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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–7211
_________________
ROBERT MITCHELL JENNINGS, PETITIONER v. WILLIAM STEPHENS,
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DE-PARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-RECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
[January 14, 2015]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Robert Mitchell Jennings was sentenced to death for
capital murder. He applied for federal habeas corpus relief on
three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel, prevailing on
two. The State appealed, and Jennings defended his writ on all
three theories. We consider whether Jennings was permitted to
pursue the theory that the District Court had rejected without
taking a cross-appeal or obtaining a certificate of
appealability.
I
In July 1988, petitioner Robert Mitchell Jennings entered an
adult bookstore to commit a robbery. Officer Elston Howard, by
unhappy coincidence, was at the same establishment to arrest the
store’s clerk. Undeterred, Jennings shot Howard
four times, robbed the store, and escaped. Howard died from his
wounds.
Howard was merely the most recent victim of
Jennings’ criminality. The State adjudicated
Jennings a delinquent at 14, convicted him of aggravated robbery at
17, and of additional aggravated robberies at 20. He murdered
Officer Howard only two months after his most recent release from
prison.
Jennings was arrested, tried, and convicted of capital murder,
and the State sought the death penalty. During the punishment
phase, the State introduced evidence of
Jennings’ lengthy and violent criminal history.
Jennings’ attorney called only the prison
chaplain, who testified about Jennings’
improvement and that Jennings was not
“incorrigible.â€
Jennings’ attorney acknowledged the difficulty
of his sentencing defense in his closing remarks, commenting that
he could not “quarrel with†a death
sentence, but was nonetheless pleading for mercy for his client.
The jury returned a special verdict, consistent with Texas law,
that Jennings acted deliberately in the murder and that he would
present a continuing threat to society. The trial court sentenced
Jennings to death. Texas courts affirmed
Jennings’ conviction and sentence and denied
postconviction relief. Jennings v. State, No.
AP–70911 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 20, 1993);
Ex parte Jennings, 2008 WL 5049911 (Tex. Crim.
App., Nov. 26, 2008).
Jennings applied for federal habeas corpus relief, asserting, as
relevant here, three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel
in the punishment phase of his trial. Jennings first claimed trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his
disadvantaged background, including that his conception was the
product of his mother’s rape, that his mother
was only 17 when he was born, and that he grew up in poverty.
Jennings offered his mother and sister as witnesses.
Jennings next argued that trial counsel was ineffective for
failure to investigate and to present evidence of
Jennings’ low intelligence and organic brain
damage. His trial attorney admitted in affidavit that he failed to
review the case files from Jennings’ prior
convictions, which contained a report suggesting Jennings suffered
from mild mental retardation and mild organic brain dysfunction.
(The report also suggested that Jennings malingered, feigning
mental illness in order to delay proceedings.) Jennings argued that
trial counsel should have examined Jennings’
prior case files, investigated Jennings’ mental
health problems, and presented evidence of mental impairment in the
punishment phase.
Finally, Jennings argued that counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for stating that he could not
“quarrel with†a death sentence.
According to Jennings, this remark expressed resignation
to—even the propriety of—a
death sentence.
Jennings cited our decision in Wiggins v.
Smith,539 U. S. 510 (2003), as establishing
constitutional ineffectiveness when counsel fails to investigate or
to introduce substantial mitigating evidence in a sentencing
proceeding. Though he did not cite our decision in Smith
v. Spisak,558 U. S. 139 (2010), he also argued
that counsel’s closing remarks amounted to
constitutional ineffectiveness. The parties referred to these
alleged errors as the “Wiggins
errors†and the “Spisak
error â€; we use the same terminology.
The federal habeas court granted Jennings relief on both of his
Wiggins theories, but denied relief on his Spisak
theory. Jennings v. Thaler, 2012 WL 1440387 (SD Tex.,
Apr. 23, 2012). The court ordered that the State
“shall release Jennings from custody unless,
within 120 days, the State of Texas grants Jennings a new
sentencing hearing or resentences him to a term of imprisonment as
provided by Texas law at the time of
Jennings[ ’ ]
crime.†Id., at *7.
The State appealed, attacking both Wiggins theories
(viz., trial counsel’s failure to present
evidence of a deprived background and failure to investigate
evidence of mental impairment). Jennings argued before the Fifth
Circuit that the District Court correctly found constitutional
ineffectiveness on both Wiggins theories, and argued again
that trial counsel performed ineffectively under his Spisak
theory. The Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas corpus under
the two Wiggins theories and rendered judgment for the
State. 537 Fed. Appx. 326, 334–335 (2013). The
court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over
Jennings’ Spisak theory. Id., at
338–339. Implicitly concluding that raising
this argument required taking a cross-appeal, the panel noted that
Jennings failed to file a timely notice of appeal, see Fed. Rule
App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A), and failed to obtain a certificate of
appealability as required by28 U. S. C.
§2253(c). Section 2253(c) provides, as relevant here,
that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the
court of appeals from . . . the final order
in a habeas corpus proceeding.â€
We granted certiorari, 572 U. S. ___, (2014), to
decide whether Jennings was required to file a notice of
cross-appeal and seek a certificate of appealability to pursue his
Spisak theory.
II
The rules governing the argumentation permissible for appellees
urging the affirmance of judgment are familiar, though this case
shows that familiarity and clarity do not go hand-in-hand.
A
An appellee who does not take a cross-appeal may
“urge in support of a decree any matter
appearing before the record, although his argument may involve an
attack upon the reasoning of the lower court.â€
United States v. American Railway Express Co.,265
U. S. 425,435 (1924). But an appellee who does not
cross-appeal may not “attack the decree with a
view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening
the rights of his adversary.†Ibid. Since
Jennings did not cross-appeal the denial of his Spisak
theory, we must determine whether urging that theory sought to
enlarge his rights or lessen the State’s under
the District Court’s judgment granting habeas
relief.
The District Court’s opinion, in its section
labeled “Order,†commanded the
State to “release Jennings from custody unless,
within 120 days, the State of Texas grants Jennings a new
sentencing hearing or resentences him to a term of imprisonment as
provided by Texas law at the time of
Jennings[ ’ ]
crime.†2012 WL 1440387, at *7. The District
Court’s corresponding entry of judgment
contained similar language. App. 35. The intuitive answer to the
question whether Jennings’ new theory expands
these rights is straightforward: Jennings’
rights under the judgment were what the judgment
provided—release, resentencing, or commutation
within a fixed time, at the State’s option; the
Spisak theory would give him the same. Similarly, the
State’s rights under the judgment were to
retain Jennings in custody pending resentencing or to commute his
sentence; the Spisak theory would allow no less.
The State objects to this straightforward result. A conditional
writ of habeas corpus, it argues, does not merely entitle a
successful petitioner to retrial (or resentencing), but it entitles
him to retrial (or resentencing) without the challenged
errors. Because each basis for habeas relief imposes an
additional implied obligation on the State (not to repeat
that error), each basis asserted by a successful petitioner
seeks to lessen the State’s rights at retrial,
and therefore each additional basis requires a cross-appeal.
This is an unusual position, and one contrary to the manner in
which courts ordinarily behave. Courts reduce their opinions and
verdicts to judgments precisely to define the rights and
liabilities of the parties. Parties seeking to enforce a foreign
court’s decree do not attempt to domesticate an
opinion; they domesticate a judgment. Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 481–482 (1987). A
prevailing party seeks to enforce not a district
court’s reasoning, but the
court’s judgment. Rogers v.
Hill,289 U. S. 582,587 (1933). This Court, like all
federal appellate courts, does not review lower
courts’ opinions, but their judgments.
Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 U. S.
837,842 (1984). And so a rule that contravenes this structure, that
makes the opinion part of the judgment, is
peculiar—especially when it is applied to
impose extrajudgment obligations on a sovereign State.
The State’s argument might have force in a
case where a district court explicitly imposes (or the
appellee asks the appellate court explicitly to impose) a condition
governing the details of the retrial. But that case is not before
us. The implications of the State’s position
make clear why such orders are atypical, and why we should not
infer such conditions from silence. Construing every federal grant
of habeas corpus as carrying an attendant list of unstated acts (or
omissions) that the state court must perform (or not perform) would
substantially transform conditional habeas corpus relief from an
opportunity “to replace an invalid judgment with
a valid one,†Wilkinson v. Dotson,544
U. S. 74 (Scalia, J., concurring), to a general grant
of supervisory authority over state trial courts.
In a variation on the same theme, the dissent posits that, apart
from implied terms, a habeas petitioner who successfully defends a
judgment on an alternative ground has expanded his rights
under the judgment, because he has changed the
judgment’s issue-preclusive effects. This
theory confuses a party’s rights under a
judgment—here, the right to release,
resentencing, or commutation, at the State’s
option—with preclusive effects that the
judgment might have in future proceedings. That makes nonsense of
American Railway. Whenever an appellee successfully
defends a judgment on an alternative ground, he changes what would
otherwise be the judgment’s issue-preclusive
effects. Thereafter, issue preclusion no longer attaches to the
ground on which the trial court decided the case, and instead
attaches to the alternative ground on which the appellate court
affirmed the judgment. Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 27 (1982). Thus, making alteration of
issue-preclusive effects the touchstone of necessity for
cross-appeal would require cross-appeal for every defense of
a judgment on alternative grounds. That is, of course, the polar
opposite of the rule we established in American Railway.
Under the habeas court’s judgment, Jennings
was entitled, at the State’s option, to either
release, resentencing, or commutation of his sentence. Any
potential claim that would have entitled Jennings to a new
sentencing proceeding could have been advanced to
“urge . . .
support†of the judgment within the meaning of
American Railway. 265 U. S., at 435. The dissent
and the State contend that applying American Railway in this
fashion will lead to a proliferation of frivolous appellate
defenses in habeas cases. If so, that is a problem that can only be
solved by Congress. Until it does so, we think it appropriate to
adhere to the usual law of appeals.
We think, however, that the danger is exaggerated. To begin
with, not all defenses will qualify. A habeas applicant who has won
resentencing would be required to take a cross-appeal in order to
raise a rejected claim that would result in a new trial. Similarly,
even if a habeas applicant has won retrial below, a claim that his
conduct was constitutionally beyond the power of the State to
punish would require cross-appeal. And even a successful applicant
doing no more than defending his judgment on appeal is confined to
those alternative grounds present in the record: he may not
simply argue any alternative basis, regardless of its
origin. Ibid.
Moreover, successful habeas applicants have an incentive to
defend their habeas grants effectively, an objective that is not
furthered by diverting an appellate court’s
attention from a meritorious defense to a frivolous one. The
dissent gives two examples of habeas petitioners who raised
numerous ostensibly frivolous claims. Post, at 9. They prove
nothing except the dissent’s inability to
substantiate its claim that our holding will foster the
presentation of frivolous alternative grounds for affirmance. For
both examples involved habeas petitioners who lost before
the magistrate and were casting about for any basis that might
justify a writ. We are talking here about habeas petitioners who
have won before the district court. The notion that they can
often be expected to dilute their defense of the
(by-definition-nonfrivolous) basis for their victory by dragging in
frivolous alternative grounds to support it is thoroughly
implausible. Indeed, as the State and Jennings agree, it is rare
that a habeas petitioner successful in the district court will even
be called upon to defend his writ on appeal.
And finally, we doubt that any more judicial time will be wasted
in rejection of frivolous claims made in defense of judgment on an
appeal already taken than would be wasted in rejection of similar
claims made in (what the State and dissent would require) a
separate proceeding for a certificate of appealability. To be sure,
as the dissent points out, post, at 9, the certificate
ruling will be made by just one judge rather than three; but that
judge will always be required to consider and rule on the
alternative grounds, whereas the three-judge court entertaining the
government’s habeas appeal will not reach the
alternative grounds unless it rejects the ground relied on by the
lower court. Not to mention the fact that in an already-pending
appeal the court can give the back of its hand to frivolous claims
en passant, whereas the certificate process requires the
opening and disposition of a separate proceeding.
In the end, the dissent tries to evade American Railway
by asserting that habeas corpus is
“unique.†Post, at 7. There
are undoubtedly some differences between writs of habeas corpus and
other judgments—most notably, that habeas
proceedings traditionally ignored the claim-preclusive effect of
earlier adjudications. But the realitythat some things about
habeas are different does not mean that everything about
habeas is different. The dissent must justify why the particular
distinction it urges here—abandonment of the
usual American Railway rule—is an
appropriate one. It cannot.
B
The State also advances what could be termed a corollary to the
American Railway rule. Citing Helvering v.
Pfeiffer,302 U. S. 247 (1937), and Alexander
v. Cosden Pipe Line Co.,290 U. S. 484 (1934),
the State insists that a cross-appeal is necessary not only for
Jennings to enlarge his rights under the District
Court’s judgment, but also to attack the
District Court’s ruling rejecting his
Spisak theory, even if Jennings’ rights
under the court’s judgment would remain
undisturbed.
The view of Pfeiffer and Alexander advanced by the
State would put these cases in considerable tension with our
oft-reaffirmed holding in American Railway. And it is not
the correct view. Both Pfeiffer and Alexander arose
from disputes between the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service and taxpayers regarding multiple discrete federal tax
liabilities. Pfeiffer, supra, at 248;
Alexander, supra, at 486. In Pfeiffer, the
Commissioner prevailed before the Board of Tax Appeals on his
contention that a dividend was taxable, but lost a similar claim
against a cash payment. Only the taxpayer sought the Second
Circuit’s review, and the taxpayer prevailed on
the dividend liability. 302 U. S., at 249. In
Alexander, the taxpayer sought refund of four tax
liabilities; the taxpayer won on all four. Only the Commissioner
appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and that court affirmed two of the
refunds, eliminated a third, and reduced a fourth. Pfeiffer,
supra, at 248–249; Alexander,
supra, at 486. The Commissioner sought our review in both
cases; we refused to entertain the
Commissioner’s arguments regarding the cash
payment in Pfeiffer, or the taxpayer’s
regarding the elimi-nated and reduced claims in Alexander,
citing American Railway.
The State argues that these holdings expanded the need for
cross-appeal, beyond merely those arguments that would enlarge
rights under the judgment, to those arguments that revisit a lower
court’s disposition of an issue on which a
judgment rests. For, the State argues, the re-jected arguments
would not necessarily have expandedthe
Commissioner’s or the
taxpayer’s rights; if some of the points on
which the respective appellee won below were rejected on appeal,
his new arguments might do no more than preserve the amount
assessed.
But this view of Pfeiffer and Alexander distorts
American Railway. American Railway does not merely
require a cross-appeal where a party, if fully successful on his
new arguments, would certainly obtain greater relief than provided
below; it requires cross-appeal if the party’s
arguments are presented “with a view
either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the
rights of his adversary.†265 U. S., at
435. In Pfeiffer and Alexander the assertion of
additional tax liabilities or defenses, respectively, necessarily
sought to enlarge or to reduce the
Commissioner’s rights, even if, under some
combination of issues affirmed and reversed, one possibility would
have produced no more than the same tax obligations pronounced by
the judgment below.
Once we have rejected the
State’s—and
dissent’s—theories of
implied terms in conditional writs, Jennings’
Spisak theory sought the same relief awarded under his
Wiggins theories: a new sentencing hearing. Whether
prevailing on a single theory or all three, Jennings sought the
same, indivisible relief. This occurred in neither Pfeiffer
nor Alexander, and we decline to view those cases as
contradicting our
‘ “inveterate and
certain’ †rule in
American Railway. Greenlaw v. United
States,554 U. S. 237,245 (2008).
C
Finally, the State urges that even if Jennings was not required
to take a cross-appeal by American Railway, Pfeiffer,
and Alexander, he was required to obtain a certificate of
appealability. We disagree.
Section 2253(c) of Title 28 provides that “an
appeal may not be taken to the court of appealsâ€
without a certificate of appealability, which itself requires
“a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.†It is unclear whether this
requirement applies to a habeas petitioner seeking to cross-appeal
in a case that is already before a court of appeals. Section
2253(c) performs an important gate-keeping function, but once a
State has properly noticed an appeal of the grant of habeas relief,
the court of appeals must hear the case, and
“there are no remaining gates to be
guarded.†Szabo v. Walls, 313
F. 3d 392, 398 (CA7 2002) (Easterbrook, J.).
But we need not decide that question now, since it is clear that
§2253(c) applies only when “an
appeal†is “taken to the court of
appeals.†Whether or not this embraces a cross-appeal,
it assuredly does not embrace the defense of a judgment on
alternative grounds. Congress enacted §2253(c) against
the well-known, if not entirely sharp, distinction between
defending a judgment on appeal and taking a cross-appeal. Nothing
in the statute justifies ignoring that distinction.
The dissent laments that this result frustrates
AEDPA’s purpose of preventing
“frivolous appeals.†Post,
at 8. It can indulge that lament only by insisting that the defense
of an appealed judgment on alternative grounds is itself an appeal.
The two are not the same. The statutory text at issue here
addresses the “tak[ing]†of an
appeal, not “the making of arguments in defense
of a judgment from which appeal has been taken.â€
Extending the certificate of appealability requirement from the
former to the latter is beyond the power of the courts.
*  *  *
Because Jennings’ Spisak theory would
neither have enlarged his rights nor diminished the
State’s rights under the District
Court’s judgment, he was required neither to
take a cross-appeal nor to obtain a certificate of appealability.
We reverse the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remand the case
for consideration of Jennings’ Spisak
claim.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–7211
_________________
ROBERT MITCHELL JENNINGS, PETITIONER v. WILLIAM STEPHENS,
DIRECTOR, TEXAS DE-PARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COR-RECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit
[January 14, 2015]
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito
join, dissenting.
The Court holds today that a prisoner who obtains an order for
his release unless the State grants him a new sentencing proceeding
may, as an appellee, raise any alternative argument rejected below
that could have resulted in a similar order. In doing so, the
majority mistakenly equates a judgment granting a
conditional-release order with an ordinary civil judgment. I
respectfully dissent.
I
Title28 U. S. C.
§2253(c)(1)(A), as amended by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), provides in relevant
part: “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the
court of appeals from . . . the final order
in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of
arises out of process issued by a State court.â€
Further, “[a] certificate of appealability may
issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right,†and the certificate must
“indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy
[that] showing.â€
§§2253(c)(2),(3). Because Jennings did not
obtain a certificate of appealability (COA), we must consider
whether, by raising his
“cross-point,†he took an appeal
within the meaning of AEDPA.
I agree with the majority that if a habeas petitioner takes what
is, in substance or in form, a cross-appeal to the Court of
Appeals, then he must obtain a COA. The failure to obtain a COA is
a jurisdictional bar to review. See Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at
8). The critical question the Court faces is whether
Jennings’
“cross-point†was in fact a
cross-appeal.
II
A
The majority correctly identifies the rule we apply to determine
whether a party has taken a cross-appeal, United States v.
American Railway Express Co.,265 U. S. 425,435
(1924), but then fails to apply it in accordance with the history
of the writ of habeas corpus, our precedents concerning
conditional-release orders, and traditional principles governing
equitable relief. Each of these guides supports the conclusion that
a prisoner who obtains a conditional-release order allowing the
State to resentence him in a new proceeding is entitled, if the
State elects that option, to a new sentencing proceeding free of
the specific constitutional violation identified by the district
court. Because a conditional-release order embodies this specific
right, an appellee’s attempt to add additional
errors is an attempt to modify or expand his rights under the
judgment.
For most of its existence, the writ of habeas corpus was
understood far more narrowly than it is today. See Wright v.
West,505 U. S. 277–287
(1992) (opinion of Thomas, J.). Originally, it played only a
procedural role: It issued as of right when a prisoner showed
probable cause to believe he was being held
illegally—that is, without a conviction entered
by a court of competent jurisdiction over the
prisoner—and obligated the warden to file a
“return†identifying the grounds of
imprisonment. Â W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of
Habeas Corpus §§94, 122 (rev. 2d ed. 1893)
(hereinafter Church). The “grant of the writ
decided nothing except that there was a case calling for an answer
by the gaoler.†Goddard, A Note on Habeas Corpus, 65
L. Q. Rev. 30, 34 (1949). And the court’s
ultimate decision on the matter was limited to confirming the
legality of the prisoner’s confinement or
ordering his immediate discharge. See Church
§§130, 131.
The writ today, by contrast, is invoked to justify broad federal
review of state criminal proceedings for constitutional violations.
And, when a district court issues the writ, it usually enters a
conditional-release order, offering the State a choice between
immediate release or a retrial (or resentencing) within a defined
period of time. See Wilkinson v. Dotson,544
U. S. 74–87 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
The purpose of a conditional-release order is to afford the
State an opportunity to remedy the specific constitutional
violation identified by the district court. Since its inception
over a century ago, we have treated a conditional-release order as
entitling a habeas petitioner not just toa new proceeding, but to a
new proceeding that cures the specific defect identified by the
district court. One of our earliest precedents contemplating such
an order is In re Bonner,151 U. S.
242–260 (1894). That case involved a prisoner
who had been lawfully convicted, but unlawfully ordered to serve
his federal sentence in a state penitentiary. Id., at
254–255, 260. Invoking its
“power to control and direct the form of
judgment to be entered in cases brought up before it on habeas
corpus,†the Court ordered the delay of discharge
to allow the prisoner to be “taken before the
court where the judgment was rendered, that the defects for
want of jurisdiction which are the subject of complaint in
that judgment may be corrected.†Id., at
261 (emphasis added); see also Magwood v.
Patterson,561 U. S. 320,347 (2010) (Kennedy, J.,
joined by, inter alios, Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[A] conditional grant of relief
. . . allows the state court to correct an
error that occurred at the original sentencingâ€). That
understanding of habeas judgments has prevailed in an unbroken line
of precedent. See Richmond v. Lewis,506
U. S. 40,52 (1992); Hilton v.
Braunskill,481 U. S. 770,775 (1987); Dowd
v. United States ex rel. Cook,340
U. S. 206–210 (1951); Mahler
v. Eby,264 U. S. 32,46 (1924). Cf.
Dotson, supra, at 86 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[T]he conditional writ serves only to
‘delay the release . . . in order to provide the
State an opportunity to correct the constitutional
violation’ †(quoting
Braunskill, supra, at 775)).
When the State fails to cure the specific constitutional
violation identified by the district court, the habeas petitioner
is entitled to release. That is because the prevailing habeas
petitioner has shown that his conviction or sentencing proceeding
was unconstitutional and that he is therefore
“actually entitled to release.â€
Dotson, 544 U. S., at 86 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). “Conditional writs enable habeas
courts to give States time to replace an invalid judgment with a
valid one, and the consequence when they fail to do so is always
release.†Id., at 87. But that entitlement to
release is tied to the constitutional violation identified by the
Court. A State committing a new constitutional violation during the
new sentencing proceeding will not be required to release the
habeas petitioner under the old order. Cf. Magwood,
supra, at 339 (explaining that a habeas petitioner who
obtains a new sentencing proceeding on the basis of one error may
subsequently raise, in a first habeas application, other errors
repeated in that proceeding).
A habeas petitioner’s rights under the
conditional-release order are thus defined by the violation that
justified its entry, not by the wording of the order.
Pitchess v. Davis,421 U. S. 482 (1975)
(per curiam), makes that clear. Davis involved a
prisoner who had obtained habeas relief because the prosecutor had
failed to disclose a material and exculpatory laboratory report, in
violation of Brady v. Maryland,373 U. S.
83 (1963). 421 U. S., at 483. When the State moved to
retry him, the prisoner discovered that the State had destroyed
some of the physical evidence used against him at his initial
trial. Id., at 484. The District Court granted the
prisoner’s motion to convert its initial
conditional-release order into an unconditional order. Id.,
at 485. After the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, this
Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id., at 486, 490.
Although the conditional-release order provided only that the
prisoner should be released unless the State moved to retry him
within 60 days, Davis v. Pitchess, 388
F. Supp. 105, 114 (CD Cal. 1974), the Court read that
conditional-release order to require the State to
“provid[e] respondent with the laboratory
report,†in addition to moving to retry him within
60 days, Davis, 421 U. S., at 483 (emphasis
added). Because the order did not address the separate issue of the
physical evidence, the Court refused to allow the District Court to
use its destruction as a basis for converting the
conditional-release order to an unconditional order.
That decision makes sense when considered in light of
traditional principles of equitable relief.
“This Court has frequently rested its habeas
decisions on equitable principles.†Withrow v.
Williams,507 U. S. 680,717 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). (Such principles remain
relevant after AEDPA’s enactment when they are
consistent with the statutory scheme Congress adopted. See,
e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S.
___, ___ – ___ (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at 2–3).) And the Court has
frequently recognized that an equitable “remedy
must . . . be limited to the inadequacy
that produced†the asserted injury. Lewis v.
Casey,518 U. S. 343,357 (1996). Thus, a
conditional-release order will not “permit a
federal habeas court to maintain a continuing supervision over a
retrial conducted pursuant to a conditional writ granted by the
habeas court.†Davis, 421 U. S., at
490. But neither will a conditional-release order permit a State to
hold a prisoner under a new judgment infected by the same
constitutional violation that justified the
order’s entry in the first place. See
Dotson, supra, at 87 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Harvest v. Castro, 531 F. 3d 737, 750
(CA9 2008); Phifer v. Warden, 53 F. 3d
859, 864–865 (CA7 1995). Such an interpretation
of ha-beas judgments would render the writ hollow.
The history of the writ of habeas corpus, the treatment of
conditional-release orders, and traditional principles of equitable
relief resolve the dispute at issue here. A habeas petitioner
awarded a conditional-release order based onan error at his
sentencing proceeding is entitled, under that order, to a new
proceeding without the specific constitutional violation identified
by the district court. Raising any other constitutional violation
on appeal would be an attempt to modify the
prisoner’s rights flowing from that order.
B
Given these principles, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be affirmed. Jennings prevailed in the District Court on two
theories of ineffective assistance of counsel and lost on another.
The District Court entered a conditional-release order instructing
the State to release Jennings unless it granted Jennings a new
sentencing hearing within 120 days or commuted his sentence.
Ante, at 5. Under this Court’s
precedents, that general order embodies a specific instruction to
the State with respect to a new sentencing proceeding: resentence
Jennings without the two identified Wiggins errors. See
ante, at 3 (citing Wiggins v. Smith,539
U. S. 510 (2003)). The State’s
failure to comply with that order would justify
Jennings’ release. Jennings attempted, through
his cross-point, to expand his rights under the judgment when he
attempted to alter the instruction to the
State—adding an additional instruction about a
Spisak error—and, accordingly, the
grounds upon which he could obtain immediate release. See
ante, at 3 (citing Smith v. Spisak,558
U. S. 139 (2010)). Jennings’
cross-point was in substance a cross-appeal for which he needed to
obtain a COA.
III
A
The majority makes no attempt to reconcile its decision with the
history of conditional-release orders, our precedents, or
traditional limitations on equitable relief. Nor could it. Instead,
it divines an “intuitive answer†to
the question presented, ante, at 5, from the law of
judgments. But not only is this the incorrect source of law, the
major-ity’s position is fundamentally at odds
with the law of judgments on which it purports to rely.
The majority agrees that, to understand how the cross-appeal
rule applies in a given case, one must understand the rights that
parties obtained under the judgment at issue. But the majority
refuses to look past the language of the conditional-release order.
It is, of course, true that parties domesticate judgments, not
opinions. Ante, at 5–6. And it is
similarly true that prevailing parties enforce judgments, not
reasoning. Ante, at 6. Those truisms, however, do not answer
the question here, which is what rights flow from those
judgments.
In answering that question, the majority simply announces
that the rights that flow from a habeas
petitioner’s judgment are the same rights that
flow from any other civil judgment. But that assertion ignores the
unique context of habeas, in which the traditional principles of
the law of judgments have never applied. As explained above, the
writ of habeas corpus was historically a purely procedural
mechanism to obtain a court’s determination as
to the legality of a prisoner’s confinement.
Church §§94, 122, 130, 131. And that
determination was never treated as an ordinary civil judgment
entitled to res judicata effect. Id., §386; see
also McCleskey v. Zant,499 U. S. 467,479
(1991).
Even if the majority were correct that the law of judgments
could simply be imported to the habeas context, it misapplies that
law. Under long recognized principles, including the doctrine of
preclusion, parties have greater rights under civil judgments than
merely the particular relief afforded. A prevailing
plaintiff’s claims are wholly merged into his
judgment, preventing a defendant, in a future action on that
judgment, from availing himself of defenses that he could have
raised in the court’s first adjudication of the
claims. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §18 (1980).
And a defendant, whether victorious or not, can rely upon that
judgment as the final adjudication of a particular claim,
preventing the plaintiff from pursuing another action against him
in the future on that same claim. Id., §19.
These principles give rights to the parties beyond the remedy
ordered. By narrowly and artificially defining the rights flowing
from a civil judgment as solely those rights identified in a
written order, the majority disregards these basic principles. And
because the majority purports to apply the general law of
judgments, its decision will do damage well beyond the habeas
context in which this case arises.
B
In the habeas context specifically, the
majority’s opinion invites the same frivolous
appeals that Congress passed AEDPA to prevent. Although courts had
long relied on the certificate of probable cause as a mechanism to
prevent frivolous appeals in habeas cases, AEDPA further narrowed
access to such appeals with the creation of the COA requirement.
Miller-El v. Cockrell,537 U. S. 322,356
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). A habeas petitioner cannot obtain
a COA absent a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional, not merely federal, right. See Slack
v. McDaniel,529 U. S.
473–484 (2000). This requirement serves an
important gatekeeping function. But the
majority’s decision will seriously undermine
the courts’ ability to perform this function by
allowing prisoners to pursue any alternative allegation, no
matter how frivolous, that would have justified the same new
proceeding awarded in the conditional-release order below.
This danger is by no means
“exaggerated,†ante, at 7,
as the majority suggests. Habeas petitioners frequently pursue 20
or more arguments on collateral review, even though they could more
effectively concentrate on a handful of arguments. See,
e.g., Calvert v. Henderson, 2012 WL 1033632,
*1 (ED La., Mar. 27, 2012) (raising 26 allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel); Battle v. Roper, 2009 WL
799604, *13 (ED Mo., Mar. 24, 2009) (raising 1 double jeopardy
issue and 20 allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel). I
see little reason to suspect that the prisoners who file these
scattershot applications will suddenly alter their strategy on
appeal. Indeed, the experience of the Courts of Appeals suggests
otherwise. See, e.g., Jones v. Keane, 329
F. 3d 290, 296 (CA2 2003) (noting, but refusing to
consider absent a COA, a prevailing ha-beas
petitioner’s “alternative
grounds†for
affirmance—allegations of insufficiency of the
evidence and ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate
counsel). And the experience of the Courts of Appeals with this
conduct is only likely to grow now that the majority has approved
it. Where before only the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit had permitted prevailing habeas petitioners to
raise rejected claims as alternative grounds for affirmance, now
all Courts of Appeals will be subject to that rule.
The majority also overlooks a significant procedural distinction
between an application for a COA and a merits appeal. The majority
expresses “doubt that any more judicial time
will be wasted in rejection of frivolous claims made in defense of
judgment on an appeal already taken than would be wasted in
rejection of similar claims made in . . . a
separate proceeding for a certificate of
appealability.†Ante, at 8. But a COA can be
decided by a single court of appeals judge,28
U. S. C. §2253(c)(1), while a
merits appeal must be heard by a three-judge panel. By mandating
the involvement of two additional judges in the adjudication of
these claims, today’s ruling triples the
burden on the Courts of Appeals.
*  *  *
This Court has repeatedly recognized that
AEDPA’s purpose is to
“reduc[e] delays in the execution of state and
federal criminal sentences.†Ryan v.
Valencia Gonzales, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
(slip op., at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). One of the
key ways in which AEDPA encourages finality is to narrow the scope
of appellate review by requiring habeas petitioners to obtain COAs.
The majority’s decision undermines that
legislative choice and, in so doing, transforms the understandingof
conditional-release orders that has prevailed sincethe Court first
announced their creation. I respectfully dissent.