SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SHAWN PATRICK LYNCH
v. ARIZONA
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
supreme court of arizona
No. 15–8366. Decided May 31, 2016
Per Curiam.
Under
Simmons v.
South Carolina,
512 U. S. 154 (1994) , and its progeny, “where a capital
defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only
sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life
imprisonment without possibility of parole,” the Due Process Clause
“entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole
ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by
counsel.’ ”
Shafer v.
South Carolina, 532
U. S. 36, 39 (2001) (quoting
Ramdass v.
Angelone, 530 U. S. 156, 165 (2000) (plurality
opinion)). In the decision below, the Arizona Supreme Court found
that the State had put petitioner Shawn Patrick Lynch’s future
dangerousness at issue during his capital sentencing proceeding and
acknowledged that Lynch’s only alternative sentence to death was
life imprisonment without parole. 238 Ariz. 84, 103, 357 P. 3d 119,
138 (2015). But the court nonetheless concluded that Lynch had no
right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility.
Ibid.
The judgment is reversed.
A jury convicted Lynch of first-degree murder,
kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary for the 2001 killing of
James Panzarella. The State sought the death penalty. Before
Lynch’s penalty phase trial began, Arizona moved to prevent his
counsel from informing the jury that the only alternative sentence
to death was life without the possibility of parole. App. K to Pet.
for Cert. The court granted the motion.
Lynch’s first penalty phase jury failed to reach
a unanimous verdict. A second jury was convened and sentenced Lynch
to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the sentence
because the jury instructions improperly described Arizona law. The
court did not address Lynch’s alternative argument that the trial
court had violated
Simmons. On remand, a third penalty phase
jury sentenced Lynch to death.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, this time
considering and rejecting Lynch’s
Simmons claim. The court
agreed that, during the third penalty phase, “[t]he State suggested
. . . that Lynch could be dangerous.” 238 Ariz., at 103,
357 P. 3d, at 138. The court also recognized that Lynch was parole
ineligible: Under Arizona law, “parole is available only to
individuals who committed a felony before January 1, 1994,” and
Lynch committed his crimes in 2001.
Ibid. (citing Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §41–1604.09(I)). Nevertheless, while “[a]n instruction
that parole is not currently available would be correct,” the court
held that “the failure to give the
Simmons instruction was
not error.” 238 Ariz., at 103, 357 P. 3d, at 138.
That conclusion conflicts with this Court’s
precedents. In
Simmons, as here, a capital defendant was
ineligible for parole under state law. 512 U. S., at 156
(plurality opinion). During the penalty phase, the State argued
that the jurors should consider the defendant’s future
dangerousness when determining the proper punishment.
Id.,
at 157. But the trial court refused to permit defense counsel to
tell the jury that the only alternative sentence to death was life
without parole.
Id., at 157, 160. The Court reversed,
reasoning that due process entitled the defendant to rebut the
prosecution’s argument that he posed a future danger by informing
his sentencing jury that he is parole ineligible.
Id., at
161–162;
id., at 178 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
The Court’s opinions reiterated that holding in
Ramdass,
Shafer, and
Kelly v.
South Carolina, 534
U. S. 246 (2002) .
The Arizona Supreme Court thought Arizona’s
sentencing law sufficiently different from the others this Court
had considered that
Simmons did not apply. It relied on the
fact that, under state law, Lynch could have received a life
sentence that would have made him eligible for “release” after 25
years. 238 Ariz., at 103–104, 357 P. 3d, at 138–139; §13–751(A).
But under state law, the only kind of release for which Lynch would
have been eligible—as the State does not contest—is executive
clemency. See Pet. for Cert. 22; 238 Ariz., at 103–104, 357 P. 3d,
at 138–139. And
Simmons expressly rejected the argument that
the possibility of clemency diminishes a capital defendant’s right
to inform a jury of his parole ineligibility. There, South Carolina
had argued that the defendant need not be allowed to present this
information to the jury “because future exigencies,” including
“commutation [and] clemency,” could one day “allow [him] to be
released into society.” 512 U. S., at 166 (plurality opinion).
The Court disagreed: “To the extent that the State opposes even a
simple parole-ineligibility instruction because of hypothetical
future developments, the argument has little force.”
Ibid.;
id., at 177 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (explaining that the
defendant had a right “to bring his parole ineligibility to the
jury’s attention” and that the State could respond with “truthful
information regarding the availability of commutation, pardon, and
the like”).
The State responds that
Simmons
“ ‘applies only to instances where, as a legal matter, there
is
no possibility of parole.’ ” Brief in Opposition 11
(quoting
Ramdass, 530 U. S., at 169 (plurality
opinion)). Notwithstanding the fact that Arizona law currently
prevents all felons who committed their offenses after 1993 from
obtaining parole, 238 Ariz., at 103, 357 P. 3d, at 138, Arizona
reasons that “nothing prevents the legislature from creating a
parole system in the future for which [Lynch] would have been
eligible had the court sentenced him to life with the possibility
of release after 25 years.” Brief in Opposition 12.
This Court’s precedents also foreclose that
argument.
Simmons said that the potential for future
“legislative reform” could not justify refusing a
parole-ineligibility instruction. 512 U. S., at 166 (plurality
opinion). If it were otherwise, a State could always argue that its
legislature might pass a law rendering the defendant parole
eligible. Accordingly, as this Court later explained, “the
dispositive fact in
Simmons was that the defendant
conclusively established his parole ineligibility under state law
at the time of his trial.”
Ramdass,
supra, at 171
(plurality opinion). In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court
confirmed that parole was unavailable to Lynch under its law.
Simmons and its progeny establish Lynch’s right to inform
his jury of that fact.
The petition for writ of certiorari and the
motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis are granted.
The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.