NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal
revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United
States Reports. Readers are requested to notify
the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–193
_________________
SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, et al., PETITIONERS v. STEVEN
DRIEHAUS et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit
[June 16, 2014]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners in this case seek to challenge an Ohio statute that
prohibits certain “false statementsâ€
during the course of a political campaign. The question in this
caseis whether their preenforcement challenge to that law is
justiciable—and in particular, whether they have
alleged a sufficiently imminent injury for the purposes of Article
III. We conclude that they have.
I
The Ohio statute at issue prohibits certain
“false statement[s]â€
“during the course of any campaign for
nomination or election to public office or office of a political
party.†Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.21(B)
(Lexis 2013). As relevant here, the statute makes it a crime for
any person to “[m]ake a false statement
concerning the voting record of a candidate or public
official,†§3517.21(B)(9), or to
“[p]ost, publish, circulate, distribute, or
otherwise disseminate a false statement concerning a candidate,
either knowing the same to be false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not,â€
§3517.21(B)(10).[
1]
“[A]ny person†acting on personal
knowledge may file a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission
(or Commission) alleging a violation of the false statement
statute. §3517.153(A) (Lexis Supp. 2014). If filed
within 60 days of a primary election or 90 days of a general
election, the complaint is referred to a panel of at least three
Commission members. §§3517.156(A), (B)(1)
(Lexis 2013). The panel must then hold an expedited hearing,
generally within two business days, §3517.156(B)(1), to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the alleged
violation occurred, §3517.156(C). Upon a finding of
probable cause, the full Commission must, within 10 days, hold a
hearing on the complaint. §3517.156(C)(2); see also
Ohio Admin. Code
§3517–1–10(E)
(2008).
The statute authorizes the full Commission to subpoena witnesses
and compel production of documents. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§3517.153(B) (Lexis Supp. 2014). At the full hearing,
the parties may make opening and closing statements and present
evidence. Ohio Admin. Code
§§3517–1–11(B)(2)(c),
(d), (g). If the Commission determines by “clear
and convincing evidence†that a party has violated the
false statement law, the Commission
“shall†refer the matter to the
relevant county prosecutor. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§3517.155(D)(1)–(2)
(Lexis Supp. 2014). Alternatively, the
Commission’s regulations state that it may
simply issue a reprimand. See Ohio Admin. Code
§3517–1–14(D).
Violation of the false statement statute is a first-degree
misdemeanor punishable by up to six months of imprisonment, a fine
up to $5,000, or both. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§3599.40 (Lexis 2013), 3517.992(V) (Lexis
Supp. 2014). A second conviction under the false statement statute
is a fourth-degree felony that carries a mandatory penalty of
disfranchisement. §3599.39.
II
Petitioner Susan B. Anthony List (SBA) is a
“pro-life advocacy organization.â€
525 Fed. Appx. 415, 416 (CA6 2013). During the 2010 election cycle,
SBA publicly criticized various Members of Congress who voted for
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). In
particular, it issued a press release announcing its plan to
“educat[e] voters that their representative
voted for a health care bill that includes taxpayer-funded
abortion.†App. 49–50. The press
release listed then-Congressman Steve Driehaus, a respondent here,
who voted for the ACA. SBA also sought to display a billboard in
Driehaus’ district condemning that vote. The
planned billboard would have read: “Shame on
Steve Driehaus! Driehaus voted FOR taxpayer-funded
abortion.†Id., at 37. The advertising company that
owned the billboard space refused to display that message, however,
after Driehaus’ counsel threatened legal
action.
On October 4, 2010, Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio
Elections Commission alleging, as relevant here, that SBA had
violated §§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) by
falsely stating that he had voted for
“taxpayer-funded abortion.â€[
2] Because Driehaus filed his complaint 29 days before
the general election, a Commission panel held an expedited hearing.
On October 14, 2010, the panel voted 2 to 1 to find probable cause
that a violation had been committed. The full Commission set a
hearing date for 10 business days later, and the parties commenced
discovery. Driehaus noticed depositions of three SBA employees as
well as individuals affiliated with similar advocacy groups. He
also issued discovery requests for all evidence that SBA would rely
on at the Commission hearing, as well as SBA’s
communications with allied organizations, political party
committees, and Members of Congress and their staffs.
On October 18, 2010—after the
panel’s probable-cause determination, but before
the scheduled Commission hearing—SBA filed suit
in Federal District Court, seek-ing declaratory and injunctive
relief on the ground that §§3517.21(B)(9)
and (10) violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. The District Court stayed the action under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) , pending
completion of the Commission proceedings. The Sixth Circuit denied
SBA’s motion for an injunction pending appeal.
Driehaus and SBA eventually agreed to postpone the full Commission
hearing until after the election.
When Driehaus lost the election in November 2010, he moved to
withdraw his complaint against SBA. The Commission granted the
motion with SBA’s consent. Once the Commission
proceedings were terminated, the District Court lifted the stay and
SBA amended its complaint. As relevant here, the amended complaint
alleged that Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§3517.21(B)(9) and (10) are
unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Specifically, the
complaint alleged that SBA’s speech about
Driehaus had been chilled; that SBA “intends to
engage in substantially similar activity in the
futureâ€; and that it “face[d] the
prospect of its speech and associational rights again being chilled
and burdened,†because “[a]ny
complainant can hale [it] before the [Commission], forcing it to
expend time and resources defending itself.†App.
121–122.
The District Court consolidated SBA’s suit
with a separate suit brought by petitioner Coalition Opposed to
Ad-ditional Spending and Taxes (COAST), an advocacy orga-nization
that also alleged that the same Ohio falsestatement provisions are
unconstitutional both facially and as applied.[
3]
According to its amended complaint, COAST intended to disseminate a
mass e-mail and other materials criticizing
Driehaus’ vote for the ACA as a vote
“to fund abortions with tax
dollars,†but refrained from doing so because of the
Commission proceedings against SBA. Id., at 146, 148, 162. COAST
further alleged that it “desires to make the
same or similar statements about other federal candidates who voted
for†the ACA, but that fear “of
finding itself subject to the same fate†as SBA has
deterred it from doing so. Id., at 149, 157.[
4]
The District Court dismissed both suits as non-justiciable,
concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete
injury for purposes of standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed on ripeness grounds. 525 Fed. Appx. 415. The Court of
Appeals analyzed three factors to assess whether the case was ripe
for review: (1) the likelihood that the alleged harm would come to
pass; (2) whether the factual record was sufficiently developed;
and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief were
denied.
Regarding the first factor, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
SBA’s prior injuries—the
probable-cause determination and the billboard
rejection—“do not help it
show an imminent threat of future prosecution,â€
particularly where “the Commission never found
that SBA . . . violated Ohio’s false-statement
law.†Id., at 420. The court further reasoned that it
was speculative whether any person would file a complaint with the
Commission in the future, in part because Driehaus took a 2-year
assignment with the Peace Corps in Africa after losing the
election. Finally, the court noted that SBA has not alleged that
“it plans to lie or recklessly disregard the
veracity of its speech†in the future, but rather
maintains that the statements it intends to make are factually
true. Id., at 422.
As for the remaining factors, the court concluded that the
factual record was insufficiently developed with respect to the
content of SBA’s future speech, and that
withholding judicial relief would not result in undue hardship
because, in the time period leading up to the 2010 election, SBA
continued to communicate its message even after Commission
proceedings were initiated. The Sixth Circuit therefore determined
that SBA’s suit was not ripe for review, and
that its analysis as to SBA compelled the same conclusion with
respect to COAST.
We granted certiorari, 571 U. S. ___ (2014), and now
reverse.
III
A
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of
federal courts to “Cases†and
“Controversies.†U. S.
Const., Art. III, §2. The doctrine of standing gives
meaning to these constitutional limits by
“identify[ing] those disputes which are
appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.â€[
5] Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) .
“The law of Article III standing, which is built
on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial
process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.†Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U. S. ___, ___, (2013) (slip op., at 9). To
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an
“injury in fact,†(2) a sufficient
“causal connection between the injuryand the
conduct complained of,†and (3) a
“likel[ihood]†that the injury
“will be redressed by a favorable
decision.†Lujan, supra, at 560–561
(internal quotation marksomitted).
This case concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, which helps
to ensure that the plaintiff has a “personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy.†Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted). An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be
“concrete and particularized†and
“actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’ â€
Lujan, supra, at 560 (some internal question marks omitted). An
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is
“certainly impending,†or there is a
“ ‘substantial
risk’ that the harm will occur.â€
Clapper, 568 U. S., at ___, ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 10,
15, n. 5) (emphasis deleted and internal quotation
marks omitted).
“ ‘ The
party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing’ standing.†Id., at ___
(slip op., at 12). “[E]ach element must be
supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and
degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.†Lujan, supra, at 561.
B
One recurring issue in our cases is determining when the
threatened enforcement of a law creates an Article III injury. When
an individual is subject to such a threat, an actual arrest,
prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a prerequisite to
challenging the law. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S.
452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that
petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to
be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the
exercise of his constitutional rightsâ€); see also
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U. S. 118
–129 (2007) (“[W]here
threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a
plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to
challenge the basis for the threatâ€). Instead, we have
permitted pre-enforcement review under circumstances that render
the threatened enforcement sufficiently imminent. Specifically, we
have held that a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
where he alleges “an intention to engage in a
course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest,
but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of
prosecution thereunder.†Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442
U. S. 289, 298 (1979) . Several of our cases illustrate
the circumstances under which plaintiffs may bring a preenforcement
challenge consistent with Article III.
In Steffel, for example, police officers threatened to arrest
petitioner and his companion for distributing handbills protesting
the Vietnam War. Petitioner left to avoid arrest; his companion
remained and was arrested and charged with criminal trespass.
Petitioner sought a declaratory judgment that the trespass statute
was unconstitutional as applied to him.
We determined that petitioner had alleged a credible threat of
enforcement: He had been warned to stop handbilling and threatened
with prosecution if he disobeyed; he stated his desire to continue
handbilling (an activity he claimed was constitutionally
protected); and his companion’s prosecution
showed that his “concern with
arrest†was not
“ ‘ chimerical.’ â€
415 U. S., at 459. Under those circumstances, we said,
“it is not necessary that petitioner first
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to
challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his
constitutional rights.†Ibid.
In Babbitt, we considered a preenforcement challenge to a
statute that made it an unfair labor practice to encourage
consumers to boycott an “agricultural product
. . . by the use of dishonest, untruthful
and deceptive
publicity.’ †442
U. S., at 301. The plaintiffs contended that the law
“unconstitutionally penalize[d] inaccuracies
inadvertently uttered in the course of consumer
appeals.†Ibid.
Building on Steffel, we explained that a plaintiff could bring a
preenforcement suit when he “has alleged an
intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably af-fected with
a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there
exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.â€
Babbit, supra, at 298. We found those circumstances present in
Babbitt. In that case, the law “on its face
proscribe[d] dishonest, untruthful, and deceptive
publicity.†442 U. S., at 302. The
plaintiffs had “actively engaged in consumer
publicity campaigns in the past†and alleged
“an intention to continue†those
campaigns in the future. Id., at 301. And although they did not
“plan to propagate untruths,†they
argued that
“ ‘ erroneous
statement is inevitable in free
debate.’ †Ibid. We
concluded that the plaintiffs’ fear of
prosecution was not “imaginary or wholly
speculative,†and that their challenge to the consumer
publicity provision presented an Article III case or controversy.
Id., at 302.
Two other cases bear mention. In Virginia v. American
Booksellers Assn. Inc., 484 U. S. 383 (1988) , we held
that booksellers could seek preenforcement review of a law making
it a crime to
“ ‘knowingly
display for commercial
purpose’ †material that
is “ ‘harmful to
juveniles’ †as defined
by the statute. Id., at 386. At trial, the booksellers introduced
16 books they believed were covered by the statute and testified
that costly compliance measures would be necessary to avoid
prosecution for displaying such books. Just as in Babbitt and
Steffel, we determined that the “pre-enforcement
nature†of the suit was not
“troubl[ing]†because the plaintiffs
had “alleged an actual and well-founded fear
that the law will be enforced against them.†484
U. S., at 393.
Finally, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U. S. 1 (2010) , we considered a preenforcement
challenge to a law that criminalized
“ ‘ knowingly
provid[ing] mate-rial support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization.’ †Id., at
8. The plaintiffs claimed that they had provided support to groups
designated as terrorist organizations prior to the
law’s enactment and would provide similar
support in the future. The Government had charged 150 persons with
violating the law and declined to disavow prosecution if the
plaintiffs resumed their support of the designated organizations.
We held that the claims were justiciable: The plaintiffs faced a
“ ‘credible
threat’ †of enforcement
and “ ‘should not
be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking
relief.’ †Id., at
15.
IV
Here, SBA and COAST contend that the threat of enforcement of
the false statement statute amounts to an Article III injury in
fact. We agree: Petitioners have alleged a credible threat of
enforcement. See Babbitt, 442 U. S., at 298.
A
First, petitioners have alleged “an intention
to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a
constitutional interest.†Ibid. Both petitioners have
pleaded specific statements they intend to make in future election
cycles. SBA has already stated that representatives who voted for
the ACA supported “taxpayer-funded
abortion,†and it has alleged an
“inten[t] to engage in substantially similar
activity in the future.†App. 49–50,
122. See also Humanitarian Law Project, supra, at
15–16 (observing that plaintiffs had previously
provided support to groups designated as terrorist organizations
and alleged they “would provide similar support
[to the same terrorist organizations] again if the
statute’s allegedly unconstitutional bar were
liftedâ€). COAST has alleged that it previously intended
to disseminate materials criticizing a vote for the ACA as a vote
“to fund abortions with tax
dollars,†and that it “desires to
make the same or similar statements about other federal candidates
who voted for [the ACA].†App. 146, 149, 162. Because
petitioners’ intended future conduct concerns
political speech, it is certainly “affected with
a constitutional interest.†Babbitt, supra, at 298; see
also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272
(1971) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of
campaigns for political officeâ€).
B
Next, petitioners’ intended future conduct is
“arguably. . .
proscribed by [the] statute†they wish to challenge.
Babbitt, supra, at 298. The Ohio false statement law sweeps
broadly, see supra, at 1–2, and
n. 1., and covers the subject matter of
petitioners’ intended speech. Both SBA and COAST
have alleged an intent to “[m]akeâ€
statements “concerning the voting record of a
candidate or public official,â€
§3517.21(B)(9), and to
“disseminate†statements
“concerning a candidate
. . . to promote the election, nomination,
or defeat of the candidate,â€
§3517.21(B)(10). And, a Commission panel here already
found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the statute when
it stated that Driehaus had
supported“taxpayer-funded
abortionâ€â€”the same sort of statement
petitioners plan to disseminate in the future. Under these
circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that
petitioners’ intended speech is
“arguably proscribed†by the
law.
Respondents incorrectly rely on Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S.
103 (1969) . In that case, the plaintiff had previously distributed
anonymous leaflets criticizing a particular Congressman who had
since left office. Id., at 104–106, and
n. 2. The Court dismissed the
plaintiff’s challenge to the electoral
leafletting ban as nonjusticiable because his
“sole concern was literature relating to the
Congressman and his record,†and “it
was most unlikely that the Congressman would again be a
candidate.†Id., at 109 (emphasis added). Under those
circumstances, any threat of future prosecution was
“wholly conjectural.†Ibid.
Here, by contrast, petitioners’ speech
focuses on the broader issue of support for the ACA, not on the
voting record of a single candidate. See Reply Brief
4–5 (identifying other elected officials who
plan to seek reelection as potential objects of
SBA’s criticisms). Because
petitioners’ alleged future speech is not
directed exclusively at Driehaus, it does not matter whether he
“may run for office again.†Brief
for Respondents 33 (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as
petitioners continue to engage in comparable electoral speech
regarding support for the ACA, that speech will remain arguably
proscribed by Ohio’s false statement
statute.
Respondents, echoing the Sixth Circuit, contend that
SBA’s fears of enforcement are misplaced because
SBA has not said it
“ ‘plans to lie
or recklessly disregard the veracity of its
speech.’ †Id., at 15
(quoting 525 Fed. Appx., at 422). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
because SBA “can only be liable for making a
statement ‘knowing’ it is
false,†SBA’s insistence that its
speech is factually true “makes the possibility
of prosecution for uttering such statements exceedingly
slim.†Id., at 422.
The Sixth Circuit misses the point. SBA’s
insistence that the allegations in its press release were true did
not prevent the Commission panel from finding probable cause to
believe that SBA had violated the law the first time around. And,
there is every reason to think that similar speech in the future
will result in similar proceedings, notwithstanding
SBA’s belief in the truth of its allegations.
Nothing in this Court’s decisions requires a
plaintiff who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a law to
confess that he will in fact violate that law. See, e.g., Babbitt,
442 U. S., at 301 (case was justiciable even though
plaintiffs disavowed any intent to “propagate
untruthsâ€).
C
Finally, the threat of future enforcement of the false statement
statute is substantial. Most obviously, there is a history of past
enforcement here: SBA was the subject of a complaint in a recent
election cycle. We have observed that past enforcement against the
same conduct is good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not
“ ‘ chimerical.’ â€
Steffel, 415 U. S., at 459; cf. Clapper, 568
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12)
(plaintiffs’ theory of standing was
“substantially undermine[d]†by
their “fail[ure] to offer any evidence that
their communications ha[d] been monitored†under the
challenged statute). Here, the threat is even more substantial
given that the Commission panel actually found probable cause to
believe that SBA’s speech violated the false
statement statute. Indeed future complainants may well
“invoke the prior probable-cause finding to
prove that SBA knowingly lied.†Brief for Petitioners
32.
The credibility of that threat is bolstered by the fact that
authority to file a complaint with the Commission is not limited to
a prosecutor or an agency. Instead, the false statement statute
allows “any person†with knowledge
of the purported violation to file a complaint.
§3517.153(A). Because the universe of potential
complainants is not restricted to state officials who are
constrained by explicit guidelines or ethical obligations, there is
a real risk of complaints from, for example, political opponents.
See Brief for Michael DeWine, Attorney General of Ohio, as Amicus
Curiae 8 (hereinafter DeWine Brief); see also id., at 6 (noting
that “the Commission has no system for weeding
out frivolous complaintsâ€). And petitioners, who intend
to criticize candidates for political office, are easy targets.
Finally, Commission proceedings are not a rare occurrence.
Petitioners inform us that the Commission
“ ‘handles about
20 to 80 false statement complaints per
year,’ †Brief for
Petitioners 46, and respondents do not deny that the Commission
frequently fields complaints alleging violations of the false
statement statute. Cf. Humani-tarian Law Project, 561
U. S., at 16 (noting that there had been numerous prior
prosecutions under the challenged statute). Moreover, respondents
have not disavowed enforcement if petitioners make similar
statements in the future. See Tr. of Oral Arg.
29–30; see also Humanitarian Law Project, supra,
at 16 (“The Government has not argued to this
Court that plaintiffs will not be prosecuted if they do what they
say they wish to doâ€). In fact, the specter of
enforcement is so substantial that the owner of the billboard
refused to display SBA’s message after receiving
a letter threatening Commission proceedings. On these facts, the
prospect of future enforcement is far from
“imaginary or speculative.†Babbitt,
supra, at 298.
We take the threatened Commission proceedings into account
because administrative action, like arrest or prosecution, may give
rise to harm sufficient to justify pre-enforcement review. See Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc., 477 U. S. 619 –626,
n. 1 (1986) (“If a reasonable threat
of prosecution creates a ripe controversy, we fail to see how the
actual filing of the administrative action threatening sanctions in
this case does notâ€). The burdens that Commission
proceedings can impose on electoral speech are of particular
concern here. As the Ohio Attorney General himself notes, the
“practical effect†of the Ohio false
statement scheme is “to permit a private
complainant . . . to gain a campaign
advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a
statement.†DeWine Brief 7.
“[C]omplainants may time their submissions to
achieve maximum disruption of their political opponents while
calculating that an ultimate decision on the merits will be
deferred until after the relevant election.†Id., at
14–15. Moreover, the target of a false statement
complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources to
hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the crucial
days leading up to an election. And where, as here, a Commission
panel issues a preelection probable-cause finding,
“such a determination itself may be viewed [by
the electorate] as a sanction by the State.†Id., at
13.
Although the threat of Commission proceedings is a substantial
one, we need not decide whether that threat standing alone gives
rise to an Article III injury. The burdensome Commission
proceedings here are backed by the additional threat of criminal
prosecution. We conclude that the combination of those two threats
suffices to create an Article III injury under the circumstances of
this case. See Babbitt, supra, at 302, n. 13 (In
addition to the threat of criminal sanctions,
“the prospect of issuance of an administrative
cease-and-desist order or a court-ordered injunction against such
prohibited conduct provides substantial additional support for the
conclusion that appellees’ challenge
. . . is justiciableâ€
(citations omitted)).
That conclusion holds true as to both SBA and COAST.
Respondents, relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) ,
appear to suggest that COAST lacks standing because it refrained
from actually disseminating its planned speech in order to avoid
Commission proceedings of its own. See Brief for Respondents
26–27, 34. In Younger, the plaintiff had been
indicted for distributing leaflets in violation of the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act. When he challenged the constitutionality
of the law in federal court, several other plaintiffs intervened,
arguing that their own speech was inhibited by
Harris’ prosecution. The Court concluded that
only the plaintiff had standing because the intervenors
“d[id] not claim that they ha[d] ever been
threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution [wa]s likely, or
even that a prosecution [wa]s remotely possible.†401
U. S., at 42.
That is not this case. Unlike the intervenors in Younger, COAST
has alleged an intent to engage in the same speech that was the
subject of a prior enforcement proceeding. Also unlike the
intervenors in Younger, who had never been threatened with
prosecution, COAST has been the subject of Commission proceedings
in the past. See, e.g., COAST Candidates PAC v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 543 Fed. Appx. 490 (CA6 2013). COAST is
far more akin to the plaintiff in Steffel, who was not arrested
alongside his handbilling companion but was nevertheless threatened
with prosecution for similar speech. 415 U. S., at
459.
In sum, we find that both SBA and COAST have alleged a credible
threat of enforcement.
V
In concluding that petitioners’ claims were
not justiciable, the Sixth Circuit separately considered two other
factors: whether the factual record was sufficiently developed, and
whether hardship to the parties would result if judicial relief is
denied at this stage in the proceedings. 525 Fed. Appx., at 419.
Respondents contend that these “prudential
ripeness†factors confirm that the claims at issue are
nonjusticiable. Brief for Respondents 17. But we have already
concluded that petitioners have alleged a sufficient Article III
injury. To the extent respondents would have us deem
petitioners’ claims nonjusticiable
“on grounds that are
‘prudential,’ rather than
constitutional,†“[t]hat request is
in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that
‘a federal court’s obligation
to hear and decide’ cases within its
jurisdiction ‘is virtually
unflagging.’ †Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6) (quoting
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. ___,
___ (2013) (slip op., at 6); some internal quotation marks
omitted).
In any event, we need not resolve the continuing vitality of the
prudential ripeness doctrine in this case because the
“fitness†and
“hardship†factors are easily
satisfied here. First, petitioners’ challenge to
the Ohio false statement statute presents an issue that is
“purely legal, and will not be clarified by
further factual development.†Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agricultural Products Co., 473 U. S. 568, 581 (1985) .
And denying prompt judicial review would impose a substantial
hardship on petitioners, forcing them to choose between refraining
from core political speech on the one hand, or engaging in that
speech and risking costly Commission proceedings and criminal
prosecution on the other.
*  *  *
Petitioners in this case have demonstrated an injury in fact
sufficient for Article III standing. We accordingly reverse the
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion, including a determination whether the remaining
Article III standing requirements are met.
It is so ordered.