SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–86
_________________
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
PETITIONER
v. ABERCROMBIE & FITCHSTORES, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the tenth circuit
[June 1, 2015]
Justice Thomas, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court that there are two—and
only two—causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 as understood by our precedents: a disparate-treatment (or
intentional-discrimination) claim and a disparate-impact claim.
Ante, at 3. Our agreement ends there. Unlike the majority, I
adhere to what I had thought before today was an undisputed
proposition: Mere application of a neutral policy cannot constitute
“intentional discrimination.” Because the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) can prevail here only if Abercrombie
engaged in intentional discrimination, and because Abercrombie’s
application of its neutral Look Policy does not meet that
description, I would affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit.
I
This case turns on whether Abercrombie’s
conduct constituted “intentional discrimination” within the meaning
of 42 U. S. C. §1981a(a)(1). That provision allows a
Title VII plaintiff to “recover compensatory and punitive damages”
only against an employer “who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact).” The damages award EEOC obtained against
Abercrombie is thus proper only if that company engaged in
“intentional discrimination”—as opposed to “an employment practice
that is unlawful because of its disparate impact”—within the
meaning of §1981a(a)(1).
The terms “intentional discrimination” and
“disparate impact” have settled meanings in federal employment
discrimination law. “[I]ntentional discrimination . . .
occur[s] where an employer has treated a particular person less
favorably than others because of a protected trait.”
Ricci
v.
DeStefano, 557 U. S. 557, 577 (2009) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). “[D]isparate-impact
claims,” by contrast, “involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in
fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity.”
Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 540 U. S. 44, 52 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Conceived by this Court in
Griggs v.
Duke
Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971) , this “theory of
discrimination” provides that “a facially neutral employment
practice may be deemed illegally discriminatory without evidence of
the employer’s subjective intent to discriminate that is required
in a disparate-treatment case,”
Raytheon, supra, at 52–53
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
I would hold that Abercrombie’s conduct did not
constitute “intentional discrimination.” Abercrombie refused to
create an exception to its neutral Look Policy for Samantha Elauf’s
religious practice of wearing a headscarf.
Ante, at 2. In
doing so, it did not treat religious practices less favorably than
similar secular practices, but instead remained neutral with regard
to religious practices. To be sure, the
effects of
Abercrombie’s neutral Look Policy, absent an accommodation, fall
more harshly on those who wear headscarves as an aspect of their
faith. But that is a classic case of an alleged disparate impact.
It is not what we have previously understood to be a case of
disparate treatment because Elauf received the
same
treatment from Abercrombie as any other applicant who appeared
unable to comply with the company’s Look Policy. See
ibid.;
App. 134, 144. Because I cannot classify Abercrombie’s conduct as
“intentional discrimination,” I would affirm.
II
A
Resisting this straightforward application of
§1981a, the majority expands the meaning of “intentional
discrimination” to include a refusal to give a religious applicant
“favored treatment.”
Ante, at 6–7. But contrary to the
majority’s assumption, this novel theory of discrimination is not
commanded by the relevant statutory text.
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual
. . . because of such individual’s . . .
religion.” §2000e–2(a)(1). And as used in Title VII, “[t]he term
‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
§2000e( j). With this gloss on the definition of “religion” in
§2000e–2(a)(1), the majority concludes that an employer may violate
Title VII if he “refuse[s] to hire . . . any individual
. . . because of such individual’s . . .
religious . . . practice” (unless he has an “undue
hardship” defense). See
ante, at 3–4.
But inserting the statutory definition of
religion into §2000e–2(a) does not answer the question whether
Abercrombie’s refusal to hire Elauf was “because of her religious
practice.” At first glance, the phrase “because of such
individual’s religious practice” could mean one of two things.
Under one reading, it could prohibit taking an action because of
the religious nature of an employee’s particular practice. Under
the alternative reading, it could prohibit taking an action because
of an employee’s practice that
happens to be religious.
The distinction is perhaps best understood by
example. Suppose an employer with a neutral grooming policy
forbidding facial hair refuses to hire a Muslim who wears a beard
for religious reasons. Assuming the employer applied the neutral
grooming policy to all applicants, the motivation behind the
refusal to hire the Muslim applicant would not be the religious
nature of his beard, but its existence. Under the first reading,
then, the Muslim applicant would lack an intentional-discrimination
claim, as he was not refused employment “because of” the religious
nature of his practice. But under the second reading, he would have
such a claim, as he was refused employment “because of” a practice
that happens to be religious in nature.
One problem with the second, more expansive
reading is that it would punish employers who have no
discrimina-tory motive. If the phrase “because of such individual’s
religious practice” sweeps in any case in which an employer takes
an adverse action because of a practice that hap-pens to be
religious in nature, an employer who had no idea that a particular
practice was religious would be penalized. That strict-liability
view is plainly at odds with the concept of intentional
discrimination. Cf.
Raytheon,
supra, at 54, n. 7
(“If [the employer] were truly unaware that such a disability
existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to have
been based, even in part, on [the applicant’s] disability. And, if
no part of the hiring decision turned on [the applicant’s] status
as disabled, he cannot,
ipso facto, have been subject to
disparate treatment”). Surprisingly, the majority leaves the door
open to this strict-liability theory, reserving the question
whether an employer who does not even “suspec[t] that the practice
in question is a religious practice” can nonetheless be punished
for
intentional discrimination.
Ante, at 6, n. 3.
For purposes of today’s decision, however, the
majority opts for a compromise, albeit one that lacks a foothold in
the text and fares no better under our precedents. The majority
construes §2000e–2(a)(1) to punish employers who refuse to
accommodate applicants under neutral policies when they act “with
the motive of avoiding accommodation.”
Ante, at 5. But an
employer who is aware that strictly applying a neutral policy will
have an adverse effect on a religious group, and applies the policy
anyway, is not engaged in intentional discrimination, at least as
that term has traditionally been understood. As the Court explained
many decades ago, “ ‘Discriminatory
purpose’ ”—
i.e., the purpose necessary for a claim of
intentional discrimination—demands “more than . . .
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker
. . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”
Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U. S. 256,
279 (1979) (internal citation and footnote omitted).
I do not dispute that a refusal to accommodate
can, in some circumstances, constitute intentional discrimination.
If an employer declines to accommodate a particular religious
practice, yet accommodates a similar secular (or other
denominational) practice, then that may be proof that he has
“treated a particular person less favorably than others because of
[a religious practice].”
Ricci, 557 U. S., at 577
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also,
e.g., Dixon v.
Hallmark Cos., 627 F. 3d 849, 853
(CA11 2010) (addressing a policy forbidding display of “religious
items” in management offices). But merely refusing to create an
exception to a neutral policy for a religious practice cannot be
described as treating a particular applicant “less favorably than
others.” The majority itself appears to recognize that its
construction requires something more than equal treatment. See
ante, at 6–7 (“Title VII does not demand mere neutrality
with regard to religious practices,” but instead “gives them
favored treatment”). But equal treatment is not disparate
treatment, and that basic principle should have disposed of this
case.
B
The majority’s novel theory of intentional
discrimination is also inconsistent with the history of this area
of employment discrimination law. As that history shows, cases
arising out of the application of a neutral policy absent religious
accommodations have traditionally been understood to involve only
disparate-impact liability.
When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it
prohibited discrimination “because of . . . religion” and
did not include the current definition of “religion” encompassing
“religious observance and practice” that was added to the statute
in 1972. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§701, 703(a), 78Stat. 253–255.
Shortly thereafter, the EEOC issued guidelines purporting to create
“an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to the
religious needs of employees.” 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966). From an
early date, the EEOC defended this obligation under a
disparate-impact theory. See Brief for United States as
Amicus
Curiae in
Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., O. T.
1970, No. 835, pp. 7, 13, 29–32. Courts and commentators at
the time took the same view. See,
e.g., Reid v.
Memphis
Publishing Co., 468 F. 2d 346, 350 (CA6 1972);
Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709,
713 (WD Mich. 1969), rev’d, 429 F. 2d 324 (CA6 1970), aff’d by
an equally di-vided Court, 402 U. S. 689 (1971) (
per
curiam); 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment
Discrimination Law 187–188 (3d ed. 1976).
This Court’s first decision to discuss a refusal
to accommodate a religious practice,
Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977) , similarly
did not treat such conduct as intentional discrimination.
Hardison involved a conflict between an employer’s neutral
seniority system for assigning shifts and an employee’s observance
of a Saturday Sabbath. The employer denied the employee an
accommodation, so he refused to show up for work on Saturdays and
was fired.
Id., at 67–69. This Court held that the employer
was not liable under Title VII because the proposed accommodations
would have imposed an undue hardship on the employer.
Id.,
at 77. To bolster its conclusion that there was no statutory
violation, the Court relied on a provision of Title VII shielding
the application of a “ ‘bona fide seniority or merit
system’ ” from challenge unless that application is
“ ‘the result of an intention to discriminate because of
. . . religion.’ ”
Id., at 81–82 (quoting
§2000e–2(h)). In applying that provision, the Court observed that
“[t]here ha[d] been no suggestion of discriminatory intent in th[e]
case.”
Id., at 82. But if the major-ity’s view were
correct—if a mere refusal to accommodate a religious practice under
a neutral policy could constitute intentional discrimination—then
the Court in
Hardison should never have engaged in such
reasoning. After all, the employer in
Hardison knew of the
employee’s religious practice and refused to make an exception to
its neutral seniority system, just as Abercrombie arguably knew of
Elauf’s religious practice and refused to make an exception to its
neutral Look Policy.[
1]*
Lower courts following
Hardison likewise
did not equate a failure to accommodate with intentional
discrimination. To the contrary, many lower courts, including the
Tenth Circuit below, wrongly assumed that Title VII creates a
freestanding failure-to-accommodate claim distinct from either
disparate treatment or disparate impact. See,
e.g., 731
F. 3d 1106, 1120 (2013) (“A claim for religious discrimination
under Title VII can be asserted under several different theories,
including disparate treatment and failure to accommodate” (internal
quotation marks omitted));
Protos v.
Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 797 F. 2d 129, 134, n. 2 (CA3 1986) (“In
addition to her religious accommodation argument, [the plaintiff]
maintains that she prevailed in the district court on a disparate
treatment claim”). That assumption appears to have grown out of
statements in our cases suggesting that Title VII’s definitional
provision concerning religion created an independent duty. See,
e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v.
Philbrook, 479 U. S.
60 , n. 1 (1986) (“The reasonable accommodation duty was
incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the
definition of religion”). But in doing so, the lower courts
correctly recognized that a failure-to-accommodate claim based on
the application of a neutral policy is not a disparate-treatment
claim. See,
e.g., Reed v.
International Union, United
Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 569
F. 3d 576, 579–580 (CA6 2009);
Chalmers v.
Tulon Co.
of Richmond, 101 F. 3d 1012, 1018 (CA4 1996).
At least before we granted a writ of certiorari
in this case, the EEOC too understood that merely applying a
neutral policy did not automatically constitute intentional
discrimination giving rise to a disparate-treatment claim. For
example, the Commission explained in a recent compliance manual, “A
religious accommodation claim is distinct from a disparate
treatment claim, in which the question is whether employees are
treated equally.” EEOC Compliance Manual §12–IV, p. 46 (2008).
Indeed, in asking us to take this case, the EEOC dismissed one of
Abercrombie’s supporting authorities as “a case addressing
intentional discrimination, not religious accommodation.” Reply to
Brief in Opposition 7, n. Once we granted certiorari in this case,
however, the EEOC altered course and advanced the
intentional-discrimination theory now adopted by the majority. The
Court should have rejected this eleventh-hour request to expand our
understanding of “intentional discrimination” to include merely
applying a religion-neutral policy.
* * *
The Court today rightly puts to rest the
notion that Title VII creates a freestanding
religious-accommodation claim,
ante, at 3, but creates in
its stead an entirely new form of liability: the
disparate-treatment-based-on-equal-treatment claim. Because I do
not think that Congress’ 1972 redefinition of “religion” also
redefined “intentional discrimination,” I would affirm the judgment
of the Tenth Circuit. I respectfully dissent from the portions of
the majority’s decision that take the contrary view.