A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law
unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could
not avail himself at law, because it did not amount to a legal
defense, or had a good defense at law which he was prevented from
availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence
of himself or his agents.
Therefore a bill was properly dismissed where the complainant
sought relief from a judgment at law for the following reasons:
1. Where he alleged that he had been defrauded in the sale of
the property, for the purchase of which he gave his notes. The
fraud was pleaded at law, and the verdict against him. Moreover,
six years elapsed between the sale and suit, and no effort was made
to rescind the contract.
2. Certain verbal promises alleged to have been made by the
agent of the vendor. These were not admissible in any court to vary
a written contract. This defense was also set up at law, and
failed.
3. That certain letters from a co-defendant were read to the
jury as admissions. This ground of relief was also untenable.
4. That certain claims of setoff existed which he purposely
abstained from using in the trial at law. If he voluntarily waived
this defense, relying upon a separate action, he has no right now
to ask a court of equity to interfere.
On the 26th of October, 1851, Hendrickson, as survivor of
Hendrickson and Campbell, filed a bill in the United States
Circuit
Page 58 U. S. 444
Court for the District of Ohio alleging that on the 21st day of
April, 1848, Hinckley brought a suit on the law side of said court
on three promissory notes against said Hendrickson and one Andrew
Campbell. That said Hendrickson and Campbell set up in their
pleadings and on the trial for defenses the want of consideration,
fraud in obtaining the notes, and payment. That the case was tried
on these issues by a jury, and thereupon a judgment was recovered
against said defendants for $2,386.11 and costs of suit. That
afterwards said Campbell and Hendrickson moved for a new trial,
which, on consideration, was refused. That Campbell has since died
insolvent. That before and after said suit was brought, said
Campbell and Hendrickson had a good setoff against said Hinckley
amounting to $3,337.85. That before the trial they consulted their
counsel respecting it, and that both counsel and client concluded
not to set it up on that trial. That on the trial said defendants
were surprised by the introduction, on the part of the plaintiff of
letters written by said Campbell and to which the jury gave undue
weight. That Hinckley is a nonresident of the State of Ohio, and
has no property besides said judgment in said state.
The bill then prays for a full discovery from the defendant as
to all the facts alleged, and on the grounds of fraud, surprise,
nonresidence of the defendant, Hinckley, and the equitable
jurisdiction of courts of chancery over claims of only setoff,
prays that the judgment be enjoined and his claim be liquidated,
and he offers to pay any balance which may be found to be due said
Hinckley on such final adjustment.
September 26, 1851, the writ of injunction issued. On the 7th of
May, 1852, the defendant, Henckley, filed his answer, denying
seriatim all the material allegations in the bill and,
under the rule of court, denied all equity therein and prayed to
have the same benefit from his answer as if he had demurred to the
bill.
At the October term, 1852, the case was heard on the demurrer,
the injunction dissolved, and the bill dismissed. From this decree
said complainant appealed to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE CURTIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant filed his bill in the Circuit Court of the
Page 58 U. S. 445
United States for the District of Ohio, and that court having
ordered the bill to be dismissed on a demurrer for want of equity,
the complainant appealed.
The object of the bill is to obtain relief against a judgment at
law, founded on three promissory notes, signed by the complainant,
and one Campbell since deceased.
A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law
unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could
not avail himself at law because it did not amount to a legal
defense, or had a good defense at law which he was prevented from
availing himself of by fraud or accident, unmixed with negligence
of himself or his agents.
Marine Ins. Co. v.
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 333;
Creath v.
Sims, 5 How. 192;
Walker v.
Robbins, 14 How. 584.
The application of this rule to the case stated in the bill
leaves the complainant no equity whatever.
The contract under which these notes were taken was made in
December, 1841. One of the notes is dated in December, 1841, and
the others in January, 1842. In April, 1848, suit was brought on
the notes. In October, 1850, the trial was had and judgment
recovered. The reasons alleged by the bill for enjoining the
judgment are:
1. That the consideration of the notes was the sale of certain
property, and the complainant and Campbell were defrauded in that
sale. But this alleged fraud was pleaded in the action at law as a
defense to the notes, and the jury found against the defendants.
Moreover, upwards of six years elapsed after the sale an before the
suit was brought, and the vendees, who do not pretend to have been
ignorant of the alleged fraud during any considerable part of that
period of time, did not offer to rescind the contract, nor did they
at any time either return or offer to return the property sold.
2. This bill alleges certain promises to have been made by an
agent of the defendant concerning the time and mode of payment of
the notes when they were given. These promises could not be availed
of in any court as a defense to the notes, for to allow them such
effect would be to alter written contracts by parol evidence, which
cannot be done in equity any more than at law in the absence of
fraud or mistake.
Sprigg v. Bank of Mount
Pleasant, 14 Pet. 201.
But whatever substance there was in this defense, it was set up,
at law, and upon this also the verdict was against the defendants,
and the same is true of the alleged partial failure of
consideration.
3. The next ground is that on the trial at law, letters from the
joint defendant, Campbell containing admissions adverse
Page 58 U. S. 446
to the defense were read in evidence to the jury, and the bill
avers that Campbell was not truly informed concerning the subjects
on which he wrote, and that until the letters were produced at the
trial, the complainant was not aware of their existence, and so was
surprised.
To this there are two answers, either of which is sufficient.
The first is that the complainant and Campbell being jointly
interested in the purchase and ownership of the property for which
these notes were given and joint defendants in the action at law,
and there being no allegation of any collusion between Campbell and
the plaintiff in that action, the complainant cannot be allowed to
allege this surprise. If he did not know what admissions Campbell
had made, he might and with the use of due diligence would have
known them, and he must be treated in equity as well as at law as
if he had himself made the admissions.
Another answer is that if there was surprise at the trial,
motion for delay, as is practiced in some circuits, or a motion for
a new trial according to the practice in others, afforded a
complete remedy at law.
4. The complainant asserts that he has claims against the
defendant, and he prays that inasmuch as the defendant resides out
of the jurisdiction of the court, these claims may be set off
against the judgment recovered at law by the decree of the court
upon this bill. But upon this subject the bill states, speaking of
the action at law:
"Your orator frequently conferred with L. D. Campbell one of his
attorneys, in reference to the said cause, and frequently spoke to
him of the claims which your orator and said Andrew Campbell had
against the said Hinckley, as hereinafter specifically set forth,
but the said Campbell, attorney, regarded the defense pleaded as so
amply sufficient as that neither he nor your orator ever thought it
necessary to exhibit said demands against said Henckley as matter
of defense, could it even have been done consistently with the
defense made as aforesaid."
He purposely omitted to set off these alleged claims in the
action at law, and now asks a court of equity to try these
unliquidated claims and ascertain their amount, and enable him to
have the same advantage which he has once waived, when it was
directly presented to him in the regular course of legal
proceedings. Courts of equity do not assist those whose condition
is attributable only to want of due diligence, nor lend their aid
to parties who, having had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at law, have purposely omitted to avail themselves of it.
It is suggested that courts of equity have an original
jurisdiction
Page 58 U. S. 447
in cases of setoff, and that this jurisdiction is not taken away
by the statutes of setoff, which have given the right at law. This
may be admitted, though it has been found exceedingly difficult to
determine what was the original jurisdiction in equity over this
subject. 2 Story's Eq. 656, 664. But whatever may have been its
exact limits, there can be no doubt that a party sued at law has
his election to set off his claim or resort to his separate action.
And if he deliberately elects the last, he cannot come into a court
of equity and ask to be allowed to make a different determination
and to be restored to the right which he has once voluntarily
waived.
Barker v. Elkins, 1 John.Ch. 465;
Greene v.
Darling, 5 Mason 201.
Similar considerations are fatal to the plaintiff's claim for
relief on the ground that the defendant resides out of the state,
and that therefore he should have the aid of a court of equity to
subject the judgment at law to the payment of the complainant's
claim. When the complainant elected not to file these claims in
setoff in the action at law, he knew that defendant, who was the
plaintiff in that action, resided out of the state. If that fact
was deemed by the complainant insufficient to induce him to avail
himself of his complete legal remedy, it can hardly be supposed
that it can induce a court of equity to interpose to create one for
him. The question is not merely whether he now has a legal remedy,
but whether he has had one and waived it. And as this clearly
appears, equity will not interfere.
The decree of the court below is affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Ohio, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is
now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that the
decree of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
