SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 17–6086
_________________
HERMAN AVERY GUNDY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[June 20, 2019]
Justice Gorsuch, with whom The Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
The Constitution promises that only the people’s
elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting
liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that design. It
purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to
write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million
citizens. Yes, those affected are some of the least popular among
us. But if a single executive branch official can write laws
restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that
mean for the next?
Today, a plurality of an eight-member Court
endorses this extraconstitutional arrangement but resolves nothing.
Working from an understanding of the Constitution at war with its
text and history, the plurality reimagines the terms of the statute
before us and insists there is nothing wrong with Congress handing
off so much power to the Attorney General. But Justice Alito
supplies the fifth vote for today’s judgment and he does not join
either the plurality’s constitutional or statutory analysis,
indicating instead that he remains willing, in a future case with a
full Court, to revisit these matters. Respectfully, I would not
wait.
I
For individuals convicted of sex offenses
after Congress adopted the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) in 2006, the statute offers detailed
instructions. It requires them “to provide state governments with
(and to update) information, such as names and current addresses,
for inclusion on state and federal sex offender
registries.”[
1] The law divides
offenders into three tiers based on the seriousness of their
crimes: Some must register for 15 years, others for 25 years, and
still others for life.[
2] The
statute proceeds to set registration deadlines: Offenders sentenced
to prison must register before they’re released, while others must
register within three business days after sentencing.[
3] The statute explains when and how
offenders must update their registrations.[
4] And the statute specifies particular penalties for
failing to comply with its commands.[
5] On and on the statute goes for more than 20 pages of
the U. S. Code.
But what about those convicted of sex offenses
before the Act’s adoption? At the time of SORNA’s enactment,
the nation’s population of sex offenders exceeded 500,000, and
Congress concluded that something had to be done about these
“pre-Act” offenders too. But it seems Congress couldn’t agree what
that should be. The treatment of pre-Act offenders proved a
“controversial issue with major policy significance and practical
ramifications for states.”[
6]
Among other things, applying SORNA immediately to this group
threatened to impose unpopular and costly burdens
on States and localities by forcing them to
adopt or overhaul their own sex offender registration
schemes.[
7] So Congress simply
passed the problem to the Attorney General. For all half-million
pre-Act offenders, the law says only this, in 34 U. S. C.
§20913(d):
“The Attorney General shall have the
authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this
subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this
chapter . . . and to prescribe rules for the registration
of any such sex offender.”
Yes, that’s it. The breadth of the authority
Congress granted to the Attorney General in these few words can
only be described as vast. As the Department of Justice itself has
acknowledged, SORNA “does not require the Attorney General” to
impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders “within a
certain time frame or by a date certain; it does not require him to
act at all.”[
8] If the Attorney
General does choose to act, he can require all pre-Act offenders to
register, or he can “require some but not all to
register.”[
9] For those he
requires to register, the Attorney General may impose “some but not
all of [SORNA’s] registration requirements,” as he
pleases.[
10] And he is free
to change his mind on any of these matters “at any given time or
over the course of different [political] administrations.”[
11] Congress thus gave the Attorney
General free rein to write the rules for virtually the entire
existing sex offender population in this country—a situation that
promised to persist for years or decades until
pre-Act offenders passed away or fulfilled the
terms of their registration obligations and post-Act offenders came
to predominate.
Unsurprisingly, different Attorneys General have
exercised their discretion in different ways.[
12] For six months after SORNA’s enactment,
Attorney General Gonzales left past offenders alone. Then the
pendulum swung the other direction when the Department of Justice
issued an interim rule requiring pre-Act offenders to follow all
the same rules as post-Act offenders.[
13] A year later, Attorney General Mukasey issued more
new guidelines, this time directing the States to register some but
not all past offenders.[
14]
Three years after that, Attorney General Holder required the States
to register only those pre-Act offenders convicted of a new felony
after SORNA’s enactment.[
15]
Various Attorneys General have also taken different positions on
whether pre-Act offenders might be entitled to credit for time
spent in the community before SORNA was enacted.[
16]
These unbounded policy choices have profound
consequences for the people they affect. Take our case. Before
SORNA’s enactment, Herman Gundy pleaded guilty in 2005 to a sexual
offense. After his release from prison five years later, he was
arrested again, this time for failing to register as a sex offender
according to the rules the Attorney General had then prescribed for
pre-Act offenders. As a result, Mr. Gundy faced an additional
10-year prison term—10 years more than if the Attorney General had,
in
his discretion, chosen to write the rules
differently.
II
A
Our founding document begins by declaring that
“We the People . . . ordain and establish this
Constitution.” At the time, that was a radical claim, an assertion
that sovereignty belongs not to a person or institution or class
but to the whole of the people. From that premise, the Constitution
proceeded to vest the authority to exercise different aspects of
the people’s sovereign power in distinct entities. In Article I,
the Constitution entrusted all of the federal government’s
legislative power to Congress. In Article II, it assigned the
executive power to the President. And in Article III, it gave
independent judges the task of applying the laws to cases and
controversies.
To the framers, each of these vested powers had
a distinct content. When it came to the legislative power, the
framers understood it to mean the power to adopt gener- ally
applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private
persons—the power to “prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated,”[
17] or the power to “prescribe general rules for
the government of society.”[
18]
The framers understood, too, that it would
frustrate “the system of government ordained by the Constitution”
if Congress could merely announce vague aspirations and then assign
others the responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its
goals.[
19] Through the
Constitution, after
all, the people had vested the power to
prescribe rules limiting their liberties in Congress alone. No one,
not even Congress, had the right to alter that arrangement. As
Chief Justice Marshall explained, Congress may not “delegate
. . . powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.”[
20] Or as John
Locke, one of the thinkers who most influenced the framers’
understanding of the separation of powers, described it:
“The legislative cannot transfer the power
of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated
power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to
others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth,
which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose
hands that shall be. And when the people have said we will submit
to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such
forms, nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor
can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by
those whom they have chosen and authorised to make laws for
them.”[
21]
Why did the framers insist on this particular
arrangement? They believed the new federal government’s most
dangerous power was the power to enact laws restricting the
people’s liberty.[
22] An
“excess of law-making” was, in their words, one of “the diseases to
which our governments are most liable.”[
23] To address that tendency, the framers went to
great lengths to make lawmaking difficult. In Article I, by far the
longest part of the Constitution, the
framers insisted that any proposed law must win
the approval of two Houses of Congress—elected at different times,
by different constituencies, and for different terms in office—and
either secure the President’s approval or obtain enough support to
override his veto. Some occasionally complain about Article I’s
detailed and arduous processes for new legislation, but to the
framers these were bulwarks of liberty.
Nor was the point only to limit the government’s
capac- ity to restrict the people’s freedoms. Article I’s detailed
processes for new laws were also designed to promote deliberation.
“The oftener the measure is brought under examination,” Hamilton
explained, “the greater the diversity in the situations of those
who are to examine it,” and “the less must be the danger of those
errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those
missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or
interest.”[
24]
Other purposes animated the framers’ design as
well. Because men are not angels[
25] and majorities can threaten minority rights, the
framers insisted on a legislature composed of different bodies
subject to different electorates as a means of ensuring that any
new law would have to secure the approval of a supermajority of the
people’s representatives. This, in turn, assured minorities that
their votes would often decide the fate of proposed legislation.
Indeed, some even thought a Bill of Rights would prove unnecessary
in light of the Constitution’s design; in their view, sound
structures forcing “[a]mbition [to] . . . counteract
ambition” would do more than written promises to guard unpopular
minorities from the tyranny of the majority.[
26] Restricting the task of legislating to one
branch characterized by difficult and deliberative processes was
also designed to promote fair notice and the rule of law, ensuring
the people would be subject to a relatively stable and predictable
set of rules.[
27] And by
directing that legislating be done only by elected representatives
in a public process, the Constitution sought to ensure that the
lines of accountability would be clear: The sovereign people would
know, without ambiguity, whom to hold accountable for the laws they
would have to follow.[
28]
If Congress could pass off its legislative power
to the executive branch, the “[v]esting [c]lauses, and indeed the
entire structure of the Constitution,” would “make no
sense.”[
29] Without the
involvement of representatives from across the country or the
demands of bicameralism and presentment, legislation would risk
becoming nothing more than the will of the current President. And
if laws could be simply declared by a single person, they would not
be few in number, the product of widespread social consensus,
likely to protect minority interests, or apt to provide stability
and fair notice.[
30]
Accountability would suffer too. Legislators might seek to take
credit for addressing a pressing social problem by sending it to
the executive for resolution, while at the same time blaming the
executive for the problems that attend whatever measures he chooses
to pursue. In turn, the executive might point to Congress as the
source of the problem. These opportunities for finger-pointing
might prove tempt-
ingly advantageous for the politicians involved,
but they would also threaten to “ ‘disguise . . .
responsibility for . . . the decisions.’ ”[
31]
The framers warned us against permitting
consequences like these. As Madison explained, “ ‘[t]here can
be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or body of magistrates.’ ”[
32] The framers knew, too, that the job of
keeping the legislative power confined to the legislative branch
couldn’t be trusted to self-policing by Congress; often enough,
legislators will face rational incentives to pass problems to the
executive branch. Besides, enforcing the separation of powers isn’t
about protecting institutional prerogatives or governmental turf.
It’s about respecting the people’s sovereign choice to vest the
legislative power in Congress alone. And it’s about safeguarding a
structure designed to protect their liberties, minority rights,
fair notice, and the rule of law. So when a case or controversy
comes within the judicial competence, the Constitution does not
permit judges to look the other way; we must call foul when the
constitutional lines are crossed. Indeed, the framers afforded us
independence from the political branches in large part to encourage
exactly this kind of “forti- tude . . . to do [our] duty
as faithful guardians of the Constitution.”[
33]
B
Accepting, then, that we have an obligation to
decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of
its legislative responsibilities, the question follows: What’s the
test? Madison acknowledged that “no skill in the science of
government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with
sufficient certainty, its three great provinces—the legislative,
executive, and judiciary.”[
34] Chief Justice Marshall agreed that policing the
separation of powers “is a subject of delicate and difficult
inquiry.”[
35] Still, the
framers took this responsibility seriously and offered us important
guiding principles.
First, we know that as long as Congress makes
the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may
authorize another branch to “fill up the details.” In
Wayman
v.
Southard, this Court upheld a statute that instructed the
federal courts to borrow state-court procedural rules but allowed
them to make certain “alterations and additions.” Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between those
“important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a
general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act . . . to fill up the details.”[
36] The Court upheld the statute before it
because Congress had announced the controlling general policy when
it ordered federal courts to follow state procedures, and the
residual authority to make “alterations and additions” did no more
than permit courts to fill up the details.
Later cases built on Chief Justice Marshall’s
understanding. In
In re Kollock, for example, the Court
upheld
a statute that assigned the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the responsibility to design tax stamps for
margarine packages.[
37]
Later still, and using the same logic, the Court sustained other
and far more consequential statutes, like a law authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to adopt rules regulating the “use and
occupancy” of public forests to protect them from “destruction” and
“depredations.”[
38] Through
all these cases, small or large, runs the theme that Congress must
set forth standards “sufficiently definite and precise to enable
Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain” whether
Congress’s guidance has been followed.[
39]
Second, once Congress prescribes the rule
governing private conduct, it may make the application of that rule
depend on executive fact-finding. Here, too, the power extended to
the executive may prove highly consequential. During the Napoleonic
Wars, for example, Britain and France each tried to block the
United States from trading with the other. Congress responded with
a statute instructing that, if the President found that either
Great Britain or France stopped interfering with American trade, a
trade embargo would be imposed against the other country. In
Cargo of Brig Aurora v.
United States, this Court
explained that it could “see no sufficient reason, why the
legislature should not exercise its discretion [to impose an
embargo] either expressly or
conditionally, as their
judgment should direct.”[
40]
Half a century later, Congress likewise made the construction of
the Brooklyn Bridge depend on a finding by the Secretary of War
that
the bridge wouldn’t interfere with navigation of
the East River. The Court held that Congress “did not abdicate any
of its authority” but “simply declared that, upon a certain fact
being established, the bridge should be deemed a lawful structure,
and employed the secretary of war as an agent to ascertain that
fact.”[
41]
Third, Congress may assign the executive and
judicial branches certain non-legislative responsibilities. While
the Constitution vests all federal legislative power in Congress
alone, Congress’s legislative authority sometimes overlaps with
authority the Constitution separately vests in another
branch.[
42] So, for example,
when a congressional statute confers wide discretion to the
executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if “the
discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope
of executive power.”[
43]
Though the case was decided on different grounds, the
foreign-affairs-related statute in
Cargo of the Brig Aurora
may be an example of this kind of permissible lawmaking, given that
many foreign affairs powers are constitutionally vested in the
president under Article II.
Wayman itself might be explained
by the same principle as applied to the judiciary: Even in the
absence of any statute, courts have the power under Article III “to
regulate their practice.”[
44]
C
Before the 1930s, federal statutes granting
authority to
the executive were comparatively modest and
usually easily upheld. But then the federal government began to
grow explosively. And with the proliferation of new executive
programs came new questions about the scope of congressional
delegations. Twice the Court responded by striking down statutes
for violating the separation of powers.
In
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, the Court considered a statute that
transferred to the President the power “to approve ‘codes of fair
competition’ ” for slaughterhouses and other
industries.[
45] But Congress
offered no meaningful guidance. It did not, for example, reference
any pre-existing common law of fair competition that might have
supplied guidance on the policy questions, as it arguably had done
earlier with the Sherman Act.[
46] And it did not announce rules contingent on executive
fact-finding. Nor was this assigned power one that anyone thought
might inhere in the executive power. Proceeding without the need to
convince a majority of legislators, the President adopted a lengthy
fair competition code written by a group of (possibly self-serving)
New York poultry butchers.
Included in the code was a rule that often made
it a federal crime for butchers to allow customers to select which
individual chickens they wished to buy. Kosher butchers such as the
Schechters had a hard time following these rules. Yet the
government apparently singled out the Schechters as a test case;
inspectors repeatedly visited them and, at times, apparently
behaved abusively toward their customers. When the Schechters
finally kicked the
inspectors out, they were greeted with a
criminal indictment running to dozens of counts. After a trial in
which the Schechters were found guilty of selling one allegedly
“unfit” chicken and other miscellaneous counts,[
47] this Court agreed to hear the case and
struck down the law as a violation of the separation of powers. If
Congress could permit the President to write a new code of fair
competition all his own, Justice Cardozo explained, then “anything
that Congress may do within the limits of the commerce clause for
the betterment of business [could] be done by the President
. . . by calling it a code. This is delegation running
riot.”[
48]
The same year, in
Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, the Court struck down a statute that authorized the
President to decide whether and how to prohibit the interstate
transportation of “ ‘hot oil,’ ” petroleum produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of state-set quotas. As in
Schechter Poultry, the law provided no notice to regulated
parties about what the President might wind up prohibiting, leading
the Court to observe that Congress “ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d]
established no standard, ha[d] laid down no rule.”[
49] The Court explained that the statute
did not call for the executive to “ascertai[n] the existence of
facts to which legislation is directed.”[
50] Nor did it ask the executive to “ ‘fill up
the details’ ” “within the framework of the policy which the
legislature has sufficiently defined.”[
51] “If [the statute] were held valid,” the Court
continued, “it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left
of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its
law-making function.”[
52]
After
Schechter Poultry and
Panama
Refining, Congress responded by writing a second wave of New
Deal legislation more “[c]arefully crafted” to avoid the kind of
problems that sank these early statutes.[
53] And since that time the Court hasn’t held another
statute to violate the separation of powers in the same way. Of
course, no one thinks that the Court’s quiescence can be attributed
to an unwavering new tradition of more scrupulously drawn statutes.
Some lament that the real cause may have to do with a mistaken
“case of death by association” because
Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining happened to be handed down during the same
era as certain of the Court’s now-discredited substantive due
process decisions
.[
54] But maybe the most likely explanation of all lies in
the story of the evolving “intelligible principle” doctrine.
This Court first used that phrase in 1928 in
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.
United States,
where it remarked that a statute “lay[ing] down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the [executive official] is
directed to conform” satisfies the separation of powers.[
55] No one at the time thought the
phrase meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s
understanding of the Constitution. While the exact line between
policy and details, lawmaking and fact-finding, and legislative and
non-legislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable debate,
everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries. And when Chief
Justice Taft wrote of an “intelligible principle,” it seems plain
enough that he sought only to explain the
operation of these traditional tests; he gave no
hint of a wish to overrule or revise them. Tellingly, too, he wrote
the phrase seven years before
Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining, and it did nothing to alter the analysis in
those cases, let alone prevent those challenges from succeeding by
lopsided votes.
There’s a good argument, as well, that the
statute in
J. W. Hampton passed muster under the
traditional tests. To boost American competitiveness in
international trade, the legislation directed the President to
“ ‘investigat[e]’ ” the relative costs of production for
American companies and their foreign counterparts and impose
tariffs or duties that would “ ‘equalize’ ” those
costs.[
56] It also offered
guidance on how to determine costs of production, listing several
relevant factors and establishing a process for interested parties
to submit evidence.[
57] The
President’s fact-finding responsibility may have required intricate
calculations, but it could be argued that Congress had made all the
relevant policy decisions, and the Court’s reference to an
“intelligible principle” was just another way to describe the
traditional rule that Congress may leave the executive the
responsibility to find facts and fill up details.[
58]
Still, it’s undeniable that the “intelligible
principle” remark eventually began to take on a life of its own. We
sometimes chide people for treating judicial opinions as if they
were statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context,
ignoring all that came before and after, and treating an isolated
phrase as if it were controlling.[
59] But that seems to be exactly what happened here. For
two decades, no one thought to invoke the “intelligible principle”
comment as a basis to uphold a statute that would have failed more
traditional separation-of-powers tests. In fact, the phrase sat
more or less silently entombed until the late 1940s. Only then did
lawyers begin digging it up in earnest and arguing to this Court
that it had somehow displaced (
sub silentio of course) all
prior teachings in this area.[
60]
This mutated version of the “intelligible
principle” remark has no basis in the original meaning of the
Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was
plucked. Judges and scholars representing a wide and diverse range
of views have condemned it as resting on “misunderst[ood]
historical foundations.”[
61]
They have explained, too, that it has been abused to permit
delegations of legislative power that on any other conceivable
account should be held unconstitutional. Indeed, where some have
claimed to see “intelligible principles” many “less discerning
readers [have been able only to] find gibberish.”[
62] Even Justice Douglas, one of the
fathers of the administrative state, came to criticize excessive
congressional delegations in the period when the intelligible
principle “test” began to take hold.[
63]
Still, the scope of the problem can be
overstated. At least some of the results the Court has reached
under the banner of the abused “intelligible principle” doctrine
may be consistent with more traditional teachings. Some delegations
have, at least arguably, implicated the president’s inherent
Article II authority. The Court has held, for example, that
Congress may authorize the President to prescribe aggravating
factors that permit a military court-martial to impose the death
penalty on a member of the Armed Forces convicted of murder—a
decision that may
implicate in part the President’s independent
commander-in-chief authority.[
64] Others of these cases may have involved laws that
specified rules governing private conduct but conditioned the
application of those rules on fact-finding—a practice that is, as
we’ve seen, also long associated with the executive
function.[
65]
More recently, too, we’ve sought to tame
misunderstandings of the intelligible principle “test.” In
Touby v.
United States, the Court considered a
provision of the Controlled Substances Act that allowed the
Attorney General to add a substance to a list of prohibited drugs
temporarily if he determined that doing so was “ ‘necessary to
avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.’ ”[
66] Notably, Congress required the
Attorney General, before acting, to consider the drug’s
“ ‘history and current pattern of abuse,’ ” the
“ ‘scope, duration, and significance of [that] abuse,’ ”
and “ ‘[w]hat, if any, risk there is to the public
health.’ ”[
67] In
approving the statute, the Court stressed all these constraints on
the Attorney General’s discretion and, in doing so, seemed to
indicate that the statute supplied an “intelligible principle”
because it assigned an essentially fact-finding
responsibility to the executive. Whether or not one agrees with its
characterization of the statute, in proceeding as it did
Touby may have at least begun to point us back in the
direction of the right questions. To determine whether a statute
provides an intelli-
gible principle, we must ask: Does the statute
assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual
findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must
consider and the criteria against which to measure them? And most
importantly, did Congress, and not the Executive Branch, make the
policy judgments? Only then can we fairly say that a statute
contains the kind of intelligible principle the Constitution
demands.
While it’s been some time since the Court last
held that a statute improperly delegated the legislative power to
another branch—thanks in no small measure to the intelligible
principle misadventure—the Court has hardly abandoned the business
of policing improper legislative delegations. When one legal
doctrine becomes unavailable to do its intended work, the hydraulic
pressures of our constitutional system sometimes shift the
responsibility to different doctrines.[
68] And that’s exactly what’s happened here. We still
regularly rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power;
we just call what we’re doing by different names.
Consider, for example, the “major questions”
doctrine. Under our precedents, an agency can fill in statutory
gaps where “statutory circumstances” indicate that Congress meant
to grant it such powers.[
69]
But we don’t follow that rule when the “statutory gap” concerns “a
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is
central to the statutory scheme.”[
70] So we’ve rejected agency demands that we defer to
their attempts to rewrite rules for billions of dollars in
healthcare tax credits,[
71]
to assume control over millions of small greenhouse gas
sources,[
72] and to ban
cigarettes.[
73] Although it
is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major
questions doctrine in service of the constitutional rule that
Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by
transferring that power to an executive agency.
Consider, too, this Court’s cases addressing
vagueness. “A vague law,” this Court has observed, “impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis.”[
74] And we have explained that our
doctrine prohibiting vague laws is an outgrowth and “corollary of
the separation of powers.”[
75] It’s easy to see, too, how most any challenge to a
legislative delegation can be reframed as a vagueness complaint: A
statute that does not contain “sufficiently definite and precise”
standards “to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to
ascertain” whether Congress’s guidance has been followed at once
presents a delegation problem and provides impermissibly vague
guidance to affected citizens.[
76] And it seems little coincidence that our
void-for-vagueness cases became much more common soon after the
Court began relaxing its approach to legislative delegations.
Before 1940, the Court decided only a handful of vagueness
challenges to federal statutes. Since then, the phrase “void for
vagueness” has appeared in our cases well over 100 times.
Nor have we abandoned enforcing other sides of
the separation-of-powers triangle between the legislative,
executive, and judiciary. We have not hesitated to prevent Congress
from “confer[ring] the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities
outside Article III.”[
77]
We’ve forbidden the executive from encroaching on legislative
functions by wielding a line-item veto.[
78] We’ve prevented Congress from delegating its
collective legislative power to a single House.[
79] And we’ve policed legislative efforts
to control executive branch officials.[
80] These cases show that, when the separation of
powers is at stake, we don’t just throw up our hands. In all these
areas, we recognize that abdication is “not part of the
constitutional design.”[
81]
And abdication here would be no more appropriate. To leave this
aspect of the constitutional structure alone undefended would serve
only to accelerate the flight of power from the legislative to the
executive branch, turning the latter into a vortex of authority
that was constitutionally reserved for the people’s representatives
in order to protect their liberties.
III
A
Returning to SORNA with this understanding of
our charge in hand, problems quickly emerge. Start with this one:
It’s hard to see how SORNA leaves the Attorney General with only
details to fill up. Of course, what qualifies as a detail can
sometimes be difficult to discern and,
as we’ve seen, this Court has upheld statutes
that allow federal agencies to resolve even highly consequential
details so long as Congress prescribes the rule governing private
conduct. But it’s hard to see how the statute before us could be
described as leaving the Attorney General with only details to
dispatch. As the government itself admitted in
Reynolds,
SORNA leaves the Attorney General free to impose on 500,000 pre-Act
offenders all of the statute’s requirements, some of them, or none
of them. The Attorney General may choose which pre-Act offenders to
subject to the Act. And he is free to change his mind at any point
or over the course of different political administrations. In the
end, there isn’t a single policy decision concerning pre-Act
offenders on which Congress even tried to speak, and not a single
other case where we have upheld executive authority over matters
like these on the ground they constitute mere “details.” This much
appears to have been deliberate, too. Because members of Congress
could not reach consensus on the treatment of pre-Act offenders, it
seems this was one of those situations where they found it
expedient to hand off the job to the executive and direct there the
blame for any later problems that might emerge.
Nor can SORNA be described as an example of
conditional legislation subject to executive fact-finding. To be
sure, Congress could have easily written this law in that way. It
might have required all pre-Act offenders to register, but then
given the Attorney General the authority to make case-by-case
exceptions for offenders who do not present an “ ‘imminent
hazard to the public safety’ ” comparable to that posed by
newly released post-Act offenders.[
82] It could have set criteria to inform that
determination, too, asking the executive to investigate, say,
whether
an offender’s risk of recidivism correlates with
the time since his last offense, or whether multiple lesser
offenses indicate higher or lower risks than a single greater
offense.
But SORNA did none of this. Instead, it gave the
Attorney General unfettered discretion to decide which requirements
to impose on which pre-Act offenders. The Attorney General’s own
edicts acknowledge the consider- able policy-making powers he
enjoys, describing his rules governing pre-Act offenders as
“ ‘of fundamental importance to the initial operation of
SORNA, and to its practical scope . . . since [they]
determin[e] the applicability of SORNA’s requirements to virtually
the entire existing sex offender population.’ ”[
83] These edicts tout, too, the Attorney
General’s “discretion to apply SORNA’s requirements to sex
offenders with pre-SORNA convictions if he determines (as he has)
that the public benefits of doing so outweigh any adverse
effects.”[
84] Far from
deciding the factual predicates to a rule set forth by statute, the
Attorney General himself acknowledges that the law entitles him to
make his own policy decisions.
Finally, SORNA does not involve an area of
overlapping authority with the executive. Congress may assign the
President broad authority regarding the conduct of foreign affairs
or other matters where he enjoys his own inherent Article II
powers. But SORNA stands far afield from any of that. It gives the
Attorney General the authority to “prescrib[e] the rules by which
the duties and rights” of citizens are determined, a
quintessentially legislative power.[
85]
Our precedents confirm these conclusions. If
allowing
the President to draft a “cod[e] of fair
competition” for slaughterhouses was “delegation running riot,”
then it’s hard to see how giving the nation’s chief prosecutor the
power to write a criminal code rife with his own policy choices
might be permissible.[
86]
And if Congress may not give the President the discretion to ban or
allow the interstate transportation of petroleum, then it’s hard to
see how Congress may give the Attorney General the discretion to
apply or not apply any or all of SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act
offenders, and then change his mind at any time.[
87] If the separation of powers means
anything, it must mean that Congress cannot give the executive
branch a blank check to write a code of conduct governing private
conduct for a half-million people.
The statute here also sounds all the alarms the
founders left for us. Because Congress could not achieve the
consensus necessary to resolve the hard problems associated with
SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders, it passed the potato to
the Attorney General. And freed from the need to assemble a broad
supermajority for his views, the Attorney General did not hesitate
to apply the statute retroactively to a politically unpopular
minority. Nor could the Attorney General afford the issue the kind
of deliberative care the framers designed a representative
legislature to ensure. Perhaps that’s part of the reason why the
executive branch found itself rapidly adopting different positions
across different administrations. And because SORNA vested
lawmaking power in one person rather than many, it should be no
surprise that, rather than few and stable, the edicts have proved
frequent and shifting, with fair notice sacrificed in the process.
Then, too, there is the question of accountability. In passing
this
statute, Congress was able to claim credit for
“comprehensively” addressing the problem of the entire existing
population of sex offenders (who can object to that?), while in
fact leaving the Attorney General to sort it out.
It would be easy enough to let this case go.
After all, sex offenders are one of the most disfavored groups in
our society. But the rule that prevents Congress from giving the
executive
carte blanche to write laws for sex offenders is
the same rule that protects everyone else. Nor is it hard to
imagine how the power at issue in this case—the power of a
prosecutor to require a group to register with the government on
pain of weighty criminal penalties—could be abused in other
settings. To allow the nation’s chief law enforcement officer to
write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing—to
“ ‘unit[e]’ ” the “ ‘legislative and executive
powers . . . in the same person’ ”—would be to mark
the end of any meaningful enforcement of our separation of powers
and invite the tyranny of the majority that follows when lawmaking
and law enforcement responsibilities are united in the same
hands.[
88]
Nor would enforcing the Constitution’s demands
spell doom for what some call the “administrative state.” The
separation of powers does not prohibit any particular policy
outcome, let alone dictate any conclusion about the proper size and
scope of government. Instead, it is a procedural guarantee that
requires Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing
our nation’s course on policy questions like those implicated by
SORNA. What is more, Congress is hardly bereft of options to
accomplish all it might wish to achieve. It may always authorize
executive branch officials to fill in even a large number of
details, to find facts that trigger the generally applicable rule
of conduct specified in a statute, or to exercise non-
legislative powers. Congress can also commission
agencies or other experts to study and recommend legislative
language. Respecting the separation of powers forecloses no
substantive outcomes. It only requires us to respect along the way
one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual
liberty found in our Constitution.
B
What do the government and the plurality have
to say about the constitutional concerns SORNA poses? Most
everyone, the plurality included, concedes that if SORNA allows the
Attorney General as much authority as we have outlined, it would
present “a nondelegation question.”[
89] So the only remaining available tactic is to try to
make this big case “small-bore”[
90] by recasting the statute in a way that might satisfy
any plausible separation-of-powers test. So, yes, just a few years
ago in
Reynolds the government represented to this Court
that SORNA granted the Attorney General nearly boundless discretion
with respect to pre-Act offenders. But
now, faced with a
constitutional challenge, the government speaks out of the other
side of its mouth and invites us to reimagine SORNA as compelling
the Attorney General to register pre-Act offenders “to the maximum
extent feasible.” And, as thus reinvented, the government insists,
the statute supplies a clear statement of legislative policy, with
only details for the Attorney General to clean up.
But even this new dream of a statute wouldn’t be
free from doubt. A statute directing an agency to regulate private
conduct to the extent “feasible” can have many possible meanings:
It might refer to “technological” feasibility, “economic”
feasibility, “administrative” feasibility,
or even “political” feasibility. Such an
“evasive standard” could threaten the separation of powers if it
effectively allowed the agency to make the “important policy
choices” that belong to Congress while frustrating “meaningful
judicial review.”[
91] And
that seems exactly the case here, where the Attorney General is
left free to make all the important policy decisions and it is
difficult to see what standard a court might later use to judge
whether he exceeded the bounds of the authority given to him.
But don’t worry over that; return to the real
world. The bigger problem is that the feasibility standard is a
figment of the government’s (very recent) imagination. The only
provision addressing pre-Act offenders, §20913(d), says
nothing about feasibility. And the omission can hardly be
excused as some oversight: No one doubts that Congress knows
exactly how to write a feasibility standard into law when it
wishes.[
92] Unsurprisingly,
too, the existence of some imaginary statutory feasibility standard
seemed to have escaped notice at the Department of Justice during
the Attorney General’s many rulemakings; in those proceedings, as
we have seen, the Attorney General has repeatedly admitted that the
statute affords him the authority to “balance” the burdens on sex
offenders with “public safety interests” as and how he sees
fit.[
93]
Unable to muster a feasibility standard from the
only statutory provision addressing pre-Act offenders, the
plurality invites us to hunt in other and more unlikely corners. It
points first to SORNA’s “[d]eclaration of purpose,” which announces
that Congress, “[i]n order to pro-
tect the public from sex offenders and offenders
against children . . . establishes a comprehensive
national system for the registration of those offenders.”[
94] But nowhere is feasibility
mentioned here either. In fact, this provision doesn’t purport to
guide the Attorney General’s discretion at all. Instead, it simply
declares what Congress believed the
rest of the statute’s
enacted provisions had already “establishe[d],” without the need
for any action by the Attorney General. And by now surely we must
all agree that broad and sweeping statements like these about “a
statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are . . . inadequate to
overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under
consideration.”[
95] While
those adopting SORNA might have declared that they hoped and wished
for a “comprehensive national system,” the fact remains that the
law they actually adopted for pre-Act offenders leaves everything
to the Attorney General. Hopes and dreams are not laws.
Besides, even if we were to pretend that §20901
amounted to a directive
telling the Attorney General to
establish a “comprehensive national system” for pre-Act offenders,
the plurality reads too much into the word “comprehensive.”
Comprehensive coverage does not mean coverage to the maximum extent
feasible. “Comprehensive” means “having the attribute of comprising
or including much; of large content or scope,” “[i]nclusive of;
embracing,” or “[c]ontaining much in small compass;
compendious.”[
96] So, for
example, a criminal justice system may be called “comprehensive”
even though many crimes go unpursued. And SORNA itself contains all
sorts of
coverage exceptions for
post-Act
offenders yet claims to comprehensively address them.[
97] In the same way, no reason
exists why SORNA might not also claim to address pre-Act offenders
“comprehensively” even though the Attorney General is free to
exercise his discretion to forgo registration for some, many, or
maybe all of them. The statute still “comprehensively” addresses
these persons by indicating they must abide whatever rules an
Attorney General may choose. In all these ways, SORNA might be said
to address sex offenders past, present, and future in a way that
“compris[es] or includ[es] much,” and that is “of large content or
scope,” but in a way that nevertheless delegates important policy
decisions to the executive branch.
Finding it impossible to conscript the statute’s
declaration of purpose into doing the work it needs done, the
government and plurality next ask us to turn to SORNA’s definition
of “ ‘sex offender.’ ”[
98] They emphasize that SORNA defines a “sex offender” as
“ ‘an individual who
was convicted of a sex
offense’ ”—and, they note, pre-Act offenders meet this
definition.[
99] Because
pre-Act offenders fall within the definition of “sex offender[s],”
the government and plurality continue, it follows that the Attorney
General must ensure all of them are registered and subject to
SORNA’s demands.
That much, however, does not follow. To say that
pre-Act sex offenders fall within the definition of “sex offenders”
is merely a truism: Yes, of course, these people have already been
convicted of sex offenses under state law. But whether these
individuals are
also subject to federal registration
requirements is a different question entirely.
And as we have seen, the only part of the
statute that speaks to pre-Act sex offenders—§20913(d)—makes plain
that they are
not automatically subject to all the Act’s
terms but are left to their fate at the hands of the Attorney
General. Look at it this way: If the statute’s definitional section
were really enough to command the registration of all sex
offenders, the Act would have had no need to proceed to explain, as
it does at great length, when
post-Act sex offenders must
register and when they need not.
If that argument won’t work, the plurality
points us to §20913(d)’s second clause, which grants the Attorney
General the authority “to prescribe rules for the registration of
. . . sex offenders . . . who are unable to
comply” with the Act’s initial registration requirements.[
100] According to the plurality,
this language suggests that Congress expected the Attorney General
to register pre-Act offenders to the maximum extent feasible. But,
of course, this clause, too, says nothing of the sort. And the
authority provided under §20913(d)’s
first clause—which
gives the Attorney General the blanket authority “to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter”—is
additional to the authority granted under the
second
clause. So not only does the Attorney General have the authority to
prescribe rules for the registration of pre-Act offenders under the
second clause, he is free to specify which statutory requirements
he does and does not wish to apply under the first clause. Far from
suggesting a maximalist approach then, the second clause read in
light of the first only serves to underscore the breadth of the
Attorney General’s discretion.
With so little in statutory text to work with,
the government and the plurality “can’t resist” highlighting
cer-
tain statements from the Act’s legislative
history.[
101] But
“legislative history is not the law.”[
102] Still less can committee reports or statements
by individual legislators be used “to muddy clear statutory
language” like that before us.[
103] And even taken on their own terms, these statements
do no more than confirm that some members of Congress hoped and
wished that the Attorney General would exercise his discretion to
register at least some pre-Act offenders. None of these snippets
mentions a “feasibility” standard, and none can obscure the absence
of such a standard in the law itself.
That leaves the plurality and the government to
try to fish its feasibility standard from our decision in
Reynolds. But
Reynolds would make a difference only
if it bound us as a matter of
stare decisis to adopt an
interpretation inconsistent with the statute’s terms. And, of
course, it does no such thing. The government and the plurality
submit that
Reynolds was premised on an understanding that
Congress intended the statute to apply to pre-Act offenders to the
maximum extent feasible. To support their reading they point to
Reynolds’ surmise that Congress “may well have thought [that
there could be] practical problems” with applying SORNA to pre-Act
offenders and for that reason left their registration obligations
to be sorted out by the Attorney General.[
104] But speculation about some of Congress’s
motives in adopting §20913(d) aside,
Reynolds plainly
understood the statute itself as investing the Attorney General
with sole power to decide whether and when to apply SORNA’s
requirements to pre-
Act offenders.[
105]
*
Nothing found here can come as a surprise. In
Reynolds, the government told this Court that SORNA supplies
no standards regulating the Attorney General’s treatment of pre-Act
offenders. This Court agreed, and everyone proceeded with eyes open
about the potential constitutional consequences; in fact, the
dissent expressly warned that adopting such a broad construction of
the statute would yield the separation-of-powers challenge we face
today.[
106] Now, when the
statute faces the chopping block, the government asks us to ignore
its earlier arguments and reimagine (really, rewrite) the statute
in a new and narrower way to avoid its long-predicted fate. No
wonder some of us are not inclined to play along.
The only real surprise is that the Court fails
to make good on the consequences the government invited, resolving
nothing and deferring everything. In a future case with a full
panel, I remain hopeful that the Court may yet recognize that,
while Congress can enlist considerable assistance from the
executive branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may
never hand off to the nation’s chief prosecutor the power to write
his own criminal code. That “is delegation running riot.”[
107]