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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 13–339
_________________
CTS CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. PETER
WALDBURGER et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[June 9, 2014]
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–D.
The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 94Stat. 2767, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §9601
et seq., contains a provision that by its terms pre-empts
statutes of limitations applicable to state-law tort actions in
certain circumstances. §9658. Section 9658 applies to statutes of
limitations governing actions for personal injury or property
damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant into the environment.
Section 9658 adopts
what is known as the discovery rule. Under this framework, statutes
of limitations in covered actions begin to run when a plaintiff
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm in
question was caused by the contaminant. A person who is exposed to
a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting
injury for many years, and so Congress enacted §9658 out of concern
for long latency periods.
It is undoubted that
the discovery rule in §9658 pre-empts state statutes of limitations
that are in conflict with its terms. The question presented in this
case is whether §9658 also pre-empts state statutes of repose.
A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that §9658 does
pre-empt statutes of repose. That holding was in error, and, for
the reasons that follow, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed.
I
Congress enacted
CERCLA in 1980 “to promote ‘ “the timely cleanup of hazardous
waste sites” ’ and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup
efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination.”
Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 556 U. S.
599, 602 (2009) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. UGI
Utilities, Inc., 423 F. 3d 90, 94 (CA2 2005)). The Act
provided a federal cause of action to recover costs of cleanup from
culpable entities but not a federal cause of action for personal
injury or property damage. Instead, CERCLA directed preparation of
an expert report to determine “the ade-quacy of existing common law
and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man
and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances
into the environment,” including “barriers to recovery posed by
existing statutes of limitations.” 42
U. S. C. §9651(e)(1), (3)(F).
The 1982 report
resulting from that statutory directive proposed certain changes to
state tort law. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, Injuries and Damages from
Hazardous Wastes—Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1982) (hereinafter Study Group Report
or Report). As relevant here, the Study Group Report noted the long
latency periods involved in harm caused by toxic substances and
“recommend[ed] that all states that have not already done so,
clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff
discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its
cause.” Id., at pt. 1, 256. The Report further stated: “The
Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes
of repose which, in a number of states[,] have the same effect as
some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiff’s claim before
he knows that he has one.” Ibid.
Congress did not wait
long for States to respond to some or all of the Report’s
recommendations. Instead, Congress decided to act at the federal
level. Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 to add the provision now
codified in §9658. Whether §9658 repeals statutes of repose, as the
Study Group Report recommended, is the question to be addressed
here.
The instant case arose
in North Carolina, where CTS Corporation ran an electronics plant
in Asheville from 1959 to 1985. (A subsidiary, CTS of Asheville,
Inc., ran the plant until 1983, when CTS Corporation took over.)
The plant manufactured and disposed of electronics and electronic
parts. In the process, it stored the chemicals trichloroethylene
(TCE) and cis-1, 2-dichloroethane (DCE). In 1987, CTS sold the
property, along with a promise that the site was environmentally
sound. The buyer eventually sold portions of the property to
individuals who, along with adjacent landowners, brought this suit
alleging damage from contaminants on the land. Those who alleged
the injury and damage were the plaintiffs in the trial court and
are respondents here.
Their suit was brought
in 2011, 24 years after CTS sold the property. The suit, filed in
the United States District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina, was a state-law nuisance action against CTS,
petitioner here. Respondents sought “reclamation” of “toxic
chemical contaminants” belonging to petitioner, “remediation of the
environmental harm caused” by contaminants, and “monetary damages
in an amount that will fully compensate them for all the losses and
damages they have suffered, . . . and will suffer in the
future.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. Respondents claim that in 2009
they learned from the Environmental Protection Agency that their
well water was contaminated, allegedly while petitioner operated
its electronics plant.
Citing North Carolina’s
statute of repose, CTS moved to dismiss the claim. That statute
prevents subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10
years after the last culpable act of the defendant. N. C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §1–52(16) (Lexis 2013) (“[N]o cause of action shall
accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of the
defendant giving rise to the cause of action”); Robinson v.
Wadford, ___ N. C. App. ___, ___, 731 S. E. 2d 539, 541
(2012) (referring to the provision as a “statute of repose”).
Because CTS’ last act occurred in 1987, when it sold the
electronics plant, the District Court accepted the recommendation
of a Magistrate Judge and granted CTS’ motion to dismiss.
A divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that §9658
pre-empted the statute of repose. 723 F. 3d 434 (2013). The
majority found §9658 “ambiguous,” but also found that the
interpretation in favor of pre-emption was preferable because of
CERCLA’s remedial purpose. Id., at 443–444.
Judge Thacker
dissented. Id., at 445–454. She found the statutory text’s
exclusion of statutes of repose to be “plain and unambiguous.” Id.,
at 445. She further indicated that, even “if the preemptive effect
of §9658 were susceptible to two interpretations, a presumption
against preemption would counsel that we should limit §9658’s
preemptive reach to statutes of limitations without also extending
it to statutes of repose.” Ibid.
The Courts of Appeals,
as well as the Supreme Court of South Dakota, have rendered
conflicting judgments on this question. Compare Burlington N. & S.
F. R. Co. v. Poole Chemical Co., 419 F. 3d 355, 362 (CA5
2005), and Clark County v. Sioux Equipment Corp., 2008 S. D.
60, ¶¶27–29, 753 N. W. 2d 406, 417, with McDonald v. Sun Oil Co.,
548 F. 3d 774, 779 (CA9 2008). This Court granted certiorari. 571
U. S. ___ (2014).
II
A
The outcome of the
case turns on whether §9658 makes a distinction between
state-enacted statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.
Statutes of limitations and statutes of repose both are mechanisms
used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for
tortious acts. Both types of statute can operate to bar a
plaintiff’s suit, and in each instance time is the controlling
factor. There is considerable common ground in the policies
underlying the two types of statute. But the time periods specified
are measured from different points, and the statutes seek to attain
different purposes and objectives. And, as will be explained, §9658
mandates a distinction between the two.
In the ordinary course,
a statute of limitations creates “a time limit for suing in a civil
case, based on the date when the claim accrued.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (Black’s); see also Heimeshoff v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
(slip op., at 4) (“As a general matter, a statute of limitations
begins to run when the cause of action ‘ “accrues” ’—that
is, when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief’ ”
(quoting Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U. S. 192, 201 (1997) )).
Measured by this standard, a claim accrues in a personal-injury or
property-damage action “when the injury occurred or was
discovered.” Black’s 1546. For example, North Carolina, whose laws
are central to this case, has a statute of limitations that allows
a person three years to bring suit for personal injury or property
damage, beginning on the date that damage “becomes apparent or
ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever
event first occurs.” N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–52(16).
A statute of repose, on
the other hand, puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil
action. That limit is measured not from the date on which the claim
accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or
omission of the defendant. A statute of repose “bar[s] any suit
that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted
(such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this
period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.”
Black’s 1546. The statute of repose limit is “not related to the
accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred,
much less have been discovered.” 54 C. J. S., Limitations
of Actions §7, p. 24 (2010) (hereinafter C. J. S.). The
repose provision is therefore equivalent to “a cutoff,” Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S.
350, 363 (1991) , in essence an “absolute . . . bar” on a
defendant’s temporal liability, C. J. S. §7, at 24.
Although there is
substantial overlap between the policies of the two types of
statute, each has a distinct purpose and each is targeted at a
different actor. Statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to
pursue “diligent prosecution of known claims.” Black’s 1546.
Statutes of limitations “promote justice by preventing surprises
through [plaintiffs’] revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U. S. 342 –349 (1944). Statutes of
repose also encourage plaintiffs to bring actions in a timely
manner, and for many of the same reasons. But the rationale has a
different emphasis. Statutes of repose effect a legislative
judgment that a defendant should “be free from liability after the
legislatively determined period of time.” C. J. S. §7, at
24; see also School Board of Norfolk v. United States Gypsum
Co., 234 Va. 32, 37, 360 S. E. 2d 325, 328 (1987)
(“[S]tatutesof repose reflect legislative decisions that as a
matter of policy there should be a specific time beyond which a
defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Like a discharge in
bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be said to provide a fresh
start or freedom from liability. Indeed, the Double Jeopardy Clause
has been described as “a statute of repose” because it in part
embodies the idea that at some point a defendant should be able to
put past events behind him. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U. S. 376,
392 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
One central distinction
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose underscores
their differing purposes. Statutes of limitations, but not statutes
of repose, are subject to equitable tolling, a doctrine that
“pauses the running of, or ‘tolls,’ a statute of limitations when a
litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary
circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action.” Lozano v.
Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1 , ___ (2014) (slip op., at 7).
Statutes of repose, on the other hand, generally may not be tolled,
even in cases of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff’s
control. See, e.g., Lampf, supra, at 363 (“[A] period of repose
[is] inconsistent with tolling”); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure §1056, p. 240 (3d ed. 2002) (“[A] critical
distinction is that a repose period is fixed and its expiration
will not be delayed by estoppel or tolling”); Restatement (Second)
of Torts §899, Comment g (1977).
Equitable tolling is
applicable to statutes of limitations because their main thrust is
to encourage the plaintiff to “pursu[e] his rights diligently,” and
when an “extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a
timely action,” the restriction imposed by the statute of
limitations does not further the statute’s purpose. Lozano, supra,
at ___ (slip op., at 7). But a statute of repose is a judgment that
defendants should “be free from liability after the legislatively
determined period of time, beyond which the liability will no
longer exist and will not be tolled for any reason.”
C. J. S. §7, at 24. As an illustrative example, under
North Carolina law statutes of limitations may be tolled but
statutes of repose may not. See, e.g., Monson v. Paramount Homes,
Inc., 133 N. C. App. 235, 239–241, 515 S. E. 2d 445, 449
(1999).
B
The relevant
provisions of §9658 and its definitions are central here, so the
pre-emption directive is quoted in full:
“(a) State statutes
of limitations for hazardous substance cases
“(1) Exception to
State statutes
“In the case of any
action brought under State law for personal injury, or property
damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any
hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the
environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period
for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations
or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier
than the federally required commencement date, such period shall
commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the
date specified in such State statute.
“(2) State law
generally applicable
“Except as provided in
paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State
law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal
in-jury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by
exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant,
released into the environment from a facility.
. . . . .
“(b) Definitions
. . . . .
“(2) Applicable
limitations period
“The term ‘applicable
limitations period’ means the period specified in a statute of
limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection
(a)(1) of this section may be brought.
“(3) Commencement
date
“The term
‘commencement date’ means the date specified in a statute of
limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations
period.
“(4) Federally
required commencement date
“(A) In general
“Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), the term ‘federally required commencement date’
means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)
that the personal injury or property damages referred to in
subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by
the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.
“(B) Special rules
“In the case of a
minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term ‘federally required
commencement date’ means the later of the date referred to in
subparagraph (A) or the following:
“(i) In the case of a
minor, the date on which the minor reaches the age of majority, as
determined by State law, or has a legal representative
appointed.
“(ii) In the case of an
incompetent individual, the date on which such individual becomes
competent or has had a legal representative appointed.”
On the facts of this
case, petitioner does not contend that North Carolina’s 3-year
statute of limitations bars respondents’ suit. Though the suit was
filed in 2011, more than 20 years after petitioner sold the
property at issue, respondents allege that they learned about the
contamination only in 2009.
C
The Court now
examines in more detail the question whether the state statute of
repose is pre-empted by the federal statute.
The Court of Appeals
supported its interpretation of §9658 by invoking the proposition
that remedial statutes should be interpreted in a liberal manner.
The Court of Appeals was in error when it treated this as a
substitute for a conclusion grounded in the statute’s text and
structure. After all, almost every statute might be described as
remedial in the sense that all statutes are designed to remedy some
problem. And even if the Court identified some subset of statutes
as especially remedial, the Court has emphasized that “no
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” Rodriguez v. United
States, 480 U. S. 522 –526 (1987) (per curiam). Congressional
intent is discerned primarily from the statutory text. In any
event, were the Court to adopt a presumption to help resolve
ambiguity, substantial support also exists for the proposition that
“the States’ coordinate role in government counsels against
reading” federal laws such as §9658 “to restrict the States’
sovereign capacity to regulate” in areas of traditional state
concern. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 568 U. S.
___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 18).
Turning to the
statutory text, the Court notes first that §9658, in the caption of
subsection (a), characterizes pre-emption as an “[e]xception” to
the regular rule. §9658(a)(1). Section 9658 contains another
subsection, with the heading “State law generally applicable,” that
provides the rule that “the statute of limitations established
under State law shall apply.” §9658(a)(2). Under this structure,
state law is not pre-empted unless it fits into the precise terms
of the exception.
The statute defines the
“applicable limitations period,” the “commencement date” of which
is subject to pre-emption, as a period specified in “a statute of
limitations.” §9658(b)(2). Indeed, §9658 uses the term “statute of
limitations” four times (not including the caption), but not the
term “statute of repose.” This is instructive, but it is not
dispositive. While the term “statute of limitations” has acquired a
precise meaning, distinct from “statute of repose,” and while that
is its primary meaning, it must be acknowledged that the term
“statute of limitations” is sometimes used in a less formal way. In
that sense, it can refer to any provision restricting the time in
which a plaintiff must bring suit. See Black’s 1546; see also Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 210 (1976) . Congress
has used the term “statute of limitations” when enacting statutes
of repose. See, e.g., 15 U. S. C.
§78u–6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (2012 ed.) (creating a statute of
repose and placing it in a provision entitled “Statute of
limitations”); 42 U. S. C. §2278 (same). And petitioner
does not point out an example in which Congress has used the term
“statute of repose.” So the Court must proceed to examine other
evidence of the meaning of the term “statute of limitations” as it
is used in §9658. The parties debate the
historical development of the terms “statute of limitations” and
“statute of repose” in an effort to show how these terms were
likely understood in 1986, when Congress enacted §9658. It is
apparent that the distinction between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose was understood by some courts and scholars
before 1986. The 1977 Restatement of Torts noted that “[i]n recent
years special ‘statutes of repose’ have been adopted in some
states . . . . The statutory period in these
acts is usually longer than that for the regular statute of
limitations, but . . . may have run before a cause
of action came fully into existence.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§899, Comment g.
But that usage, now
predominant, then was not the only definition of the two terms. One
scholar, writing in 1981, described multiple usages of the terms,
including both a usage in which the terms are equivalent and also
the modern, more precise usage. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and
Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.
U. L. Rev. 579, 584 (1981) (describing a statute of repose as
“distinct from a statute of limitation because [a statute of
repose] begins to run at a time unrelated to the traditional
accrual of the cause of action”).
Respondents note that
an entry in Black’s Law Dictionary from 1979 describes a statute of
limitations as follows: “Statutes of limitations are statutes of
repose.” Black’s 835 (5th ed.). That statement likely reflects an
earlier, broader usage in which the term “statute of repose”
referred to all provisions delineating the time in which a
plaintiff must bring suit. See, e.g., Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How.
472, 477 (1852) (“Statutes of limitation . . . are
statutes of repose, and should not be evaded by a forced
construction”); Rosenberg v. North Bergen, 61 N. J. 190, 201,
293 A. 2d 662, 667 (1972) (“All statutes limiting in any way
the time within which a judicial remedy may be sought are statutes
of repose”); Black’s 1077 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “statute of
limitations” as “[a] statute . . . declaring that no suit
shall be maintained . . . unless brought within a
specified period after the right accrued. Statutes of limitation
are statutes of repose”); Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 1233 (2d ed.
1948) (similar). That usage does not necessarily support
respondents’ interpretation, because the broad usage of the term
“statute of repose” does not mean that the term “statute of
limitations” must refer to both types of statute.
From all this, it is
apparent that general usage of the legal terms has not always been
precise, but the concept that statutes of repose and statutes of
limitations are distinct was well enough established to be
reflected in the 1982 Study Group Report, commissioned by Congress.
In one of its recommendations, the Study Group Report called on
States to adopt the discovery rule now embodied in §9658. Study
Group Report, pt. 1, at 256. The Report acknowledged that statutes
of repose were not equivalent to statutes of limitations and that a
recommendation to pre-empt the latter did not necessarily include
the former. For immediately it went on to state: “The
Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes
of repose which, in a number of states[,] have the same effect as
some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiff’s claim before
he knows that he has one.” Ibid. The scholars and professionals who
were discussing this matter (and indeed were advising Congress)
knew of a clear distinction between the two.
The Report clearly
urged the repeal of statutes of repose as well as statutes of
limitations. But in so doing the Report did what the statute does
not: It referred to statutes of repose as a distinct category. And
when Congress did not make the same distinction, it is proper to
conclude that Congress did not exercise the full scope of its
pre-emption power.
While the use of the
term “statute of limitations” in §9658 is not dispositive, the
Court’s textual inquiry does not end there, for other features of
the statutory text further support the exclusion of statutes of
repose. The text of §9658 includes language describing the covered
period in the singular. The statute uses the terms “the applicable
limitations period,” “such period shall commence,” and “the statute
of limitations established under State law.” This would be an
awkward way to mandate the pre-emption of two different time
periods with two different purposes.
True, the Dictionary
Act states that “words importing the singular include and apply to
several persons, parties, or things” unless “the context indicates
otherwise.” 1 U. S. C. §1. But the Court has relied on
this directive when the rule is “ ‘necessary to carry out the
evident intent of the statute.’ ” United States v. Hayes, 555
U. S. 415 , n. 5 (2009) (quoting First Nat. Bank in
St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U. S. 640, 657 (1924) ). As
discussed, the context here shows an evident intent not to cover
statutes of repose.
Further, to return
again to the definition of the “applicable limitations period,” the
statute describes it as “the period” during which a “civil action”
under state law “may be brought.” §9658(b)(2).
It is true that in a literal sense a
statute of repose limits the time during which a suit “may be
brought” because it provides a point after which a suit cannot be
brought. Ibid.; see C. J. S. §7, at 24 (“A statute of
repose . . . limits the time within which an action may
be brought”). But the definition of the “applicable limitations
period” presupposes that “a [covered] civil action” exists.
§9658(b)(2). Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “civil action” as
identical to an “action at law,” which in relevant part is defined
as a “civil suit stating a legal cause of action.” Black’s 32–33,
279 (9th ed. 2009); see also id., at 222 (5th ed. 1979).
A statute of repose,
however, as noted above, “is not related to the accrual of any
cause of action.” C. J. S. §7, at 24. Rather, it mandates
that there shall be no cause of action beyond a certain point, even
if no cause of action has yet accrued. Thus, a statute of repose
can prohibit a cause of action from coming into existence. See,
e.g., N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–52(16) (“[N]o cause of action
shall accrue more than 10 years from the last act or omission of
the defendant giving rise to the cause of action”); see also
Hargett v. Holland, 337 N. C. 651, 654–655, 447 S. E. 2d
784, 787 (1994) (“A statute of repose creates an additional element
of the claim itself which must be satisfied in order for the claim
to be maintained . . . . If the action is not
brought within the specified period, the plaintiff literally has no
cause of action” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lamb v.
Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N. C. 419, 440–441, 302 S. E.
2d 868, 880 (1983). A statute of repose can be said to define the
scope of the cause of action, and therefore the liability of the
defendant. See Hargett, supra, at 655–656, 447 S. E. 2d, at
788.
In light of the
distinct purpose for statutes of repose, the definition of
“applicable limitations period” (and thus also the definition of
“commencement date”) in §9658(b)(2) is best read to encompass only
statutes of limitations, which generally begin to run after a cause
of action accrues and so always limit the time in which a civil
action “may be brought.” A statute of repose, however, may preclude
an alleged tortfeasor’s liability before a plaintiff is entitled to
sue, before an actionable harm ever occurs.
Another and altogether
unambiguous textual indication that §9658 does not pre-empt
statutes of repose is that §9658 provides for equitable tolling for
“minor or incompetent plaintiff[s].” §9658(b)(4)(B). As noted in
the preceding discussion, a “critical distinction” between statutes
of limitations and statutes of repose “is that a repose period is
fixed and its expiration will not be delayed by estoppel or
tolling.” 4 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure §1056, at 240.
As a consequence, the inclusion of a tolling rule in §9658 suggests
that the statute’s reach is limited to statutes of limitations,
which traditionally have been subject to tolling. It would be odd
for Congress, if it did seek to pre-empt statutes of repose, to
pre-empt not just the commencement date of statutes of repose but
also state law prohibiting tolling of statutes of repose—all
without an express indication that §9658 was intended to reach the
latter.
In addition to their
argument that §9658 expressly pre-empts statutes of repose,
respondents contend that §9658 effects an implied pre-emption
because statutes of repose “creat[e] an unacceptable ‘obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’ ” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555
–564 (2009) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67
(1941) ). Respondents argue that pre-emption of statutes of repose
advances §9658’s purpose, namely to help plaintiffs bring tort
actions for harm caused by toxic contaminants.
But the level of
generality at which the statute’s purpose is framed affects the
judgment whether a specific reading will further or hinder that
purpose. CERCLA, it must be remembered, does not provide a complete
reme-dial framework. The statute does not provide a general cause
of action for all harm caused by toxic contaminants. Section 9658
leaves untouched States’ judgments about causes of action, the
scope of liability, the duration of the period provided by statutes
of limitations, burdens of proof, rules of evidence, and other
important rules governing civil actions. “ ‘The case for
federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has
indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of
federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them.’ ” Wyeth, supra, at 574–575 (quoting Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141 –167 (1989)).
Respondents have not shown that in light of Congress’ decision to
leave those many areas of state law untouched, statutes of repose
pose an unacceptable obstacle to the attainment of CERCLA’s
purposes.
D
Under a proper
interpretation of §9658, statutes of repose are not within
Congress’ pre-emption mandate. Although the natural reading of
§9658’s text is that statutes of repose are excluded, the Court
finds additional support for its conclusion in well-established
“presumptions about the nature of pre-emption.” Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U. S. 470 –485 (1996) (citing Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
“[B]ecause the States
are independent sovereigns in our federal system,” the Court
“ ‘assum[es] that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Medtronic, supra,
at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ). It follows
that “when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more
than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading
that disfavors pre-emption.’ ” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555
U. S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U. S. 431, 449 (2005) ). That approach is “consistent with
both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state
regulation of matters of health and safety.” Medtronic, 518
U. S., at 485.
The effect of that
presumption is to support, where plausible, “a narrow
interpretation” of an express pre-emption provision, ibid.,
especially “when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally
occupied by the States,” Altria, supra, at 77. The presumption has
greatest force when Congress legislates in an area traditionally
governed by the States’ police powers. See Rice, supra, at 230. “In
our federal system, there is no question that States possess the
‘traditional authority to provide tort remedies to their citizens’
as they see fit.” Wos v. E. M. A., 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013)
(slip op., at 11) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U. S. 238, 248 (1984) ).
The result of
respondents’ interpretation would be that statutes of repose would
cease to serve any real function. Respondents have not shown the
statute has the clarity necessary to justify that reading.
* * *
The judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.