In 1839, the Legislature of Tennessee passed a law containing
the following provision, namely:
"That whenever a deed has been registered twenty years, or more,
the same shall be presumed to be upon lawful authority, and the
probate shall be good and effectual, though the certificate on
which the same has been registered, has not been transferred to the
register's books, and no matter what has been the form of the
certificate of probate or acknowledgment. "
Page 58 U. S. 577
A deed to "the legatees and devisees of the late Anthony
Bledsoe," which was certified by the register of Maury County,
Tennessee, to have been recorded there in January, 1809, was, under
the authority of this statute, properly admitted in evidence,
although informalities existed with respect to its being proved,
and with respect to the acknowledgment of a
feme
covert.
So, also, the deed is effectual, under the circumstances of the
case, to transfer a fee simple estate to the legatees and devisees
of Anthony Bledsoe, whose will was in evidence. The deed was a
release of the bare legal title to equitable owners in fee, on
partition between them as tenants in common. The old common law
rule as to the distinction between releases from one joint tenant
to another, and from one tenant in common to another, is not
applicable.
A defendant in ejectment cannot object to the production in
evidence of one of the muniments of the plaintiff's title, because
it was "
res inter alios acta."
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the trial of this case, the plaintiff below having shown that
the lessor of plaintiff was one of the children of Anthony Bledsoe
-- also the will of Anthony Bledsoe, and a grant of five thousand
acres of land, by the State of North Carolina, to Nicholas Lang --
offered in evidence a copy of a paper writing purporting to be a
deed from John J. Lang, Basset Stith, and Mary his wife, and
others, devisees of the legal estate, to the "legatees and devisees
of the late Anthony Bledsoe," for the one-fourth part of said
tract, or, twelve hundred and fifty acres, by certain metes and
bounds. This copy is certified by the Register of Maury County,
Tennessee, as there recorded on the 11th of January, 1809. The
defendants objected to the admission of this copy as evidence,
"because it was not duly proved, acknowledged, or authenticated,
so as to entitle the same to registration, and there was no proof
of the acknowledgment or privy examination of Mary Stith, the
feme covert, and that the registration of said deed being
unauthorized, a copy would not be read."
The court overruled the objection and permitted the deed to be
read, and the exception to this ruling is chiefly relied on as a
ground for reversing the judgment of the court below.
The acknowledgment certified with this deed, which purports to
have been taken in open court, in Halifax County, North Carolina,
at November sessions, 1807, is admitted not to have been such as
the registration acts then required, nor was it certified under the
seal of the court, as required by law. But an act was passed in
1839, by the Legislature of Tennessee, the 9th section of which
contains the following provision: that whenever
Page 58 U. S. 578
a deed has been registered
"twenty years or more, the same shall be presumed to be upon
lawful authority, and the probate shall be good and effectual,
though the certificate on which the same has been registered has,
not been transferred to the register's books, and no matter what
has been the form of the certificate of probate or
acknowledgment."
In the early settlement of most of our states, the forms of
conveyances of land were very simple, and they were usually drawn
either by the parties themselves, or by persons equally ignorant of
the proper forms of certificates of acknowledgment required by
law.
In some states, the statutes concerning acknowledgments and
registry were stringent, while the practice was loose and careless.
And in some the courts, by unnecessary strictness in their
construction of the statutes, added to the insecurity of titles, in
a county where too many have acted on the supposition that everyone
who can write is fit for a conveyancer. The great evils likely to
arise from a strict construction applied to the
bona fide
conveyances of an age so careless of form, have compelled
legislatures to quiet titles by confirmatory acts, in order to
prevent the most gross injustice.
The act in question is one of these; it is a wise and just act;
it governs this case, and justifies the court in admitting this
deed in evidence. It was registered in 1809, and some of the
grantees have been in possession under it ever since. After such a
length of time, the law presumes it to have been registered on
lawful authority, without regard to the form of certificate of
probate or acknowledgment. As a legal presumption it is conclusive
that the deed was properly acknowledged, although the contrary may
appear on the face of the papers.
It is not a "retrospective law" under the Constitution of
Tennessee, which the legislature is forbidden to pass. It is
prospective; declaring what should thereafter be received in courts
as legal evidence of the authenticity of ancient deeds. It makes no
exception as to the rights of married women, and the courts can
make none. Informalities and errors in the acknowledgments of
feme coverts, are those which the carelessness and
ignorance of conveyancers were most liable to make, and which most
required such curative legislation.
The registration being thus validated, copies of such deeds
stand on the same footing with other legally registered deeds, of
which copies are made evidence by the law.
The objections to the form of this deed, that it has no
effective words of grant to convey a fee, nor states a
consideration, nor sufficiently describes the grantees, cannot be
supported. It is true, it is a very informal conveyance, but it
contains
Page 58 U. S. 579
enough within it to show its validity. It appears that Anthony
Bledsoe, as locator of the land for Land, was entitled by their
contract to one-fourth. The whole legal title was in Lang's
devisees, the equitable title to one-fourth in Bledsoe's devisees.
The deed does not contain the words give, grant, bargain, and sell
&c., but only "a release and quitclaim forever, unto the
legatees and devisees of Anthony Bledsoe, deceased." The will of
Bledsoe is in evidence. The deed, by this description, necessarily
refers to that instrument to ascertain the persons who are such
"legatees and devisees," and thus far incorporates it. It contains,
therefore, a sufficient description of the grantees.
It has no words of inheritance, because it is a release of the
bare legal title to equitable owners in fee, on partition between
them as tenants in common. This appears on the face of the deed.
The consideration of the conveyance is stated to be a release, on
behalf of the grantees, "of all claims under a certain contract,"
&c. By the common law, there is a distinction between a release
by one joint tenant to another, and the same as between tenants in
common; the first requires no words of inheritance, but the latter
does. But this technical distinction is founded on feudal reasons
with respect to livery of seisin, which have no application where
the release is to the equitable owner in fee. By the statutes of
Tennessee, registering a deed is the only livery of seisin
required.
But whether the deed passed the legal estate in fee or not, was
a question not arising in the case, as the lessor of plaintiff was
one of the devisees of Anthony Bledsoe, and therefore one of the
original grantees in the deed, and had a legal as well as equitable
estate.
The objection to the record of partition between the heirs or
devisees of Nicholas Lang, because it was
res inter alios
acta, ought not to have been made. The authenticity of the
record was not disputed, and if it had any legal bearing whatever
on the title of the plaintiff, the defendants, who had as yet shown
no title, cannot object to the muniments of plaintiffs' title, when
offered in evidence, whether they be deeds, wills, or partitions,
"because they are
res inter alios acta."
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Middle District
of Tennessee, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof
it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the
judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs.