Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. ___ (2019)
For representation in administrative proceedings, the Social Security Act provides that if a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the lesser of 25% of past-due benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000, 42 U.S.C. 406(a)(2)(A); absent an agreement, the agency may set any “reasonable” fee, section 406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is required to withhold up to 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of fees. For representation in court proceedings, section 406(b) caps fees at 25% of past-due benefits; the agency may withhold benefits to pay these fees.
Culbertson represented Wood in Social Security disability benefit proceedings before the agency and in court. The agency ultimately awarded Wood past-due benefits, withheld 25%, and awarded Culbertson fees under section 406(a) for representation before the agency. Culbertson sought a separate award under 406(b) for the court proceedings, requesting 25% of past-due benefits. The Eleventh Circuit held that 406(b)’s 25% limit applies to the total fees awarded under both sections.
The Supreme Court reversed. Section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation, not to the aggregate fees awarded under 406(a) and (b). The subsections address different stages of the representation and use different methods for calculating fees. Applying 406(b)’s 25% cap on court-stage fees to 406(a) agency-stage fees, or the aggregate fees, would make little sense and would subject 406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to 406(b)’s 25% cap—a limitation not included in the statute. The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of past-due benefits for payment of fees does not support an aggregate reading. The amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court.
Social Security Act section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation, not to the aggregate fees awarded under sections 406(a) and (b) for representation before the agency and before the court.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Culbertson v. Berryhill, ACTING Commissioner of Social Security
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
No. 17–773. Argued November 7, 2018—Decided January 8, 2019
The Social Security Act regulates the fees that attorneys may charge claimants seeking Title II benefits for representation both before the Social Security Administration and in federal court. For representation in administrative proceedings, the Act provides two ways to determine fees. If a fee agreement exists, fees are capped at the lesser of 25% of past-due benefits or a set dollar amount—currently $6,000. 42 U. S. C. §406(a)(2)(A). Absent an agreement, the agency may set any “reasonable” fee. §406(a)(1). In either case, the agency is required to withhold up to 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of any fee. §406(a)(4). For representation in court proceedings, fees are capped at 25% of past-due benefits, and the agency has authority to withhold such benefits to pay these fees. §406(b)(1)(A).
Petitioner Culbertson represented Katrina Wood in Social Security disability benefit proceedings before the agency and in District Court. The agency ultimately awarded Wood past-due benefits, withheld 25% of those benefits to pay any attorney’s fees, and awarded Culbertson fees under §406(a) for representation before the agency. Culbertson then moved for a separate fee award under §406(b) for the court proceedings, requesting a full 25% of past-due benefits. The District Court granted the request, but only in part, because Culbertson did not subtract the amount he had already received under §406(a) for his agency-level representation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the 25% limit under §406(b) applies to the total fees awarded under both §§406(a) and (b).
Held: Section 406(b)(1)(A)’s 25% cap applies only to fees for court representation and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§406(a) and (b). Pp. 5–9.
(a) Section 406(b) provides that a court rendering a favorable judgment to a claimant “represented before the court by an attorney” may award “a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent” of past-due benefits. Here, the adjective “such,” which means “[o]f the kind or degree already described or implied,” refers to the only form of representation “already described” in §406(b)—i.e., “represent[ation] before the court.” Thus, the 25% cap applies only to fees for representation before the court, not the agency.
Subsections (a) and (b) address different stages of the representation and use different methods for calculating fees. Given this statutory structure, applying §406(b)’s 25% cap on court-stage fees to §406(a) agency-stage fees, or the aggregate of §§406(a) and (b) fees, would make little sense. For example, such a reading would subject §406(a)(1)’s reasonableness limitation to §406(b)’s 25% cap—a limitation not included in the relevant provision of the statute. Had Congress wanted agency-stage fees to be capped at 25%, it presumably would have said so directly in subsection (a). Pp. 5–7.
(b) The fact that the agency presently withholds a single pool of 25% of past-due benefits for direct payment of agency and court fees does not support an aggregate reading. The statutory text provides for two pools of money for direct payment of fees. See §§406(a)(4), (b)(1)(A). The agency’s choice to withhold only one pool of 25% of past-due benefits does not alter this text. More fundamentally, the amount of past-due benefits that the agency can withhold for direct payment does not delimit the amount of fees that can be approved for representation before the agency or the court. Pp. 7–9.
861 F. 3d 1197, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Amicus brief of Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below submitted. |
SET FOR ARGUMENT on Wednesday, November 7, 2018 |
Motion of Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration for divided argument submitted. |
Motion for divided argument filed by respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration. |
Amicus brief of National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives not accepted for filing. (July 25, 2018) - To be resubmitted with required documents.) |
Brief amicus curiae of National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives in support of neither party filed. |
Brief of petitioner Richard Culbertson filed. |
Joint appendix filed. |
Brief of respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration in support of reversal and remand filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file the briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix, petitioner's brief on the merits, and respondent's brief in support is extended to and including July 16, 2018. The time to file the brief of Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below is extended to and including September 7, 2018. |
Any amicus briefs in support of the judgment below are due within 7 days after the filing of the brief of Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. |
Motion for an extension of time to file the briefs on the merits filed. |
Amy Weil, Esquire, of Atlanta, Georgia, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below. |
Blanket Consent filed by Petitioner, Richard Culbertson. |
As Rule 34.6 provides, “If the Court schedules briefing and oral argument in a case that was governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c) or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 49.1(c), the parties shall submit electronic versions of all prior and subsequent filings with this Court in the case, subject to [applicable] redaction rules.” Subsequent party and amicus filings in the case should now be submitted through the Court’s electronic filing system, with any necessary redactions. |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 5/17/2018. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 5/10/2018. |
Letter waiving the 14-day waiting period for the filing of a reply pursuant to Rule 15.5 received. |
Brief of respondent Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration filed. |
Letter of March 30, 2018, received from counsel for the petitioner. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including April 5, 2018. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from March 22, 2018 to April 5, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including March 22, 2018. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from March 8, 2018 to March 22, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including March 8, 2018. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from January 26, 2018 to March 8, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including January 26, 2018 |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from December 27, 2017 to January 26, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Pursuant to Rule 34.6 and Paragraph 9 of the Guidelines for the Submission of Documents to the Supreme Court’s Electronic Filing System, filings in this case should be submitted in paper form only, and should not be submitted through the Court’s electronic filing system. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 27, 2017) |
Application (17A279) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until November 23, 2017. |
Application (17A279) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from September 24, 2017 to November 23, 2017, submitted to Justice Thomas. |
Prior History
- Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 16-13664 (11th Cir. Jun. 26, 2017)
- Wood v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 6:2012cv00915 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 16, 2013)
Richard Culbertson was counsel for the four plaintiffs in these consolidated Social Security disability benefits cases. At issue in this appeal was the attorney's fees for Culbertson under 42 U.S.C. 406 and the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in its interpretation and application of Dawson v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1970) and by imposing a 24% cap on section 406 fees; it was necessary for the district court to add the requested section 406(b) fee together with his EAJA award; and the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not exceed its authority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.