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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–1173
_________________
MARVIN M. BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST, et al.
PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the tenth circuit
[March 10, 2014]
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the mid-19th
century, Congress began granting private railroad companies rights
of way over public lands to encourage the settlement and
development of the West. Many of those same public lands were later
conveyed by the Government to homesteaders and other settlers, with
the lands continuing to be subject to the railroads’ rights of way.
The settlers and their successors remained, but many of the
railroads did not. This case presents the question of what happens
to a railroad’s right of way granted under a particular statute—the
General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875—when the railroad
abandons it: does it go to the Government, or to the private party
who acquired the land underlying the right of way?
I
A
In the early to
mid-19th century, America looked west. The period from the
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 to the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 saw the
acquisition of the western lands that filled out what is now the
contiguous United States.
The young country had
numerous reasons to encourage settlement and development of this
vast new expanse. What it needed was a fast and reliable way to
transport people and property to those frontier lands. New
technology provided the answer: the railroad. The Civil War spurred
the effort to develop a transcontinental railroad, as the Federal
Government saw the need to protect its citizens and secure its
possessions in the West. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440
U. S. 668 –676 (1979). The construction of such a railroad
would “furnish a cheap and expeditious mode for the transportation
of troops and supplies,” help develop “the agricultural and mineral
resources of this territory,” and foster settlement. United States
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 80 (1875) .
The substantial
benefits a transcontinental railroad could bring were clear, but
building it was no simple matter. The risks were great and the
costs were staggering. Popular sentiment grew for the Government to
play a role in supporting the massive project. Indeed, in 1860,
President Lincoln’s winning platform proclaimed: “That a railroad
to the Pacific Ocean is imperatively demanded by the interests of
the whole country; that the Federal Government ought to render
immediate and efficient aid in its construction.” J. Ely, Railroads
and American Law 51 (2001). But how to do it? Sufficient funds were
not at hand (especially with a Civil War to fight), and there were
serious reservations about the legal authority for direct
financing. “The policy of the country, to say nothing of the
supposed want of constitutional power, stood in the way of the
United States taking the work into its own hands.” Union Pacific R.
Co., supra, at 81.
What the country did
have, however, was land—lots of it. It could give away vast swaths
of public land—which at the time possessed little value without
reliable transportation—in hopes that such grants would increase
the appeal of a transcontinental railroad to private investors.
Ely, supra, at 52–53. In the early 1860s, Congress began granting
to railroad companies rights of way through the public domain,
accompanied by outright grants of land along those rights of way.
P. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 362–368 (1968).
The land was con-veyed in checkerboard blocks. For example, under
the Union Pacific Act of 1862, odd-numbered lots of one square mile
apiece were granted to the railroad, while even-numbered lots were
retained by the United States. Leo Sheep Co., supra, at 672–673,
686, n. 23. Railroads could then either develop their lots or sell
them, to finance construction of rail lines and encourage the
settlement of future customers. Indeed, railroads became the
largest secondary dispenser of public lands, after the States.
Gates, supra, at 379.
But public resentment
against such generous land grants to railroads began to grow in the
late 1860s. Western settlers, initially some of the staunchest
supporters of governmental railroad subsidization, complained that
the railroads moved too slowly in placing their lands on the market
and into the hands of farmers and settlers. Citizens and Members of
Congress argued that the grants conflicted with the goal of the
Homestead Act of 1862 to encourage individual citizens to settle
and develop the frontier lands. By the 1870s, legislators across
the political spectrum had embraced a policy of reserving public
lands for settlers rather than granting them to railroads. Id., at
380, 454–456.
A House resolution
adopted in 1872 summed up the change in national policy,
stating:
“That in the judgment of this House the
policy of granting subsidies in public lands to railroads and other
corporations ought to be discontinued, and that every consideration
of public policy and equal justice to the whole people requires
that the public lands should be held for the purpose of securing
homesteads to actual settlers, and for educational purposes, as may
be provided by law.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., 1585.
Congress enacted the last checkerboard
land-grant statute for railroads in 1871. Gates, supra, at 380.
Still wishing to encourage railroad construction, however, Congress
passed at least 15 special acts between 1871 and 1875 granting to
designated railroads “the right of way” through public lands,
without any accompanying land subsidy. Great Northern R. Co. v.
United States, 315 U. S. 262 , and n. 9 (1942).
Rather than continue to
enact special legislation for each such right of way, Congress
passed the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875, 18Stat. 482,
43 U. S. C. §§934–939. The 1875 Act provided that “[t]he
right of way through the public lands of the United States is
granted to any railroad company” meeting certain requirements, “to
the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of
said road.” §934. A railroad company could obtain a right of way by
the “actual construction of its road” or “in advance of
construction by filing a map as provided in section four” of the
Act. Jamestown & Northern R. Co. v. Jones, 177 U. S. 125
–131 (1900). Section 4 in turn provided that a company could
“secure” its right of way by filing a proposed map of its rail
corridor with a local Department of the Interior office within 12
months after survey or location of the road. §937. Upon approval by
the Interior Department, the right of way would be noted on the
land plats held at the local office, and from that day forward “all
such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be
disposed of subject to the rightof way.” Ibid.
The 1875 Act remained
in effect until 1976, when its provisions governing the issuance of
new rights of way were repealed by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, §706(a), 90Stat. 2793. This case requires us to
define the nature of the interest granted by the 1875 Act, in order
to determine what happens when a railroad abandons its right of
way.
B
Melvin M. Brandt
began working at a sawmill in Fox Park, Wyoming, in 1939. He later
purchased the sawmill and, in 1946, moved his family to Fox Park.
Melvin’s son Marvin started working at the sawmill in 1958 and came
to own and operate it in 1976 until it closed, 15 years later.
In 1976, the United
States patented an 83-acre parcel of land in Fox Park, surrounded
by the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest, to Melvin and Lulu
Brandt. (A land patent is an official document reflecting a grant
by a sovereign that is made public, or “patent.”) The patent
conveyed to the Brandts fee simple title to the land “with all the
rights, privileges, immunities, and appurtenances, of whatsoever
nature, thereunto belonging, unto said claimants, their successors
and assigns, forever.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 76. But the patent
did include limited exceptions and reservations. For example, the
patent “except[s] and reserv[es] to the United States from the land
granted a right-of-way thereon for ditches or canals constructedby
the authority of the United States”; “reserv[es] to the United
States . . . a right-of-way for the existing Platte
Access Road No. 512”; and “reserv[es] to the United States
. . . a right-of-way for the existing Dry Park Road No.
517.” Id., at 76–77 (capitalization omitted). But if those roads
cease to be used by the United States or its assigns for a period
of five years, the patent provides that “the easement traversed
thereby shall terminate.” Id., at 78.
Most relevant to this
case, the patent concludes by stating that the land was granted
“subject to those rights for railroad purposes as have been granted
to the Lar-amie[,] Hahn’s Peak & Pacific Railway Company, its
suc-cessors or assigns.” Ibid. (capitalization omitted). The patent
did not specify what would occur if the railroad abandoned this
right of way.
The right of way
referred to in the patent was obtained by the Laramie, Hahn’s Peak
and Pacific Railroad (LHP&P) in 1908, pursuant to the 1875
Act.[
1] The right of way is 66
miles long and 200 feet wide, and it meanders south from Laramie,
Wyoming, through the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest, to the
Wyoming-Colorado border. Nearly a half-mile stretch of the right of
way crosses Brandt’s land in Fox Park, covering ten acres of that
parcel.
In 1911, the LHP&P
completed construction of its railway over the right of way, from
Laramie to Coalmont, Colorado. Its proprietors had rosy
expectations, proclaiming that it would become “one of the most
important railroad systems in this country.” Laramie, Hahns Peak
and Pacific Railway System: The Direct Gateway to Southern Wyoming,
Northern Colorado, and Eastern Utah 24 (1910). But the railroad
ultimately fell short of that goal. Rather than shipping coal and
other valuable ores as originally hoped, the LHP&P was used
primarily to transport timber and cattle. R. King, Trails to Rails:
A History of Wyoming’s Railroads 90 (2003). Largely because of high
operating costs during Wyoming winters, the LHP&P never quite
achieved financial stability. It changed hands numerous times from
1914 until 1935, when it was acquired by the Union Pacific Railroad
at the urging of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ibid.; S.
Thybony, R. Rosenberg, & E. Rosenberg, The Medicine Bows:
Wyoming’s Mountain Country 136–138 (1985);F. Hollenback, The
Laramie Plains Line 47–49 (1960).
In 1987, the Union
Pacific sold the rail line, including the right of way, to the
Wyoming and Colorado Railroad, which planned to use it as a tourist
attraction. King, supra, at 90. That did not prove profitable
either, and in 1996 the Wyoming and Colorado notified the Surface
Transportation Board of its intent to abandon the right of way. The
railroad tore up the tracks and ties and, after receiving Board
approval, completed abandonment in 2004. In 2006 the United States
initiated this action seeking a judicial declaration of abandonment
and an order quieting title in the United States to the abandoned
right of way. In addition to the railroad, the Government named as
defendants the owners of 31 parcels of land crossed by the
abandoned right of way.
The Government settled
with or obtained a default judgment against all but one of those
landowners—Marvin Brandt. He contested the Government’s claim and
filed a counterclaim on behalf of a family trust that now owns the
Fox Park parcel, and himself as trustee.[
2] Brandt asserted that the stretch of the right of way
crossing his family’s land was a mere easement that was
extinguished upon abandonment by the railroad, so that, under
common law property rules, he enjoyed full title to the land
without the burden of the easement. The Government countered that
it had all along retained a reversionary interest in the railroad
right of way—that is, a future estate that would be restored to the
United States if the railroad abandoned or forfeited its
interest.
The District Court
granted summary judgment to the Government and quieted title in the
United States to the right of way over Brandt’s land. 2008 WL
7185272 (D Wyo., Apr. 8, 2008).[
3] The Court of Appeals affirmed. United States v. Brandt,
496 Fed. Appx. 822 (CA10 2012) (per curiam). The court acknowledged
division among lower courts regarding the nature of the
Government’s interest (if any) in abandoned 1875 Act rights of way.
But it concluded based on Circuit precedent that the United States
had retained an “implied reversionary interest” in the right of
way, which then vested in the United States when the right of way
was relinquished. Id., at 824.
We granted certiorari.
570 U. S. __ (2013).
II
This dispute turns on
the nature of the interest the United States conveyed to the
LHP&P in 1908 pursuantto the 1875 Act. Brandt contends that the
right of way granted under the 1875 Act was an easement, so that
when the railroad abandoned it, the underlying land (Brandt’s Fox
Park parcel) simply became unburdened of the easement. The
Government does not dispute that easements normally work this way,
but maintains that the 1875 Act granted the railroads something
more than an easement, reserving an implied reversionary interest
in that something more to the United States. The Government loses
that argument today, in large part because it won when it argued
the opposite before this Court more than 70 years ago, in the case
of Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 262
(1942) .
In 1907, Great Northern
succeeded to an 1875 Act right of way that ran through public lands
in Glacier County, Montana. Oil was later discovered in the area,
and Great Northern wanted to drill beneath its right of way. Butthe
Government sued to enjoin the railroad from doingso, claiming that
the railroad had only an easement, so that the United States
retained all interests beneath the surface.
This Court had indeed
previously held that the pre-1871 statutes, granting rights of way
accompanied by checkerboard land subsidies, conveyed to the
railroads “a limited fee, made on an implied condition of
reverter.” See, e.g., Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Townsend, 190
U. S. 267, 271 (1903) . Great Northern relied on those cases
to contend that it owned a “fee” interest in the right of way,
which included the right to drill for minerals beneath
thesurface.
The Government
disagreed. It argued that “the 1875 Act granted an easement and
nothing more,” and that the railroad accordingly could claim no
interest in the resources beneath the surface. Brief for United
States in Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, O. T. 1941,
No. 149, p. 29. “The year 1871 marks the end of one era and
the beginning of a new in American land-grant history,” the
Government contended; thus, cases construing the pre-1871 statutes
were inapplicable in construing the 1875 Act, id., at 15, 29–30.
Instead, the Government argued, the text, background, and
subsequent administrative and congressional construction of the
1875 Act all made clear that, unlike rights of way granted under
pre-1871 land-grant statutes, those granted under the 1875 Act were
mere easements.
The Court adopted the
United States’ position in full, holding that the 1875 Act “clearly
grants only an easement, and not a fee.” Great Northern, 315
U. S., at 271. The Court found Section 4 of the Act
“especially persuasive,” because it provided that “all such lands
over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of
subject to such right of way.” Ibid. Calling this language “wholly
inconsistent” with the grant of a fee interest, the Court endorsed
the lower court’s statement that “[a]pter words to indicate the
intent to convey an easement would be difficult to find.” Ibid.
That interpretation was
confirmed, the Court explained, by the historical background
against which the 1875 Act was passed and by subsequent
administrative and congressional interpretation. The Court accepted
the Government’s position that prior cases describing the nature of
pre-1871 rights of way—including Townsend, supra, at 271—were “not
controlling,” because of the shift in congressional policy after
that year. Great Northern, supra, at 277–278, and n. 18. The
Court also specifically disavowed the characterization of an 1875
Act right of way in Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Stringham, 239
U. S. 44 (1915) , as “ ‘a limited fee, made on an implied
condition of reverter.’ ” Great Northern, supra, at 278–279
(quoting Stringham, supra, at 47). The Court noted that in
Stringham “it does not appear that Congress’ change of policy after
1871 was brought to the Court’s attention,” given that “[n]o brief
was filed by the defendant or the United States” in that case.
Great Northern, supra, at 279, and n. 20.
The dissent is wrong to
conclude that Great Northern merely held that “the right of way did
not confer oneparticular attribute of fee title.” Post, at 3
(opinionof Sotomayor, J.). To the contrary, the Court specifically
rejected the notion that the right of way conferred even a “limited
fee.” 315 U. S., at 279; see also id., at 277–278 (declining
to follow cases describing a right of way as a “limited,” “base,”
or “qualified” fee). Instead, the Court concluded, it was “clear
from the language of the Act, its legislative history, its early
administrative interpretation and the construction placed upon it
by Congress in subse-quent enactments” that the railroad had
obtained “only an easement in its rights of way acquired under the
Act of 1875.” Id., at 277; see United States v. Union Pacific R.
Co., 353 U. S. 112, 119 (1957) (noting the conclusion in Great
Northern that, in the period after 1871, “only an easement for
railroad purposes was granted”); 353 U. S., at 128
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court
“conclude[d] in the Great Northern case that a right of way granted
by the 1875 Act was an easement and not a limited fee”).
When the United States
patented the Fox Park parcel to Brandt’s parents in 1976, it
conveyed fee simple title to that land, “subject to those rights
for railroad purposes” that had been granted to the LHP&P. The
United States did not reserve to itself any interest in the right
of way in that patent. Under Great Northern, the railroad thus had
an easement in its right of way over land owned by the Brandts.
The essential features
of easements—including, most important here, what happens when they
cease to be used—are well settled as a matter of property law. An
easement is a “nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the
possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere
with the uses authorized by the easement.” Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes §1.2(1) (1998). “Unlike most possessory
estates, easements . . . may be unilaterally terminated
by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate
unencumbered by the servitude.” Id., §1.2, Comment d; id., §7.4,
Comments a, f. In other words, if the beneficiary of the easement
abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his
full and unencumbered interest in the land. See Smith v. Townsend,
148 U. S. 490, 499 (1893) (“[W]hoever obtained title from the
government to any . . . land through which ran this right
of way would acquire a fee to the whole tract subject to the
easement of the company, and if ever the use of that right of way
was abandoned by the railroad company the easement would cease, and
the full title to that right of way would vest in the patentee of
the land”); 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 250, 254 (1879) (“the purchasers or
grantees of the United States took the fee of the lands patented to
them subject to the easement created by the act of 1824; but on a
discontinuance or abandonment of that right of way the entire and
exclusive property, and right of enjoyment thereto, vested in the
proprietors of the soil”).[
4]
Those basic common law
principles resolve this case. When the Wyoming and Colorado
Railroad abandoned the right of way in 2004, the easement referred
to in the Brandt patent terminated. Brandt’s land became unburdened
of the easement, conferring on him the same full rights over the
right of way as he enjoyed over the rest of the Fox Park
parcel.
III
Contrary to that
straightforward conclusion, the Government now tells us that Great
Northern did not really mean what it said. Emphasizing that Great
Northern involved only the question of who owned the oil and
min-
erals beneath a right of way, the Government
asks the Court to limit its characterization of 1875 Act rights of
way as “easements” to that context. Even if the right of way has
some features of an easement—such as granting only a surface
interest to the railroad when the Government wants the subsurface
oil and minerals—the Government asks us to hold that the right of
way is not an easement for purposes of what happens when the
railroad stops using it. But nothing in the text of the 1875 Act
supports such an improbable (and self-serving) reading.
The Government argues
that the similarity in the language of the 1875 Act and the
pre-1871 statutes shows that Congress intended to reserve a
reversionary interest in the lands granted under the 1875 Act, just
as it did in the pre-1871 statutes. See Brief for United States
17–18. But that is directly contrary to the very premise of this
Court’s decision (and the Government’s argument) in Great Northern:
that the 1875 Act granted a fundamen-tally different interest in
the rights of way than did the predecessor statutes. 315
U. S., at 277–278; see U. S. Great Northern Brief 30
(“[Great Northern’s] argument . . . fails because it
disregards the essential differences between the 1875 Act and its
predecessors.”). Contrary to the Government’s position now—but
consistent with the Government’s position in 1942—Great Northern
stands for the proposition that the pre-1871 statutes (and this
Court’s decisions construing them) have little relevance to the
question of what interest the 1875 Act conveyed to railroads.
The Government next
contends that this Court’s decisions in Stalker v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 225 U. S. 142 (1912) , and Great Northern R. Co.
v. Steinke, 261 U. S. 119 (1923) , support its position that
the United States retains an implied reversionary interest in 1875
Act rights of way. Brief for United States 28–32. According to the
Government, both Stalker and Steinke demonstrate that those rights
of way cannot be bare common law easements, because those cases
concluded that patents purporting to convey the land underlying a
right of way were “inoperative to pass title.” Brief for United
States 31 (quoting Steinke, supra, at 131); see also Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28–30, 33, 40–41, 44–45. If the right of way were a mere
easement, the argument goes, the patent would have passed title to
the underlying land subject to the railroad’s right of way, rather
than failing to pass title altogether. But that is a substantial
overreading of those cases.
In both Stalker and
Steinke, a railroad that had already obtained an 1875 Act right of
way thereafter claimed adjacent land for station grounds under the
Act, as it was permitted to do because of its right of way. A
homesteader subsequently filed a claim to the same land, unaware of
the station grounds. The question in each case was whether the
railroad could build on the station grounds, notwithstanding a
subsequent patent to the homesteader. The homesteader claimed
priority because the railroad’s station grounds map had not been
recorded in the local land office at the time the homesteader filed
his claim. This Court construed the 1875 Act to give the railroad
priority because it had submitted its proposed map to the
Department of the Interior before the homesteader filed his claim.
See Stalker, supra, at 148–154; Steinke, supra, at 125–129.
The dispute in each
case was framed in terms of competing claims to the right to
acquire and develop the same tract of land. The Court ruled for the
railroad, but did not purport to define the precise nature of the
interest granted under the 1875 Act. Indeed, it does not appear
that the Court in either case considered—much less rejected—an
argument that the railroad had obtained only an easement in the
contested land, so that the patent could still convey title to the
homesteader. In any event, to the extent that Stalker and Steinke
could be read to imply that the rail-roads had been granted
something more than an easement, any such implication would not
have survived this Court’s unequivocal statement in Great Northern
that the 1875 Act “clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee.”
315 U. S., at 271.
Finally, the Government
relies on a number of later enacted statutes that it says
demonstrate that Congress believed the United States had retained a
reversionary interest in the 1875 Act rights of way. Brief for
United States 34–42. But each of those statutes purported only to
dispose of interests the United States already possessed, not to
create or modify any such interests in the first place. First, in
1906 and 1909, Congress declared forfeited any right of way on
which a railroad had not been constructed in the five years after
the location of the road. 43 U. S. C. §940. The United
States would “resume[ ] the full title to the lands covered thereby
free and discharged of such easement,” but the forfeited right of
way would immediately “inure to the benefit of any owner or owners
of land conveyed by the United States prior to such date.”
Ibid.
Then, in 1922, Congress
provided that whenever a railroad forfeited or officially abandoned
its right of way, “all right, title, interest, and estate of the
United Statesin said lands” (other than land that had been
convertedto a public highway) would immediately be transferred to
either the municipality in which it was located, or else to the
person who owned the underlying land. 43 U. S. C. §912.
Finally, as part of the National Trails System Improvements Act of
1988, Congress changed course and sought to retain title to
abandoned or forfeited railroad rights of way, specifying that “any
and all right, title, interest, and estate of the United States” in
such rights of way “shall remain in the United States” upon
abandonment or forfeiture. 16 U. S. C. §1248(c).
The Government argues
that these statutes prove that Congress intended to retain (or at
least believed it had retained) a reversionary interest in 1875 Act
rights of way. Otherwise, the argument goes, these later statutes
providing for the disposition of the abandoned or forfeited strips
of land would have been meaningless. That is wrong. This case turns
on what kind of interest Congress granted to railroads in their
rights of way in 1875. Cf. Leo Sheep Co., 440 U. S., at 681
(“The pertinent inquiry in this case is the intent of Congress when
it granted land to the Union Pacific in 1862.”). Great Northern
answered that question: an easement. The statutes the Government
cites do not purport to define (or redefine) the nature of the
interest conveyed under the 1875 Act. Nor do they shed light on
what kind of property interest Congress intended to convey to
railroads in 1875. See United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304,
313 (1960) (“the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one”).
In other words, these
statutes do not tell us whether the United States has an interest
in any particular right of way; they simply tell us how any
interest the United States might have should be disposed of. For
pre-1871 rights of way in which the United States retained an
implied reversionary interest, or for rights of way crossing public
lands, these statutes might make a difference in what happens to a
forfeited or abandoned right of way. But if there is no “right,
title, interest, [or] estate of the United States” in the right of
way, 43 U. S. C. §912, then the statutes simply do not
apply.
We cannot overlook the
irony in the Government’s argument based on Sections 912 and 940.
Those provisions plainly evince Congress’s intent to divest the
United States of any title or interest it had retained to railroad
rights of way, and to vest that interest in individuals to whom the
underlying land had been patented—in other words, people just like
the Brandts. It was not until 1988—12 years after the United States
patented the Fox Park parcel to the Brandts—that Congress did an
about-face and attempted to reserve the rights of way to the United
States. That policy shift cannot operate to create an interest in
land that the Government had already given away.[
5]
* * *
More than 70 years
ago, the Government argued before this Court that a right of way
granted under the 1875 Act was a simple easement. The Court was
persuaded, and so ruled. Now the Government argues that such a
right of way is tantamount to a limited fee with an implied
reversionary interest. We decline to endorse such a stark change in
position, especially given “the special need for certainty and
predictability where land titles are concerned.” Leo Sheep Co.,
supra, at 687.
The judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.