Where a bill was filed by several distributees of an estate to
compel the payment of money alleged to be due to them, and a decree
was rendered in their favor, this Court has jurisdiction over an
appeal, although the amount payable to each individual claimant was
less than two thousand dollars.
The aggregate amount which the defendant was decreed to pay was
more than two thousand dollars, and as to him this is the matter in
dispute.
The complainants all claimed under the same title, and it was of
no consequence to the defendant in what proportions they shared the
money amongst them.
The cases upon this point examined.
Mr. Platt Smith moved to dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction, as the amount of none of the several decrees was for
$2,000, and referred to the case of
Oliver v.
Alexander, 6 Pet. 143.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the decree of the District Court of the
United States, exercising the powers of a circuit court for the
District of Iowa. A motion has been made on behalf of
Page 58 U. S. 4
Isaac Thomas, one of the appellees, to dismiss it upon the
ground that the sum in controversy with him is less than two
thousand dollars.
The facts in the case may be stated in a few words so far as
they are material to the decision of the motion.
John Goldsberry, of Kentucky, died intestate, Leaving a large
personal estate, to which the present appellees, together with
other persons named in the proceedings, were entitled as his legal
representatives in the proportions set out in the proceedings. The
widow of Goldsberry obtained letters of administration on his
estate, and afterwards intermarried with Shields, the appellant,
who thereby obtained possession of the property of the
deceased.
The representatives of John Goldsberry, of whom Isaac Thomas in
right of his wife is one, filed a bill in the Chancery Court of
Kentucky against Shields charging that he had converted to his own
use a large amount of the property, to which these representatives
were entitled. And in that proceeding they obtained a decree
against him for a large sum of money, the shares of the respective
complainants being apportioned to them in the decree, and the
appellant was directed to pay to each the specific sum to which he
was entitled, as his proportion of the property misappropriated by
Shields.
The appellant Shields lived in Iowa when this decree was made,
and the present appellees, who are a portion of the representatives
of John Goldsberry, united in the bill in equity now before us to
enforce the decree of the Kentucky court, and praying that Shields
might be compelled to pay to them respectively the several sums
decreed in their favor in the proceedings in Kentucky, and they
obtained the decree in question according to the prayer of their
bill.
The whole amount recovered against Shields in the proceeding in
Iowa exceeds two thousand dollars. But the sum allotted to each
representative who joined in the bill was less. And the motion is
made to dismiss upon the ground that the sum due to each
complainant is severally and specifically decreed to him and that
the amount thus decreed is the sum in controversy between each
representative and the appellant, and not the whole amount for
which he has been held liable. And if this view of the matter in
controversy be correct, the sum is undoubtedly below the
jurisdiction of the Court and the appeal must be dismissed.
But the Court thinks the matter in controversy in the Kentucky
court was the sum due to the representatives of the deceased
collectively, and not the particular sum to which each was entitled
when the amount due was distributed among them
Page 58 U. S. 5
according to the laws of the state. They all claimed under one
and the same title. They had a common and undivided interest in the
claim, and it was perfectly immaterial to the appellant how it was
to be shared among them. He had no controversy with either of them
on that point, and if there was any difficulty as to the
proportions in which they were to share, the dispute was among
themselves, and not with him.
It is like a contract with several to pay a sum of money. It may
be that the money, when recovered, is to be divided between them in
equal or unequal proportions. Yet if a controversy arises on the
contract and the sum in dispute upon it exceeds two thousand
dollars, an appeal would clearly lie to this Court although the
interest of each individual was less than that sum.
This being the controversy in Kentucky, the decree of that court
apportioning the sum recovered among the several representatives
does not alter its character when renewed in Iowa. So far as the
appellant is concerned, the entire sum found due by the Kentucky
court is in dispute. He disputes the validity of that decree and
denies his obligation to pay any part of the money. And if the
appellees maintain their bill, he will be made liable to pay the
whole amount decreed to them. This is the controversy on his part,
and the amount exceeds two thousand dollars. We think the Court
therefore has jurisdiction on the appeal.
The cases referred to stand on different principles. The case of
Oliver v.
Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, was a suit for seamen's
wages. And although the crew are allowed by law, for the sake of
convenience and to save costs, to join in a suit for wages, yet the
right of each seaman is separate and distinct from his associates.
His contract is separate, and his recovery does not depend upon the
recovery of others, but rests altogether on its own evidence and
merits. And he does not recover a portion of a common fund to be
distributed among the claimants, but the amount due to himself on
his own separate contract.
The case of
Rich v.
Lambert, 12 How. 352, was decided on the same
ground. The several shippers who owned the goods which had been
damaged, had no common interest in the goods. The interest of each
was separate, and his contract of affreightment separate. And the
libel of each was upon his own contract with the shipowner and for
his own individual and separate property.
The cases of
Stratton v. Jarvis and
Brown, 8 Pet. 8, and of
Sepear
v. Place, 11 How. 525, were both salvage cases,
where the property of each owner is chargeable with its own
amount
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of salvage. The salvage service is entire, but the goods of each
owner are liable only for the salvage with which they are charged,
and have no common liability for the amounts due from the ship or
other portions of the cargo. It is a separate and distinct
controversy between himself and the salvors, and not a common and
undivided one for which the property is jointly liable.
The cases relied on are therefore distinguishable from the one
before us; and the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction must
be
Overruled.
Order
On consideration of the motion made in this cause by Mr. Smith
on a prior day of the present term of this Court, to-wit, on
Friday, the 19th instant, and of the arguments of counsel
thereupon, had as well against as in support thereof, it is now
here ordered by the Court that the said motion be and the same is
hereby overruled.