In a case of collision upon Lake Huron between a propeller and a
schooner, the evidence shows that the propeller was in fault.
The fact that the libellants had received satisfaction from the
insurers for the vessel destroyed furnished no good ground of
defense for the respondent.
This was a case of collision, in September, 1850, upon Lake
Huron between a propeller called
Monticello and a schooner
called
The Northwestern by which the schooner and her
cargo were entirely lost.
In April, 1851, Mollison, the owner of the schooner, libeled the
propeller, then lying in the port of Buffalo. Wilson, the master
and claimant of the propeller, answered the libel, and much
testimony was taken on both sides. In May, 1852, the
Page 58 U. S. 153
district judge decreed that the libellant should receive the sum
of $6,000 as the value of the schooner, and the further sum of $150
as the value of the salt which constituted the cargo. The case
being carried by appeal to the circuit court, the decree was
affirmed in September, 1853. The master of the propeller appealed
to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellee in this case filed his libel in the District Court
for the Northern District of New York against the steam propeller
Monticello in a cause of collision.
The libel sets forth that the libellant is owner of the schooner
Northwestern; that on the 15th of September, 1850, the
schooner, with a cargo of salt, was on her voyage from the port of
Oswego, in New York, to the port of Chicago, in Illinois; that
about half-past eight o'clock in the evening, being about ten or
twelve miles from Presque Isle on Lake Huron and about six miles
from land, sailing with a fair breeze on the course of
west-northwest, the wind being south-southwest, the sparks from the
chimney of the propeller were seen some six miles off. In order to
give a "wide berth" to the approaching vessel, the schooner ported
her helm and ran her course a point more to the north. That when
from four to six miles apart, a bright light was placed in a
conspicuous position on the schooner, and the vessel held steadily
to her course, so that the approaching propeller might not mistake
the course of the schooner. That the propeller exhibited no light
except that occasionally thrown out by the sparks from her chimney.
That sometime after, the master of the schooner, by close
observation, discovered that the propeller was directly forward of
the beam of the schooner, close upon her, and steering directly for
her. He then hailed the steamboat, and ordered his helm aport, but
too late to avoid the collision, which caused the schooner to sink
immediately.
The answer admits that the lights of the schooner were seen when
five miles off, and states that the steamboat was on a course of
east-southeast, and continued on that course for a short time after
seeing the light of the schooner, but that, as the schooner
appeared "far in shore," in order to give her lake room,
Page 58 U. S. 154
the propeller bore away into the lake about three quarters of a
point, and that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the
schooner in not keeping her course.
The answer also alleges as a defense that the schooner and cargo
had been insured and abandoned to the insurers, who accepted the
abandonment and had paid the insurance to the libellant prior to
the filing of the libel.
1. On the first point, as to the party to whom the fault of this
collision is to be imputed, we entirely concur with the judgment of
the district and circuit courts. The testimony of libellant's
witnesses is consistent, and, connected with the admissions of the
answer and of respondent's witnesses, is conclusive to show that
the fault was in the steamboat. The master of the steamboat was not
on board on that occasion, and the testimony of the mate, who had
command and by whose obliquity of vision or want of judgment the
steamboat was so dexterously brought into collision with the
schooner, attempts to excuse his conduct by a statement of facts
disproved by all the other witnesses and demonstrably incorrect. He
admits that he saw the bright light of the schooner five miles off.
He asserts that the schooner's light appeared on the starboard bow
of the steamer; this is clearly a mistake in his statement of
facts, or, if true, was occasioned by the steamer's turning out of
her course.
The theory of mere negligence or inattention will hardly account
for this collision. Defendant's witnesses admit that they at one
time mistook the bright light of the schooner for the Presque Isle
lighthouse, and it is evident that, laboring under this delusion,
they must have steered directly for the schooner's light, not
discovering their mistake till it was too late to remedy it. The
night, though dark, had some starlight, by which the land, some six
miles off, showed itself above the horizon. With a channel and room
to pass as wide as the lake, with the bright light of the schooner
full in view for more than twenty minutes before the collision, it
cannot be accounted for except by the hypothesis of the active
cooperation of the officers of the steamboat, caused by a delusion
under which they continued to labor in consequence of a reckless
inattention to their duty.
It is contended on behalf of respondent that the fault of the
collision is to be attributed to the schooner because she did not
keep on her course and leave the steamboat to pass as best she
could, according to the rules laid down by this Court in the case
of
St. John v.
Paine, 10 How. 557. The answer to this argument is
obvious. When the master of the schooner first observed that he was
sailing on a line with the steamboat, and ordered his helm to be
ported so as to avoid being on the track of the approaching vessel,
they were seven or eight miles or more apart,
Page 58 U. S. 155
not in the narrow channel, but in the wide lake. There was no
immediate danger of a collision. The order was one of extreme
caution; it did not tend to produce the collision, for when the
light of the schooner was first seen five miles off, the schooner
was sailing steadily on her course of northwest by north, making an
angle of one point with the course of the steamer, and continued on
that course till she was run down and sunk.
The rules laid down by this Court for avoiding collision should
be strictly adhered to so that conflicting orders may not produce
the collision instead of avoiding it. But in the present case, when
the schooner changed her course, the vessels were in no danger of
collision, being many miles apart in an open sea. They had not
approached to that point of danger which brings the rules of the
admiralty into exercise and makes their observance necessary in
order to avoid a collision. When the steamer first discovered the
light of the schooner, she was sailing steadily on the course
adopted, and continued to do so till the collision was produced by
the perverse dexterity of the helmsman of the steamboat.
2. The defense set up in the answer, that the libellants have
received satisfaction from the insurers, cannot avail the
respondent. The contract with the insurer is in the nature of a
wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no
concern. The insurer does not stand in the relation of a joint
trespasser, so that satisfaction accepted from him shall be a
release of others. This is a doctrine well established at common
law and received in courts of admiralty.
See Yates v.
Whyte, 4 Bing.N.C. 272; Phillips on Insurance, 2163; Abbott on
Shipping 318.
It is true that in courts of common law, the injured party alone
can sue for a trespass, as the damages are not legally assignable;
and if there be an equitable claimant, he can sue only in the name
of the injured party, whereas in admiralty the person equitably
entitled may sue in his own name. But the same reasons why the
wrongdoer cannot be allowed to set up as a defense the equities
between the insurer and insured equally apply in both courts. The
respondent is not presumed to know or bound to inquire as to the
relative equities of parties claiming the damages. He is bound to
make satisfaction for the injury he has done. When he has once made
it to the injured party, he cannot be made liable to another suit
at the instance of any merely equitable claimant. If notified of
such a claim before payment, he may compel the claimants to
interplead; otherwise, in making reparation for a wrong done, he
need look no further than to the party injured. If others claim a
right to stand in his place, they must intervene in proper time or
lose their recourse to the respondent.
Page 58 U. S. 156
The insurer may at all times intervene in courts of admiralty if
he has the equitable right to the whole or any part of the damages.
Under the 34th rule in admiralty of this Court, he may be allowed
to intervene and become the
dominus litis where he can
show an abandonment which devests the original claimant of all
interest.
See 1 Curtis 340. Under the 43d rule, also, he
may intervene after decree and claim the damages recovered by
showing that he is equitably entitled to them. But with all this
the respondent has no concern, nor can he defend himself by setting
up these equities of others unless he can show that he has made
satisfaction to the party justly entitled to receive the
damages.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
Affirmed with costs.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL dissented.
In the cases of
The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison,
in admiralty, and in those of
Clapp v. City of Providence
and of
The Bank of Tennessee v. Horn, I dissent from the
opinion and decision of this Court, not upon the merits of those
cases, but upon the ground of a want of jurisdiction in this Court
to adjudicate them. The reasons for my objection to the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases like those above mentioned have
been so frequently assigned in preceding instances before this
Court that a repetition of them on the present occasion is deemed
superfluous. My purpose is simply to maintain my own consistency in
adhering to convictions which are in no wise weakened.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this
Court that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause be,
and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs and interest until paid
at the same rate per annum that similar judgments bear in the
courts of the State of New York.