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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–517
_________________
GREGORY P. WARGER, PETITIONER v. RANDY D. SHAUERS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
[December 9, 2014]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that certain juror
testimony regarding what occurred in a jury room is inadmissible
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.”
The question presented in this case is whether Rule 606(b)
precludes a party seeking a new trial from using one juror’s
affidavit of what another juror said in deliberations to
demonstrate the other juror’s dishonesty during voir dire. We
hold that it does.
I
Petitioner Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway
outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by respondent
Randy Shauers struck him from behind. Warger claims he was stopped
at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger
suddenly pulled out in front of him. Regardless of the cause of the
accident, no one disputes its tragic result: Warger sustained
serious injuries that ultimately required the amputation of his
left leg.
Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court.
During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy
voir dire of the prospective jurors. Warger’s counsel asked
whether any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and
suffering or for future medical expenses, or whether there was any
juror who thought, “I don’t think I could be a fair and
impartial juror on this kind of case.” App. 105. Prospective
juror Regina Whipple, who was later selected as the jury
foreperson, answered no to each of these questions. See id., at 83,
89, 105.
Trial commenced, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in
favor of Shauers. Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted
Warger’s counsel to express concern over juror
Whipple’s conduct. The complaining juror subsequently signed
an affidavit claiming that Whipple had spoken during deliberations
about “a motor vehicle collision in which her daughter was at
fault for the collision and a man died,” and had
“related that if her daughter had been sued, it would have
ruined her life.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a.
Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial. He
contended that Whipple had deliberately lied during voir dire about
her impartiality and ability to award damages. Thus, he asserted,
he had satisfied the requirements of McDonough Power Equipment,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U. S. 548 (1984) , which holds that a party
may “obtain a new trial” if he “demonstrate[s]
that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on
voir dire, and . . . that a correct response would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id., at
556.
The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that
the only evidence that supported Warger’s motion, the
complaining juror’s affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b). As relevant here, that Rule provides that
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,”
evidence “about any statement made or incident that occurred
during the jury’s deliberations” is inadmissible. Rule
606(b)(1). The Rule contains three specific
exceptions—allowing testimony “about whether (A)
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly
brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering
the verdict on the verdict form,” Rule 606(b)(2)—but
the District Court found none of these exceptions to be
applicable.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 721 F. 3d 606 (2013). It first held
that Warger’s proffered evidence did not fall within the
“extraneous prejudicial evidence” exception set forth
in Rule 606(b)(2)(A). The court explained that
“[j]urors’ personal experiences do not constitute
extraneous information; it is unavoidable they will bring such
innate experiences into the jury room.” Id., at 611. Next,
the court rejected Warger’s alternative argument that Rule
606(b) is wholly inapplicable when a litigant offers evidence to
show that a juror was dishonest during voir dire. Acknowledging
that there was a split among the Federal Courts of Appeals on this
question, the Eighth Circuit joined those Circuits that had held
that Rule 606(b) applies to any proceeding in which the
jury’s verdict might be invalidated, including efforts to
demonstrate that a juror lied during voir dire. Compare id., at
611–612 (citing Williams v. Price, 343 F. 3d 223,
235–237 (CA3 2003), and United States v. Benally, 546 F. 3d
1230, 1235 (CA10 2008)), with Hard v. Burlington N. R. Co., 812 F.
2d 482, 485 (CA9 1987) (“Statements which tend to show deceit
during voir dire are not barred by [Rule 606(b)]”), and
Maldonado v. Missouri P. R. Co., 798 F. 2d 764, 770
(CA5 1986) (same).
We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), and now
affirm.
II
We hold that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a
proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the
ground that a juror lied during voir dire. In doing so, we simply
accord Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning. The Rule,
after all, applies “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of
a verdict.” Rule 606(b)(1). A postverdict motion for a new
trial on the ground of voir dire dishonesty plainly entails
“an inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict”: If a
juror was dishonest during voir dire and an honest response
would have provided a valid basis to challenge that juror for
cause, the verdict must be invalidated. See McDonough, 464
U. S., at 556.
This understanding of the text of Rule 606(b) is consistent with
the underlying common-law rule on which it was based. Although some
common-law courts would have permitted evidence of jury
deliberations to be introduced to demonstrate juror dishonesty
during voir dire, the majority would not, and the language of Rule
606(b) reflects Congress’ enactment of the more restrictive
version of the common-law rule.
Rule 606(b) had its genesis in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11, 99
Eng. Rep. 944 (K. B. 1785), in which Lord Mansfield held
inadmissible an affidavit from two jurors claiming that the jury
had decided the case through a game of chance. See 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §2352, p. 696 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). The rule
soon took root in the United States, id., at 696–697, where
it was viewed as both promoting the finality of verdicts and
insulating the jury from outside influences, see McDonald v. Pless,
238 U. S. 264 –268 (1915).
Some versions of the rule were narrower than others. Under what
was sometimes known as the “Iowa” approach, juror
testimony regarding deliberations was excluded only to the extent
that it related to matters that “ ‘inhere[d] in
the verdict,’ ” which generally consisted of
evidence of the jurors’ subjective intentions and thought
processes in reaching a verdict. 3 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence §6:16, p. 70 (4th ed. 2013); 8 Wigmore,
Evidence §§2353, 2354, at 699–702. [
1 ] A number of courts adhering to the Iowa rule held
that testimony regarding jury deliberations is admissible when used
to challenge juror conduct during voir dire. See, e.g., Mathi- sen
v. Norton, 187 Wash. 240, 244–246, 60 P. 2d 1, 3–4
(1936); Williams v. Bridges, 140 Cal. App. 537, 538–541, 35
P. 2d 407, 408–409 (1934).
But other courts applied a broader version of the
anti-impeachment rule. Under this version, sometimes called the
“federal” approach, litigants were prohibited from
using evidence of jury deliberations unless it was offered to show
that an “extraneous matter” had influenced the jury.
See 3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §6:16, at
71; Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F. R. D. 183, 265 (1973). The “great majority” of
appellate courts applying this version of the rule held jury
deliberations evidence inadmissible even if used to demonstrate
dishonesty during voir dire. Wilson v. Wiggins, 54 Ariz. 240, 246,
94 P. 2d 870, 872 (1939); see, e.g., Willis v. Davis, 333 P. 2d
311, 314 (Okla. 1958); Turner v. Hall’s Adm’x, 252 S.
W. 2d 30, 34 (Ky. 1952); Hinkel v. Oregon Chair Co., 80 Ore. 404,
406, 156 P. 438, 439 (1916); State v. Cloud, 130 La. 955,
958–960, 58 So. 827, 828–829 (1912); Payne v. Burke,
236 App. Div. 527, 528–530, 260 N. Y. S. 259, 260–262
(1932).
This Court occasionally employed language that might have
suggested a preference for the Iowa rule. See Hyde v. United
States, 225 U. S. 347 –384 (1912) (“[W]e think the
rule expressed in Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa
195 [1866], . . . should apply, that the testimony of jurors should
not be received to show matters which essentially inhere in the
verdict itself and necessarily depend upon the testimony of the
jurors and can receive no corroboration”); Mattox v. United
States, 146 U. S. 140 –149 (1892) (quoting at length a
Kansas Supreme Court decision setting out the Iowa test). But to
the extent that these decisions created any question as to which
approach this Court followed, McDonald v. Pless largely settled
matters. There, we held that juror affidavits were not admissible
to show that jurors had entered a “quotient” verdict,
precisely the opposite of the result reached by the Iowa Supreme
Court in its decision establishing the Iowa approach. Compare 238
U. S., at 265, 268, with Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co.,
20 Iowa 195, 211–212 (1866). In doing so, we observed that
although decisions in a few States made admissible a
“juror’s affidavit as to an overt act of misconduct,
which was capable of being controverted by other jurors,” the
argument in favor of that approach (i.e., the Iowa rule) had not
been generally accepted, because permitting such evidence
“would open the door to the most pernicious arts and
tampering with jurors.” 238 U. S., at 268 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Our subsequent decision in Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1
(1933) , was consistent with our apparent rejection of the Iowa
approach. In Clark, the Government had prosecuted for contempt a
juror who, during voir dire in a prior case, had falsely
denied knowing the defendant. Id., at 6–8. We held that the
prosecution could introduce evidence of what had occurred during
deliberations in the prior case, rejecting the juror’s
argument that these communications were privileged. We were careful
to explain, however, that nothing in our decision was “at
variance with the rule . . . that the testimony of a juror is not
admissible for the impeachment of his verdict.” Id., at 18.
This was because the verdict in the original case was not at issue,
and therefore “the rule against impeachment [was] wholly
unrelated to the problem . . . before us.” Ibid.; accord,
McDonald, 238 U. S., at 269. Clark thus clarified that the
rule against jurors’ impeaching their verdicts applies only
in a proceeding actually impeaching that verdict—precisely
the line Rule 606(b) draws when it refers to an “inquiry into
the validity of a verdict.”
In any event, these decisions predated Congress’ enactment
of Rule 606(b), and Congress was undoubtedly free to prescribe a
broader version of the anti-impeachment rule than we had previously
applied. The language of the Rule it adopted clearly reflects the
federal approach: As enacted, Rule 606(b) prohibited the use of any
evidence of juror deliberations, subject only to the express
exceptions for extraneous information and outside influences. [
2 ]
For those who consider legislative history relevant, here it
confirms that this choice of language was no accident. Congress
rejected a prior version of the Rule that, in accordance with the
Iowa approach, would have prohibited juror testimony only as to the
“effect of anything upon . . . [any] juror’s mind or
emotions . . . or concerning his mental processes.” Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F. R. D.
315, 387 (1971); see Tanner v. United States, 483 U. S. 107
–125 (1987) (detailing the legislative history of the Rule).
Thus Congress “specifically understood, considered, and
rejected a version of Rule 606(b)” that would have likely
permitted the introduction of evidence of deliberations to show
dishonesty during voir dire. Id., at 125.
III
A
Seeking to rebut this straightforward understanding of Rule
606(b), Warger first insists that the proceedings that follow a
motion for new trial based on dishonesty during voir dire do
not involve an “inquiry into the validity of the
verdict.” His argument is as follows: Under McDonough, a
party moving for a new trial on the basis of voir dire dishonesty
need not show that this dishonesty had an effect on the verdict.
See 464 U. S., at 556. Although a successful claim will result
in vacatur of the judgment, vacatur is simply the remedy for the
McDonough error, just as it may be the remedy for a variety of
errors that have nothing to do with the manner in which the jury
reached its verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 569
U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 12) (listing certain
“ ‘structural’ ” errors
warranting “automatic reversal” of a criminal
conviction). Therefore, Warger asserts, the “inquiry begins
and ends with what happened during voir dire.” Brief for
Petitioner 19–20.
We are not persuaded. Warger, it seems, would restrict Rule
606(b)’s application to those claims of error for which a
court must examine the manner in which the jury reached its
verdict—claims, one might say, involving an inquiry into the
jury’s verdict. But the “inquiry” to which the
Rule refers is one into the “validity of the verdict,”
not into the verdict itself. The Rule does not focus on the means
by which deliberations evidence might be used to invalidate a
verdict. It does not say “during an inquiry into jury
deliberations,” or prohibit the introduction of evidence of
deliberations “for use in determining whether an asserted
error affected the jury’s verdict.” It simply applies
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of the
verdict”—that is, during a proceeding in which the
verdict may be rendered invalid. Whether or not a juror’s
alleged misconduct during voir dire had a direct effect on the
jury’s verdict, the motion for a new trial requires a court
to determine whether the verdict can stand.
B
Next, Warger contends that excluding jury deliberations evidence
tending to show that a juror lied during voir dire is
unnecessary to fulfill Congress’ apparent objectives of
encouraging full and open debate in the jury room and preventing
the harassment of former jurors. He observes that jurors remain
free to, and may sometimes be forced to, disclose what happened in
the jury room, and that ethical rules limit the ability of parties
to harass jurors following trial. But these are arguments against
Rule 606(b) generally, not arguments for the particular exception
to the Rule that Warger seeks. Congress’ enactment of Rule
606(b) was premised on the concerns that the use of deliberations
evidence to challenge verdicts would represent a threat to both
jurors and finality in those circumstances not covered by the
Rule’s express exceptions. Warger cannot escape the scope of
the Rule Congress adopted simply by asserting that its concerns
were misplaced.
C
Nor do we accept Warger’s contention that we must adopt
his interpretation of Rule 606(b) so as to avoid constitutional
concerns. The Constitution guarantees both criminal and civil
litigants a right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 362 (1966) ; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946) . And we have made clear that voir dire
can be an essential means of protecting this right. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion); Ham
v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524, 527 (1973) . These principles,
Warger asserts, require that parties be allowed to use evidence of
deliberations to demonstrate that a juror lied during voir
dire.
Given the clarity of both the text and history of Rule 606(b),
however, the canon of constitutional avoidance has no role to play
here. The canon “is a tool for choosing between competing
plausible interpretations” of a provision. Clark v.
Suarez-Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 381 (2005) . It “has no
application in the absence of . . . ambiguity.” United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532
U. S. 483, 494 (2001) . We see none here.
Moreover, any claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in
circumstances such as these is foreclosed by our decision in
Tanner. In Tanner, we concluded that Rule 606(b) precluded a
criminal defendant from introducing evidence that multiple jurors
had been intoxicated during trial, rejecting the contention that
this exclusion violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to “ ‘a tribunal both impartial and mentally
competent to afford a hearing.’ ” 483 U. S., at
126 (quoting Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176
(1912) ). We reasoned that the defendant’s right to an
unimpaired jury was sufficiently protected by voir dire, the
observations of court and counsel during trial, and the potential
use of “nonjuror evidence” of misconduct. 483
U. S., at 127. Similarly here, a party’s right to an
impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)’s
removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased. Even if
jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror
impartiality is adequately assured by the parties’ ability to
bring to the court’s attention any evidence of bias before
the verdict is rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after
the verdict is rendered. [
3 ]
IV
We further hold, consonant with the Eighth Circuit, that the
affidavit Warger sought to introduce was not admissible under Rule
606(b)(2)(A)’s exception for evidence as to whether
“extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury’s attention.”
Generally speaking, information is deemed
“extraneous” if it derives from a source
“external” to the jury. See Tanner, 483 U. S., at 117.
“External” matters include publicity and information
related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide,
while “internal” matters include the general body of
experiences that jurors are understood to bring with them to the
jury room. See id., at 117–119; 27 C. Wright & V. Gold,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence §6075, pp.
520–521 (2d ed. 2007). Here, the excluded affidavit falls on
the “internal” side of the line: Whipple’s
daughter’s accident may well have informed her general views
about negligence liability for car crashes, but it did not provide
either her or the rest of the jury with any specific knowledge
regarding Shauers’ collision with Warger.
Indeed, Warger does not argue that Whipple’s statements
related to “extraneous” information in this sense.
Instead, he contends that because Whipple would have been
disqualified from the jury had she disclosed her daughter’s
accident, any information she shared with the other jurors was
extraneous.
We cannot agree that whenever a juror should have been excluded
from the jury, anything that juror says is necessarily
“extraneous” within the meaning of Rule 606(b)(2)(A).
Were that correct, parties would find it quite easy to avoid Rule
606(b)’s limitations. As discussed above, Congress adopted
the restrictive version of the anti-impeachment rule, one that
common-law courts had concluded precludes parties from using
deliberations evidence to prove juror dishonesty during voir dire.
But if Warger’s understanding of the “extraneous”
information exception were accepted, then any time a party could
use such evidence to show that a juror’s “correct
response [during voir dire] would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge”—a prerequisite for relief under
McDonough, 464 U. S., at 556—all evidence of what that
juror said during deliberations would be admissible. The
“extraneous” information exception would swallow much
of the rest of Rule 606(b).
Even if such a result were not precluded by Congress’
apparent intent to adopt the restrictive federal approach, it is
foreclosed by Tanner, which relied upon the doctrine that
“treat[s] allegations of the physical or mental incompetence
of a juror as ‘internal’ rather than
‘external’ matters.” 483 U. S., at 118. Tanner
cited, in particular, cases holding that evidence of jurors’
insanity, inability to understand English, and hearing impairments
are all “internal” matters subject to exclusion under
Rule 606(b). Id., at 119. Were we to follow Warger’s
understanding of the “extraneous information”
exception, all these cases, including Tanner, would have been
wrongly decided: If the jurors were not able to serve on the jury
in the first place, or should have been dismissed for their
misconduct during the trial, then what they said or did during
deliberations would necessarily be “extraneous” and
admissible. Tanner’s implicit rejection of this view easily
extends from the sort of juror incompetence considered in that case
to the alleged bias considered here. Whether a juror would have
been struck from the jury because of incompetence or bias, the mere
fact that a juror would have been struck does not make admissible
evidence regarding that juror’s conduct and statements during
deliberations.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
