NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–301
_________________
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL CLARKE
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 19, 2014]
Justice Kagan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS or Service) has broad statutory authority to summon a
taxpayer to produce documents or give testimony relevant to
determining tax liability. If the taxpayer fails to comply, the IRS
may petition a federal district court to enforce the summons. In an
enforcement proceeding, the IRS must show that it issued the
summons in good faith.
This case requires us
to consider when a taxpayer, as part of such a proceeding, has a
right to question IRS officials about their reasons for issuing a
summons. We hold, contrary to the Court of Appeals below, that a
bare allegation of improper purpose does not entitle a taxpayer to
examine IRS officials. Rather, the taxpayer has a right to conduct
that examination when he points to specific facts or circumstances
plausibly raising an inference of bad faith.
I
Congress has
“authorized and required” the IRS “to make the inquiries,
determinations, and assessments of all taxes” the Internal Revenue
Code imposes. 26 U. S. C. §6201(a). And in support of
that authority, Congress has granted the Service broad latitude to
issue summonses “[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
of any return, making a return where none has been made,
determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax . . . , or collecting any such liability.”
§7602(a). Such a summons directs a taxpayer (or associated
person[
1]) to appear before an
IRS official and to provide sworn testimony or produce “books,
papers, records, or other data . . . relevant or material
to [a tax] inquiry.” §7602(a)(1).
If a taxpayer does not
comply with a summons, the IRS may bring an enforcement action in
district court. See §§7402(b), 7604(a). In that proceeding, we have
held, the IRS “need only demonstrate good faith in issuing the
summons.” United States v. Stuart, 489 U. S. 353, 359 (1989) . More
specifically, that means establishing what have become known as the
Powell factors: “that the investigation will be conducted pursuant
to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the
purpose, that the information sought is not already within the
[IRS’s] possession, and that the administrative steps required by
the [Internal Revenue] Code have been followed.” United States v.
Powell, 379 U. S. 48 –58 (1964). To make that showing, the IRS
usually files an affidavit from the responsible investigating
agent. See Stuart, 489 U. S., at 360. The taxpayer, however,
has an opportunity to challenge that affidavit, and to urge the
court to quash the summons “on any appropriate ground”—including,
as relevant here, improper purpose. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U. S. 440, 449 (1964) .
The summons dispute in
this case arose from an IRS examination of the tax returns of
Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) for the 2005–2007 tax
years. The IRS harbored suspicions about large interest expenses
that those returns had reported. As its investigation proceeded,
the Service persuaded Dynamo to agree to two year-long extensions
of the usual 3-year limitations period for assessing tax liability;
in 2010, with that period again drawing to a close, Dynamo refused
to grant the IRS a third extension. Shortly thereafter, in
September and October 2010, the IRS issued summonses to the
respondents here, four individuals associated with Dynamo whom the
Service believed had information and records relevant to Dynamo’s
tax obligations. None of the respondents complied with those
summonses. In December 2010 (still within the augmented limitations
period), the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustment proposing changes to Dynamo’s returns that would result
in greater tax liability. Dynamo responded in February 2011 by
filing suit in the United States Tax Court to challenge the
adjustments. That litigation remains pending. A few months later,
in April 2011, the IRS instituted proceedings in District Court to
compel the respondents to comply with the summonses they had
gotten.
Those enforcement
proceedings developed into a dispute about the IRS’s reasons for
issuing the summonses. The IRS submitted an investigating agent’s
affidavit attesting to the Powell factors; among other things, that
declaration maintained that the testimony and records sought were
necessary to “properly investigate the correctness of [Dynamo’s]
federal tax reporting” and that the summonses were “not issued to
harass or for any other improper purpose.” App. 26, 34. In reply,
the respondents pointed to circumstantial evidence that, in their
view, suggested “ulterior motive[s]” of two different kinds. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 72a. First, the respondents asserted that the IRS
issued the summonses to “punish[ ] [Dynamo] for refusing to
agree to a further extension of the applicable statute of
limitations.” App. 52. More particularly, they stated in sworn
declarations that immediately after Dynamo declined to grant a
third extension of time, the IRS, “despite having not asked for
additional information for some time, . . . suddenly
issued” the summonses. Id., at 95. Second, the respondents averred
that the IRS decided to enforce the summonses, subsequent to
Dynamo’s filing suit in Tax Court, to “evad[e] the Tax Court[’s]
limitations on discovery” and thus gain an unfair advantage in that
litigation. Id., at 53. In support of that charge, the respondents
submitted an affidavit from the attorney of another Dynamo
associate, who had chosen to comply with a summons issued at the
same time. The attorney reported that only the IRS attorneys
handling the Tax Court case, and not the original investigating
agents, were present at the interview of his client. In light of
those submissions, the respondents asked for an opportunity to
question the agents about their motives.
The District Court
denied that request and ordered the respondents to comply with the
summonses. According to the court, the respondents “ha[d] made no
meaningful allegations of improper purpose” warranting examination
of IRS agents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The court characterized
the respondents’ statute-of-limitations theory as “mere
conjecture.” Id., at 14a. And it ruled that the respondents’
evasion-of-discovery-limits claim was “incorrect as a matter of
law” because “[t]he validity of a summons is tested as of the date
of issuance,” not enforcement—and the Tax Court proceedings had not
yet begun when the IRS issued the summonses. Id., at 15a.
The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the District
Court’s refusal to allow the respondents to examine IRS agents
constituted an abuse of discretion. In support of that ruling, the
Court of Appeals cited binding Circuit precedent holding that a
simple “allegation of improper purpose,” even if lacking any
“factual support,” entitles a taxpayer to “question IRS officials
concerning the Service’s reasons for issuing the summons.” 517 Fed.
Appx. 689, 691 (2013) (quoting United States v. Southeast First
Nat. Bank of Miami Springs, 655 F. 2d 661, 667 (CA5 1981)); see
Nero Trading, LLC v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 570 F. 3d
1244, 1249 (CA11 2009) (reaffirming Southeast).
Every other Court of
Appeals has rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s view that a bare
allegation of improper motive entitles a person objecting to an IRS
summons to examine the responsible officials.[
2] We granted certiorari to resolve that conflict,
571 U. S. __ (2014), and we now vacate the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion.
II
A person receiving an
IRS summons is, as we have often held, entitled to contest it in an
enforcement proceeding. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420
U. S. 141, 146 (1975) ; Powell, 379 U. S., at 57–58;
Reisman, 375 U. S., at 449. The power “vested in tax
collectors may be abused, as all power” may be abused. Bisceglia,
420 U. S., at 146. In recognition of that possibility,
Congress made enforcement of an IRS summons contingent on a court’s
approval. See 26 U. S. C. §7604(b). And we have time and
again stated that the requisite judicial proceeding is not
ex parte but adversarial. See Donaldson v. United States, 400
U. S. 517, 527 (1971) ; Powell, 379 U. S., at 58;
Reisman, 375 U. S., at 446. The summoned party must receive
notice, and may present argument and evidence on all matters
bearing on a summons’s validity. See Powell, 379 U. S.,at
58.
Yet we have also
emphasized that summons enforcement proceedings are to be “summary
in nature.” Stuart, 489 U. S., at 369. The purpose of a
summons is “not to accuse,” much less to adjudicate, but only “to
inquire.” Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 146. And such an
investigatory tool, we have recognized, is a crucial backstop in a
tax system based on self-reporting. See ibid. (restricting summons
authority would enable “dishonest persons [to] escap[e] taxation[,]
thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers”). Accordingly,
we long ago held that courts may ask only whether the IRS issued a
summons in good faith, and must eschew any broader role of
“oversee[ing] the [IRS’s] determinations to investigate.” Powell,
379 U. S., at 56. So too, we stated that absent contrary
evidence, the IRS can satisfy that standard by submitting a simple
affidavit from the investigating agent. See Stuart, 489 U. S.,
at 359–360. Thus, we have rejected rules that would “thwart and
defeat the [Service’s] appropriate investigatory powers.”
Donaldson, 400 U. S., at 533.
The balance we have
struck in prior cases comports with the following rule, applicable
here: As part of the adversarial process concerning a summons’s
validity, the taxpayer is entitled to examine an IRS agent when he
can point to specific facts or circumstances plausibly raising an
inference of bad faith. Naked allegations of improper purpose are
not enough: The taxpayer must offer some credible evidence
supporting his charge. But circumstantial evidence can suffice to
meet that burden; after all, direct evidence of another person’s
bad faith, at this threshold stage, will rarely if ever be
available. And although bare assertion or conjecture is not enough,
neither is a fleshed out case demanded: The taxpayer need only make
a showing of facts that give rise to a plausible inference of
improper motive. That standard will ensure inquiry where the facts
and circumstances make inquiry appropriate, without turning every
summons dispute into a fishing expedition for official wrongdoing.
And the rule is little different from the one that both the
respondents and the Government have recommended to us.[
3]
But that is not the
standard the Eleventh Circuit applied. Although the respondents
gamely try to put an-other face on the opinion below, see Brief for
Respondents 24–25, and n. 17, we have no doubt that the Court
of Appeals viewed even bare allegations of improper purpose as
entitling a summons objector to question IRS agents. The court in
fact had some evidence before it pertaining to the respondents’
charges: The respondents, for example, had submitted one
declaration relating the timing of the summonses to Dynamo’s
refusal to extend the limitations period, see App. 95, and another
aiming to show that the IRS was using the summonses to obtain
discovery it could not get in Tax Court, see id., at 97–100. But
the Eleventh Circuit never assessed whether those (or any other)
materials plausibly supported an inference of improper motive;
indeed, the court never mentioned the proffered evidence at all.
Instead, and in line with Circuit precedent, the court applied a
categorical rule, demanding the examination of IRS agents even when
a taxpayer made only conclusory allegations. See supra, at 4. That
was error. On remand, the Court of Appeals must consider the
respond-ents’ submissions in light of the standard we have
stated.
That consideration must
as well give appropriate deference to the District Court’s ruling.
An appellate court, as the Eleventh Circuit noted, reviews for
abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to order—or not—the
questioning of IRS agents. See 517 Fed. Appx., at 691, n. 2;
Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U. S. 310 ,
n. 7 (1985). That standard of review reflects the district
court’s supe-rior familiarity with, and understanding of, the
dispute; andit comports with the way appellate courts review
related matters of case management, discovery, and trial prac-tice.
See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U. S. 165
–173 (1989); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574 –601
(1998). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals must take into account on
remand the District Court’s broad discretion to determine whether a
tax-payer has shown enough to require the examination of IRS
investigators.
But two caveats to that
instruction are in order here. First, the District Court’s decision
is entitled to deference only if based on the correct legal
standard. See Fox v. Vice, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip
op., at 11) (“A trial court has wide discretion when, but only
when, it calls the game by the right rules”). We leave to the Court
of Appeals the task of deciding whether the District Court asked
and answered the relevant question—once again, whether the
respondents pointed to specific facts or circumstances plausibly
raising an inference of improper motive.
And second, the
District Court’s latitude does not extend to legal issues about
what counts as an illicit motive. As indicated earlier, one such
issue is embedded in the respondents’ claim that the Government
moved to enforce these summonses to gain an unfair advantage in Tax
Court litigation. See supra, at 4. The Government responds, and the
District Court agreed, that any such purpose is irrelevant because
“the validity of a summons is judged at the time” the IRS
originally issued the summons, and here that preceded the Tax Court
suit. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; see Reply Brief 19–20; App. to Pet. for
Cert. 15a. Similarly, with respect to the respondents’ alternative
theory, the Government briefly suggested at argument that issuing a
summons because “a taxpayer declined to extend a statute of
limitations would [not] be an improper purpose,” even assuming that
happened here. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. We state no view on those
issues; they are not within the question presented for our review.
We note only that they are pure questions of law, so if they arise
again on remand, the Court of Appeals has no cause to defer to the
District Court. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 100
(1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when
it makes an error of law”).
For these reasons, we
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.