A Treasury transcript was admissible in evidence in a suit
brought by the United States against their debtor, although
authenticated copies of the receipts which the debtor had given for
money did not accompany the transcript. If an item was charged
against him which the debtor disputed, it was in his power to
obtain the original voucher, and if it appeared on the face of the
account that the item charged did not come into his hands in the
regular course of business, the transcript would not be evidence to
sustain that charge.
The cases upon this point examined.
It was not necessary for the United States to produce the
commission of the debtor or a certified copy of it. The surety was
estopped from denying it..
Where there were two consecutive commissions and two sets of
sureties, the latter set were responsible for all money which
remained in the hands of the principal at the expiration of the
first commission. If it was misapplied during the first term of
office, it was incumbent upon the second set of sureties to show
that it was so.
The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 58 U. S. 438
The writ of error in this case is brought upon a judgment
obtained by the United States in the Circuit Court for the District
of Missouri.
It appears that Bruce, one of the plaintiffs in error, was
appointed agent for the Sioux tribe of Indians in 1844, and gave
the bond on which this suit is brought, for the faithful
performance of his official duty. Franklin Steele, the other
plaintiff in error, and John Atchison, were sureties in the bond,
and Atchison having died pending the suit in the circuit court, it
abated as to him, and the judgment in favor of the United States
was rendered against the plaintiffs in error. The breach assigned
is that there was a balance in Bruce's hands on the 1st of July,
1848, of $10,191.69, which he refused to turn over and pay to the
United States when required to do so.
Bruce had held the same appointment for four years before he
received the one of which we are now speaking, and his account with
government begins in May, 1840.
At the trial, the United States offered in evidence a transcript
from the books of the Treasury Department stating the account of
Bruce from the time of his first appointment. According to this
account, the balance above mentioned was due to the United States,
but Bruce claimed various additional credits, amounting altogether
to $6,931.68, which had been disallowed or suspended by the
accounting officers, as appears by the closing account, usually
called the statement of differences.
The United States further offered the transcript of a letter
from the Second Auditor, whose duty it was to settle this account,
addressed to Bruce, stating the balance due from him according to
the settlement in the auditor's office and enclosing him the
statement of differences above mentioned, and directing him to turn
over to his successor in office the balance of the public money in
his hands, and also offered the deposition of his successor stating
that he had made the demand, but that Bruce had failed to comply
with it.
The defendants therefore objected to the admissibility of this
evidence, but the court overruled the objection, and this
constitutes the first exception in the case.
The objection is stated in general terms, and applies to the
whole evidence offered by the United States, without pointing out
the particular ground of the objection. But we understand from the
argument here that the defendants in the court below supposed that
the transcript from the books of the Treasury was not of itself
evidence that he received the several sums of money charged against
him, and that authenticated copies of his receipts ought to have
accompanied the transcript.
But this objection cannot be maintained. The act of 1797
Page 58 U. S. 439
provides that a transcript from the books and proceedings of the
Treasury, certified by the register and authenticated under the
seal of the department, shall be admitted in evidence. And the Act
of March 3, 1817, directs that all accounts whatever in which the
United States are concerned, either as debtors or creditors, shall
be settled and adjusted in the Treasury Department. The act makes
the auditors and comptrollers, by whom the accounts in the war and
navy departments are settled, officers of the Treasury Department.
And the provision above mentioned in the act of 1797, in relation
to transcripts from the books and proceedings in the Treasury, is
extended to the accounts of the war and navy departments, and the
certificates of the auditors respectively charged with the
settlement of these accounts, are to have the same effect as that
directed in the former act of Congress to be signed by the
register.
The accounts in question belonged to the war department during
the period of Bruce's agency, and were adjusted and certified by
the proper officers. There could therefore be no objection to the
evidence on that score.
Nor do we see how any valid objection can be made to the items
charged against Bruce in the transcript. The books of the
accounting officer necessarily contain the charges against, as well
as the credits of, the disbursing officer. The accounts could not
be adjusted on the books in any other manner, and the transcript,
or in other words the copy of the entire account as it stands on
the books, which must include debits as well as credits, are made
evidence by the law. Nor do we see any reason for restricting the
words of the acts of Congress within narrower limits than the words
plainly imply. The accounts are adjusted by public sworn officers,
bound to do equal justice to the government and the individual.
They are records of the proper departments, and always open to the
inspection of the party interested. And after all, the transcript
is only
prima facie evidence, and if the party disputes
any of the charges against him, it is in his power, by a proper
application to the court supported by sufficient evidence, to
obtain the original vouchers on which he was charged, if necessary
to his defense, and to show that the debit against him is
erroneous.
If, indeed, it appeared on the face of the account that an item
was charged against him which had not come to his hands in the
regular and ordinary operations of the government, and of which,
therefore, the accounting officers could have no official
knowledge, the transcript would not be evidence to support that
charge. But no such debit is found in this transcript, for
according to the regular and ordinary practice of the government in
cases of this description, the agent receives
Page 58 U. S. 440
from his predecessor in the office the money and property
remaining in his hands, and other funds, which it may be his duty
to disburse, are sometimes sent through the general superintendent
at St. Louis, sometimes by a Treasury draft, forwarded directly to
himself, and sometimes through the agency of a military or other
officer of the government. And these advances pass through the
proper offices of the Treasury and War Departments, now through the
Department of the Interior, and the agent is charged upon his own
receipts and warrants, issued in his favor.
This appears to have been done in the case before us. Every
payment or advance to him is separately charged, and the time when
it came to his hands, as well as the name of the person from whom
he received it. The copies of his receipts, or of the vouchers for
the charge, would have given him no further information, and the
acts of Congress above referred to do not require them to be
annexed to or accompany the account, but in plain and unambiguous
terms makes the transcript itself evidence.
Cases analogous to this have on several occasions come before
the Court and have all been decided upon the construction of the
acts of Congress above stated.
Smith v. United
States, 5 Pet. 292;
Coxe
& Dick v. United States, 6 Pet. 202; and
Hoyt v. United
States, 10 How. 109, are all in point. And the
cases of
United States v.
Buford, 3 Pet. 29, and
United
States v. Jones, 8 Pet. 376, which are sometimes
supposed to maintain a contrary doctrine, are perfectly consistent
with the other decisions and with the one now given.
For in the case of the
United States v. Buford, who was
a deputy commissary, the money had been placed in his hands by
Morrison, who was a deputy quartermaster, without authority and
contrary to his duty, and the accounting officers refused to credit
it in Morrison's account. Upon application to Congress, however, a
law was passed authorizing the accounting officers to allow the
credit upon receiving from Morrison an assignment to the United
States of all his right to the money mentioned in the receipt,
which he had taken from Buford when he advanced him the money.
Morrison made the assignment accordingly, and thereupon an account
was stated on the books of the Treasury, charging Buford as debtor
to Morrison for the amount advanced to him. And a transcript from
this account was offered in evidence. It is set out in the report
of the case, and it is evident that this account was not within the
letter or spirit of the act of Congress. It certainly could not
prove the receipt of Buford, for the whole transaction was outside
of the regular operations of the government, and the
Page 58 U. S. 441
accounting officers could not be presumed to have any official
knowledge of the unauthorized transactions between the parties.
And so again as to the case of the
United States v.
Jones, who was surety in the bond of an army contractor. The
transcript contained charges against the contractor for bills of
exchange drawn by him and paid to other persons. The court regarded
this operation as not within the ordinary mode of proceeding in the
department, and that the accounting officers could not be presumed
to have any knowledge of the drawing of those bills, or of their
endorsement to others, and thereupon rejected these items. It will
be seen, therefore, that the cases of the
United States v.
Buford and
United States v. Jones are distinguishable
from the present case as well as from the other cases above
referred to, and stand on different ground.
Indeed, none of the debits in the transcript appears to have
been disputed by the plaintiffs in error, and no exception was
taken to any one of them. The statement of differences between the
accounting officers and Bruce shows that there was no difference as
to the amount with which he was chargeable. The difference
consisted in a variety of credits which he claimed and which had
been suspended or refused at the Treasury, and the testimony
offered by him after his objection to the transcript had been
overruled and the document admitted in evidence was altogether
directed to support the credits he claimed, and not to impeach and
one of the debits against him.
The circuit court were therefore right in overruling his
objection to the testimony offered by the United States.
We proceed to the next exception.
After the testimony on both sides was closed, the plaintiffs in
error asked for the following instructions to the jury, all of
which were refused, and the direction which follows them given:
"1. That unless they believe from the evidence that Bruce was
legally appointed and commissioned as such Indian agent, they will
find for defendant, Steele, and they are further instructed that
the commission or a legally certified copy thereof is the highest
and best evidence thereof."
"2. If the jury finds from the evidence that Bruce was a
defaulter at the time of the execution of the bond sued on, it will
find for defendant, Steele, to the extent of such preexisting
default."
"3. Defendant Steele is not liable for any defalcation existing
on the part of Bruce prior to the 29th of August, 1844."
"4. Defendant Steele is not liable as the surety of Bruce
Page 58 U. S. 442
for any money received by Bruce before he was sub-Indian
agent."
"5. The original receipts of Bruce, or certified copies of the
originals on file, is the best evidence of any moneys received by
him, and the jury will disregard the transcript of accounts from
the books, unless they believe it was out of the power of plaintiff
to produce the receipts, or certified copies thereof."
These instructions were all refused, and
"the court directed the jury that if, when Bruce was reappointed
agent in 1844, he had moneys in his hands of the United States
which he received as agent under his previous commission, then he
was bound to apply and account for such moneys under the second
commission, and his sureties are bound under the bond which is sued
on. But if Bruce had appropriated the moneys received under the
previous commission to his own use when this bond was given, then
the first set of sureties are responsible for the moneys thus
illegally appropriated, and these defendants are not liable, and
the burden of proof is on the defendants to show that Bruce had
illegally appropriated the moneys before the bond sued on was
given."
We think the court was right in refusing the prayers and in
giving this instruction. In relation to the first instruction asked
for, it certainly was not necessary for the government to produce
the commission of Bruce or a certified copy. The bond upon which
the suit was brought recites that he was appointed Indian agent,
and the obligors in the bond are therefore estopped from denying
it.
And as to the 5th, it is but a repetition of the objection to
the transcript, which we have already disposed of.
And as relates to the 2d, 3d, and 4th, we think the court was
right in refusing them and giving the instruction as above stated.
When Bruce received his second commission, if any money or property
which he received in his former term of office still remained in
his hands, he was bound to apply and account for it under the
appointment he then received.
The terms of the bond clearly require it, and his sureties are
bound for it. It was so much money in his hands to be disbursed and
applied upon his second appointment. Indeed, if it were otherwise,
the government would have no security for it. For if it was not
wasted or misapplied during his first official term, but still
remained in his hands to be applied according to his official duty,
the sureties in his first bond would not be liable. For there would
in that case be no default or breach of duty in that term of
office, and if afterwards wasted or misapplied, it would be a
breach of duty in that official term for which Steele was one of
his sureties.
Page 58 U. S. 443
Undoubtedly the sureties in the second term of office are not
responsible for a default committed in his first. But if any part
of the balance now claimed from him was misapplied during that
period, it was incumbent on the plaintiffs in error to prove it. No
officer, without proof, will be presumed to have violated his duty,
and if Bruce had done so, Steele had a right, under the opinion of
the circuit court, to show it and exonerate himself to that amount;
but it could not be presumed merely because there appears by the
accounts to have been a balance in his hands at the expiration of
his first term.
We see no error in the opinions of the circuit court, and the
judgment must therefore be
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Missouri, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is
now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby
affirmed, with interest at the same rate per annum that similar
judgments bear in the courts of the State of Missouri.