United States v. Stitt, 586 U.S. ___ (2018)
Defendants were each convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); each was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 15-year prison term required by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) for section 922(g)(1) offenders who have at least three previous convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies. ACCA defines “violent felony” to include “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is burglary,” section 924(e)(2)(B). Defendants’ prior convictions were for violations of statutes that prohibit burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. The Courts of Appeals vacated both sentences.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the term “burglary” in ACCA includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. Under the categorical approach, courts evaluate a prior state conviction based on the elements of the state offense, not the defendant’s behavior on a particular occasion. A prior state conviction does not qualify as generic burglary where those elements are broader than those of generic burglary: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Arkansas and Tennessee statutes satisfy those elements. When ACCA was passed, most state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging. Congress also viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime that “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation.” An offender who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, or another structure or vehicle that is adapted or customarily used for lodging creates a similar risk of violent confrontation.
The term “burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
United States v. Stitt
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 17–765. Argued October 9, 2018—Decided December 10, 2018[1]
Respondents Victor J. Stitt and Jason Daniel Sims were each convicted in federal court of unlawfully possessing a firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1). The sentencing judge in each case imposed the mandatory minimum 15-year prison term that the Armed Career Criminal Act requires for §922(g)(1) offenders who have at least three previous convictions for certain “violent” or drug-related felonies, §924(e)(1). The Act defines “violent felony” to mean, among other things, “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is burglary.” §924(e)(2)(B). Respondents’ prior convictions were for violations of state burglary statutes—a Tennessee statute in Stitt’s case and an Arkansas statute in Sims’ case—that prohibit burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. In both cases, the District Courts found that the state statutory crimes fell within the scope of the federal Act’s term “burglary.” The relevant Court of Appeals in each case disagreed, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.
Held:
1. The term “burglary” in the Armed Career Criminal Act includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. Pp. 4–8.
(a) In deciding whether an offense qualifies as a violent felony under the Act, the categorical approach first adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, requires courts to evaluate a prior state conviction by reference to the elements of the state offense, rather than to the defendant’s behavior on a particular occasion. A prior state conviction does not qualify as generic burglary under the Act where “the elements of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary.” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___. Taylor, which specifically considered the statutory term “burglary” and defined the elements of generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime,” 495 U. S., at 598, governs and determines the outcome here. Pp. 4–5.
(b) The state statutes at issue here fall within the scope of Taylor’s definition of generic burglary. Congress intended that definition to reflect “the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most States” when the Act was passed. 495 U. S., at 598. And at that time, a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging. Congress also viewed burglary as an inherently dangerous crime that “creates the possibility of a violent confrontation” between the offender and an occupant or someone who comes to investigate. Id., at 588. An offender who breaks into a mobile home, an RV, a camping tent, or another structure or vehicle that is adapted or customarily used for lodging creates a similar or greater risk of violent confrontation. Although the risk of violence is diminished if the vehicle is only used for lodging part of the time, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intended to make a part-time/full-time distinction. Respondents also argue that the vehicles covered here are analogous to the nontypical structures and vehicles that Taylor, Mathis, and other cases described as falling outside the scope of generic burglary, but none of those prior cases presented the question whether generic burglary includes structures or vehicles that are adapted or customarily used for overnight use. Pp. 5–8.
2. Sims’ case is remanded for further proceedings. His argument that Arkansas’ residential burglary statute is too broad to count as generic burglary because it also covers burglary of “a vehicle . . . [w]here any person lives,” Ark. Code Ann. §5–39–101(1)(A), rests in part upon state law, and the lower courts have not considered it. Those courts remain free to determine whether Sims properly presented that argument and, if so, to decide the merits. Pp. 8–9.
No. 17–765, 860 F. 3d 854, reversed; No. 17–766, 854 F. 3d 1037, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Amicus brief of The National Association of Federal Defenders submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers filed. VIDED. (Distributed) |
Amicus brief of The National Association of Federal Defenders not accepted for filing. (August 24, 2018) |
Amicus brief of The National Association of Federal Defenders submitted. |
Amicus brief of The National Association of Federal Defenders not accepted for filing. (Brief to be reprinted - August 24, 2018) |
Amicus brief of The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers submitted. |
Brief amicus curiae of National Association of Federal Defenders filed. VIDED. (Distributed) |
Motion of Jason Daniel Sims for divided argument submitted. |
Joint motion for divided argument filed by respondents. VIDED. |
Blanket Consent filed by Respondent, Victor Stitt, II |
Consent to the filing of amicus briefs received from counsel for Victor Stitt, II submitted. |
Blanket Consent filed by Respondent, Jason Daniel Sims |
Consent to the filing of amicus briefs received from counsel for Jason Daniel Sims submitted. |
Brief of Victor Stitt, II submitted. |
Brief of Jason Daniel Sims submitted. |
Brief of respondent Jason Daniel Sims (in 17-766) filed. (Distributed) |
Brief of respondent Victor Stitt, II filed. (Distributed) |
Record received from the U.S.C.A. 6 Circuit. The record is electronic. |
Record requested from the U.S.C.A. 6th Circuit. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner GRANTED. VIDED. |
CIRCULATED |
SET FOR ARGUMENT On Tuesday, October 9, 2018. VIDED. |
Brief of petitioner United States filed. VIDED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/24/2018. |
Motion to dispense with printing the joint appendix filed by petitioner United States. VIDED. |
Motion to extend the time to file the opening briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to an including June 26, 2018. The time to file respondents' briefs on the merits is extended to and including August 14, 2018. |
Motion for an extension of time filed. |
Motion for appointment of counsel filed by respondent Jason Sims (in No. 17-766). (Corrected motion to be submitted 5/29/18). |
Motion for appointment of counsel filed by respondent Jason Daniel Sims (in No. 17-766). (Corrected motion received 6/4/18). |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent GRANTED. |
Because the Court has consolidated these cases for briefing and oral argument, future filings and activity in the cases will now be reflected on the docket of No. 17-765. Subsequent filings in these cases must therefore be submitted through the electronic filing system in No. 17-765. Each document submitted in connection with one or more of these cases must include on its cover the case number and caption for each case in which the filing is intended to be submitted. Where a filing is submitted in fewer than all of the cases, the docket entry will reflect the case number(s) in which the flings is submitted; a document filed in all of the consolidated cases will be noted as “VIDED.” |
Petition GRANTED. The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 17-766 is granted. The cases are consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/20/2018. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 4/13/2018. |
Rescheduled. |
Letter of petitioner United States filed. (Distributed) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/2/2018. |
Reply of petitioner United States filed. |
Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by respondent Victor Stitt, II. |
Brief of respondent Victor Stitt, II in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including January 25, 2018. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from December 26, 2017 to January 25, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 26, 2017) |
Application (17A287) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until November 24, 2017. |
Application (17A287) to extend further the time from October 25, 2017 to November 24, 2017, submitted to Justice Kagan. |
Application (17A287) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until October 25, 2017. |
Application (17A287) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from September 25, 2017 to October 25, 2017, submitted to Justice Kagan. |
Prior History
- United States v. Stitt, No. 14-6158 (6th Cir. Jun. 27, 2017)
In 2011, Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth while threatening to kill her. When a neighbor called the police, Stitt fled, then surrendered to authorities after a brief foot chase. Detectives recovered the gun lying on the ground within his reach. A jury found Stitt guilty of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Due to his nine prior “violent felony” convictions—including six for Tennessee aggravated burglary—the court sentenced Stitt under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 290 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the government conceded that the 2015 Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. United States, invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior offenses, leaving only his six aggravated-burglary convictions at issue. Bound by its precedent, (United States v. Nance), which held that Tennessee aggravated burglary fit the Supreme Court’s definition of “generic burglary,” the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed his sentence. On rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is broader than the definition of generic burglary. The court applied the categorical analysis; Tennessee’s aggravated-burglary statute is indivisible, thereby foreclosing application of the modified categorical approach.