Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. ___ (2019)
Lambert filed a class action, alleging that Nutraceutical’s marketing of a dietary supplement violated California consumer-protection law. On February 20, 2015, the district court decertified the class. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), Lambert had 14 days to ask for permission to appeal the order. Instead, he moved for reconsideration more than 14 days later, on March 12. The district court denied the motion on June 24. Fourteen days later, Lambert petitioned the Ninth Circuit for permission to appeal the decertification order. The Ninth Circuit held that Rule 23(f)’s deadline should be tolled because Lambert had “acted diligently” and reversed the decertification order. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Rule 23(f), “a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule,” is not subject to equitable tolling. Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but on whether its text leaves room for such flexibility. Rule 26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of time, states that a court of appeals “may not extend the time to file . . . a petition for permission to appeal.” The Rules express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling might otherwise exist. A timely motion for reconsideration would affect the when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the availability of tolling.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which provides 14 days for seeking permission to appeal a class certification order, is “a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule” that is not subject to equitable tolling.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 17–1094. Argued November 27, 2018—Decided February 26, 2019
Respondent Troy Lambert filed a class action in federal court alleging that petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation’s marketing of a dietary supplement ran afoul of California consumer-protection law. On February 20, 2015, the District Court ordered the class decertified. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), Lambert had 14 days from that point to ask the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal the order. Instead, he filed a motion for reconsideration on March 12, which the District Court denied on June 24. Fourteen days later, Lambert petitioned the Court of Appeals for permission to appeal the decertification order. Nutraceutical objected that Lambert’s petition was untimely because it was filed far more than 14 days from the February 20 decertification order. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that Rule 23(f)’s deadline should be tolled under the circumstances because Lambert had “acted diligently.” On the merits, the court reversed the decertification order.
Held: Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 3–10.
(a) Rule 23(f) is properly classified as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, but that does not render it malleable in every respect. Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on whether its text leaves room for such flexibility. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421. Here, the governing rules speak directly to the issue of Rule 23(f)’s flexibility and make clear that its deadline is not subject to equitable tolling. While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 authorizes a court of appeals for good cause to “suspend any provision . . . in a particular case,” it does so with a caveat: “except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” Rule 26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of time, in turn includes the carveout that a court of appeals “may not extend the time to file . . . a petition for permission to appeal”—the precise type of filing at issue here. The Rules thus express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling might otherwise exist. Precedent confirms this understanding. See Carlisle, 517 U.S. 416, and United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220. Pp. 3–6.
(b) Lambert’s counterarguments do not withstand scrutiny. Lambert argues that Rule 26(b)’s prohibition on extending the time to file a petition for permission to appeal should be understood to foreclose only formal extensions granted ex ante and to leave courts free to excuse late filings on equitable grounds after the fact. But this Court has already rejected an indistinguishable argument concerning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) in Robinson, and Lambert offers no sound basis for reading Rule 26(b) differently. Further, the 1998 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f) speak to a court of appeals’ discretion to decide whether a particular certification decision warrants review in an interlocutory posture, not to its determination whether a petition is timely. Finally, Lambert notes that every Court of Appeals to have considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f) petition filed within 14 days of the resolution of a motion for reconsideration that was itself filed within 14 days of the original order. Although his own reconsideration motion was not filed until after the initial 14 days had run, he cites the lower courts’ handling of such cases as evidence that Rule 23(f) is amenable to tolling. However, a timely motion for reconsideration affects the antecedent issue of when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the availability of tolling. See United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 4, n. 2. Pp. 6–9.
(c) On remand, the Court of Appeals can address other preserved arguments about whether Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition was timely even without resort to tolling. Pp. 9–10.
870 F.3d 1170, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Brief of Nutraceutical Corporation submitted. |
Joint Appendix submitted. |
Brief of petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation filed. |
Joint appendix filed. |
Joint motion to extend the time to file the opening briefs on the merits granted. The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 20, 2018. The time to file respondent's brief on the merits is extended to and including October 1, 2018. |
Joint motion for an extension of time to file the opening briefs on the merits filed. |
Joint motion for an extension of time not accepted for filing. (July 23, 2018 - Corrected motion to be submitted.) |
Petition GRANTED. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/21/2018. |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 6/14/2018. |
Reply of petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation filed. |
Brief of respondent Troy Lambert in opposition filed. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted in part and the time is extended to and including May 14, 2018. |
Motion to extend the time to file a response from April 6, 2018 to June 1, 2018, submitted to The Clerk. |
Response Requested. (Due April 6, 2018) |
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/16/2018. |
Waiver of right of respondent Troy Lambert to respond filed. |
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due March 7, 2018) |
Prior History
- Lambert v. Nutraceutical Corp., No. 15-56423 (9th Cir. Sep. 15, 2017)
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) deadline, which governs interlocutory appeals of orders granting or denying class action certification, is not jurisdictional, and thus equitable exceptions apply. The Ninth Circuit held that a motion for reconsideration filed within the Rule 23(f) deadline will toll the deadline; additional equitable circumstances may also warrant tolling; and, in this case, the Rule 23(f) deadline was tolled when counsel for the lead plaintiff, within fourteen days of the district court's decertification order, informed the court of his intention to
seek reconsideration, explained his reasons for doing so, and the court set a date for filing the motion with which counsel complied. On the merits, the panel held that the district court abused its discretion in decertifying the class. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.