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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–9026
_________________
LARRY WHITFIELD, PETITIONER
v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
[January 13, 2015]
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal law establishes enhanced penalties for anyone who
“forces any person to accompany him” in the course of committing or
fleeing from a bank robbery.18 U. S. C. §2113(e). We
consider whether this provision applies when a bank robber forces
someone to move with him over a short distance.
I
Petitioner Larry Whitfield, fleeing police after a botched bank
robbery, entered the home of 79-year-old Mary Parnell through an
unlocked door. Once inside, he encountered a terrified Parnell and
guided her from the hallway to a computer room (which Whitfield
estimates was between four and nine feet away. Brief for Petitioner
5). There, Parnell suffered a fatal heart attack. Whitfield fled,
and was found hiding nearby.
A grand jury indicted Whitfield for, among other things,
violating §2113(e) by forcing Parnell to accompany him in the
course of avoiding apprehension for a bank robbery. That section
provides:
“Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or
in avoiding or attempting to avoid apprehension for the commission
of such offense . . .
forces any person to accompany
him without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned not
less than ten years, or if death results shall be punished by death
or life imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.)
Whitfield pleaded not guilty to the offense but a jury convicted
him.
On appeal, Whitfield challenged the sufficiency of the evidence,
arguing that §2113(e) requires “substantial” movement, and that his
movement with Parnell did not qualify. Brief for Appellant in No.
10–5217 (CA4),pp. 50–52. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding
that, “[a]lthough Whitfield required Mrs. Parnell to accompany him
for only a short distance within her own home, and for a brief
period, no more is required to prove that a forced accompaniment
occurred.” 695 F. 3d 288, 311 (2012). After further
proceedings in the District Court and Court of Appeals, 548 Fed.
Appx. 70 (2013), we granted certiorari, 573 U. S. ___
(2014).
II
Congress enacted the forced-accompaniment provision in 1934
after “an outbreak of bank robberies committed by John Dillinger
and others.”
Carter v.
United States,530 U. S.
255,280 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Section 2113 has been
amended frequently, but the relevant phrase—“forces any person to
accompany him without the consent of such person”—has remained
unchanged, and so presumptively retains its original meaning.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex
rel. Stevens,529 U. S. 765,783, n.12 (2000).
In 1934, just as today, to “accompany” someone meant to “go
with” him. See Oxford English Dictionary 60 (1st ed. 1933)
(defining “accompany” as: “To go in company with, to go along
with”). The word does not, as Whitfield contends, connote movement
over a substantial distance. It was, and still is, perfectly
natural to speak of accompanying someone over a relatively short
distance, for example: from one area within a bank “to the
vault”;[
1] “to the altar” at a wedding;[
2] “up the stairway”;[
3] or into, out
of, or across a room.[
4] English literature is
replete with examples. See,
e.g., C. Dickens, David
Copperfield 529 (Modern Library ed. 2000) (Uriah “accompanied me
into Mr. Wickfield’s room”); J. Austen, Pride and Prejudice 182
(Greenwich ed. 1982) (Elizabeth “accompanied her out of the
room”).
It is true enough that accompaniment does not embrace minimal
movement—for example, the movement of a bank teller’s feet when the
robber grabs her arm. It must constitute movement that would
normally be described as from one place to another, even if only
from one spot withina room or outdoors to a different one. Here,
Whitfield forced Parnell to accompany him for at least several
feet, from one room to another. That surely sufficed.
In an attempt to support his position that “accompany” should be
read to mean “accompany over a substantial distance,” Whitfield
observes that a forced-accompaniment conviction carries severe
penalties: a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, and a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment. In 1934, a forced-accompaniment
conviction could even be punished with death. Act of May 18, 1934,
ch. 304, §3,48Stat.783. The severity of these sentences, Whitfield
says, militates against interpreting subsection (e) to capture
forced accompaniment occurring over a small distance.
But it does not seem to us that the danger of a forced
accompaniment varies with the distance traversed. Consider, for
example, a hostage-taker’s movement of one of his victims a short
distance to a window, where she would be exposed to police fire; or
his use of the victim as a human shield as he approaches the door.
And even if we thought otherwise, we would have no authority to add
a limitation the statute plainly does not contain. The Congress
that wrote this provision may well have had most prominently in
mind John Dillinger’s driving off with hostages, but it enacted a
provision which goes wellbeyond that. It is simply not in accord
with English usage to give “accompany” a meaning that covers only
large distances.
Whitfield also contends that “accompany” must be read narrowly
in light of §2113’s graduated penalty scheme. That scheme
prescribes: (1) a 20-year maximum sentence for bank robbers who use
“force and violence” or “intimidation,” §2113(a), (2) a 25-year
maximum sentence for those who “assaul[t]” or “pu[t] in jeopardy
the life of” another “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device,”
§2113(d), and (3) a minimum sentence of 10 years, and a maximum
sentence of life, for forced accompaniment, §2113(e). According to
Whitfield, bank robbers almost always “exert some control over the
movement of the bank’s employ-ees.” Brief for Petitioner 22.
Therefore, he says, unless “accompany” is limited to forced
movement over sub-stantial distances, nearly all §2113 violations
will be punishable under subsection (e), making subsections (a)
and(d) pointless.
We disagree. Even if Whitfield is right that bank robbers always
“exert some control” over others, it does not follow that they
always force others to
accompany them somewhere—that is, to
go somewhere
with them. As we have no reason to think that
to be the case, and because subsections (a), (d), and (e) all cover
distinct conduct, our interpretation of “accompany” does not make
any part of §2113 superfluous.
* * *
We hold that a bank robber “forces [a] person to accompany him,”
for purposes of §2113(e), when he forces that person to go
somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a
single building or over a short distance. Defined in this manner,
Whitfield forced Parnell to “accompany him.” §2113(e). The judgment
of the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
