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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–517
_________________
GREGORY P. WARGER, PETITIONER v. RANDY D. SHAUERS
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
[December 9, 2014]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that certain juror
testimony regarding what occurred in a jury room is inadmissible
“[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.” The question
presented in this case is whether Rule 606(b) precludes a party
seeking a new trial from using one juror’s affidavit of what
another juror said in deliberations to demonstrate the other
juror’s dishonesty during voir dire. We hold that it does.
I
Petitioner Gregory Warger was riding his motorcycle on a highway
outside Rapid City, South Dakota, when a truck driven by respondent
Randy Shauers struck him from behind. Warger claims he was stopped
at the time of the accident, while Shauers claims that Warger
suddenly pulled out in front of him. Regardless of the cause of the
accident, no one disputes its tragic result: Warger sustained
serious injuries that ultimately required the amputation of his
left leg.
Warger sued Shauers for negligence in Federal District Court.
During jury selection, counsel for both parties conducted lengthy
voir dire of the prospective jurors. Warger’s counsel asked whether
any jurors would be unable to award damages for pain and suffering
or for future medical expenses, or whether there was any juror who
thought, “I don’t think I could be a fair and impartial juror on
this kind of case.” App. 105. Prospective juror Regina Whipple, who
was later selected as the jury foreperson, answered no to each of
these questions. See id., at 83, 89, 105.
Trial commenced, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in
favor of Shauers. Shortly thereafter, one of the jurors contacted
Warger’s counsel to express concern over juror Whipple’s conduct.
The complaining juror subsequently signed an affidavit claiming
that Whipple had spoken during deliberations about “a motor vehicle
collision in which her daughter was at fault for the collision and
a man died,” and had “related that if her daughter had been sued,
it would have ruined her life.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a–41a.
Relying on this affidavit, Warger moved for a new trial. He
contended that Whipple had deliberately lied during voir dire about
her impartiality and ability to award damages. Thus, he asserted,
he had satisfied the requirements of McDonough Power Equipment,
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U. S. 548 (1984) , which holds that a party
may “obtain a new trial” if he “demonstrate[s] that a juror failed
to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and . . .
that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a
challenge for cause.” Id., at 556.
The District Court refused to grant a new trial, holding that
the only evidence that supported Warger’s motion, the complaining
juror’s affidavit, was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
As relevant here, that Rule provides that “[d]uring an inquiry into
the validity of a verdict,” evidence “about any statement made or
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations” is
inadmissible. Rule 606(b)(1). The Rule contains three specific
exceptions—allowing testimony “about whether (A) extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s
attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear
on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on
the verdict form,” Rule 606(b)(2)—but the District Court found none
of these exceptions to be applicable.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 721 F. 3d 606 (2013). It first held
that Warger’s proffered evidence did not fall within the
“extraneous prejudicial evidence” exception set forth in Rule
606(b)(2)(A). The court explained that “[j]urors’ personal
experiences do not constitute extraneous information; it is
unavoidable they will bring such innate experiences into the jury
room.” Id., at 611. Next, the court rejected Warger’s alternative
argument that Rule 606(b) is wholly inapplicable when a litigant
offers evidence to show that a juror was dishonest during voir
dire. Acknowledging that there was a split among the Federal Courts
of Appeals on this question, the Eighth Circuit joined those
Circuits that had held that Rule 606(b) applies to any proceeding
in which the jury’s verdict might be invalidated, including efforts
to demonstrate that a juror lied during voir dire. Compare id., at
611–612 (citing Williams v. Price, 343 F. 3d 223, 235–237 (CA3
2003), and United States v. Benally, 546 F. 3d 1230, 1235 (CA10
2008)), with Hard v. Burlington N. R. Co., 812 F. 2d 482, 485 (CA9
1987) (“Statements which tend to show deceit during voir dire are
not barred by [Rule 606(b)]”), and Maldonado v. Missouri
P. R. Co., 798 F. 2d 764, 770 (CA5 1986) (same).
We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), and now
affirm.
II
We hold that Rule 606(b) applies to juror testimony during a
proceeding in which a party seeks to secure a new trial on the
ground that a juror lied during voir dire. In doing so, we simply
accord Rule 606(b)’s terms their plain meaning. The Rule, after
all, applies “[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.”
Rule 606(b)(1). A postverdict motion for a new trial on the ground
of voir dire dishonesty plainly entails “an inquiry into the
validity of [the] verdict”: If a juror was dishonest during
voir dire and an honest response would have provided a valid
basis to challenge that juror for cause, the verdict must be
invalidated. See McDonough, 464 U. S., at 556.
This understanding of the text of Rule 606(b) is consistent with
the underlying common-law rule on which it was based. Although some
common-law courts would have permitted evidence of jury
deliberations to be introduced to demonstrate juror dishonesty
during voir dire, the majority would not, and the language of Rule
606(b) reflects Congress’ enactment of the more restrictive version
of the common-law rule.
Rule 606(b) had its genesis in Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T. R. 11, 99
Eng. Rep. 944 (K. B. 1785), in which Lord Mansfield held
inadmissible an affidavit from two jurors claiming that the jury
had decided the case through a game of chance. See 8 J. Wigmore,
Evidence §2352, p. 696 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). The rule soon
took root in the United States, id., at 696–697, where it was
viewed as both promoting the finality of verdicts and insulating
the jury from outside influences, see McDonald v. Pless, 238 U. S.
264 –268 (1915).
Some versions of the rule were narrower than others. Under what
was sometimes known as the “Iowa” approach, juror testimony
regarding deliberations was excluded only to the extent that it
related to matters that “ ‘inhere[d] in the verdict,’ ”
which generally consisted of evidence of the jurors’ subjective
intentions and thought processes in reaching a verdict. 3 C.
Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §6:16, p. 70 (4th
ed. 2013); 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§2353, 2354, at 699–702. [
1 ] A number of courts adhering to the Iowa rule held
that testimony regarding jury deliberations is admissible when used
to challenge juror conduct during voir dire. See, e.g., Mathi- sen
v. Norton, 187 Wash. 240, 244–246, 60 P. 2d 1, 3–4 (1936); Williams
v. Bridges, 140 Cal. App. 537, 538–541, 35 P. 2d 407, 408–409
(1934).
But other courts applied a broader version of the
anti-impeachment rule. Under this version, sometimes called the
“federal” approach, litigants were prohibited from using evidence
of jury deliberations unless it was offered to show that an
“extraneous matter” had influenced the jury. See 3 Mueller &
Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence §6:16, at 71; Rules of Evidence for
United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F. R. D. 183, 265 (1973).
The “great majority” of appellate courts applying this version of
the rule held jury deliberations evidence inadmissible even if used
to demonstrate dishonesty during voir dire. Wilson v. Wiggins, 54
Ariz. 240, 246, 94 P. 2d 870, 872 (1939); see, e.g., Willis v.
Davis, 333 P. 2d 311, 314 (Okla. 1958); Turner v. Hall’s Adm’x, 252
S. W. 2d 30, 34 (Ky. 1952); Hinkel v. Oregon Chair Co., 80 Ore.
404, 406, 156 P. 438, 439 (1916); State v. Cloud, 130 La. 955,
958–960, 58 So. 827, 828–829 (1912); Payne v. Burke, 236 App. Div.
527, 528–530, 260 N. Y. S. 259, 260–262 (1932).
This Court occasionally employed language that might have
suggested a preference for the Iowa rule. See Hyde v. United
States, 225 U. S. 347 –384 (1912) (“[W]e think the rule
expressed in Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195
[1866], . . . should apply, that the testimony of jurors should not
be received to show matters which essentially inhere in the verdict
itself and necessarily depend upon the testimony of the jurors and
can receive no corroboration”); Mattox v. United States, 146
U. S. 140 –149 (1892) (quoting at length a Kansas Supreme
Court decision setting out the Iowa test). But to the extent that
these decisions created any question as to which approach this
Court followed, McDonald v. Pless largely settled matters. There,
we held that juror affidavits were not admissible to show that
jurors had entered a “quotient” verdict, precisely the opposite of
the result reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in its decision
establishing the Iowa approach. Compare 238 U. S., at 265, 268,
with Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 211–212
(1866). In doing so, we observed that although decisions in a few
States made admissible a “juror’s affidavit as to an overt act of
misconduct, which was capable of being controverted by other
jurors,” the argument in favor of that approach (i.e., the Iowa
rule) had not been generally accepted, because permitting such
evidence “would open the door to the most pernicious arts and
tampering with jurors.” 238 U. S., at 268 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Our subsequent decision in Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1
(1933) , was consistent with our apparent rejection of the Iowa
approach. In Clark, the Government had prosecuted for contempt a
juror who, during voir dire in a prior case, had falsely
denied knowing the defendant. Id., at 6–8. We held that the
prosecution could introduce evidence of what had occurred during
deliberations in the prior case, rejecting the juror’s argument
that these communications were privileged. We were careful to
explain, however, that nothing in our decision was “at variance
with the rule . . . that the testimony of a juror is not admissible
for the impeachment of his verdict.” Id., at 18. This was because
the verdict in the original case was not at issue, and therefore
“the rule against impeachment [was] wholly unrelated to the problem
. . . before us.” Ibid.; accord, McDonald, 238 U. S., at 269.
Clark thus clarified that the rule against jurors’ impeaching their
verdicts applies only in a proceeding actually impeaching that
verdict—precisely the line Rule 606(b) draws when it refers to an
“inquiry into the validity of a verdict.”
In any event, these decisions predated Congress’ enactment of
Rule 606(b), and Congress was undoubtedly free to prescribe a
broader version of the anti-impeachment rule than we had previously
applied. The language of the Rule it adopted clearly reflects the
federal approach: As enacted, Rule 606(b) prohibited the use of any
evidence of juror deliberations, subject only to the express
exceptions for extraneous information and outside influences. [
2 ]
For those who consider legislative history relevant, here it
confirms that this choice of language was no accident. Congress
rejected a prior version of the Rule that, in accordance with the
Iowa approach, would have prohibited juror testimony only as to the
“effect of anything upon . . . [any] juror’s mind or emotions . . .
or concerning his mental processes.” Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F. R. D. 315, 387 (1971); see
Tanner v. United States, 483 U. S. 107 –125 (1987) (detailing
the legislative history of the Rule). Thus Congress “specifically
understood, considered, and rejected a version of Rule 606(b)” that
would have likely permitted the introduction of evidence of
deliberations to show dishonesty during voir dire. Id., at
125.
III
A
Seeking to rebut this straightforward understanding of Rule
606(b), Warger first insists that the proceedings that follow a
motion for new trial based on dishonesty during voir dire do
not involve an “inquiry into the validity of the verdict.” His
argument is as follows: Under McDonough, a party moving for a new
trial on the basis of voir dire dishonesty need not show that this
dishonesty had an effect on the verdict. See 464 U. S., at
556. Although a successful claim will result in vacatur of the
judgment, vacatur is simply the remedy for the McDonough error,
just as it may be the remedy for a variety of errors that have
nothing to do with the manner in which the jury reached its
verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Davila, 569 U. S. ___,
___ (2013) (slip op., at 12) (listing certain
“ ‘structural’ ” errors warranting “automatic reversal”
of a criminal conviction). Therefore, Warger asserts, the “inquiry
begins and ends with what happened during voir dire.” Brief for
Petitioner 19–20.
We are not persuaded. Warger, it seems, would restrict Rule
606(b)’s application to those claims of error for which a court
must examine the manner in which the jury reached its
verdict—claims, one might say, involving an inquiry into the jury’s
verdict. But the “inquiry” to which the Rule refers is one into the
“validity of the verdict,” not into the verdict itself. The Rule
does not focus on the means by which deliberations evidence might
be used to invalidate a verdict. It does not say “during an inquiry
into jury deliberations,” or prohibit the introduction of evidence
of deliberations “for use in determining whether an asserted error
affected the jury’s verdict.” It simply applies “[d]uring an
inquiry into the validity of the verdict”—that is, during a
proceeding in which the verdict may be rendered invalid. Whether or
not a juror’s alleged misconduct during voir dire had a direct
effect on the jury’s verdict, the motion for a new trial requires a
court to determine whether the verdict can stand.
B
Next, Warger contends that excluding jury deliberations evidence
tending to show that a juror lied during voir dire is
unnecessary to fulfill Congress’ apparent objectives of encouraging
full and open debate in the jury room and preventing the harassment
of former jurors. He observes that jurors remain free to, and may
sometimes be forced to, disclose what happened in the jury room,
and that ethical rules limit the ability of parties to harass
jurors following trial. But these are arguments against Rule 606(b)
generally, not arguments for the particular exception to the Rule
that Warger seeks. Congress’ enactment of Rule 606(b) was premised
on the concerns that the use of deliberations evidence to challenge
verdicts would represent a threat to both jurors and finality in
those circumstances not covered by the Rule’s express exceptions.
Warger cannot escape the scope of the Rule Congress adopted simply
by asserting that its concerns were misplaced.
C
Nor do we accept Warger’s contention that we must adopt his
interpretation of Rule 606(b) so as to avoid constitutional
concerns. The Constitution guarantees both criminal and civil
litigants a right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 362 (1966) ; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946) . And we have made clear that voir dire
can be an essential means of protecting this right. See, e.g.,
Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion); Ham
v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524, 527 (1973) . These principles,
Warger asserts, require that parties be allowed to use evidence of
deliberations to demonstrate that a juror lied during voir
dire.
Given the clarity of both the text and history of Rule 606(b),
however, the canon of constitutional avoidance has no role to play
here. The canon “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible
interpretations” of a provision. Clark v. Suarez-Martinez, 543 U.
S. 371, 381 (2005) . It “has no application in the absence of
. . . ambiguity.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001) . We see none here.
Moreover, any claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in
circumstances such as these is foreclosed by our decision in
Tanner. In Tanner, we concluded that Rule 606(b) precluded a
criminal defendant from introducing evidence that multiple jurors
had been intoxicated during trial, rejecting the contention that
this exclusion violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
“ ‘a tribunal both impartial and mentally competent to afford
a hearing.’ ” 483 U. S., at 126 (quoting Jordan v.
Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167, 176 (1912) ). We reasoned that
the defendant’s right to an unimpaired jury was sufficiently
protected by voir dire, the observations of court and counsel
during trial, and the potential use of “nonjuror evidence” of
misconduct. 483 U. S., at 127. Similarly here, a party’s right
to an impartial jury remains protected despite Rule 606(b)’s
removal of one means of ensuring that jurors are unbiased. Even if
jurors lie in voir dire in a way that conceals bias, juror
impartiality is adequately assured by the parties’ ability to bring
to the court’s attention any evidence of bias before the verdict is
rendered, and to employ nonjuror evidence even after the verdict is
rendered. [
3 ]
IV
We further hold, consonant with the Eighth Circuit, that the
affidavit Warger sought to introduce was not admissible under Rule
606(b)(2)(A)’s exception for evidence as to whether “extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s
attention.”
Generally speaking, information is deemed “extraneous” if it
derives from a source “external” to the jury. See Tanner, 483 U.
S., at 117. “External” matters include publicity and information
related specifically to the case the jurors are meant to decide,
while “internal” matters include the general body of experiences
that jurors are understood to bring with them to the jury room. See
id., at 117–119; 27 C. Wright & V. Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Evidence §6075, pp. 520–521 (2d ed. 2007). Here, the
excluded affidavit falls on the “internal” side of the line:
Whipple’s daughter’s accident may well have informed her general
views about negligence liability for car crashes, but it did not
provide either her or the rest of the jury with any specific
knowledge regarding Shauers’ collision with Warger.
Indeed, Warger does not argue that Whipple’s statements related
to “extraneous” information in this sense. Instead, he contends
that because Whipple would have been disqualified from the jury had
she disclosed her daughter’s accident, any information she shared
with the other jurors was extraneous.
We cannot agree that whenever a juror should have been excluded
from the jury, anything that juror says is necessarily “extraneous”
within the meaning of Rule 606(b)(2)(A). Were that correct, parties
would find it quite easy to avoid Rule 606(b)’s limitations. As
discussed above, Congress adopted the restrictive version of the
anti-impeachment rule, one that common-law courts had concluded
precludes parties from using deliberations evidence to prove juror
dishonesty during voir dire. But if Warger’s understanding of the
“extraneous” information exception were accepted, then any time a
party could use such evidence to show that a juror’s “correct
response [during voir dire] would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge”—a prerequisite for relief under McDonough, 464
U. S., at 556—all evidence of what that juror said during
deliberations would be admissible. The “extraneous” information
exception would swallow much of the rest of Rule 606(b).
Even if such a result were not precluded by Congress’ apparent
intent to adopt the restrictive federal approach, it is foreclosed
by Tanner, which relied upon the doctrine that “treat[s]
allegations of the physical or mental incompetence of a juror as
‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.” 483 U. S., at 118.
Tanner cited, in particular, cases holding that evidence of jurors’
insanity, inability to understand English, and hearing impairments
are all “internal” matters subject to exclusion under Rule 606(b).
Id., at 119. Were we to follow Warger’s understanding of the
“extraneous information” exception, all these cases, including
Tanner, would have been wrongly decided: If the jurors were not
able to serve on the jury in the first place, or should have been
dismissed for their misconduct during the trial, then what they
said or did during deliberations would necessarily be “extraneous”
and admissible. Tanner’s implicit rejection of this view easily
extends from the sort of juror incompetence considered in that case
to the alleged bias considered here. Whether a juror would have
been struck from the jury because of incompetence or bias, the mere
fact that a juror would have been struck does not make admissible
evidence regarding that juror’s conduct and statements during
deliberations.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
