By the Act of Congress passed on the 26th of August, 1852, ch.
91, it was made the duty of the superintendent of public printing
to receive all matter ordered by Congress to be printed and to
deliver it to the public printer or printers.
In 1854, Beverly Tucker was printer to the Senate, and O. A. P.
Nicholson, printer to the House of Representatives.
The act further provided that when any document should be
ordered to be printed by both Houses of Congress, the entire
printing of such document should be done by the printer of that
House which first ordered the printing.
In January, 1854, the Commissioner of Patents communicated to
the Senate that portion of his Annual Report for 1853, which
related to arts and manufactures, and on the ensuing day the same
communication was made to the House of Representatives. Each House
having ordered it to be printed, the printing was assigned to Mr.
Tucker.
In March, 1854, the agricultural portion of the report was sent
to both Houses, and both of them, on the same day, ordered it to be
printed. In actual priority of time, the order of the House was
passed first. The printing of it was given to Mr. Nicholson.
A writ of mandamus will not lie from the circuit court of the
United States, commanding the superintendent to deliver the
printing to Mr. Tucker.
Whether the two portions of the report constituted one document
and which House passed the order first were questions requiring the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the public officer, who had
something more than a mere ministerial daty to perform.
The cases upon this point examined.
The question was whether the Report of the Commissioner of
Patents relating to arts and manufactures and also to agriculture,
which was divided into the two branches and made to Congress at
different times, was or was not one document, and
Page 58 U. S. 226
whether the delivery of it to the public printer of one or the
other House of Congress was or was not a mere ministerial duty.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 58 U. S. 229
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error, at the times hereinafter mentioned, was
and still is superintendent of public printing of the two Houses of
Congress, and the relator printer to the Senate, and O. A. P.
Nicholson printer to the House of Representatives.
By the Act of August 26, 1852, it is made the duty of the
superintendent to receive, from the Secretary of the Senate and the
Clerk of the House of Representatives, all matter ordered by
Congress to be printed, and to deliver it to the public printer or
printers. And the 12th section provides that when any document
shall be ordered to be printed by both Houses of Congress, the
entire printing of such document shall be done by the printer of
that House which first ordered the printing.
On the 31st of January, 1854, the Commissioner of Patents
communicated to the Senate that portion of his annual report for
1853 which relates to arts and manufactures, which that body on the
same day ordered to be printed, and on the following day it was
communicated to the House of Representatives, who passed a similar
order. This communication was delivered by the superintendent to
the relator.
On the 20th of March, 1854, the Commissioner communicated to
both Houses the agricultural portion of his report, which each
House, on the same day, ordered to be printed; the order of the
House of Representatives being, it is admitted, first made.
The relator claimed that the report of the Commissioner of
Patents was but one document within the meaning of the act of
Congress above referred to, and that by virtue of the order of the
Senate of the 31st of January, 1854, he was entitled to
Page 58 U. S. 230
the printing of the agricultural portion of the report, although
the printing of this part was first ordered by the House of
Representatives. The superintendent, however, refused to deliver
it, and the relator thereupon applied to the Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia for a mandamus to compel the delivery. That
court was of opinion that it had not jurisdiction of the case and
refused the mandamus, and this writ of error is brought by the
relator.
The power of the circuit court of this District to issue writs
of mandamus to an officer of the government in Washington has
frequently been the subject of discussion in this Court. It was
before the Court in
Kendall v.
Stokes, 12 Pet. 524; in
Decatur v.
Paulding, 14 Pet. 497; in
Brashear v.
Mason, 6 How. 92; and again in
Goodrich v.
Guthrie at the present term. The rule to be gathered from all
of these cases is too well settled to need further discussion. It
cannot issue in a case where discretion and judgments are to be
exercised by the officer, and it can be granted only where the act
required to be done is merely ministerial, and the relator without
any other adequate remedy.
Now it is evident that this case is not one in which the
superintendent had nothing to do but obey the order of a superior
authority. He had inquiries to make before he could execute the
authority he possessed. He must examine evidence -- that is to say,
he must ascertain in which House the order to print was first
passed. He may, it is true, generally obtain this from the journals
of the two Houses, but yet he must examine them, and compare the
dates of the orders; and in this particular case it may even have
been necessary to take oral testimony, before he could determine
the fact of priority, as the order was passed in each House on the
same day. And after he had made up his mind upon this fact, it was
still necessary to examine into the usages and practice of
Congress, in marking a communication in their proceedings as a
document, and to make up his mind whether separate communications
upon the same subject, or on different subjects from the same
office, when made at different times, were, according to the usages
and practice of Congress, described as one document, or different
documents, in printing and publishing their proceedings. He was
obliged, therefore, to examine evidence and form his judgment
before he acted, and whenever that is to be done, it is not a case
for a mandamus.
Nor is there any reason of public policy or individual right
which requires that this remedy should be extended beyond its
legitimate bounds in order to embrace cases of this description,
for it would embarrass the operations of the legislative and
Page 58 U. S. 231
executive departments of the government if the court of this
district was authorized to interfere, by this summary process, in
controversies between officers, in their respective employments,
whenever differences of opinion as to their respective rights may
arise. If these differences cannot be adjusted by the authorities
under which they are acting, an ordinary action at law would be an
adequate remedy for any injury sustained.
It seems to be supposed that the case of
Kendall v.
Stokes justified this application, but it is altogether unlike
it. The award of the Solicitor of the Treasury in that case was an
official act; he was the officer appointed by act of Congress to
settle that account and determine the amount of credit to which
Stokes was entitled, if to any, and all that the Postmaster General
was required to do was, to enter it in the books of the department,
when reported to him by the solicitor of the Treasury. He was
merely to record it. His duty under that act of Congress was like
that of a clerk of a court, who is required to record its
proceedings, or of an officer appointed by law to record deeds,
which a party has a right by law to place on record, or of the
Register of the Treasury of the United States, to record accounts
transmitted to him by the proper accounting officers to be
recorded. The duty in such cases is merely ministerial -- as much
so as that of a sheriff or marshal to execute the process of a
court.
This was the point decided in
Kendall v. Stokes and the
subsequent cases have all been decided upon the same principles.
They are in no degree in conflict with it; on the contrary, they
have followed it.
But the case before us, for the reasons above stated, is unlike
that of
Kendall v. Stokes, and the circuit court was right
in refusing the mandamus.
The judgment must therefore be affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia, holden in and for the County of Washington, and was
argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said circuit
court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with
costs.