SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–462
_________________
DIRECTV, INC., PETITIONER
v. AMY
IMBURGIA, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal
of california, second appellate district
[December 14, 2015]
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor
joins, dissenting.
It has become routine, in a large part due to
this Court’s decisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write
into their form contracts with consumers and employees
no-class-action arbitration clauses. The form contract in this case
contains a Delphic provision stating that “if the law of your
state” does not permit agreements barring class arbitration, then
the entire agreement to arbitrate becomes unenforceable, freeing
the aggrieved customer to commence class-based litigation in court.
This Court reads that provision in a manner most protective of the
drafting enterprise. I would read it, as the California court did,
to give the customer, not the drafter, the benefit of the doubt.
Acknowledging the precedent so far set by the Court, I would take
no further step to disarm consumers, leaving them without effective
access to justice.
I
This case began as a putative class action in
state court claiming that DIRECTV, by imposing hefty
early-termination fees, violated California consumer-protective
legislation, including the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA),
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1750
et seq. (West 2015)
.
App. 58. DIRECTV did not initially seek to stop the lawsuit and
compel bilateral arbitration. See
id., at 52–53. The reason
for DIRECTV’s failure to oppose the litigation is no mystery. The
version of DIRECTV’s service agreement applicable in this case (the
2007 version) requires consumers to arbitrate all disputes and to
forgo class arbitration.
Id., at 128–129. If the relevant
provision stopped there, the Court’s recent precedent, see
American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant,
570 U. S. ___ (2013);
AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333 (2011) , would control, and
DIRECTV could have resisted the lawsuit. But DIRECTV’s form
contract continued:The entire arbitration clause is unenforceable
“[i]f . . . the law of your state would find”
unenforceable the agreement’s class-arbitration prohibition. App.
129. At the time plaintiff-respondents Imburgia and Greiner
commenced their court action, class-arbitration bars like the one
in DIRECTV’s agreement were
per se unenforceable as
unconscionable under the law of California. See
Discover
Bank v.
Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162–163, 113
P. 3d 1100, 1110 (2005).
Nearly three years into the litigation, this
Court held in
Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 338–351, that
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1
et seq., preempts state rules that render
class-arbitration bans unenforceable. DIRECTV then moved to halt
the long-pending lawsuit and compel bilateral arbitration. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 4a. The California Superior Court denied DIRECTV’s
motion, No. BC398295 (Super. Ct. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., Jan. 26,
2012), App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a–20a, and the Califor-nia Court of
Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal first observed that, under the
California law DIRECTV confronted when it drafted the clause in
question, provisions relinquishing the right to proceed under the
CLRA on behalf of a class would not be enforced. 225 Cal. App. 4th
338, 342, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (2014). The question
dispositive of DIRECTV’s motion, the California court explained,
trains on the meaning of the atypical contractual phrase “the law
of your state”: “does it mean ‘the law of your state to the extent
it is not preempted by the FAA,’ or ‘the law of your state without
considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA’?”
Id., at 344, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 195.
In resolving this question, the California court
emphasized that DIRECTV drafted the service agreement, giving its
customers no say in the matter, and reserving to itself the right
to modify the agreement unilaterally at any time.
Id., at
345, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 196. See also Brief for Respondents 1–2.
DIRECTV used the same take-it-or-leave-it contract everywhere it
did business.
Ibid. “[ T ]o protect the party who
did not choose the language from an unintended or unfair result,”
the California court applied “the common-law rule of contract
interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language
against the interest of the party that drafted it.” 225 Cal. App.
4th, at 345, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 196 (quoting
Mastrobuono
v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52 –63
(1995)). That rule was particularly appropriate in this case, the
court reasoned, for, “as a practical matter, it seems unlikely that
plaintiffs anticipated in 2007 that the Supreme Court would hold in
2011 that the FAA preempts” state-law protection against compelled
class-arbitration waivers. 255 Cal. App. 4th, at 345, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 3d, at 196 (internal quotation marks omitted).
II
The Court today holds that the California
Court of Appeal interpreted the language in DIRECTV’s service
agreement so unreasonably as to suggest discrimination against
arbitration in violation of the FAA.
Ante, at 8. As I see
it, the California court’s interpretation of the “law of your
state” provision is not only reasonable, it is entirely right.
Arbitration is a matter of “consent, not
coercion.”
Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 681 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The FAA “requires courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with
their terms.”
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468,
478 (1989) . “[T]he interpretation of private contracts is
ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit
to review.”
Id., at 474. See also
First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944 (1995)
(when interpreting arbitration agreements, courts “should apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
contracts”). Historically, this Court has respected state-court
interpretations of arbitration agreements. See
Mastrobuono,
514 U. S., at 60, n. 4;
Volt Information Sciences, 489
U. S., at 484. Indeed, in the more than 25 years between
Volt Information Sciences and this case, not once has this
Court reversed a state-court decision on the ground that the state
court misapplied state contract law when it determined the meaning
of a term in a particular arbitration agreement. Today’s decision
is a dangerous first.
Beyond genuine debate, DIRECTV originally meant
the “law of your state” clause to refer to its customer’s home
state law untouched by federal preemption. As DIRECTV explained in
a state-court filing, the clause prevented enforcement of the
arbitration agreement in those States, California among them, where
the class-arbitration proscription was unenforceable as a matter of
state law, while requiring bilateral arbitration in States that did
not outlaw purported waivers of class proceedings. App. 52 (“The
Customer Agreement between DIRECTV and its customers provides that
the customer’s home state laws will govern the relationship, and
that any disputes will be resolved in individual arbitration
if the customer’s home state laws enforce the parties’
arbitration agreement.” (emphasis added)).
According to DIRECTV, because the
class-arbitration ban, post-
Concepcion, is enforceable in
all States, this case must now be resolved, if at all, in bilateral
arbitration. The Court agrees. After
Concepcion, the Court
maintains, it no longer matters whether DIRECTV meant California’s
“home state laws” when it drafted the 2007 version of its service
agreement. But
Concepcion held only that a State cannot
compel a party to engage in class arbitration when the
controlling agreement unconditionally prohibits class procedures.
See 563 U. S., at 351 (“Arbitration is a matter of contract,
and the FAA requires courts to honor parties’ expectations,” so
parties may consent to class procedures even though such procedures
“may not be required by state law.”). Just as a contract itself may
provide for class arbitration, so the parties may
choose to
be bound by a particular state law, in this case, the CLRA, even if
the FAA would otherwise displace that state law.
Hall Street
Associates, L. L. C. v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S.
576, 586 (2008) (“[T]he FAA lets parties tailor some, even many,
features of arbitration by contract, including . . .
procedure and choice of substantive law.”).[
1] “In principle,” the Court acknowledges, parties
“might choose to have portions of their contract governed by the
law of Tibet, [or] the law of pre-revolutionary Russia.”
Ante, at 6; see Brief for Petitioner 20 (observing that the
FAA would allow parties “to bind themselves by reference to the
rules of a board game”). Pre-revolutionary Russian law, but not
California’s “home state laws” operative and unquestionably valid
in 2007? Makes little sense to me.
Nothing in
Concepcion or the FAA
nullifies provisions of the CLRA. They hold sway when parties elect
judicial resolution of their disputes, and should similarly control
when parties choose that consumer-protective law to govern their
arbitration agreements. See
Volt Information Sciences, 489
U. S., at 475 (where parties had “incorporat[ed]
. . . California rules of arbitration into their
agreement,” they had “no FAA-guaranteed right to compel
arbitration” on terms inconsistent with those California
rules).[
2] Thus, even after
Concepcion, one could properly refer to the CLRA’s
class-waiver proscription as “California law.” To repeat, the
dispositive question in this case is whether the parties intended
the “law of your state” provision to mean state law as preempted by
federal law, as the Court today reads the provision, or home state
law as framed by the California Legislature, without considering
the preemptive effect of federal law, as the California court read
it.
The latter reading is the better one. DIRECTV
had no occasion to refer to “the law of [its customer’s] state” had
it meant to incorporate state law as preempted by the FAA. That is,
DIRECTV, like virtually every other company with a similar service
agreement, could have employed a clause directly conditioning
enforceability of the arbitration agreement on the exclusion of
class arbitration. Indeed, DIRECTV has done just that in service
agreements both before and after 2007. App. 121 (the 2004 version
provides that “[a] Court may sever any portion of [the arbitration
agreement] that it finds to be unenforce-able, except for the
prohibition on class or representative arbitration”); Brief for
Respondents 35–36 (stating that the June 2015 version of DIRECTV’s
agreement provides that “[a] court may sever any portion of [the
arbitration agreement] that it finds to be unenforceable, except
for the prohibition on [class arbitration]” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Had DIRECTV followed this pattern in its 2007 form
contract, the arbitration agreement, post-
Concepcion,
unquestionably would have been enforceable in all States. In the
2007 version, however, DIRECTV chose a different formulation, one
referring to the “law of [its customer’s] state.” I would not
translate that term to be synonymous with “federal law.” If DIRECTV
meant to exclude the application of California legislation, it
surely chose a bizarre way to accomplish that result.
As earlier noted, see
supra, at 3, and as
the California court appreciated, courts generally construe
ambiguous contractual terms against the drafter. See
Mastrobuono, 514 U. S., at 63 (“Respondents drafted an
ambiguous document, and they cannot now claim the benefit of the
doubt.”). This “common-law rule of contract interpretation,”
id., at 62, reflects the principle that a party should not
be permitted to write an ambiguous term, lock another party into
agreeing to that term, and then reap the benefit of the ambiguity
once a dispute emerges. The rule has particular force where, as
here, a court is interpreting a “standardized contrac[t]” that was
not the product of bilateral bargaining. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts §206, Comment
a (1979).
Allowing DIRECTV to reap the benefit of an
ambiguity it could have avoided would ignore not just the hugely
unequal bargaining power of the parties, but also their reasonable
expectations at the time the contract was formed. See
Mastrobuono, 514 U. S., at 63 (it is particularly
appropriate to construe terms against the drafter where the other
party had no reason to anticipate or intend the drafter’s preferred
result). See also
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U. S. 243, 262 (1984) (“[C]ontract[s]
. . . are to be read in the light of the conditions and
circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a
view to effecting the objects and purposes of the [parties] thereby
contracting.” (quoting
Rocca v.
Thompson, 223
U. S. 317 –332 (1912); ellipsis in original)). At the time
DIRECTV imposed this agreement on its customers, it assumed that
the arbitration clause would be unenforceable in California. App.
52 (explaining in state-court filing that, “[b]ecause California
law would not enforce the arbitration agreement
. . . , DIRECTV has not sought and will not seek to
arbitrate disputes with California customers”). Likewise, any
California customer who read the agreement would scarcely have
understood that she had submitted to bilateral arbitration of any
and all disputes with DIRECTV. She certainly would have had no
reason to anticipate the Court’s decision in
Concepcion,
rendered four years later, or to consider whether “law of your
state” is a chameleon term meaning California legislation when she
received her service contract, but preemptive federal law later
on.
DIRECTV primarily responds that the FAA requires
construction of all terms in arbitration agreements in favor of
arbitrability. True, this Court has found in the FAA a “federal
policy favoring arbitration.”
Ante, at 10 (quoting
Volt
Information Sciences, 489 U. S., at 476). But the Court
has also cautioned that an arbitration-favoring presumption applies
“only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a
judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is
what the parties intended because their express agreement to
arbitrate was validly formed[, is] legally enforceable[,] and [is]
best construed to encompass the dispute.”
Granite Rock Co.
v.
Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 303 (2010) . DIRECTV
acknowledges that “[t]his case . . . involves a threshold
dispute over the enforceability of the parties’ arbitration
agreement” in its entirety. Reply Brief 7. Like the California
court, I would resolve that dispute by employing traditional rules
of contract interpretation
sans any arbitration-favoring
presumption, including the rule that ambiguous language should be
construed against the drafter. See
supra, at 3, 7.
III
Today’s decision steps beyond
Concepcion and
Italian Colors. There, as here, the
Court misread the FAA to deprive consumers of effective relief
against powerful economic entities that write no-class-action
arbitration clauses into their form contracts. In
Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 336, customers brought a
class action claiming that AT&T Mobility had improperly charged
$30.22 in sales tax while advertising cellular telephones as free.
AT&T Mobility’s form consumer contract contained a mandatory
arbitration clause and a class-arbitration proscription. Because
consumers lacked input into the contractual terms, and because few
rational consumers would go through the hassle of pursuing a $30.22
claim in bilateral arbitration, the California courts deemed the
arbitration agreement unenforceable as unconscionable. See
id., at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“ ‘[T]he maximum
gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute
is still just $30.22.’ ” (quoting
Laster v.
AT&T
Mobility LLC, 584 F. 3d 849, 856 (CA9 2009)));
Carnegie v.
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F. 3d
656, 661 (CA7 2004) (“The
realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”), cert.
denied, 543 U. S. 1051 (2005) . Nonetheless, the Court held
that the FAA mandated enforcement of the entire arbitration
agreement, including the class-arbitration ban.
Concepcion,
563 U. S., at 343. Two years later, in
Italian Colors,
570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5), the Court reaffirmed that
class-arbitration prohibitions are enforceable even where claimants
“have no economic incentive to pursue their . . . claims
individually in arbitration.” Today, the Court holds that consumers
lack not only protection against unambiguous class-arbitration bans
in adhesion contracts. They lack even the benefit of the doubt when
anomalous terms in such contracts reasonably could be construed to
protect their rights.[
3]
These decisions have predictably resulted in the
deprivation of consumers’ rights to seek redress for losses, and,
turning the coin, they have insulated powerful economic interests
from liability for violations of consumer-protection laws. See
N. Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2015, p. A1, col. 5 (“By inserting
individual arbitration clauses into a soaring number of consumer
and employment contracts, companies [have] devised a way to
circumvent the courts and bar people from joining together in
class-action lawsuits, realistically the only tool citizens have to
fight illegalor deceitful business practices.”). Studies confirm
that hardly any consumers take advantage of bilateral arbitration
to pursue small-dollar claims. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The
Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L. J. 2804, 2900–2910 (2015)
(Resnik, Diffusing Disputes). Because consumers lack bargaining
power to change the terms of consumer adhesion contracts
ex
ante, “[t]he providers [have] won the power to impose a
mandatory, no-opt-out system in their own private ‘courts’ designed
to preclude aggregate litigation.” Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A
Comment on
AT&T v.
Concepcion,
Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and
Turner v.
Rogers, 125 Harv.
L. Rev. 78, 133 (2011). See also Miller, Simplified Pleading,
Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N. Y. U. L. Rev.
286, 323 (2013) (“[P]owerful economic entities can impose
no-class-action-arbitration clauses on people with little or no
bargaining position—through adhesion contracts involving securities
accounts, credit cards, mobile phones, car rentals, and many other
social amenities and necessities.”).[
4] The proliferation of take-it-or-leave-it agreements
mandating arbitration and banning class procedures, and this
Court’s readiness to enforce such one-sided agreements, have
disabled consumers from “shop[ping] to avoid arbitration mandates.”
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes 2839. See also
id., at 2872
(“[T]he numbers of clauses mandating arbitration are soaring across
many sectors.”).
The Court has suggested that these anticonsumer
outcomes flow inexorably from the text and purpose of the FAA. But
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 as a response to the reluctance of
some judges to enforce commercial arbitration agreements between
merchants with relatively equal bargaining power. Moses,
Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge? 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 147,
170–171 (2010). See also
id., at 170 (contract disputes
between merchants have been a proper subject of arbitration since
the 1600’s). The FAA’s purpose was to “make the contracting party
live up to his agreement.” H. R. Rep. No. 68–96, at 1 (1924).
See also Moses,
supra, at 147 (Congress sought to “provide
federal courts with procedural law that would permit the
enforcement of arbitration agreements between merchants in
diversity cases.”). Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated
that the Court would apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion
contracts invulnerable to attack by parties who never meaningfully
agreed to arbitration in the first place. See Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes 2860 (“The merchants and lawyers who forged the public law
of arbitration in the United States sought federal legislation to
enforce
consensual agreements.” (emphasis added)).
Nor does the text of the FAA compel this result.
Section 2, on which the Court relied in
Concepcion,
Italian Colors, and this case, prescribes simply that
arbitration provisions are to be treated the same as other
contractual terms: “[a] written provision in . . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforce-able, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9
U. S. C. §2. As Justice O’Connor observed when the Court
was just beginning to transform the FAA into what it has become,
“the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U. S.
265, 283 (1995) (concurring opinion). See also Miller,
supra, at 324 (“[O]ver the years the Act has been
transformed by the Supreme Court through constant expansion into an
expression of a ‘federal policy’ favoring arbitration, whether it
involves a bilateral business dispute or not.”).
The Court’s ever-larger expansion of the FAA’s
scope contrasts sharply with how other countries treat manda-tory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion. A 1993
European Union Directive forbids binding consumers to unfair
contractual terms, defined as those “not . . .
individually negotiated” that “caus[e] a significant imbalance in
the parties’ rights and obligations . . . to the
detriment of the consumer.” Coun. Directive 93/13, Art. 3, 1993 O.
J. (L. 95) 31. A subsequent EU Recommendation interpreted this
Directive to bar enforcement of one-party-dictated mandatory
consumer arbitration agreements. Comm’n Recommendation 98/257, 1998
O. J. (L. 115) 34 (“The consumer’s recourse to the out-of-court
procedure may not be the result of a commitment prior to the
materialisation of the dispute, where such commitment has the
effect of depriving the consumer of his right to bring an action
before the courts for the settlement of the dispute.”). As a result
of this Directive and Recommendation, disputes between providers
and consumers in the EU are arbitrated only when the parties
mutually agree to arbitration on a “post-dispute basis.”
Sternlight, Is the U. S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the
U. S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment
Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. Miami
L. Rev. 831, 847–848 (2002) (emphasis deleted); see
id., at 852 (enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts of adhesion “is quite rare, if not nonexistent,”
outside the United States).
* * *
The California Court of Appeal appropriately
applied traditional tools of state contract law to interpret
DIRECTV’s reference to the home state laws of its customers.
Demeaning that court’s judgment through harsh construction, this
Court has again expanded the scope of the FAA, further degrading
the rights of consumers and further insulating already powerful
economic entities from liability for unlawful acts. I resist the
Court’s bent, and would affirm the judgment of the California Court
of Appeal.