SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RANDY WHITE, WARDEN v. ROGER L. WHEELER
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 14–1372. Decided
December 14, 2015
Per Curiam.
A death sentence imposed by a Kentucky trial court and affirmed
by the Kentucky Supreme Court has been overturned, on habeas corpus
review, by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. During the
jury selection process, the state trial court excused a juror after
concluding he could not give sufficient assurance of neutrality or
impartiality in considering whether the death penalty should be
imposed. The Court of Appeals, despite the substantial deference it
must accord to state-court rulings in federal habeas proceedings,
determined that excusing the juror in the circumstances of this
case violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling
contravenes controlling precedents from this Court, and it is now
necessary to reverse the Court of Appeals by this summary
disposition.
Warden Randy White is the petitioner here, and the convicted
prisoner, Roger Wheeler, is the respondent.
In October 1997, police in Louisville, Kentucky, found the
bodies of Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield in the apartment the
couple shared. Malone had been stabbed nine times. Warfield had
been strangled to death and a pair of scissors stuck out from her
neck. She was pregnant. DNA taken from blood at the crime scene
matched respondent’s. Respondent was charged
with the murders.
During voir dire, Juror 638 gave equivocal and
inconsistent answers when questioned about whether he could
consider voting to impose the death penalty. In response to the
judge’s questions about his personal beliefs on
the death penalty, Juror 638 said,
“I’m not sure that I have
formed an opinion one way or the other. I believe there are
arguments on both sides of the—of
it.†App. to Pet. for Cert. 126a. When asked by the
prosecution about his ability to consider all available penalties,
Juror 638 noted he had “never been confronted
with that situation in a, in a real-life sense of having to make
that kind of determination.†Id., at 131a.
“So it’s difficult for
me,†he explained, “to judge how I
would I guess act, uh.†Ibid. The prosecution
sought to clarify Juror 638’s answer, asking if
the juror meant he was “not absolutely certain
whether [he] could realistically consider†the death
penalty. Id., at 132a. Juror 638 replied,
“I think that would be the most accurate way I
could answer your question.†Ibid. During
defense counsel’s examination, Juror 638
described himself as “a bit more contemplative
on the issue of taking a life and, uh, whether or not we have the
right to take that life.†Id., at 133a. Later,
however, he expressed his belief that he could consider all the
penalty options. Id., at 134a.
The prosecution moved to strike Juror 638 for cause based on his
inconsistent replies, as illustrated by his statement that he was
not absolutely certain he could realistically consider the death
penalty. The defense opposed the motion, arguing that Juror
638’s answers indicated his ability to consider
all the penalty options, despite having some reservations about the
death penalty. The judge said that when she was done questioning
Juror 638, she wrote in her notes that the juror
“ ‘could consider [the]
entire range’ †of penalties.
Id., at 138a. She further stated that she did not
“see him as problematic†at the end
of her examination. Ibid. But she also noted that she did
not “hear him say that he
couldn’t realistically consider the death
penalty,†and reserved ruling on the motion until she
could review Juror 638’s testimony.
Ibid. The next day, after reviewing the relevant testimony,
the judge struck Juror 638 for cause. When she announced her
decision to excuse the juror, the trial judge stated,
“And when I went back and reviewed [the
juror’s] entire testimony, [the prosecution]
concluded with saying, ‘Would it be accurate to
say that you couldn’t,
couldn’t consider the entire
range?’ And his response
is—I think was, ‘I think
that would be pretty accurate.’ So,
I’m going to sustain that one,
too.†Id., at
139a–140a.
The case proceeded to trial. Respondent was convicted of both
murders and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed
the convictions and the sentence. Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 121 S. W. 3d 173, 189 (2003). In considering
respondent’s challenges to the trial
court’s excusal of certain jurors for cause,
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial judge
“appropriately struck for cause those jurors
that could not impose the death pen-alty. . . . There was no error
and the rights of the defendant to a fair trial by a fair and
impartial jury . . . under both the federal and state constitutions
were not violated.†Id., at 179.
After exhausting available state postconviction procedures,
respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C.
§2254 from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky. He asserted, inter alia, that
the Kentucky trial court erred in striking Juror 638 during voir
dire on the ground that the juror could not give assurances
that he could consider the death penalty as a sentencing option.
The District Court dismissed the petition; but a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, granting
habeas relief as to respondent’s sentence.
Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F. 3d 366, 379 (2015). While
acknowledging the deferential standard required on federal habeas
review of a state conviction, the Court of Appeals held that
allowing the exclusion of Juror 638 was an unreasonable application
of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968) ,
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985) , and their
progeny. 779 F. 3d, at 372–374.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), habeas relief is authorized if the state
court’s decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.†28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
This Court, time and again, has instructed that AEDPA, by setting
forth necessary predicates before state-court judgments may be set
aside, “erects a formidable barrier to federal
habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court.†Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S.
___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6). Under §2254(d)(1),
“ ‘a state prisoner must show
that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.’ †White v.
Woodall, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 4) (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011)
).
The Court of Appeals was required to apply this deferential
standard to the state court’s analysis of
respondent’s juror exclusion claim. In
Witherspoon, this Court set forth the rule for juror
disqualification in capital cases. Witherspoon recognized
that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an
impartial jury confers on capital defendants the right to a jury
not “uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die.†391 U. S., at 521. But the Court with equal
clarity has acknowledged the State’s
“strong interest in having jurors who are able
to apply capital punishment within the framework state law
prescribes.†Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U. S.
1, 9 (2007) . To ensure the proper balance between these two
interests, only “a juror who is substantially
impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under
the state-law framework can be excused for cause.â€
Ibid. As the Court explained in Witt, a juror may be
excused for cause “where the trial judge is left
with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be
unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.â€
469 U. S., at 425–426.
Reviewing courts owe deference to a trial
court’s ruling on whether to strike a
particular juror “regardless of whether the
trial court engages in explicit analysis regarding substantial
impairment; even the granting of a motion to excuse for cause
constitutes an implicit finding of bias.â€
Uttecht, 551 U. S., at 7. A trial
court’s “finding may be
upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that
he or she is impaired . . . .†Ibid. And where,
as here, the federal courts review a state-court ruling under the
constraints imposed by AEDPA, the federal court must accord an
additional and “independent, high
standard†of deference. Id., at 10. As a
result, federal habeas reviewof a Witherspoon-Witt
claim—much like federal habeas review of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—must be
“ ‘
“doubly deferential.â€
’ †Burt, supra, at
___ (slip op., at 1) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U. S. 170, 190 (2011) ).
The Court of Appeals held that the Kentucky Supreme Court
unreasonably applied Witherspoon, Witt, and their
progeny when it determined that removing Juror 638 for cause was
constitutional. 779 F. 3d, at 372–374. The
Court of Appeals determined Juror 638
“understood the decisions he would face and
engaged with them in a thoughtful, honest, and conscientious
manner.†Id., at 373. In the Court of
Appeals’ estimation, the trial judge concluded
the juror was not qualified only by
“misapprehending a single question and answer
exchange†between Juror 638 and the prosecution,
id., at 374—the exchange in which Juror
638 stated he was not absolutely certain he could realistically
consider the death penalty, id., at 372. According to the
Court of Appeals, Juror 638 “agreed he did
not know to an absolute certainty whether he could
realistically consider the death penalty, but the court proceeded
as if he knew he could not.†Ibid. The
Court of Appeals further determined that if the trial judge, when
reviewing Juror 638’s examination, had
“properly processed that exchangeâ€
between Juror 638 and the prosecution, Juror 638 would not have
been excused. Id., at 374.
Both the analysis and the conclusion in the decision under
review were incorrect. While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
deference was required under AEDPA, it failed to ask the critical
question: Was the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
decision to affirm the excusal of Juror 638 for cause
“ ‘so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement’ � Woodall,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 4) (quoting Harrington,
supra, at 103).
The Court of Appeals did not properly apply the deference it was
required to accord the state-court ruling. A fairminded jurist
could readily conclude that the trial judge’s
exchange with Juror 638 reflected a “diligent
and thoughtful voir direâ€; that she considered
with care the juror’s testimony; and that she
was fair in the exercise of her “broad
discretion†in determining whether the juror was
qualified to serve in this capital case. Uttecht, 551 U. S.,
at 20. Juror 638’s answers during voir
dire were at least ambiguous as to whether he would be able to
give appropriate consideration to imposing the death penalty. And
as this Court made clear in Uttecht,
“when there is ambiguity in the prospective
juror’s statements,†the trial
court is “ ‘entitled to
resolve it in favor of the State.’
†Id., at 7 (quoting Witt, supra,
at 434).
The Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the trial
judge’s reformulation of an important part of
Juror 638’s questioning. 779 F. 3d, at 372.
When excusing the juror the day after the voir dire, the
trial judge said that the prosecution had asked whether the juror
“couldn’t con-sider the
entire range†of penalties. App. to Pet. for Cert.
139a. The prosecution in fact asked if the juror was
“not absolutely certain whether [he] could
realistically con-sider†the entire range of
penalties. Id., at 132a. The juror’s
confirmation that he was “not absolutely certain
whether [he] could realistically consider†the death
penalty, ibid., was a reasonable basis for the trial judge
to conclude that the juror was unable to give that penalty fair
consideration. The trial judge’s decision to
excuse Juror 638 did not violate clearly established federal law by
concluding that Juror 638 was not qualified to serve as a member
ofthis capital jury. See Witt, supra, at
424–426. And similarly, the Kentucky Supreme
Court’s ruling that therewas no error is not
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
The Court of Appeals noted that the deference toward trial
courts recognized in Uttecht “was largely
premised on the trial judge’s ability to
‘observe the demeanor of’
†the juror. 779 F. 3d, at 373 (quoting 551 U. S., at
17). It concluded that deference to the trial court here supported
habeas relief, because the trial judge’s
“initial assessment of [the
juror’s] answers and demeanor†did
not lead her to immediately strike Juror 638 for cause. 779 F. 3d,
at 373–374.
The Court of Appeals’ conclusion conflicts
with the meaning and holding of Uttecht and with a
common-sense understanding of the jury selection process. Nothing
in Uttecht limits the trial court to evaluating demeanor
alone and not the substance of a juror’s
response. And the implicit suggestion that a trial judge is
entitled to less deference for having deliberated after her initial
ruling is wrong. In the ordinary case the conclusion should be
quite the opposite. It is true that a trial
court’s contemporaneous assessment of a
juror’s demeanor, and its bearing on how to
interpret or understand the juror’s responses,
are entitled to substantial deference; but a trial court ruling is
likewise entitled to deference when made after a careful review of
a formal transcript or recording. If the trial judge chooses to
reflect and deliberate further, as this trial judge did after the
proceedings recessed for the day, that is not to be faulted; it is
to be commended.
This is not a case where “the record
discloses no basis for a finding of substantial
impairment.†Uttecht, supra, at
20. The two federal judges in the majority below might have
reached a different conclusion had they been presiding over this
voir dire. But simple disagreement does not overcome the two
layers of deference owed by a federal habeas court in this
context.
*  *  *
The Kentucky Supreme Court was not unreasonable in its
application of clearly established federal law when it concluded
that the exclusion of Juror 638 did not violate the Sixth
Amendment. Given this conclusion, there is no need to consider
petitioner’s further contention that, if there
were an error by the trial court in excluding the juror, it should
be subject to harmless-error analysis. And this Court does not
review the other rulings of the Court of Appeals that are not
addressed in this opinion.
As a final matter, this Court again advises the Court of Appeals
that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force even when
reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the death penalty.
See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 567 U. S. ___
(2012) (per curiam); Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U. S.
___ (2011) (per curiam); Bobby v. Mitts, 563
U. S. 395 (2011) (per curiam); Bobby v. Van
Hook, 558 U. S. 4 (2009) (per curiam).
The petition for certiorari and respondent’s
motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.