NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United
States Reports. Readers are requested to notify
the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–6827
_________________
GREGORY HOUSTON HOLT, aka ABDUL MAALIK MUHAMMAD, PETITIONER
v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
[January 20, 2015]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, is
an Arkansas inmate and a devout Muslim who wishes to grow a
1∕2-inch beard in accordance with his religious
beliefs. Petitioner’s objection to shaving his
beard clashes with the Arkansas Department of
Correction’s grooming policy, which prohibits
inmates from growing beards unless they have a particular
dermatological condition. We hold that the
Department’s policy, as applied in this case,
violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA),114Stat.803,42 U. S. C.
§2000cc et seq., which prohibits a
stateor local government from taking any action that substantially
burdens the religious exercise of an institutionalized person
unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes the
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest.
We conclude in this case that the
Department’s policy substantially burdens
petitioner’s religious exercise. Although we do
not question the importance of the Department’s
interests in stopping the flow of contraband and facilitating
prisoner identification, we do doubt whether the prohibition
against petitioner’s beard furthers its
compelling interest about contraband. And we conclude that the
Department has failed to show that its policy is the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests. We thus
reverse the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
I
A
Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),107Stat.1488,42
U. S. C. §2000bb
et seq., “in order to provide
very broad protection for religious liberty.â€
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573
U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 4). RFRA was
enacted three years after our decision in Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,494
U. S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral, generally
applicable laws that incidentally burden the exercise of religion
usually do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Id., at 878–882. Smith
largely repudiated the method of analysis used in prior free
exercise cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder,406
U. S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v.
Verner,374 U. S. 398 (1963). In those cases, we
employed a balancing test that considered whether a challenged
government action that substantially burdened the exercise of
religion was necessary to further a compelling state interest. See
Yoder, supra, at 214, 219; Sherbert,
supra, at 403, 406.
Following our decision in Smith, Congress enacted RFRA in
order to provide greater protection for religious exercise than is
available under the First Amendment. See Hobby Lobby,
supra, at ___ – ___ (slip op., at
5–6). RFRA provides that
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability,â€
unless the government “demonstrates that
application of the burden to the
person––(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2)Â is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.†42
U. S. C.
§§2000bb–1(a), (b). In
making RFRA applicable to the States and their subdivisions,
Congress relied on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in
City of Boerne v. Flores,521 U. S. 507
(1997), this Court held that RFRA exceeded
Congress’ powers under that provision.
Id., at 532–536.
Congress responded to City of Boerne by enacting RLUIPA,
which applies to the States and their subdivisions and invokes
congressional authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses.
See §2000cc–1(b). RLUIPA concerns
two areas of government activity: Section 2 governs land-use
regulation, §2000cc; and Section
3—the provision at issue in this
case—governs religious exercise by
institutionalized persons,
§2000cc–1. Section 3 mirrors RFRA
and provides that “[n]o government shall impose
a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing
in or confined to an institution . . . even
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that
person––(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.â€
§2000cc–1(a). RLUIPA thus allows
prisoners “to seek religious accommodations
pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.â€
Gonzales v. O Centro EspÃrita Beneficente
União do Vegetal,546 U. S. 418,436
(2006).
Several provisions of RLUIPA underscore its expansive protection
for religious liberty. Congress defined
“religious exercise†capaciously to
include “any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief.â€
§2000cc–5(7)(A). Congress mandated
that this concept “shall be construed in favor
of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
Constitution.â€
§2000cc–3(g). And Congress stated
that RLUIPA “may require a government to incur
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial
burden on religious exercise.â€
§2000cc–3(c). See Hobby
Lobby, supra, at ___ – ___, ___
(slip op., at 6–7, 43).
B
Petitioner, as noted, is in the custody of the Arkansas
Department of Correction and he objects on religious grounds to the
Department’s grooming policy, which provides
that “[n]o inmates will be permitted to wear
facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not
extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the
lip.†App. to Brief for Petitioner 11a. The policy
makes no exception for inmates who object on religious grounds, but
it does contain an exemption for prisoners with medical needs:
“Medical staff may prescribe that inmates with a
diagnosed dermatological problem may wear facial hair no longer
than one quarter of an inch.†Ibid. The policy
provides that “[f]ailure to abide by [the
Department’s] grooming standards is grounds for
disciplinary action.†Id., at 12a.
Petitioner sought permission to grow a beard and, al-though he
believes that his faith requires him not to trim his beard at all,
he proposed a “compromise†under
which he would grow only a 1∕2-inch beard. App.
164. Prison officials denied his request, and the warden told him:
“[Y]ou will abide by [Arkansas Department of
Correction] policies and if you choose to disobey, you can suffer
the consequences.†No.
5:11–cv–00164 (ED Ark.,
July 21, 2011), Doc. 13, p. 6 (Letter from Gaylon Lay to Gregory
Holt (July 19, 2011)).
Petitioner filed a pro se complaint in
Federal District Court challenging the grooming policy under
RLUIPA. We refer to the respondent prison officials collectively as
the Department. In October 2011, the District Court granted
petitioner a preliminary injunction and remanded to a Magistrate
Judge for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Department
called two witnesses. Both expressed the belief that inmates could
hide contraband in even a 1∕2-inch beard, but
neither pointed to any instances in which this had been done in
Arkansas or elsewhere. Both witnesses also acknowledged that
inmates could hide items in many other places, such as in the hair
on their heads or their clothing. In addition, one of the
witnesses—Gaylon Lay, the warden of
petitioner’s
prison—testified that a prisoner who escaped
could change his appearance by shaving his beard, and that a
prisoner could shave his beard to disguise himself and enter a
restricted area of the prison. Neither witness, however, was able
to explain why these problems could not be addressed by taking a
photograph of an inmate without a beard, a practice followed in
other prison systems. Lay voiced concern that the Department would
be unable to monitor the length of a prisoner’s
beard to ensure that it did not exceed one-half inch, but he
acknowledged that the Department kept track of the length of the
beards of those inmates who are allowed to wear a
1∕4-inch beard for medical reasons.
As a result of the preliminary injunction, petitioner had a
short beard at the time of the hearing, and the Magistrate Judge
commented: “I look at your particular
circumstance and I say, you know, it’s almost
preposterous to think that you could hide contraband in your
beard.†App. 155. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the preliminary injunction be vacated and that
petitioner’s complaint be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Magistrate
Judge emphasized that “the prison officials are
entitled to deference,†id., at 168, and that
the grooming policy allowed petitioner to exercise his religion in
other ways, such as by praying on a prayer rug, maintaining the
diet required by his faith, and observing religious holidays.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation in full, and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in a brief per
curiam opinion, holding that the Department had satisfied its
burden of showing that the grooming policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interests.
509 Fed. Appx. 561 (2013). The Court of Appeals stated that
“courts should ordinarily defer to [prison
officials’] expert judgment†in
security matters unless there is substantial evidence that a
prison’s response is exaggerated. Id.,
at 562. And while acknowledging that other prisons allow inmates to
maintain facial hair, the Eighth Circuit held that this evidence
“does not outweigh deference owed to [the]
expert judgment of prison officials who are more familiar with
their own institutions.†Ibid.
We entered an injunction pending resolution of
petitioner’s petition for writ of certiorari,
571 U. S. ___ (2013), and we then granted certiorari,
571 U. S. ___ (2014).
II
Under RLUIPA, petitioner bore the initial burden of proving that
the Department’s grooming policy implicates his
religious exercise. RLUIPA protects “any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief,â€
§2000cc–5(7)(A), but, of course, a
prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be
sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other
motivation, see Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at ___,
n. 28 (slip op., at 29, n. 28). Here, the religious
exercise at issue is the growing of a beard, which petitioner
believes is a dictate of his religious faith, and the Department
does not dispute the sincerity of petitioner’s
belief.
In addition to showing that the relevant exercise of religion is
grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, petitioner also bore
the burden of proving that the Department’s
grooming policy substantially burdened that exercise of religion.
Petitioner easily satisfied that obligation. The
Department’s grooming policy requires
petitioner to shave his beard and thus to
“engage in conduct that seriously violates [his]
religious beliefs.†Id., at ___ (slip op., at
32). If petitioner contravenes that policy and grows his beard, he
will face serious disciplinary action. Because the grooming policy
puts petitioner to this choice, it substantially burdens his
religious exercise. Indeed, the Department does not argue
otherwise.
The District Court reached the opposite conclusion, but its
reasoning (adopted from the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge)
misunderstood the analysis that RLUIPA demands. First, the District
Court erred by concluding that the grooming policy did not
substantially burden petitioner’s religious
exercise because “he had been provided a prayer
rug and a list of distributors of Islamic material, he was allowed
to correspond with a religious advisor, and was allowed to maintain
the required diet and observe religious holidays.â€
App. 177. In taking this approach, the District Court improperly
imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving
prisoners’ First Amendment rights. See,
e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,482 U. S. 342–352
(1987); see also Turner v. Safley,482
U. S. 78,90 (1987). Under those cases, the availability
of alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant
consideration, but RLUIPA provides greater protection.
RLUIPA’s “substantial
burden†inquiry asks whether the government has
substantially burdened religious exercise (here, the growing of a
1∕2-inch beard), not whether the RLUIPA claimant
is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.
Second, the District Court committed a similar error in
suggesting that the burden on petitioner’s
religious exercise was slight because, according to
petitioner’s testi-mony, his religion would
“credit†him for attempting to
follow his religious beliefs, even if that attempt provedto be
unsuccessful. RLUIPA, however, applies to an exercise of religion
regardless of whether it is
“compelled.â€
§2000cc–5(7)(A).
Finally, the District Court went astray when it relied on
petitioner’s testimony that not all Muslims
believe that men must grow beards. Petitioner’s
belief is by no means idiosyncratic. See Brief for Islamic Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae 2 (“hadith
requiring beards . . . are widely followed
by observant Muslims across the various schools of
Islamâ€). But even if it were, the protection of
RLUIPA, no less than the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause, is
“not limited to beliefs which are shared by all
of the members of a religious sect.†Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div.,450
U. S. 707–716 (1981).
III
Since petitioner met his burden of showing that the
Department’s grooming policy substantially
burdened his exercise of religion, the burden shifted to the
Department to show that its refusal to allow petitioner to grow a
1∕2-inch beard “(1) [was] in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was]
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.â€
§2000cc–1(a).
The Department argues that its grooming policy represents the
least restrictive means of furthering a
“ ‘broadly
formulated
interes[t],’ †see
Hobby Lobby, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 39) (quoting
O Centro, 546 U. S., at 431), namely, the
Department’s compelling interest in prison
safety and security. But RLUIPA, like RFRA, contemplates a
“ ‘more
focused’ †inquiry and
“ ‘requires the
Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is
satisfied through application of the challenged law
“to the
personâ€â€“–the
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially
burdened.’ †Hobby
Lobby, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 39)
(quoting O Centro, supra, at
430–431 (quoting
§2000bb–1(b))). RLUIPA requires us
to
“ ‘scrutiniz[e]
the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular
religious claimants’ â€
and “to look to the marginal interest in
enforcing†the challenged government action in that
particular context. Hobby Lobby, supra, at ___ (slip
op., at 39) (quoting O Centro, supra, at 431;
alteration in original). In this case, that means the enforcement
of the Department’s policy to prevent
petitioner from growing a 1∕2-inch beard.
The Department contends that enforcing this prohibition is the
least restrictive means of furthering prison safety and security in
two specific ways.
A
The Department first claims that the no-beard policy prevents
prisoners from hiding contraband. The Department worries that
prisoners may use their beards to conceal all manner of prohibited
items, including razors, needles, drugs, and cellular phone
subscriber identity module (SIM) cards.
We readily agree that the Department has a compelling interest
in staunching the flow of contraband into and within its
facilities, but the argument that this interest would be seriously
compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a
1∕2-inch beard is hard to take seriously. As
noted, the Magistrate Judge observed that it was
“almost preposterous to think that [petitioner]
could hide contraband†in the short beard he had grown
at the time of the evidentiary hearing. App. 155. An item of
contraband would have to be very small indeed to be concealed by a
1∕2-inch beard, and a prisoner seeking to hide
an item in such a short beard would have to find a way to prevent
the item from falling out. Since the Department does not demand
that inmates have shaved heads or short crew cuts, it is hard to
see why an inmate would seek to hide contraband in a
1∕2-inch beard rather than in the longer hair on
his head.
Although the Magistrate Judge dismissed the possibility that
contraband could be hidden in a short beard, the Magistrate Judge,
the District Court, and the Court of Appeals all thought that they
were bound to defer to the Department’s
assertion that allowing petitioner to grow such a beard would
undermine its interest in suppressing contraband. RLUIPA, however,
does not permit such unquestioning deference. RLUIPA, like RFRA,
“makes clear that it is the obligation of the
courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test
set forth by Congress.†O Centro, supra,
at 434. That test requires the Department not merely to explain why
it denied the exemption but to prove that denying the exemption is
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental
interest. Prison officials are experts in running prisons and
evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts
should respect that expertise. But that respect does not justify
the abdication of the responsibility, conferred by Congress, to
apply RLUIPA’s rigorous standard. And without a
degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning acceptance,
it is hard to swallow the argument that denying petitioner a
1∕2-inch beard actually furthers the
Department’s interest in rooting out
contraband.
Even if the Department could make that showing, its contraband
argument would still fail because the Department cannot show that
forbidding very short beards is the least restrictive means of
preventing the concealment of contraband. “The
least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally
demanding,†and it requires the government to
“sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving
its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion by the objecting part[y].â€
Hobby Lobby, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 40).
“[I]f a less restrictive means is available for
the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use
it.†United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc.,529 U. S. 803,815 (2000).
The Department failed to establish that it could not satisfy its
security concerns by simply searching
petitioner’s beard. The Department already
searches prisoners’ hair and clothing, and it
presumably examines the 1∕4-inch beards of
inmates with dermatological conditions. It has offered no sound
reason why hair, clothing, and 1∕4-inch beards
can be searched but 1∕2-inch beards cannot. The
Department suggests that requiring guards to search a
prisoner’s beard would pose a risk to the
physical safety of a guard if a razor or needle was concealed in
the beard. But that is no less true for searches of hair, clothing,
and 1∕4-inch beards. And the Department has
failed to prove that it could not adopt the less restrictive
alternative of having the prisoner run a comb through his beard.
For all these reasons, the Department’s
interest in eliminating contraband cannot sustain its refusal to
allow petitioner to grow a 1∕2-inch beard.
B
The Department contends that its grooming policy is necessary to
further an additional compelling interest, i.e., preventing
prisoners from disguising their identities. The Department tells us
that the no-beard policy allows secu-rity officers to identify
prisoners quickly and accurately. It claims that bearded inmates
could shave their beards and change their appearance in order to
enter restricted areas within the prison, to escape, and to evade
apprehension after escaping.
We agree that prisons have a compelling interest in the quick
and reliable identification of prisoners, and we acknowledge that
any alteration in a prisoner’s appearance, such
as by shaving a beard, might, in the absence of effective
countermeasures, have at least some effect on the ability of guards
or others to make a quick identification. But even if we assume for
present purposes that the Department’s grooming
policy sufficiently furthers its interest in the identification of
prisoners, that policy still violates RLUIPA as applied in the
circumstances present here. The Department contends that a prisoner
who has a beard when he is photographed for identification purposes
might confuse guards by shaving his beard. But as petitioner has
argued, the Department could largely solve this problem by
requiring that all inmates be photographed without beards when
first admitted to the facility and, if necessary, periodically
thereafter. Once that is done, an inmate like petitioner could be
allowed to grow a short beard and could be photographed again when
the beard reached the 1∕2-inch limit. Prison
guards would then have a bearded and clean-shaven photo to use in
making identifications. In fact, the Department (like many other
States, see Brief for Petitioner 39) already has a policy of
photographing a prisoner both when he enters an institution and
when his “appearance changes at any time during
[his] incarceration.†Arkansas Department of
Correction, Inmate Handbook 3–4 (rev. Jan.
2013).
The Department argues that the dual-photo method is inadequate
because, even if it might help authorities apprehend a bearded
prisoner who escapes and then shaves his beard once outside the
prison, this method is unlikely to assist guards when an inmate
quickly shaves his beard in order to alter his appearance within
the prison. The Department contends that the identification concern
is particularly acute at petitioner’s prison,
where inmates live in barracks and work in fields. Counsel for the
Department suggested at oral argument that a pris-oner could gain
entry to a restricted area by shavinghis beard and swapping
identification cards with an-other inmate while out in the fields.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 28–30,
39–43.
We are unpersuaded by these arguments for at least two reasons.
First, the Department failed to show, in the face of
petitioner’s evidence, that its prison system
is so different from the many institutions that allow facial hair
that the dual-photo method cannot be employed at its institutions.
Second, the Department failed to establish why the risk that a
prisoner will shave a 1∕2-inch beard to disguise
himself is so great that 1∕2-inch beards cannot
be allowed, even though prisoners are allowed to grow mustaches,
head hair, or 1∕4-inch beards for medical
reasons. All of these could also be shaved off at a
moment’s notice, but the Department apparently
does not think that this possibility raises a serious security
concern.
C
In addition to its failure to prove that
petitioner’s proposed alternatives would not
sufficiently serve its security interests, the Department has not
provided an adequate response to two additional arguments that
implicate the RLUIPA analysis.
First, the Department has not adequately demonstrated why its
grooming policy is substantially underinclusive in at least two
respects. Although the Department denied
petitioner’s request to grow a
1∕2-inch beard, it permits prisoners with a
dermatological condition to grow 1∕4-inch
beards. The Department does this even though both beards pose
similar risks. And the Department permits inmates to grow more than
a 1∕2-inch of hair on their heads. With respect
to hair length, the grooming policy provides only that hair must be
worn “above the ear†and
“no longer in the back than the middle of the
nape of the neck.†App. to Brief for Petitioner 11a.
Hair on the head is a more plausible place to hide contraband than
a 1∕2-inch beard—and the
same is true of an inmate’s clothing and shoes.
Nevertheless, the Department does not require inmates to go about
bald, barefoot, or naked. Although the
Department’s proclaimed objectives are to stop
the flow of contraband and to facilitate prisoner identification,
“[t]he proffered objectives are not pursued with
respect to analogous nonreligious conduct,†which
suggests that “those interests could be achieved
by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser
degree.†Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah,508 U. S. 520,546 (1993).
In an attempt to demonstrate why its grooming policy is
underinclusive in these respects, the Department emphasizes that
petitioner’s 1∕2-inch beard
is longer than the 1∕4-inch beard allowed for
medical reasons. But the Department has failed to establish (and
the District Court did not find) that a 1∕4-inch
difference in beard length poses a meaningful increase in security
risk. The Department also asserts that few inmates require beards
for medical reasons while many may request beards for religious
reasons. But the Department has not argued that denying petitioner
an exemption is necessary to further a compelling interest in cost
control or program administration. At bottom, this argument is but
another formulation of the “classic rejoinder of
bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you,
I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no
exceptions.†O Centro, 546 U. S.,
at 436. We have rejected a similar argument in analogous contexts,
see ibid.; Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 407,
and we reject it again today.
Second, the Department failed to show, in the face of
petitioner’s evidence, why the vast majority of
States and the Federal Government permit inmates to grow
1∕2-inch beards, either for any reason or for
religious reasons, but it cannot. See Brief for Petitioner
24–25; Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 28–29. “While not
necessarily controlling, the policies followed at other well-run
institutions would be relevant to a determination of the need for a
particular type of restriction.†Procunier v.
Martinez,416 U. S. 396, n. 14
(1974). That so many other prisons allow inmates to grow beards
while ensuring prison safety and security suggests that the
Department could satisfy its security concerns through a means less
restrictive than denying petitioner the exemption he seeks.
We do not suggest that RLUIPA requires a prison to grant a
particular religious exemption as soon as a few other jurisdictions
do so. But when so many prisons offer an accommodation, a prison
must, at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes that
it must take a different course, and the Department failed to make
that showing here. Despite this, the courts below deferred to these
prison officials’ mere say-so that they could
not accommodate petitioner’s request. RLUIPA,
however, demands much more. Courts must hold prisons to their
statutory burden, and they must not “assume a
plausible, less restrictive alternative would be
ineffective.†Playboy Entertainment, 529
U. S., at 824.
We emphasize that although RLUIPA provides substantial
protection for the religious exercise of institutionalized persons,
it also affords prison officials ample ability to maintain
security. We highlight three ways in which this is so. First, in
applying RLUIPA’s statutory standard, courts
should not blind themselves to the fact that the analysis is
conducted in the prison setting. Second, if an institution suspects
that an inmate is using religious activity to cloak illicit
conduct, “prison officials may appropriately
question whether a prisoner’s religiosity,
asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is
authentic.†Cutter v. Wilkinson,544
U. S. 709, n. 13 (2005). See also Hobby
Lobby, 573 U. S., at ___, n. 28 (slip op., at 29,
n. 28). Third, even if a claimant’s
religious belief is sincere, an institution might be entitled to
withdraw an accommodation if the claimant abuses the exemption in a
manner that undermines the prison’s compelling
interests.
IV
In sum, we hold that the Department’s
grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it prevents petitioner
from growing a 1∕2-inch beard in accordance with
his religious beliefs. The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–6827
_________________
GREGORY HOUSTON HOLT, aka ABDUL MAALIK MUHAMMAD, PETITIONER
v. RAY HOBBS, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit
[January 20, 2015]
Justice Sotomayor, concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion, which holds
that the Department failed to show why the less restrictive
al-ternatives identified by petitioner in the course of this
litigation were inadequate to achieve the
Department’s compelling security-related
interests. I write separatelyto explain my understanding of the
applicable legalstandard.
Nothing in the Court’s opinion calls into
question our prior holding in Cutter v. Wilkinson
that “[c]ontext matters†in the
application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),114Stat.803,42
U. S. C. §2000cc
et seq. 544 U. S. 709,723 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In the dangerous prison
environment, “regulations and
procedures†are needed to “maintain
good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration
of costs and limited resources.†Ibid. Of
course, that is not to say that cost alone is an absolute defense
to an otherwise meritorious RLUIPA claim. See
§2000cc–3(c). Thus, we recognized
“that prison security is a compelling state
interest, and that deference is due to institutional
officials’ expertise in this
area.†Cutter, 544 U. S., at 725,
n. 13.
I do not understand the Court’s opinion to
preclude deferring to prison officials’
reasoning when that deference is due—that is,
when prison officials offer a plausible explanation for their
chosen policy that is supported by whatever evidence is reasonably
available to them. But the deference that must be
“extend[ed to] the experience and expertise of
prison administrators does not extend so far that prison officials
may declare a compelling governmental interest by
fiat.†Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741
F. 3d 48, 59 (CA10 2014). Indeed, prison policies
“ ‘grounded on
mere speculation’ â€
are exactly the ones that motivated Congress to enact
RLUIPA. 106 Cong. Rec. 16699 (2000) (quoting
S. Rep. No. 103–111, 10
(1993)).
Here, the Department’s failure to
demonstrate why the less restrictive policies petitioner identified
in the course of the litigation were insufficient to achieve its
compelling interests—not the
Court’s independent judgment concerning the
merit of these alternative approaches—is
ultimately fatal to the Department’s position.
The Court is appro-priately skeptical of the relationship between
the De-partment’s no-beard policy and its
alleged compelling interests because the Department offered little
more than unsupported assertions in defense of its refusal of
petitioner’s requested religious accommodation.
RLUIPA requires more.
One final point bears emphasis. RLUIPA requires institutions
refusing an accommodation to demonstrate that the policy it defends
“is the least restrictive means of furthering
[the alleged] compelling . . .
interest[s].â€
§2000cc–1(a)(2); see also
Washington v. Klem, 497 F. 3d 272, 284
(CA3 2007) (“[T]he phrase
‘least restrictive means’
is, by definition, a relative term. It necessarily implies a
comparison with other meansâ€); Couch v.
Jabe, 679 F. 3d 197, 203 (CA4 2012) (same). But
nothing in the Court’s opinion suggests that
prison officials must refute every conceivable option to satisfy
RLUIPA’s least restrictive means requirement.
Nor does it intimate that officials must prove that they considered
less restrictive alternatives at a particular point in time.
Instead, the Court correctly notes that the Department inadequately
responded to the less restrictive policies that petitioner brought
to the Department’s attention during the course
of the litigation, including the more permissive policies used by
the prisons in New York and California. See, e.g., United
States v. Wilgus, 638 F. 3d 1274, 1289 (CA10
2011) (observing in the analogous context of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 that the government need not
“do the impossible—refute
each and every conceivable alternative regulation
scheme†but need only “refute the
alternative schemes offered by the challengerâ€).
Because I understand the Court’s opinion to
be consistent with the foregoing, I join it.