The State of Pennsylvania, in 1826, passed a law by which all
inheritances being within that commonwealth which, by the intestacy
or the will of any decedent, should devolve upon any other than the
father, mother, wife, children, or lineal descendants of such
person should be subject to a tax.
In 1850, an explanatory act was passed declaring that the words
"being within this commonwealth" should be so construed as to
relate to all persons who have been at the time of their decease or
now may be, domiciled within this commonwealth, as well as to
estates.
In 1849, a citizen of Pennsylvania died, whose will was proven
by a resident executor in December, 1849. The executor represented
that a portion of the estate, consisting of securities, stocks,
loans, and evidences of debt and property, was not within the
commonwealth.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that this portion was
subject to the tax, and this Court has no authority to revise that
decision.
The explanatory law is not within the prohibitions of the
Constitution of the United States.
It is true that in some respects the rights of donees under a
will become vested by the death of a testator, but until the period
of distribution arrives, the law of the decedent's domicile
attaches to the property.
The explanatory act is not an
ex post facto law within
the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution of the
United States. This phrase was used in a restricted sense, relating
to criminal cases only.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 58 U. S. 461
MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Legislature of Pennsylvania, in 1826, adopted a law by which
all inheritances, "being within this commonwealth," which, by the
intestacy or the will of any decedent, should devolve "upon any
other than the father, mother, wife, children, or lineal
descendants" of such person, should be subject to the payment of a
tax, now fixed at five percent Purd.Dig. 138, ยง 1.
The assessments under this act were confined to the property
which might be within the commonwealth.
Commonwealth v.
Smith, 5 Barr. 142.
In March, 1850, by an explanatory act it was declared that the
words
"'being within this commonwealth' shall be so construed as to
relate to all persons who have been at the time of their decease,
or now may be, domiciled within this commonwealth, as well as to
estates, and this is declared to be the true intent and meaning of
this act."
William Short, a citizen of Pennsylvania, died within the state
a few months previously to the passage of this act, leaving his
property to friends and collateral relations, the principal of
whom, the residuary legatees, reside beyond the limits of the
state. The will was proven by a resident executor in December,
1849, before the Register's Court in Philadelphia, and a settlement
was made with that court in June of the following year. In that
settlement, the executor represented that a portion of the estate,
consisting of securities, stocks, loans, and evidences of debt and
property, was not within the commonwealth, and offered to pay the
tax for the property within under the act of 1826, and denied the
validity of the assessment under the act of 1850. The tax was
assessed upon the entire personal estate, without reference to its
locality, by the court, and its judgment upon this subject was
affirmed by the supreme court, to which it was removed by
certiorari. That
Page 58 U. S. 462
court said:
"More pointed words to make the act of 1850 retrospective could
not be chosen, and it will scarce be said the legislature had not
power to make it so, at least while the assets remain in the hands
of the executor as administrator. No clause of the Constitution
forbids it to extend a tax already laid, or to tax assets not taxed
before, and in establishing its peculiar interpretation, it has
only done indirectly what it was competent to do directly."
The supreme court thus interprets the act of 1850 as if it
read:
"That assets in the hands of an executor, for distribution among
the collateral relations of or strangers to the decedent, shall be
subject to a tax of five percent."
This Court has no authority to revise the act of Pennsylvania,
upon any grounds of justice, policy, or consistency to its own
Constitution. These are concluded by the decision of the public
authorities of the state. The only inquiry for this Court is does
the act violate the Constitution of the United States, or the
treaties and laws made under it?
The validity of the act, as affecting successions to open after
its enactment, is not contested, nor is the authority of the state
to levy taxes upon personal property belonging to its citizens, but
situated beyond its limits, denied. But the complaint is that the
application of the act of 1826, by that of 1850, to a succession
already in the course of settlement, and which had been
appropriated by the last will of the decedent, involved an
arbitrary change of the existing laws of inheritance to the extent
of this tax, in the sequestration of that amount for the uses of
the state. That the rights of the residuary legatees were vested at
the death of the testator, and from that time those persons were
nonresidents, and the property taxed was also beyond the state; and
that the state has employed its power over the executor and the
property within its borders, to accomplish a measure of wrong and
injustice. That the act contains the imposition of a forfeiture or
penalty, and is
ex post facto. It is, in some sense true
that the rights of donees under a will are vested at the death of
the testator, and that the acts of administration which follow are
conservatory means, directed by the state to ascertain those
rights, and to accomplish an effective translation of the dominion
of the decedent to the objects of his bounty, and the legislation
adopted with any other aim than this would justify criticism and
perhaps censure. But until the period for distribution arrives, the
law of the decedent's domicile attaches to the property, and all
other jurisdictions refer to the place of the domicile, as that
where the distribution should be made. The will of the testator is
proven there, and his executor receives his authority to
collect
Page 58 U. S. 463
the property, by the recognition of the legal tribunals of that
place. The personal estate, so far as it has a determinate owner,
belongs to the executor thus constituted. The rights of the donee
are subordinate to the conditions, formalities, and administrative
control prescribed by the state in the interests of its public
order, and are only irrevocably established upon its abdication of
this control at the period of distribution. If the state, during
this period of administration and control by its tribunals and
their appointees, thinks fit to impose a tax upon the property,
there is no obstacle in the Constitution and laws of the United
States to prevent it.
Ennis v.
Smith, 14 How. 400;
In re Ewin, 1 Cr.
& Jer. 151; 1 Barb.Ch. 180; 6 W.H. & G.Cy. 217; 21 Conn.
577.
The act of 1850, in enlarging the operation of the act of 1826,
and by extending the language of that act beyond its legal import,
is retrospective in its form; but its practical agency is to
subject to assessment property liable to taxation, to answer an
existing exigency of the state, and to be collected in the course
of future administration; and the language retrospective is of no
importance, except to describe the property to be included in the
assessment. And, as the supreme court has well said, "in
establishing its peculiar interpretation, it the legislature has
only done indirectly what it was competent to do directly."
But if the act of 1850 involved a change in the law of
succession, and could be regarded as a civil regulation for the
division of the estates of unmarried persons having no lineal
heirs, and not as a fiscal imposition, this Court could not
pronounce it to be an
ex post facto law within the 10th
section of the 1st Article of the Constitution. The debates in the
federal convention upon the Constitution show that the terms
"
ex post facto laws" were understood in a restricted
sense, relating to criminal cases only, and that the description of
Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their meaning. 3
Mad.Pap. 1399, 1450, 1579.
This signification was adopted in this Court shortly after its
organization in opinions carefully prepared, and has been
repeatedly announced since that time.
Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386;
Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87;
33
U. S. 8 Pet. 88;
36 U. S. 11
Pet. 421.
The same words are used in the Constitutions of many of the
states and in the opinions of their courts and by writers upon
public law, and are uniformly understood in this restricted sense.
3 N.H. 375; 5 Mon. 133; 9 Mass. 363; 6 Binn. 271; 4 Ga. 208.
The plaintiff's argument concedes that his case is not within
the scope of this clause of the Constitution unless its limits
are
Page 58 U. S. 464
enlarged to embrace civil as well as criminal cases, and he
insists that the Court should depart from the adjudications
heretofore made upon this subject. But this cannot be done. There
is no error in the record, and the judgment of the supreme court
is
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof it is now here ordered, adjudged, and
decreed by this Court that the decree of the said supreme court in
this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.