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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 14–1504
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ROBERT J. WITTMAN, et al., APPELLANTS v. GLORIA
PERSONHUBALLAH, et al.
on appeal from the united states district court for the eastern
district of virginia
[May 23, 2016]
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
Ten Members of Congress from Virginia, intervenors in the
District Court below, have appealed a judgment from a three-judge
panel striking down a congressional redistricting plan applicable
to the November 2016 election. We conclude that the intervenors now
lack standing to pursue the appeal. And we consequently order the
appeal dismissed.
I
This lawsuit began in October 2013, after the then-Governor of
Virginia signed into law a new congressional redistricting plan
(which we shall call the “Enacted Plan”) designed to reflect the
results of the 2010 census. Three voters from Congressional
District 3 brought this lawsuit against the Commonwealth. They
challenged the Enacted Plan on the ground that its redrawing of
their district’s lines was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
The Members of Congress now before us intervened to help defend the
Enacted Plan.
After a bench trial, a divided three-judge District Court agreed
with the voters. It concluded that the Commonwealth had used race
as the predominant basis for modifying the boundaries of District
3. Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 58 F.
Supp. 3d 533, 550 (ED Va. 2014). And it found that the
Commonwealth’s use of race, when scrutinized strictly, was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
Id., at 553.
The Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal. Instead, the
intervenor Members of Congress appealed the District Court’s
judgment to this Court. See 28 U. S. C. §1253 (granting
the right to directly appeal certain three-judge district court
orders to the Supreme Court). Having just decided a racial
gerrymandering case, Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 575 U. S. ___ (2015), we vacated the District
Court’s judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of that
recent decision. Cantor v. Personhuballah, 575
U. S. ___ (2015).
On remand the District Court again decided that District 3, as
modified by the Enacted Plan, was an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander. Page v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,
2015 WL 3604029, *19 (ED Va., June 5, 2015). The court’s order set
forth a deadline of September 1, 2015, for the Virginia Legislature
to adopt a new redistricting plan.
Again, the Commonwealth of Virginia decided not to appeal. And
again, the intervenor Members of Congress appealed to this Court.
On September 28, 2015, we asked the parties to file supplemental
briefs addressing whether the intervenors had standing to appeal
the District Court’s decision. 576 U. S. ___. As relevant
here, the intervenors argued in their supplemental brief that they
had standing because the District Court’s order, if allowed to
stand, would necessarily result in a redrawing of their districts
that would harm some of the intervenors’ reelection prospects. On
November 13, 2015, we issued an order explaining that the Court was
“postpon[ing]” “consideration of the question of jurisdiction”
until “the hearing of the case on the merits.” In addition, our
order instructed the parties to dedicate a portion of their briefs
and their oral argument time to the issue of standing—specifically,
“[w]hether [the intervenors] lack standing because none reside in
or represent the only congressional district whose
constitutionality is at issue in this case.” 577 U. S.
___.
In the meantime, the Virginia Legislature failed to meet the
September 1 deadline imposed by the District Court. The District
Court thus appointed a Special Master to develop a new districting
plan. The Special Master did so, and on January 7, 2016, the
District Court approved that plan (which we shall call the
“Remedial Plan”). The intervenor Members of Congress asked this
Court to stay implementation of the Remedial Plan pending
resolution of their direct appeal to this Court. We declined to do
so. 577 U. S. ___ (2016). On March 21, we heard oral argument.
That argument focused both on (1) the merits of intervenors’ claims
denying any racial gerrymander and (2) the question of standing. In
respect to standing, the Court focused on whether the District
Court’s approval of the Remedial Plan on January 7 supported, or
undermined, the intervenors’ standing argument that, in the absence
of the original Enacted Plan, they would suffer harm. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 9–23.
II
As our request for supplemental briefing, our order postponing
consideration of jurisdiction, and our questions at oral argument
suggested, we cannot decide the merits of this case unless the
intervenor Members of Congress challenging the District Court’s
racial-gerrymandering decision have standing. We conclude that the
intervenors now lack standing. We must therefore dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.
Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts the
power to decide legal questions only in the presence of an actual
“Cas[e]” or “Controvers[y].” This restriction requires a party
invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction to demonstrate standing.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U. S. 43, 64 (1997) . A party has standing only if he shows
that he has suffered an “injury in fact,” that the injury is
“fairly traceable” to the conduct being challenged, and that the
injury will likely be “redressed” by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555
–561 (1992) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). The
need to satisfy these three requirements persists throughout the
life of the lawsuit. Arizonans for Official English, 520
U. S., at 67.
The relevant parties here are the intervenor Members of
Congress. Since the Commonwealth of Virginia has not pursued an
appeal, only the intervenors currently attack the District Court’s
decision striking down the Enacted Plan. And an “intervenor cannot
step into the shoes of the original party” (here, the Commonwealth)
“unless the intervenor independently ‘fulfills the requirements of
Article III.’ ” Id., at 65 (quoting Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 68 (1986) ).
Although 10 current and former Members of Congress are
technically intervenors, only 3 of the 10 now claim before this
Court that they have standing. Those three Members are
Representative Randy Forbes, Representative Robert Wittman, and
Representative David Brat.
Representative Forbes, the Republican incumbent in Congressional
District 4, told us in his brief that, unless the Enacted Plan is
upheld, District 4 will be “completely transform[ed] from a 48%
Democratic district into a safe 60% Democratic district.” Brief for
Appellants 58. According to Forbes, the threat of that kind of
transformation compelled him to run in a different district,
namely, Congressional District 2.
At oral argument, Forbes’ counsel told the Court that, if the
Enacted Plan were reinstated, Representative Forbes would abandon
his election effort in Congressional District 2 and run in his old
district, namely, Congressional District 4. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10.
Soon after oral argument, however, the Court received a letter from
counsel stating that Representative Forbes would “continue to seek
election in District 2 regardless of whether the Enacted Plan is
reinstated.” Letter from Counsel for Appellants to Scott S. Harris,
Clerk of Court (Mar. 25, 2016), p. 2. Given this letter, we do not
see how any injury that Forbes might have suffered “is likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 570 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at
5–6). Consequently, we need not decide whether, at the time he
first intervened, Representative Forbes possessed standing.
Regardless, he does not possess standing now. See Arizonans for
Official English, supra, at 65; Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472 –478 (1990).
Representative Wittman and Representative Brat are Republicans
representing Congressional District 1 and Congressional District 7,
respectively. In their opening brief they argue that they have
standing to challenge the District Court’s order because, unless
the Enacted Plan is reinstated, “a portion of the[ir] ‘base
electorate’ ” will necessarily be replaced with “unfavorable
Democratic voters,” thereby reducing the likelihood of the
Representatives’ reelection. Brief for Appellants 58; see also
Application for Stay of Remedial Plan Pending Resolution of Direct
Appeal of Liability Judgment 25. Even assuming, without deciding,
that this kind of injury is legally cognizable, Representatives
Wittman and Brat have not identified record evidence establishing
their alleged harm.
We have made clear that the “party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of establishing” that he has suffered an injury by
submitting “affidavit[s] or other evidence.” Lujan, 504
U. S., at 561. When challenged by a court (or by an opposing
party) concerned about standing, the party invoking the court’s
jurisdiction cannot simply allege a nonobvious harm, without more.
Ibid. Here, there is no “more.” Representatives Wittman and
Brat claim that unless the Enacted Plan is reinstated, their
districts will be flooded with Democratic voters and their chances
of reelection will accordingly be reduced. But we have examined the
briefs, looking for any evidence that an alternative to the Enacted
Plan (including the Remedial Plan) will reduce the relevant
intervenors’ chances of reelection, and have found none. The briefs
focus on Congressional District 3 and Congressional District 4,
districts with which Representatives Wittman and Brat are not
associated.
We need go no further. Given the lack of evidence that any of
the three Representatives has standing, we need not decide when, or
whether, evidence of the kind of injury they allege would prove
sufficient for purposes of Article III’s requirements. In light of
the letter we have received about Representative Forbes, and the
absence of any evidence in the briefs supporting any harm to the
other two Representatives, we conclude that none of the intervenors
has standing to bring an appeal in this case. We consequently lack
jurisdiction and therefore dismiss this appeal.
It is so ordered.
