
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination—it had regu- lated “the
form or content of individual expression.”
Id., at 24; see
id., at 25–26.
Cohen also famously recognized that
“words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force,”
id., at 26, and that “one man’s vulgarity
is another’s lyric,”
id., at 25. That is all consistent with
observing that a plain, blanket restriction on profanity
(regardless of the idea to which it is attached) is a
viewpoint-neutral form of content discrimination. The essence of
Cohen’s discussion is that profanity can serve to tweak (or
amplify) the viewpoint that a message expresses, such that it can
be hard to disentangle the profanity from the underlying
message—without the profanity, the message is not quite the same.
See
id., at 25–26. But those statements merely reinforce
that profanity is still properly understood as protected First
Amendment content. See also
R. A. V., 505
U. S., at 384–385.
Cohen’s discussion does not also go
further to declare, as Brunetti suggests, that a provision that
treats all instances of profanity equally is nevertheless by nature
an instance of “the government target[ing] . . .
particular views taken by speakers on a subject.”
Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829. To be sure, such a
restriction could have the incidental effect of tamping down the
overall volume of debate on all sides. But differential effects
alone, as explained above, do not render a restriction viewpoint
(or even content) discriminatory. See
Ward, 491 U. S.,
at 791–792.[
8]
Cohen therefore does not resolve this
case in Brunetti’s favor. Yes, Brunetti has been, as Cohen was,
subject to content discrimination, but that content discrimination
is properly understood as viewpoint neutral. And whereas even
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination is (in all but the most
compelling cases, such as threats) impermissible in the context of
a criminal prosecution like the one that Cohen faced, Brunetti is
subject to such regulation only in the context of the federal
trademark-registration system. I discuss next why that distinction
matters.
B
While the Court has often subjected even
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination to strict constitutional
scrutiny, see,
e.g., Reed, 576 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 6), there are contexts in which it does not, see,
e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 829–830. When that is
the case, the difference between viewpoint-based and
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination can be decisive. The
federal trademark-registration system is such a context.
Rights to a trademark itself arise through use,
not registration. Regardless of whether a trademark is registered,
it can be used, owned, and enforced against would-be infringers.
See
B&B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Industries,
Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3, 5).
Trademark registration, meanwhile, confers several ancillary
benefits on trademark-holders who meet Congress’ specifications,
including for example, additional protections against infringers.
See
ante, at 2;
Tam, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 5). Registering a mark in the Government’s searchable
register puts the world on notice (whether actual or constructive)
that a party is asserting ownership of that mark.[
9] Registration, in short, is a helpful
system, but it is one that the Government is under no obligation to
establish and that is collateral to the existence and use of
trademarks themselves. There is no evidence that speech or commerce
would be endangered if the Government were not to provide it at
all.
When the Court has talked about governmental
initiatives like this one before, it has usually used one of two
general labels. In several cases, the Court has treated such
initiatives as a limited public (or nonpublic) forum. See,
e.g.,
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of
Law v.
Martinez,
561 U.S.
661, 669–670, 682 (2010) (“ ‘Registered Student
Organization’ ” program providing various financial and
nonfinancial benefits to recognized law-school student groups);
Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 823–824, 829–830 (“Student
Activities Fund” for registered campus student groups);
Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund,
Inc.,
473 U.S.
788, 790–791, 799–801, 806 (1985) (“Combined Federal Campaign”
literature enabling approved charitable organizations to solicit
donations from federal employees). In other situations, the Court
has discussed similar initiatives as government programs or
subsidies. See,
e.g., Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez,
531 U.S.
533, 536, 543–544 (2001) (government program distributing funds
to legal-services organizations);
National Endowment for
Arts v.
Finley,
524 U.S.
569, 573, 585–587 (1998) (competitive government grant-making
program to support the arts).[
10] In each of these situations, a governmental body
established an initiative that supported some forms of expression
without restricting others. Some speakers were better off, but no
speakers were worse off.
Regardless of the finer distinctions between
these labels, reasonable, viewpoint-neutral content discrimination
is generally permissible under either framework. See
Christian
Legal Soc., 561 U. S., at 679 (“Any access barrier must be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral”);
Velazquez, 531
U. S., at 543–544, 548–549 (analogizing to limited-forum cases
and explaining that “[w]here private speech is involved, even
Congress’ antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the
suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own
interest”); see also
Ysursa v.
Pocatello Ed. Assn.,
555 U.S.
353, 355 (2009) (finding government conduct that did not
restrict speech but sim- ply “decline[d] to promote” it valid where
it was “reasonable in light of the State’s interest”). Perhaps for
that reason, the Court has often discussed the two frameworks as at
least closely related. See,
e.g., Christian Legal Society,
561 U. S., at 682 (“[T]his case fits comfortably within the
limited-public forum category, for [the plaintiff], in seeking what
is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure
. . . ”);
Velazquez, 531 U. S., at 544 (“As this
suit involves a subsidy, limited forum cases . . . may
not be controlling in a strict sense, yet they do provide some
instruction”).
Whichever label one chooses here, the federal
system of trademark registration fits: It is, in essence, an
opportun- ity to include one’s trademark on a list and thereby
secure the ancillary benefits that come with registration.[
11] Just as in the limited-forum and
government-program cases, some speakers benefit, but no speakers
are harmed. Brunetti, for example, can use, own, and enforce his
mark regardless of whether it has been registered. Whether he may
register his mark can therefore turn on reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral content regulations.[
12]
C
Prohibiting the registration of obscene,
profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulation. Apart from any
interest in regulating commerce itself, the Government has an
interest in not promoting certain kinds of speech, whether because
such speech could be perceived as suggesting governmental
favoritism or simply because the Government does not wish to
involve itself with that kind of speech. See,
e.g., Ysursa,
555 U. S., at 359–360;
Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 809.
While “there is no evidence that the public associates the contents
of trademarks with the Federal Government,”
Tam, 582
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17), registration nevertheless
entails Government involvement in promoting a particular mark.
Registration requires the Government to publish the mark, as well
as to take steps to combat international infringement. See 15
U. S. C. §§1062, 1124; see also Brief for United States
35. The Government has a reasonable interest in refraining from
lending its ancillary support to marks that are obscene, vulgar, or
profane. Cf.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell,
485 U.S.
46, 56 (1988) (“[S]peech that is vulgar, offensive, and
shocking is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection
under all circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
III
“The cardinal principle of statutory
construction is to save and not to destroy.”
Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S., at 30; see also
Hooper v.
California,
155 U.S.
648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality”). In directing the PTO to deny the ancillary
benefit of registration to trademarks featuring “scandalous”
content, Congress used a word that is susceptible of different
meanings. The majority’s reading would render the provision
unconstitutional; mine would save it. Under these circumstances,
the Court ought to adopt the narrower construction, rather than
permit a rush to register trademarks for even the most viscerally
offensive words and images that one can imagine.[
13]
That said, I emphasize that Brunetti’s challenge
is a facial one. That means that he must show that “ ‘a
substantial number of [the scandalous-marks provision’s]
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
[provision’s] plainly legitimate sweep.’ ”
United
States v.
Stevens,
559 U.S.
460, 473 (2010). With “scandalous” narrowed to reach only
obscene, profane, and vulgar content, the provision would not be
overly broad. Cf.
Frisby, 487 U. S., at 488 (rejecting
a facial challenge after adopting a limiting construction);
Boos, 485 U. S., at 331 (same). Even so, hard cases
would remain, and I would expect courts to take seriously
as-applied challenges demonstrating a danger that the provision had
been used to restrict speech based on the views expressed rather
than the mode of expression.[
14] Cf.
Finley, 524 U. S., at 587 (reserving
the possibility of as-applied challenges).
Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of our
society, and the First Amendment protects Brunetti’s right to use
words like the one at issue here. The Government need not, however,
be forced to confer on Brunetti’s trademark (and some more extreme)
the ancillary benefit of trademark registration, when “scandalous”
in §1052(a) can reasonably be read to bar the registration of only
those marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane. Though I concur
as to the unconstitutionality of the term “immoral” in §1052(a), I
respectfully dissent as to the term “scandalous” in the same
statute and would instead uphold it under the narrow construction
discussed here.