Congress have directed by law that in certain cases the duties
of collectors of the revenue should be united with those of naval
officer or surveyor of the port, but never with those of inspector
of the customs.
Therefore, where a person held the two offices of collector of
the revenue and inspector of the customs, and charged a salary for
each office separately, it was irregular.
In May, 1822, Congress passed an act, 3 Stat. 693, directing
that
"No collector, surveyor, or naval officer, shall ever receive
more than $400 annually, exclusive of his compensation as
collector, surveyor, or naval officer, and the fines and
forfeitures allowed by law for any services he may perform for the
United States in any other office or capacity."
This act was intended to provide compensation to the collector
&c., for extraordinary services incident to their respective
offices, and to them only; but did not include the union of the two
offices of collector and inspector of the customs. A different mode
and rate of compensation for inspectors was provided by law.
There was an agreed statement of facts in the record, which is
transcribed in the opinion of the Court, and therefore it is
unnecessary to recite it here.
Stewart was sued in 1835, and voluntarily appeared. From
Page 58 U. S. 117
that time to 1850, the cause was regularly continued upon the
docket. Under the instructions of the court, the jury found a
verdict for the plaintiffs, for $638.81, with interest from the
13th of January, 1833.
Stewart brought the case up to this Court by writ of error.
Page 58 U. S. 124
Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes before us upon a writ of error to a judgment of
the Circuit Court of the United States for Washington County, in
the District of Columbia, in favor of the defendants in error
against the plaintiff as collector of the revenue for the District
of Michilimackinac. The jury, upon the trial in the circuit
Page 58 U. S. 125
court, rendered a verdict for the defendants in error for the
sum of $638.81, with interest thereon from the 13th day of January,
1833, and for this amount the court, at its October term, 1852,
gave judgment.
The questions of law passed upon and reserved by a bill of
exceptions in the court below, and which this Court are now called
on to review, arise upon the following agreed statement of facts,
namely:
That on or about the 12th March, 1818, the defendant was
appointed by the President of the United States collector for the
District of Michilimackinac, and inspector of the revenue for the
port thereof, which offices he continued to hold, by successive
reappointments, and to receive the emoluments of, till the 15th day
of January, 1833.
"That on or about the 1st April, 1819, the defendant was
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury inspector of the customs
for the port of Michilimackinac, which office he continued to hold
under his original appointment until January 15, 1833. The
defendant's is the only case found on record of a collector holding
at the same time the office of inspector of the customs. His
allowance, in this capacity, was fixed by the Secretary at forty
dollars a month, and so continued until the second quarter of the
year 1820, when it was increased by the Secretary to three dollars
per day, the maximum allowance permitted by law to a regular
inspector of the customs. The defendant continued to be paid, as
inspector of the customs, at this rate, till the 1st July, 1822,
when the Act of Congress of the 7th May, 1822, went into effect,
entitled, 'An act further to establish the compensation of officers
of the customs, and to alter certain collection districts, and for
other purposes.' 3 Stat. 693. The 18th section of this act is as
follows:"
" No collector, surveyor, or naval officer shall ever receive
more than $400 annually, exclusive of his compensation as
collector, surveyor, or naval officer, and the fines and
forfeitures allowed by law, for any services he may perform for the
United States in any other office or capacity."
"A copy of the foregoing law was duly transmitted by the
Treasury Department to the defendant. In his accounts for the 3d
and 4th quarters of the year 1822, the defendant charged
compensation at the rate of $3 a day as inspector of customs, which
charge was disallowed at the Treasury, and in his accounts for the
first three quarters of the year 1823, he charged compensation at
the rate of $40 a month as inspector of the customs, which latter
charge was also disallowed at the Treasury. The defendant rendered
several other accounts, containing no charge as inspector of the
customs, till the end of the year 1824. In a Treasury settlement,
made at that date, the defendant is
Page 58 U. S. 126
credited with $1,000,"
"the amount of an allowance made by the Secretary of the
Treasury, to the collector, for services as inspector, from 1st
July, 1822, to 31st of December, 1824, at $400 per annum."
"In his account rendered for the 1st quarter of the year 1825,
the defendant charged himself with the balance found due from him
on the next preceding settlement, in which he had been allowed but
$400 per annum, as inspector of the customs, and in his several
successive settlements from that time to 31st December, 1831,
continued to charge only $400 per annum, as inspector of the
customs."
"By the Act of 2 March, 1831, 'to regulate the foreign and
coasting trade on the northern, northwestern, and northeastern
frontiers of the United States, and for other purposes,' 4 Stat.
487, the compensation of every collector, on the northern and
northeastern and northwestern lakes and rivers, 'was fixed at an
amount equal to the entire compensation received by such officer
during the past year.' The defendant was credited in 1831 and
subsequently, with the compensation allowed to him in 1830, being
$835 85/100, which included $400, allowed him as inspector of the
customs. In 1832, he charged his compensation under this law, but
in the 4th quarter of that year he claimed the difference between
$400 and 1,095 a year from the 30th of June, 1822, to the 31st of
December, 1832, being $7,297 50/100, for ten years and six months.
This claim was, before the commencement of this suit, presented to
the accounting officers of the Treasury for their examination, and
was disallowed. On the foregoing evidence, the counsel for the
defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury as follows: that
the 18th section of the Act of Congress, passed on the 7th of May,
1822, further to establish the compensation of the officers of the
customs &c., was not intended to operate, and ought not to be
construed as operating, so as to limit the salary or compensation
of any district officer, which may by distinct and independent
appointment be vested in the person of one holding at the same time
the separate office of collector, surveyor, or naval officer, and
that such limitation applies only to cases where the collector,
surveyor, or naval officer is called to perform services in any
other office or capacity, in virtue of, and as an incident to, his
office -- not to any case where either of those officers was
appointed to and executed the duties of another separate office,
whilst collector, surveyor, or naval officer."
"If, therefore, the defendant was appointed to, and held and
exercised, the office of inspector of customs, at the same time as
that of collector of Michilimackinac, such office of inspector was
not within the purview of the 18th section of the said act."
"Which instruction the court refused to give. "
Page 58 U. S. 127
In the above statement of the claim of the plaintiff in error
there is an apparent confusion in terms which it may be proper here
to mention, although its elucidation is not deemed essential to the
decision of this case. Thus it is said that the plaintiff in error
was, in March, 1818, commissioned by the President collector for
the District of Michilimackinac and inspector of the revenue for
the port thereof, which offices he held by successive commissions
until the 15th of January, 1833. In the next place it is stated
that the plaintiff in error was, on the 1st of April, 1819,
appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury inspector of the customs
for that port, which latter office he also continued to hold under
this appointment until the 15th of January, 1833.
If by these two statements a distinction is designed between the
office of inspector of the revenue and that of inspector of the
customs, this Court can perceive no warrant for any such
distinction, but must regard the terms used as properly applicable
to those inspectors or agents who, by the 21st section of the
revenue law of March 2, 1799, are authorized, together with
weighers, gaugers, and measurers, to be employed by the collectors,
with the approbation of the officer at the head of the Treasury
Department.
Again, regarding as we do the place of inspector, alleged to
have been conferred by each of the appointments spoken of by the
plaintiff, to be the same in character and objects as provided in
the statutes, there would be a manifest irregularity in an attempt
to refer its origin and commencement to different sources of
creation, and thus to cover the same duties and obligations, and
for the same period of time, under the guise of distinct and
separate commissions.
The foundation of the claim preferred by the plaintiff in error
rests on the position that the offices of collector and surveyor
are separate and different in their character and in the powers and
duties allotted to each, and that under his separate commission and
in the discharge of his separate and appropriate duties, each
officer is entitled to his separate and appropriate
compensation.
Let us examine this proposition -- nay, let it, as a general
proposition, be conceded -- the inquiry will still remain how far
the concession will sustain the claim of the plaintiff in the
present instance.
It is undeniably true that the Act of Congress of March 2, 1799,
Stat. 642, creates and enumerates separately the different offices
of collector, naval officer, surveyor of the port, inspector,
weigher, gauger, and measurer, and defines and prescribes the
functions and duties of each respectively. And it is clear that in
ports or districts in which all these offices
Page 58 U. S. 128
are called into actual existence, the functions and duties
assigned to any one of them are not appropriated in terms nor by
necessary implication to any of the others; on the contrary, those
duties and functions, as distributed by the law, appear to be
different, and in some sense incompatible with their union in the
same individual, being in some instances in their nature
supervisory and being designed to insure the fulfillment of a
portion of those duties by others.
But whilst this is the case, there cannot be denied to Congress
the power, under circumstances satisfactory to themselves, to blend
in the same person or office functions or duties which, under
another aspect of facts, they have thought it proper to divide and
distribute. This is clearly a question of legislative discretion
bearing upon views of public necessity or policy, and accordingly
we find that, in view of such policy or necessity, Congress has, by
the very same Act of March 2, 1799, materially modified and to a
certain extent contravened the previous organization prescribed for
the collection of the revenue, adapting such modification to the
facts or necessities as they should really exist.
Notwithstanding, however, the power must be conceded to Congress
to combine in the same officer duties and powers in their nature
seemingly incompatible, that power can be conceded to the
legislative authority alone and expressly declared, and cannot be
implied upon any sound principle of legal interpretation or of
public policy. Congress have, it is true, ordained in certain
conjunctures the union of the duties of collector, naval officer,
and surveyor of the port, but under no circumstances have they
transferred to either of the officers just enumerated the duties of
inspector of the customs. This last-named agent, it is said by the
statute, may, with the approbation of the officer at the head of
the Treasury Department, be employed by the collector. Under this
provision of the statute, the question arises whether the collector
qua collector can, under any circumstances, apart from
express legislative direction, become inspector of the customs, or
under the authority to employ such an agent can contract with
himself to employ himself as such an agent? We are very sure that
such a proceeding on the part of the collector is not authorized by
the language of the statute, and we think it not warranted by any
sound principle of policy, which on the contrary would inculcate a
course tending rather to prevent than to invite to fraud and
collusion. The collector therefore is not the inspector
virtute
officii, nor warranted in employing himself as inspector, nor
in assuming the functions, nor in claiming the compensation,
allowable to the latter officer.
In the case under consideration, the plaintiff in error has,
by
Page 58 U. S. 129
the accounting officers of the government, been allowed for
compensation, as inspector the sum of $40 per month until sometime
in the year 1820, and from the period last mentioned he was, for
similar services, allowed the compensation of $3
per diem
until the 1st of July, 1822, from which last period the
compensation of the collector was limited by the government, for
all extra services, to the sum of $400 per annum, under the 18th
section of the Act of May 7, 1822, which declares
"That no collector, surveyor, or naval officer, shall ever
receive more than $400 annually, exclusive of his compensation as
collector, surveyor, or naval officer, and the fines and
forfeitures allowed by law for any services he may perform for the
United States in any other office or capacity."
The several allowances made by the government to the plaintiff
in error, as inspector of the customs and received by him in that
character and acquiesced in by both parties may be regarded as no
longer presenting subjects of controversy, but the facts of such
allowances and the acceptance of them cannot be permitted to
control the construction of a public law, nor to influence a claim
now asserted under the provisions of that law; much less can they
be regarded as affecting the power of Congress to regulate
prospectively the duties and emoluments of agents created by its
authority. When, therefore, the plaintiff in error advances a claim
in the character of inspector, he must establish a legal and
competent appointment to the office of inspector and an
appropriation to him of the duties and emoluments incident thereto.
For these he has appealed to the revenue law of March 2, 1799; but
neither in that nor in any other revenue law do we perceive as
appertaining to him as collector the authority and functions of
inspector, nor any right to compensation for the services of the
latter officer.
With regard to the allowance of $400 per annum, although
accorded to him in settlement as inspector of the customs, it is
plain from the language of the statute of May 7, 1822, ยง 18, that
this was intended to provide compensation to the collector, naval
officer, and surveyor of the port for extraordinary services
incident to their respective offices, and to them only, and did not
embrace the subordinate position of inspector, as to which a
different mode and rate of compensation -- that is, one graduated
by the month or by the day -- had been provided. To entitle himself
to this latter compensation, the claimant must show himself
regularly and exactly in the situation to which the law has
allotted it. Upon a consideration of the case, we regard the
question properly before us to be this: whether the collector, as
such and in virtue of his office, can claim compensation for
services not required by the language of the statute by which
Page 58 U. S. 130
his duties are prescribed, nor inherently nor regularly
appropriate to his office -- services which the law has, upon
obvious principles of policy, imposed on another and a different
agent, subordinate to the collector, the performance of which
services it is made the duty of the collector to supervise and
enforce. We are of the opinion that the collector could have no
such claim, and therefore decide that the judgment of the circuit
court be
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia, holden in and for the County of Washington, and was
argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered
and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said circuit
court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed.