Sheriff v. Gillie, 578 U.S. ___ (2016)
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “abusive debt collection practices,” 15 U.S.C. 1692(a)–(d), barring “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s].” The definition of “debt collectors,” excludes “any officer . . . of . . . any State to the extent that collecting . . . any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” Under Ohio law, overdue debts owed to state-owned agencies and instrumentalities are certified to the State’s Attorney General, who may appoint, as independent contractors, private attorneys, as “special counsel” to act on the Attorney General’s behalf. Special counsel must use the Attorney General’s letterhead in communicating with debtors. Attorneys appointed as special counsel, sent debt collection letters on the Attorney General’s letterhead to debtors, with signature blocks containing the name and address of the signatory as well as the designation “special” or “outside” counsel to the Attorney General. Each letter identified the sender as a debt collector seeking payment for debts to a state institution. Debtors filed a putative class action, alleging violation of FDCPA. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated, concluding that special counsel, as independent contractors, are not entitled to the FDCPA’s state-officer exemption. The Supreme Court reversed. Even if special counsel are not “state officers” under the Act, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not violate Section 1692e. The letterhead identifies the principal—Ohio’s Attorney General—and the signature block names the agent—a private lawyer. A debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the Attorney General’s Office is “scarcely inaccurate.”
Attorneys appointed as special counsel to act on a state Attorney General's behalf in collecting debts owed to state agencies or instrumentalities may use the Attorney General's letterhead in debt collection efforts without violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, since the state-officer exemption in the FDCPA applies.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SHERIFF et al. v. GILLIE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 15–338. Argued March 29, 2016—Decided May 16, 2016
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or Act) aims to eliminate “abusive debt collection practices,” 15 U. S. C. §1692(a)–(d), by, as relevant here, barring “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] . . . in connection with the collection of any debt,” §1692e. Governing “debt collectors,” the Act excludes from the definition of that term “any officer . . . of . . . any State to the extent that collecting . . . any debt is in the performance of his official duties.” §1692a(6)(C).
Under Ohio law, overdue debts owed to state-owned agencies and instrumentalities are certified to the State’s Attorney General for collection or disposition. Carrying out this responsibility, the Attorney General appoints, as independent contractors, private attorneys, naming them “special counsel” to act on the Attorney General’s behalf. The Attorney General requires special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in communicating with debtors. Among the special counsel appointed by the Attorney General in 2012 were petitioners Mark Sheriff and Eric Jones. Consistent with the Attorney General’s direction, Sheriff’s law firm and Jones sent debt collection letters on the Attorney General’s letterhead to respondents Hazel Meadows and Pamela Gillie, respectively. The signature block of each letter contained the name and address of the signatory as well as the designation “special” or “outside” counsel to the State Attorney General. Each letter also identified the sender as a debt collector seeking payment for debts to a state institution. Meadows and Gillie filed a putative class action in Federal District Court, alleging that defendants had, by using the Attorney General’s letterhead, employed deceptive and misleading means to attempt to collect consumer debts, in violation of the FDCPA. The Ohio Attorney General intervened, seeking a declaratory judgment that special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is neither false nor misleading, and urging that special counsel be deemed officers of the State exempted from the Act. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants, holding that special counsel are “officers” of the State and, in any event, their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is not false or misleading. The Sixth Circuit vacated that judgment, concluding that special counsel, as independent contractors, are not entitled to the FDCPA’s state-officer exemption. The appeals court remanded for trial the question whether use of the Attorney General’s letterhead would mislead a debtor into believing that it is the Attorney General who is collecting the debt.
Held: Assuming, arguendo, that special counsel do not rank as “state officers” within the meaning of the Act, petitioners’ use of the Attorney General’s letterhead, nevertheless, does not offend §1692e.
Special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead at the Attorney General’s direction does not offend §1692e’s general prohibition against “false . . . or misleading representation[s].” The letterhead identifies the principal—Ohio’s Attorney General—and the signature block names the agent—a private lawyer hired as outside counsel to the Attorney General. The character of the relationship between special counsel and the Attorney General bolsters the Court’s determination. Special counsel work closely with attorneys in the Attorney General’s Office, providing legal services on the Attorney General’s behalf in furtherance of the Attorney General’s debt collection responsibilities for the State. A debtor’s impression that a letter from special counsel is a letter from the Attorney General’s Office is thus scarcely inaccurate.
Special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead is also consistent with §1692e(9)’s specific prohibition against “falsely represent[ing]” that a communication is “authorized, issued, or approved” by a State. Because the Attorney General authorized—indeed required—special counsel to use his letterhead, special counsel create no false impression in doing just that. Nor did special counsel use an untrue name in their letters, in violation of §1692e(14). Special counsel do not employ a false name when they use the Attorney General’s letterhead at his instruction, for special counsel act as the Attorney General’s agents in debt-related matters. The Court sees no reason, furthermore, to construe the FDCPA in a manner that would interfere with the Attorney General’s chosen method of fulfilling his statutory obligation to collect the State’s debts.
The Sixth Circuit raises the specter of consumer confusion and the risk of intimidation from special counsel’s use of the Attorney General’s letterhead, but its exposition is unconvincing. Pp. 6–11.
785 F. 3d 1091, reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.