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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–761
_________________
POM WONDERFUL LLC, PETITIONER v. THECOCA-COLA
COMPANY
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 12, 2014]
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
POM Wonderful LLC makes
and sells pomegranate juice products, including a
pomegranate-blueberry juice blend. App. 23a. One of POM’s
competitors is the Coca-Cola Company. Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid
Division makes a juice blend sold with a label that, in describing
the contents, displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” with far
more prominence than other words on the label that show the juice
to be a blend of five juices. In truth, the Coca-Cola product
contains but 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.
Alleging that the use
of that label is deceptive and misleading, POM sued Coca-Cola under
§43 of the Lanham Act. 60Stat. 441, as amended, 15
U. S. C. §1125. That provision allows one competitor to
sue another if it alleges unfair competition arising from false or
misleading product descriptions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that, in the realm of labeling for food and beverages,
a Lanham Act claim like POM’s is precluded by a second federal
statute. The second statute is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), which forbids the misbranding of food, including by
means of false or misleading labeling. §§301, 403, 52Stat. 1042,
1047, as amended, 21 U. S. C. §§331, 343.
The ruling that POM’s
Lanham Act cause of action is precluded by the FDCA was incorrect.
There is no statutory text or established interpretive principle to
support the contention that the FDCA precludes Lanham Act suits
like the one brought by POM in this case. Nothing in the text,
history, or structure of the FDCA or the Lanham Act shows the
congressional purpose or design to forbid these suits. Quite to the
contrary, the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other in the
federal regulation of misleading food and beverage labels.
Competitors, in their own interest, may bring Lanham Act claims
like POM’s that challenge food and beverage labels that are
regulated by the FDCA.
I
A
This case concerns
the intersection and complementar-ity of these two federal laws. A
proper beginning point is a description of the statutes.
Congress enacted the
Lanham Act nearly seven decades ago. See 60Stat. 427 (1946). As the
Court explained earlier this Term, it “requires no guesswork” to
ascertain Congress’ intent regarding this federal law, for Congress
included a “detailed statement of the statute’s purposes.” Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___,
___ (2014) (slip op., at 12). Section 45 of the Lanham Act
provides:
“The intent of this chapter is to regulate
commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect
registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State,
or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception
in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits,
or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights
and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into
between the United States and foreign nations.” 15
U. S. C. §1127.
The Lanham Act’s trademark provisions are the
primary means of achieving these ends. But the Act also creates a
federal remedy “that goes beyond trademark protection.” Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U. S. 23, 29
(2003) . The broader remedy is at issue here.
The Lanham Act creates
a cause of action for unfair competition through misleading
advertising or labeling. Though in the end consumers also benefit
from the Act’s proper enforcement, the cause of action is for
competitors, not consumers.
The term “competitor”
is used in this opinion to indicate all those within the class of
persons and entities protected by the Lanham Act. Competitors are
within the class that may invoke the Lanham Act because they may
suffer “an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business
reputation proximately caused by [a] defendant’s
misrepresentations.” Lexmark, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 22). The
petitioner here asserts injury as a competitor.
The cause of action the
Act creates imposes civil liability on any person who “uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which . . . misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”
15 U. S. C. §1125(a)(1). As the Court held this Term, the
private remedy may be invoked only by those who “allege an injury
to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. A consumer who is
hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have an
injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke
the protection of the Lanham Act.” Lexmark, 572 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 13). This principle reflects the Lanham Act’s purpose
of “ ‘protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the
control of Congress] against unfair competition.’ ” Id., at
___ (slip op., at 12). POM’s cause of action would be
straightforward enough but for Coca-Cola’s contention that a
separate federal statutory regime, the FDCA, allows it to use the
label in question and in fact precludes the Lanham Act claim.
So the FDCA is the
second statute to be discussed. The FDCA statutory regime is
designed primarily to protect the health and safety of the public
at large. See 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U. S. 593,
596 (1951) ; FDCA, §401, 52Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. §341
(agency may issue certain regulations to “promote honesty and fair
dealing in the interest of consumers”). The FDCA prohibits the
misbranding of food and drink. 21 U. S. C. §§321(f), 331.
A food or drink is deemed misbranded if, inter alia, “its labeling
is false or misleading,” §343(a), information required to appear on
its label “is not prominently placed thereon,” §343(f), or a label
does not bear “the common or usual name of the food, if any there
be,” §343(i). To implement these provisions, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) promulgated regulations regarding food and
beverage labeling, including the labeling of mixes of different
types of juice into one juice blend. See 21 CFR §102.33 (2013). One
provision of those regulations is particularly relevant to this
case: If a juice blend does not name all the juices it contains and
mentions only juices that are not predominant in the blend, then it
must either declare the percentage content of the named juice or
“[i]ndicate that the named juice is present as a flavor or
flavoring,” e.g., “raspberry and cranberry flavored juice drink.”
§102.33(d). The Government represents that the FDA does not
preapprove juice labels under these regulations. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposition 16. That contrasts
with the FDA’s regulation of other types of labels, such as drug
labels, see 21 U. S. C. §355(d), and is consistent with
the less extensive role the FDA plays in the regulation of food
than in the regulation of drugs.
Unlike the Lanham Act,
which relies in substantial part for its enforcement on private
suits brought by injured competitors, the FDCA and its regulations
provide the United States with nearly exclusive enforcement
author-ity, including the authority to seek criminal sanctions in
some circumstances. 21 U. S. C. §§333(a), 337. Private
parties may not bring enforcement suits. §337. Also unlike the
Lanham Act, the FDCA contains a provision pre-empting certain state
laws on misbranding. That provision, which Congress added to the
FDCA in the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, §6,
104Stat. 2362–2364, forecloses a “State or political subdivision of
a State” from establishing requirements that are of the type but
“not identical to” the requirements in some of the misbranding
provisions of the FDCA. 21 U. S. C. §343–1(a). It does
not address, or refer to, other federal statutes or the preclusion
thereof.
B
POM Wonderful LLC is
a grower of pomegranates anda distributor of pomegranate juices.
Through its POM Wonderful brand, POM produces, markets, and sells a
variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranate-blueberry
juice blend. App. 23a.
POM competes in the
pomegranate-blueberry juice market with the Coca-Cola Company.
Coca-Cola, under its Minute Maid brand, created a juice blend
containing 99.4% apple and grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice,
0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice. Id., at 38a; Brief
for Respondent 8. Despite the minuscule amount of pomegranate and
blueberry juices in the blend, the front label of the Coca-Cola
product displays the words “pomegranate blueberry” in all capital
letters, on two separate lines. App. 38a. Below those words,
Coca-Cola placed the phrase “flavored blend of 5 juices” in much
smaller type. Ibid. And below that phrase, in still smaller type,
were the words “from concentrate with added ingredients”—and, with
a line break before the final phrase— “and other natural flavors.”
Ibid. The product’s front label also displays a vignette of
blueberries, grapes, and raspberries in front of a halved
pomegranate and a halved apple. Ibid.
Claiming that
Coca-Cola’s label tricks and deceives consumers, all to POM’s
injury as a competitor, POM brought suit under the Lanham Act. POM
alleged that the name, label, marketing, and advertising of
Coca-Cola’s juice blend mislead consumers into believing the
product consists predominantly of pomegranate and blueberry juice
when it in fact consists predominantly of less expensive apple and
grape juices. Id., at 27a. That confusion, POM complained, causes
it to lose sales. Id., at 28a. POM sought damages and injunctive
relief. Id., at 32a–33a.
The District Court
granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola on POM’s Lanham Act
claim, ruling that the FDCA and its regulations preclude challenges
to the name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The District
Court reasoned that in the juice blend regulations the “FDA has
directly spoken on the issues that form the basis of Pom’s Lanham
Act claim against the naming and labeling of” Coca-Cola’s product,
but has not prohibited any, and indeed expressly has permitted
some, aspects of Coca-Cola’s label. 727 F. Supp. 2d 849,
871–873 (CD Cal. 2010).
The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Like the District
Court, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress decided “to
entrust matters of juice beverage labeling to the FDA”; the FDA has
promulgated “comprehensive regulation of that labeling”; and the
FDA “apparently” has not imposed the requirements on Coca-Cola’s
label that are sought by POM. 679 F. 3d 1170, 1178 (2012).
“[U]nder [Circuit] precedent,” the Court of Appeals explained, “for
a court to act when the FDA has not—despite regulating extensively
in this area—would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and
authority.” Id., at 1177. For these reasons, and “[o]utof respect
for the statutory and regulatory scheme,” the Court of Appeals
barred POM’s Lanham Act claim. Id., at 1178.
II
A
This Court granted
certiorari to consider whether a private party may bring a Lanham
Act claim challenging a food label that is regulated by the FDCA.
571 U. S. ___ (2014). The answer to that question is based on
the following premises.
First, this is not a
pre-emption case. In pre-emption cases, the question is whether
state law is pre-empted by a federal statute, or in some instances,
a federal agency action. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555,
563 (2009) . This case, however, concerns the alleged preclusion of
a cause of action under one federal statute by the provisions of
another federal statute. So the state-federal balance does not
frame the inquiry. Because this is a preclusion case, any
“presumption against pre-emption,” id., at 565, n. 3, has no
force. In addition, the preclusion analysis is not governed by the
Court’s complex categorization of the types of pre-emption. See
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363 –373
(2000). Although the Court’s pre-emption precedent does not govern
preclusion analysis in this case, its principles are instructive
insofar as they are designed to assess the interaction of laws that
bear on the same subject.
Second, this is a
statutory interpretation case and the Court relies on traditional
rules of statutory interpretation. That does not change because the
case involves multiple federal statutes. See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120 –139 (2000). Nor does
it change because an agency is involved. See ibid. Analysis of the
statutory text, aided by established principles of interpretation,
controls. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U. S. 84,
94 (2001) .
A principle of
interpretation is “often countered, of course, by some maxim
pointing in a different direction.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001) . It is thus unsurprising
that in this case a threshold dispute has arisen as to which of two
competing maxims establishes the proper framework for decision. POM
argues that this case concerns whether one statute, the FDCA as
amended, is an “implied repeal” in part of an-other statute, i.e.,
the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379,
395 (2009) . POM contends that in such cases courts must give full
effect to both statutes unless they are in “irreconcilable
conflict,” see ibid., and that this high standard is not satisfied
here. Coca-Cola resists this canon and its high standard. Coca-Cola
argues that the case concerns whether a more specific law, the
FDCA, clarifies or narrows the scope of a more general law, the
Lanham Act. See, e.g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439,
453 (1988) ; Brief for Respondent 18. The Court’s task, it claims,
is to “reconcil[e]” the laws, ibid., and it says the best
reconciliation is that the more specific provisions of the FDCA bar
certain causes of action authorized in a general manner by the
Lanham Act.
The Court does not need
to resolve this dispute. Even assuming that Coca-Cola is correct
that the Court’s task is to reconcile or harmonize the statutes and
not, as POM urges, to enforce both statutes in full unless there is
a genuinely irreconcilable conflict, Coca-Cola is incorrect that
the best way to harmonize the statutes is to bar POM’s Lanham Act
claim.
B
Beginning with the
text of the two statutes, it must be observed that neither the
Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in express terms, forbids or limits Lanham
Act claims challenging labels that are regulated by the FDCA. By
its terms, the Lanham Act subjects to suit any person who
“misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin” of goods or services. 15 U. S. C.
§1125(a). This comprehensive imposition of liability extends, by
its own terms, to misrepresentations on labels, including food and
beverage labels. No other provision in the Lanham Act limits that
understanding or purports to govern the relevant interaction
between the Lanham Act and the FDCA. And the FDCA, by its terms,
does not preclude Lanham Act suits. In consequence, food and
beverage labels regulated by the FDCA are not, under the terms of
either statute, off limits to Lanham Act claims. No textual
provision in either statute discloses a purpose to bar unfair
competition claims like POM’s.
This absence is of
special significance because the Lanham Act and the FDCA have
coexisted since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. 60Stat. 427
(1946); ch. 675, 52Stat. 1040 (1938). If Congress had concluded, in
light of experience, that Lanham Act suits could interfere with the
FDCA, it might well have enacted a provision addressing the issue
during these 70 years. See Wyeth, supra, at 574 (“If Congress
thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some
point during the FDCA’s 70-year history”). Congress enacted
amendments to the FDCA and the Lanham Act, see, e.g., Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 104Stat. 2353; Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, §132, 102Stat. 3946, including an amendment
that added to the FDCA an express pre-emption provision with
respect to state laws addressing food and beverage misbranding, §6,
104Stat. 2362. Yet Congress did not enact a provision addressing
the preclusion of other federal laws that might bear on food and
beverage labeling. This is “powerful evidence that Congress did not
intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means” of ensuring proper
food and beverage labeling. See Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 575.
Perhaps the closest the
statutes come to addressing the preclusion of the Lanham Act claim
at issue here is the pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in
1990 as part of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. See 21
U. S. C. §343–1. But, far from expressly precluding suits
arising under other federal laws, the provision if anything
suggests that Lanham Act suits are not precluded.
This pre-emption
provision forbids a “State or political subdivision of a State”
from imposing requirements that are of the type but “not identical
to” corresponding FDCA requirements for food and beverage labeling.
Ibid. It is significant that the complex pre-emption provision
distinguishes among different FDCA requirements. It forbids
state-law requirements that are of the type but not identical to
only certain FDCA provisions with respect to food and beverage
labeling. See §§343–1(a)(1)–(5) (citing some but not all of the
subsections of §343); §6, 104Stat. 2362–2364 (codified at 21
U. S. C. §343–1, and note following). Just as
significant, the provision does not refer to requirements imposed
by other sources of law, such as federal statutes. For purposes of
deciding whether the FDCA displaces a regulatory or liability
scheme in another statute, it makes a substantial difference
whether that other statute is state or federal. By taking care to
mandate express pre-emption of some state laws, Congress if
anything indicated it did not intend the FDCA to preclude
requirements arising from other sources. See Setser v. United
States, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6–7) (applying
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius). Pre-emption of
some state requirements does not suggest an intent to preclude
federal claims.
The structures of the
FDCA and the Lanham Act reinforce the conclusion drawn from the
text. When two statutes complement each other, it would show
disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress
nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation
of the other. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 144 (2001) (“[W]e can plainly
regard each statute as effective because of its different
requirements and protections”); see also Wyeth, supra, at 578–579.
The Lanham Act and the FDCA complement each other in major
respects, for each has its own scope and purpose. Although both
statutes touch on food and beverage labeling, the Lanham Act
protects commercial interests against unfair competition, while the
FDCA protects public health and safety. Compare Lexmark, 572
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12–13), with 62 Cases of Jam, 340
U. S., at 596. The two statutes impose “different requirements
and protections.” J. E. M. Ag Supply, supra, at 144.
The two statutes
complement each other with respect to remedies in a more
fundamental respect. Enforcement of the FDCA and the detailed
prescriptions of its implementing regulations is largely committed
to the FDA. The FDA, however, does not have the same perspective or
expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors
possess. Competitors who manufacture or distribute products have
detailed knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon certain sales
and marketing strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition
prac-tices may be far more immediate and accurate than that of
agency rulemakers and regulators. Lanham Act suits draw upon this
market expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors
to protect their interests on a case-by-case basis. By “serv[ing] a
distinct compensatory function that may motivate injured persons to
come forward,” Lanham Act suits, to the extent they touch on the
same subject matter as the FDCA, “provide incentives” for
manufacturers to behave well. See id., at 579. Allowing Lanham Act
suits takes advantage of synergies among multiple methods of
regulation. This is quite consistent with the congressional design
to enact two different statutes, each with its own mechanisms to
enhance the protection of competitors and consumers.
A holding that the FDCA
precludes Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels
would not only ignore the distinct functional aspects of the FDCA
and the Lanham Act but also would lead to a result that Congress
likely did not intend. Unlike other types of labels regu-lated by
the FDA, such as drug labels, see 21 U. S. C. §355(d), it
would appear the FDA does not preapprove food and beverage labels
under its regulations and instead relies on enforcement actions,
warning letters, and other measures. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae in Opposition 16. Because the FDA acknowledges that
it does not necessarily pursue enforcement measures regarding all
objectionable labels, ibid., if Lanham Act claims were to be
precluded then commercial interests—and indirectly the public at
large—could be left with less effective protection in the food and
beverage labeling realm than in many other, less regulated
industries. It is un-likely that Congress intended the FDCA’s
protection of health and safety to result in less policing of
misleading food and beverage labels than in competitive markets for
other products.
C
Coca-Cola argues the
FDCA precludes POM’s Lanham Act claim because Congress intended
national uniformity in food and beverage labeling. Coca-Cola notes
three aspects of the FDCA to support that position: delegation of
enforcement authority to the Federal Government rather than private
parties; express pre-emption with respect to state laws; and the
specificity of the FDCA and its implementing regulations. But these
details of the FDCA do not establish an intent or design to
preclude Lanham Act claims.
Coca-Cola says that the
FDCA’s delegation of enforcement authority to the Federal
Government shows Congress’ intent to achieve national uniformity in
labeling. But POM seeks to enforce the Lanham Act, not the FDCA or
its regulations. The centralization of FDCA enforcement authority
in the Federal Government does not indicate that Congress intended
to foreclose private enforcement of other federal statutes.
Coca-Cola next appeals
to the pre-emption provision added to the FDCA in 1990. See §343–1.
It argues that allowing Lanham Act claims to proceed would
undermine the pre-emption provision’s goal of ensuring that food
and beverage manufacturers can market nationally without the burden
of complying with a patchwork of requirements. A significant flaw
in this argument is that the pre-emption provision by its plain
terms applies only to certain state-law requirements, not to
federal law. See Part II–B, supra. Coca-Cola in effect asks the
Court to ignore the words “State or political subdivision of a
State” in the statute.
Even if it were proper
to stray from the text in this way, it is far from clear that
Coca-Cola’s assertions about national uniformity in fact reflect
the congressional design. Although the application of a federal
statute such as the Lanham Act by judges and juries in courts
throughout the country may give rise to some variation in outcome,
this is the means Congress chose to enforce a national policy to
ensure fair competition. It is quite different from the
disuniformity that would arise from the multitude of state laws,
state regulations, state administrative agency rulings, and
state-court decisions that are partially forbidden by the FDCA’s
pre-emption provision. Congress not infrequently permits a certain
amount of variability by authorizing a federal cause of action even
in areas of law where national uniformity is important. Compare
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S.
141, 162 (1989) (“One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent
and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national
uniformity in the realm of intellectual property”), with 35
U. S. C. §281 (private right of action for patent
infringement); see Wyeth, 555 U. S., at 570 (“[T]he [FDCA]
contemplates that federal juries will resolve most misbranding
claims”). The Lanham Act itself is an example of this design:
Despite Coca-Cola’s protestations, the Act is uniform in extending
its protection against unfair competition to the whole class it
describes. It is variable only to the extent that those rights are
enforced on a case-by-case basis. The variability about which
Coca-Cola complains is no different than the variability that any
industry covered by the Lanham Act faces. And, as noted, Lanham Act
actions are a means to implement a uniform policy to prohibit
unfair competition in all covered markets.
Finally, Coca-Cola
urges that the FDCA, and particu-larly its implementing
regulations, addresses food and bev-erage labeling with much more
specificity than is foundin the provisions of the Lanham Act. That
is true. The pages of FDA rulemakings devoted only to juice-blend
labeling attest to the level of detail with which the FDA has
examined the subject. E.g., Food Labeling; Declaration of
Ingredients; Common or Usual Name for Nonstandardized Foods;
Diluted Juice Beverages, 58 Fed. Reg. 2897–2926 (1993). Because, as
we have explained, the FDCA and the Lanham Act are complementary
and have separate scopes and purposes, this greater specificity
would matter only if the Lanham Act and the FDCA cannot be
implemented in full at the same time. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC
v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at
5–7). But neither the statutory structure nor the empirical
evidence of which the Court is aware indicates there will be any
difficulty in fully enforcing each statute according to its terms.
See Part II–B, supra.
D
The Government
disagrees with both Coca-Cola and POM. It submits that a Lanham Act
claim is precluded “to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations
specifically require or authorize the challenged aspects of [the]
label.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. Applying that
standard, the Government argues that POM may not bring a Lanham Act
challenge to the name of Coca-Cola’s product, but that other
aspects of the label may be challenged. That is because, the
Government argues, the FDA regulations specifically authorize the
names of juice blends but not the other aspects of the label that
are at issue.
In addition to raising
practical concerns about drawing a distinction between regulations
that “specifically . . . authorize” a course of conduct
and those that merely tolerate that course, id., at 10–11, the flaw
in the Government’s intermediate position is the same as that in
Coca-Cola’s theory of the case. The Government assumes that the
FDCA and its regulations are at least in some circumstances a
ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage labeling. But, as
discussed above, Congress intended the Lanham Act and the FDCA to
complement each other with respect to food and beverage
labeling.
The Government claims
that the “FDA’s juice-naming regulation reflects the agency’s
‘weigh[ing of] the competing interests relevant to the particular
requirement in question.’ ” Id., at 19 (quoting Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 501 (1996) ). The rulemaking
indeed does allude, at one point, to a balancing of interests: It
styles a particular requirement as “provid[ing] manufacturers with
flexibility for labeling products while providing consumers with
information that they need.” 58 Fed. Reg. 2919–2920. But that
rulemaking does not discuss or even cite the Lanham Act, and the
Government cites no other statement in the rulemaking suggesting
that the FDA considered the full scope of the interests the Lanham
Act protects. In addition, and contrary to the language quoted
above, the FDA explicitly encouraged manufacturers to include
material on their labels that is not required by the regulations.
Id., at 2919. A single isolated reference to a desire for
flexibility is not sufficient to transform a rulemaking that is
otherwise at best inconclusive as to its interaction with other
federal laws into one with preclusive force, even on the assumption
that a federal regulation in some instances might preclude
application of a federal statute. Cf. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
Amer-ica, Inc., 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at
10–11).
In addition, Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000) , does not
support the Government’s argument. In Geier, the agency enacted a
regulation deliberately allowing manufacturers to choose between
different options because the agency wanted to encourage diversity
in the industry. A subsequent lawsuit challenged one of those
choices. The Court concluded that the action was barred because it
directly conflicted with the agency’s policy choice to encourage
flexibility to foster innovation. Id., at 875. Here, by contrast,
the FDA has not made a policy judgment that is inconsistent with
POM’s Lanham Act suit. This is not a case where a lawsuit is
undermining an agency judgment, and in any event the FDA does not
have authority to enforce the Lanham Act.
It is necessary to
recognize the implications of the United States’ argument for
preclusion. The Government asks the Court to preclude private
parties from availing themselves of a well-established federal
remedy because an agency enacted regulations that touch on similar
subject matter but do not purport to displace that remedy or even
implement the statute that is its source. Even if agency
regulations with the force of law that purport to bar other legal
remedies may do so, see id., at 874; see also Wyeth, 555
U. S., at 576, it is a bridge too far to accept an agency’s
after-the-fact statement to justify that result here. An agency may
not reorder federal statutory rights without congressional
authorization.
* * *
Coca-Cola and the
United States ask the Court to elevate the FDCA and the FDA’s
regulations over the private cause of action authorized by the
Lanham Act. But the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other
in the federal regulation of misleading labels. Congress did not
intend the FDCA to preclude Lanham Act suits like POM’s. The
position Coca-Cola takes in this Court that because food and
beverage labeling is involved it has no Lanham Act liability here
for practices that allegedly mislead and trick consumers, all to
the injury of competitors, finds no support in precedent or the
statutes. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Breyer took no
part in the consideration or decision of this case.
