SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHI-GAN, PETITIONER v. COALITION TO DEFEND AF-FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMI-GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITYBY ANY MEANS NECESSARY (BAMN), et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[April 22, 2014]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
We are fortunate to live in a democratic society. But without checks, democratically approved legislation can oppress minority groups. For that reason, our Constitution places limits on what a majority of the people may do. This case implicates one such limit: the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Although that guarantee is traditionally understood to prohibit intentional discrimination under existing laws, equal protection does not end there. Another fundamental strand of our equal protection jurisprudence focuses on process, securing to all citizens the right to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government. That right is the bedrock of our democracy, for it preserves all other rights.
Yet to know the history of our Nation is to understand its long and lamentable record of stymieing the right of racial minorities to participate in the political process. At first, the majority acted with an open, invidious purpose. Notwithstanding the command of the
Fifteenth Amendment, certain States shut racial minorities out of the political process altogether by withholding the right to vote. This Court intervened to preserve that right. The majority tried again, replacing outright bans on voting with literacy tests, good character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering. The Court was not fooled; it invalidated those measures, too. The majority persisted. This time, although it allowed the minority access to the political process, the majority changed the ground rules of the process so as to make it more difficult for the minority, and the minority alone, to obtain policies designed to foster racial integration. Although these political restructurings may not have been discriminatory in purpose, the Court reaffirmed the right of minority members of our society to participate meaningfully and equally in the political process.
This case involves this last chapter of discrimination: A majority of the Michigan electorate changed the basic rules of the political process in that State in a manner that uniquely disadvantaged racial minorities.[1
] Prior to the enactment of the constitutional initiative at issue here,all of the admissions policies of Michigan’s public colleges and universities—including race-sensitive admissions poli-cies[2
]—were in the hands of each institution’s governing board. The members of those boards are nominated by political parties and elected by the citizenry in statewide elections. After over a century of being shut out of Michigan’s institutions of higher education, racial minorities in Michigan had succeeded in persuading the elected board representatives to adopt admissions policies that took into account the benefits of racial diversity. And this Court twice blessed such efforts—first in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U. S. 265 (1978)
, and again in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306 (2003)
, a case that itself concerned a Michigan admissions policy.
In the wake of Grutter, some voters in Michigan set out to eliminate the use of race-sensitive admissions policies. Those voters were of course free to pursue this end in any number of ways. For example, they could have persuaded existing board members to change their minds through individual or grassroots lobbying efforts, or through general public awareness campaigns. Or they could have mobilized efforts to vote uncooperative board members out of office, replacing them with members who would share their desire to abolish race-sensitive admissions policies. When this Court holds that the Constitution permits a particular policy, nothing prevents a majority of a State’s voters from choosing not to adopt that policy. Our system of government encourages—and indeed, depends on—that type of democratic action.
But instead, the majority of Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the game, reconfiguring the existing political process in Michigan in a manner that burdened racial minorities. They did so in the 2006 election by amending the Michigan Constitution to enact Art. I, §26, which provides in relevant part that Michigan’s public universities “shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”
As a result of §26, there are now two very different processes through which a Michigan citizen is permitted to influence the admissions policies of the State’s universities: one for persons interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for everyone else. A citizen who is a University of Michigan alumnus, for instance, can advocate for an admissions policy that considers an applicant’s legacy status by meeting individually with members of the Board of Regents to convince them of her views, by joining with other legacy parents to lobby the Board, or by voting for and supporting Board candidates who share her position. The same options are available to a citizen who wants the Board to adopt admissions policies that consider athleticism, geography, area of study, and so on. The one and only policy a Michigan citizen may not seek through this long-established process is a race-sensitive admissions policy that considers race in an individualized manner when it is clear that race-neutral alternatives are not adequate to achieve diversity. For that policy alone, the citizens of Michigan must undertake the daunting task of amending the State Constitution.
Our precedents do not permit political restructurings that create one process for racial minorities and a separate, less burdensome process for everyone else. This Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not tolerate “a political structure that treats all individuals as equals, yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.” Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458 U. S. 457,
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such restructuring, the Court explained, “is no more permissible than denying [the minority] the [right to] vote, on an equal basis with others.” Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U. S. 385,
. In those cases—Hunter and Seattle—the Court recognized what is now known as the “political-process doctrine”: When the majority reconfigures the political process in a manner that burdens only a racial minority, that alteration triggers strict judicial scrutiny.
Today, disregarding stare decisis, a majority of the Court effectively discards those precedents. The plurality does so, it tells us, because the freedom actually secured by the Constitution is the freedom of self-government—because the majority of Michigan citizens “exercised their privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise of their democratic power.” Ante, at 15. It would be “demeaning to the democratic process,” the plurality concludes, to disturb that decision in any way. Ante, at 17. This logic embraces majority rule without an important constitutional limit.
The plurality’s decision fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the injustice worked by §26. This case is not, as the plurality imagines, about “who may resolve” the debate over the use of race in higher education admissions. Ante, at 18. I agree wholeheartedly that nothing vests the resolution of that debate exclusively in the courts or requires that we remove it from the reach of the electorate. Rather, this case is about how the debate over the use of race-sensitive admissions policies may be resolved, contra, ibid.—that is, it must be resolved in constitution-ally permissible ways. While our Constitution does not guarantee minority groups victory in the political process, it does guarantee them meaningful and equal access to that process. It guarantees that the majority may not win by stacking the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the minority alone to surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals—here, educational diversity that cannot reasonably be accomplished through race-neutral measures. Today, by permitting a majority of the voters in Michigan to do what our Constitution forbids, the Court ends the debate over race-sensitive admissions policies in Michigan in a manner that contravenes constitutional protections long recognized in our precedents.
Like the plurality, I have faith that our citizenry will continue to learn from this Nation’s regrettable history; that it will strive to move beyond those injustices towards a future of equality. And I, too, believe in the importance of public discourse on matters of public policy. But I part ways with the plurality when it suggests that judicial intervention in this case “impede[s]” rather than “advance[s]” the democratic process and the ultimate hope of equality. Ante, at 16. I firmly believe that our role as judges includes policing the process of self-government and stepping in when necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Because I would do so here, I respectfully dissent.
For much of its history, our Nation has denied to many of its citizens the right to participate meaningfully and equally in its politics. This is a history we strive to put behind us. But it is a history that still informs the society we live in, and so it is one we must address with candor. Because the political-process doctrine is best understood against the backdrop of this history, I will briefly trace its course.
Fifteenth Amendment, ratified after the Civil War, promised to racial minorities the right to vote. But many States ignored this promise. In addition to outright tactics of fraud, intimidation, and violence, there are countless examples of States categorically denying to racial minorities access to the political process. Consider Texas; there, a 1923 statute prevented racial minorities from participating in primary elections. After this Court declared that statute unconstitutional, Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536
–541 (1927), Texas responded by changing the rules. It enacted a new statute that gave political parties themselves the right to determine who could participate in their primaries. Predictably, the Democratic Party specified that only white Democrats could participate in its primaries. Nixon v. Condon,
286 U. S. 73
–82 (1932). The Court invalidated that scheme, too. Id., at 89; see also Smith v. Allwright,
321 U. S. 649 (1944)
; Terry v. Adams,
345 U. S. 461 (1953)
Some States were less direct. Oklahoma was one of many that required all voters to pass a literacy test. But the test did not apply equally to all voters. Under a “grandfather clause,” voters were exempt if their grand-fathers had been voters or had served as soldiers before 1866. This meant, of course, that black voters had to pass the test, but many white voters did not. The Court held the scheme unconstitutional. Guinn v. United States,
238 U. S. 347 (1915)
. In response, Oklahoma changed the rules. It enacted a new statute under which all voters who were qualified to vote in 1914 (under the unconstitutional grandfather clause) remained qualified, and the remaining voters had to apply for registration within a 12-day period. Lane v. Wilson,
307 U. S. 268
–271 (1939). The Court struck down that statute as well. Id., at 275.
Racial minorities were occasionally able to surmount the hurdles to their political participation. Indeed, in some States, minority citizens were even able to win elective office. But just as many States responded to the
Fifteenth Amendment by subverting minorities’ access to the polls, many States responded to the prospect of elected minority officials by undermining the ability of minorities to win and hold elective office. Some States blatantly removed black officials from local offices. See, e.g., H. Rabinowitz, Race Relations in the Urban South, 1865–1890, pp. 267, 269–270 (1978) (describing events in Tennessee and Virginia). Others changed the processes by which local officials were elected. See, e.g., Extension of the Voting Rights Act, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 2016–2017 (1981) (hereinafter 1981 Hearings) (statement of Professor J. Morgan Kousser) (after a black judge refused to resign in Alabama, the legislature abolished the court on which he served and replaced it with one whose judges were appointed by the Governor); Rabinowitz, supra, at 269–270 (the North Carolina Legislature divested voters ofthe right to elect justices of the peace and county commissioners, then arrogated to itself the authority to select justices of the peace and gave them the power to select commissioners).
This Court did not stand idly by. In Alabama, for example, the legislature responded to increased black voter registration in the city of Tuskegee by amending the State Constitution to authorize legislative abolition of the county in which Tuskegee was located, Ala. Const. Amdt. 132 (1957), repealed by Ala. Const. Amdt. 406 (1982), and by redrawing the city’s boundaries to remove all the black voters “while not removing a single white voter,” Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U. S. 339,
. The Court intervened, finding it “inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution” could be “manipulated out of existence” by being “cloaked in the garb of [political] realignment.” Id., at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court’s landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483 (1954)
, triggered a new era of political restructuring, this time in the context of education. In Virginia, the General Assembly transferred control of student assignment from local school districts to a State Pupil Placement Board. See B. Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance 34, 74 (1961). And when the legislature learned that the Arlington County school board had prepared a desegregation plan, the General Assembly “swiftly retaliated” by stripping the county of its right to elect its school board by popular vote and instead making the board an appointed body. Id., at 24; see also B. Smith, They Closed Their Schools 142–143 (1965).
Other States similarly disregarded this Court’s mandate by changing their political process. See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 44–45 (ED La. 1960) (the Louisiana Legislature gave the Governor the authority to supersede any school board’s decision to integrate); Extension of the Voting Rights Act, Hearings on H. R. 4249 et al. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 146–149 (1969) (statement of Thomas E. Harris, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) (the Mississippi Legislature removed from the people the right to elect superintendents of education in 11 counties and instead made those positions appointive).
The Court remained true to its command in Brown. In Arkansas, for example, it enforced a desegregation order against the Little Rock school board. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U. S. 1,
. On the very day the Court announced that ruling, the Arkansas Legislature responded by changing the rules. It enacted a law permitting the Governor to close any public school in the State, and stripping local school districts of their decisionmaking authority so long as the Governor determined that local officials could not maintain “ ‘a general, suitable, and efficient educational system.’ ” Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F. 2d 97, 99 (CA8 1958) (per curiam) (quoting Arkansas statute). The then-Governor immediately closed all of Little Rock’s high schools. Id., at 99–100; see also S. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 49–67 (2010) (discussing the events in Little Rock).
The States’ political restructuring efforts in the 1960’s and 1970’s went beyond the context of education. Many States tried to suppress the political voice of racial minorities more generally by reconfiguring the manner in which they filled vacancies in local offices, often transferring authority from the electorate (where minority citizens had a voice at the local level) to the States’ executive branch (where minorities wielded little if any influence). See, e.g., 1981 Hearings, pt. 1, at 815 (report of J. Cox & A. Turner) (the Alabama Legislature changed all municipal judgeships from elective to appointive offices); id., at 1955 (report of R. Hudlin & K. Brimah, Voter Educ. Project, Inc.) (the Georgia Legislature eliminated some elective offices and made others appointive when it appeared that a minority candidate would be victorious); id., at 501 (statement of Frank R. Parker, Director, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law) (the Mississippi Legislature changed the manner of filling vacancies for various public offices from election to appointment).
It was in this historical context that the Court intervened in Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U. S. 385 (1969)
, and Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458 U. S. 457 (1982)
. Together, Hunter and Seattle recognized a fundamental strand of this Court’s equal protection jurisprudence: the political-process doctrine. To understand that doctrine fully, it is necessary to set forth in detail precisely what the Court had before it, and precisely what it said. For to understand Hunter and Seattle is to understand why those cases straightforwardly resolve this one.
In Hunter, the City Council of Akron, Ohio, enacted a fair housing ordinance to “assure equal opportunity to all persons to live in decent housing facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.” 393 U. S., at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). A majority of the citizens of Akron disagreed with the ordinance and overturned it. But the majority did not stop there; it also amended the city charter to prevent the City Council from implementing any future ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the approval of the majority of the Akron electorate. Ibid. That amendment changed the rules of the political process in Akron. The Court described the result of the change as follows:
“[T]o enact an ordinance barring housing discrimination on the basis of race or religion, proponents had to obtain the approval of the City Council and of a majority of the voters citywide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing discrimination on other grounds, or to enact any other type of housing ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the City Council.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 468 (describing Hunter; emphasis deleted).
The Court invalidated the Akron charter amendment under the Equal Protection Clause. It concluded that the amendment unjustifiably “place[d] special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process,” thus effecting “a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Hunter, 393 U. S., at 391, 393. The Court characterized the amendment as “no more permissible” than denying racial minorities the right to vote on an equal basis with the majority. Id., at 391. For a “State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable size.” Id., at 392–393. The vehicle for the change—a popular referendum—did not move the Court: “The sovereignty of the people,” it explained, “is itself subject to . . . constitutional limitations.” Id., at 392.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, wrote in his concurrence that although a State can normally allocate political power according to any general principle, it bears a “far heavier burden of justification” when it reallocates political power based on race, because the selective reallocation necessarily makes it far more difficult for racial minorities to “achieve legislation that is in their interest.” Id., at 395 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Seattle, a case that mirrors the one before us, the Court applied Hunter to invalidate a statute, enacted by a majority of Washington State’s citizens, that prohibited racially integrative busing in the wake of Brown. As early as 1963, Seattle’s School District No. 1 began taking steps to cure the de facto racial segregation in its schools. 458 U. S., at 460–461. Among other measures, it enacted a desegregation plan that made extensive use of busing and mandatory assignments. Id., at 461. The district was under no obligation to adopt the plan; Brown charged school boards with a duty to integrate schools that were segregated because of de jure racial discrimination, but there had been no finding that the de facto segregation in Seattle’s schools was the product of de jure discrimination. 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15. Several residents who opposed the desegregation efforts formed a committee and sued to enjoin implementation of the plan. Id., at 461. When these efforts failed, the committee sought to change the rules of the political process. It drafted a statewide initiative “designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing for purposes of racial integration.” Id., at 462. A major-ity of the State’s citizens approved the initiative. Id., at 463–464.
The Court invalidated the initiative under the Equal Protection Clause. It began by observing that equal protection of the laws “guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the community.” Id., at 467. “It is beyond dispute,” the Court explained, “that given racial or ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner.” Ibid. But the Equal Protection Clause reaches further, the Court stated, reaffirming the principle espoused in Hunter—that while “laws structuring political institutions or allocating political power according to neutral principles” do not violate the Constitution, “a different analysis is required when the State allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.” 458 U. S., at 470. That kind of state action, it observed, “places special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process,” by making it “more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities” than for other members of the community “to achieve legislation . . . in their interest.” Ibid.
Rejecting the argument that the initiative had no racial focus, the Court found that the desegregation of public schools, like the Akron housing ordinance, “inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the minority, and [was] designed for that purpose.” Id., at 472. Because minorities had good reason to “consider busing for integration to be ‘legislation that is in their interest,’ ” the Court concluded that the “racial focus of [the initiative] . . . suffice[d] to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine.” Id., at 474 (quoting Hunter, 393 U. S., at 395) (Harlan, J. concurring)).
The Court next concluded that “the practical effect of [the initiative was] to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned in Hunter.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 474. It explained: “Those favoring the elimination of de facto school segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all other student assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local school board.” Ibid. Thus, the initiative required those in favor of racial integration in public schools to “surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable legislative action” in different contexts. Ibid.
The Court reaffirmed that the “ ‘simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presump-tively invalid racial classification.’ ” Id., at 483 (quoting Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles,
458 U. S. 527,
). But because the initiative burdened future attempts to integrate by lodging the decisionmaking authority at a “new and remote level of government,” it was more than a “mere repeal”; it was an unconstitutionally discriminatory change to the political process.[3
] Seattle, 458 U. S., at 483–484.
Hunter and Seattle vindicated a principle that is as elementary to our equal protection jurisprudence as it is essential: The majority may not suppress the minority’s right to participate on equal terms in the political process. Under this doctrine, governmental action deprives minor-ity groups of equal protection when it (1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority,” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 472; and (2) alters the political process in a manner that uniquely burdens racial minorities’ ability to achieve their goals through that process. A faithful application of the doctrine resoundingly resolves this case in respondents’ favor.
Section 26 has a “racial focus.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 474. That is clear from its text, which prohibits Michigan’s public colleges and universities from “grant[ing] preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race.” Mich. Const., Art. I, §26. Like desegregation of public schools, race-sensitive admissions policies “inur[e] primarily to the benefit of the minority,” 458 U. S., at 472, as they are designed to increase minorities’ access to institutions of higher education.[4
Petitioner argues that race-sensitive admissions policies cannot “inur[e] primarily to the benefit of the minority,” ibid., as the Court has upheld such policies only insofar as they further “the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343. But there is no conflict between this Court’s pronouncement in Grutter and the common-sense reality that race-sensitive admissions policies benefit minorities. Rather, race-sensitive admissions policies further a compelling state interest in achieving a diverse student body precisely because they increase minority enrollment, which necessarily benefits minority groups. In other words, constitutionally permissible race-sensitive admissions policies can both serve the compelling interest of obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body, and inure to the benefit of racial minorities. There is nothing mutually exclusive about the two. Cf. Seattle, 458 U. S., at 472 (concluding that the desegregation plan had a racial focus even though “white as well as Negro children bene-fit from exposure to ‘ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom’ ”).
It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that §26 is relevant only to admissions policies that have survived strict scrutiny under Grutter; other policies, under this Court’s rulings, would be forbidden with or without §26. A Grutter-compliant admissions policy must use race flexibly, not maintain a quota; must be limited in time; and must be employed only after “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,” 539 U. S., at 339. The policies banned by §26 meet all these requirements and thus already constitute the least restrictive ways to advance Michigan’s compelling interest in diversity in higher education.
Section 26 restructures the political process in Michigan in a manner that places unique burdens on racial minorities. It establishes a distinct and more burdensome political process for the enactment of admissions plans that consider racial diversity.
Long before the enactment of §26, the Michigan Constitution granted plenary authority over all matters relating to Michigan’s public universities, including admissions criteria, to each university’s eight-member governing board. See Mich. Const., Art. VIII, §5 (establishing the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, and the Board of Governors of Wayne State University). The boards have the “power to enact ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the government of the university.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §390.5 (West 2010); see also §390.3 (“The government of the university is vested in the board of regents”). They are “ ‘constitutional corporation[s] of independent authority, which, within the scope of [their] functions, [are] co-ordinate with and equal to . . . the legislature.’ ” Federated Publications, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 460 Mich. 75, 84, n. 8, 594 N. W. 2d 491, 496, n. 8 (1999).
The boards are indisputably a part of the political process in Michigan. Each political party nominates two candidates for membership to each board, and board members are elected to 8-year terms in the general statewide election. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§168.282, 168.286 (West 2008); Mich. Const., Art. VIII, §5. Prior to §26, board candidates frequently included their views on race-sensitive admissions in their campaigns. For example, in 2005, one candidate pledged to “work to end so-called ‘Affirmative-Action,’ a racist, degrading system.” See League of Women Voters, 2005 General Election Voter Guide, online at http://www.lwvka.org/guide04/regents/html (all Internet materials as visited Apr. 18, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); see also George, U-M Regents Race Tests Policy, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 26, 2000, p. 2B (noting that one candidate “opposes affirmative action admissions policies” because they “ ‘basically sa[y] minority students are not qualified’ ”).
Before the enactment of §26, Michigan’s political structure permitted both supporters and opponents of race-sensitive admissions policies to vote for their candidates of choice and to lobby the elected and politically accountable boards. Section 26 reconfigured that structure. After §26, the boards retain plenary authority over all admissions criteria except for race-sensitive admissions policies.[5
] To change admissions policies on this one issue, a Michigan citizen must instead amend the Michigan Constitution. That is no small task. To place a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot requires either the support of two-thirds of both Houses of the Michigan Legislature or a vast number of signatures from Michigan voters—10 percent of the total number of votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. See Mich. Const., Art. XII, §§1, 2. Since more than 3.2 million votes were cast in the 2010 election for Governor, more than 320,000 signatures are currently needed to win a ballot spot. See Brief for Gary Segura et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (hereinafter Segura Brief). Moreover, “[t]o account for invalid and duplicative signatures, initiative sponsors ‘need to obtain substantially more than the actual required number of signatures, typically by a 25% to 50% margin.’ ” Id., at 10 (quoting Tolbert, Lowenstein, & Donovan, Election Law and Rules for Using Initiatives, in Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States 27, 37 (S. Bowler, T. Donovan, & C. Tolbert eds., 1998)).
And the costs of qualifying an amendment are significant. For example, “[t]he vast majority of petition efforts . . . require initiative sponsors to hire paid petition circulators, at significant expense.” Segura Brief 10; see also T. Donovan, C. Mooney, & D. Smith, State and Local Politics: Institutions and Reform 96 (2012) (hereinafter Donovan) (“In many states, it is difficult to place a measure on the ballot unless professional petition firms are paid to collect some or all the signatures required for qualification”); Tolbert, supra, at 35 (“ ‘Qualifying an initiative for the statewide ballot is . . . no longer so much a measure of general citizen interest as it is a test of fundraising ability’ ”). In addition to the cost of collecting signatures, campaigning for a majority of votes is an expensive endeavor, and “organizations advocating on behalf of marginalized groups remain . . . outmoneyed by corporate, business, and professional organizations.” Strolovitch & Forrest, Social and Economic Justice Movements and Organizations, in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups 468, 471 (L. Maisel & J. Berry eds., 2010). In 2008, for instance, over $800 million was spent nationally on state-level initiative and referendum campaigns, nearly $300 million more than was spent in the 2006 cycle. Donovan 98. “In several states, more money [is] spent on ballot initiative campaigns than for all other races for political office combined.” Ibid. Indeed, the amount spent on state-level initiative and referendum campaigns in 2008 eclipsed the $740.6 million spent by President Obama in his 2008 presidential campaign, Salant, Spending Doubled as Obama Led Billion-Dollar Campaign, Bloomberg News, Dec. 27, 2008, online at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anLDS9WWPQW8.
Michigan’s Constitution has only rarely been amended through the initiative process. Between 1914 and 2000, voters have placed only 60 statewide initiatives on the Michigan ballot, of which only 20 have passed. See Segura Brief 12. Minority groups face an especially uphill battle. See Donovan 106 (“[O]n issues dealing with racial and ethnic matters, studies show that racial and ethnic minorities do end up more on the losing side of the popular vote”). In fact, “[i]t is difficult to find even a single statewide initiative in any State in which voters approved policies that explicitly favor racial or ethnic minority groups.”[6
] Segura Brief 13.
This is the onerous task that §26 forces a Michigan citizen to complete in order to change the admissions policies of Michigan’s public colleges and universities with respect to racial sensitivity. While substantially less grueling paths remain open to those advocating for any other admissions policies, a constitutional amendment is the only avenue by which race-sensitive admissions policies may be obtained. The effect of §26 is that a white graduate of a public Michigan university who wishes to pass his historical privilege on to his children may freely lobby the board of that university in favor of an expanded legacy admissions policy, whereas a black Michigander who was denied the opportunity to attend that very university cannot lobby the board in favor of a policy that might give his children a chance that he never had and that they might never have absent that policy.
Such reordering of the political process contravenes Hunter and Seattle.[7
] See Seattle, 458 U. S., at 467 (the Equal Protection Clause prohibits “ ‘a political structure that treats all individuals as equals,’ yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation” (citation omitted)). Where, as here, the majority alters the political process to the detriment of a racial minority, the governmental action is subject to strict scrutiny. See id., at 485, n. 28. Michigan does not assert that §26 satisfies a compelling state interest. That should settle the matter.
The plurality sees it differently. Disregarding the language used in Hunter, the plurality asks us to contort that case into one that “rests on the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter the procedures of government to target racial minorities.” Ante, at 8. And the plurality recasts Seattle “as a case in which the state action in question . . . had the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of race.” Ante, at 8–9. According to the plurality, the Hunter and Seattle Courts were not concerned with efforts to reconfigure the political process to the detriment of racial minorities; rather, those cases invalidated governmental actions merely because they reflected an invidious purpose to discriminate. This is not a tenable reading of those cases.
The plurality identifies “invidious discrimination” as the “necessary result” of the restructuring in Hunter. Ante, at 8. It is impossible to assess whether the housing amendment in Hunter was motivated by discriminatory purpose, for the opinion does not discuss the question of intent.[8
] What is obvious, however, is that the possibility of invidious discrimination played no role in the Court’s reasoning. We ordinarily understand our precedents to mean what they actually say, not what we later think they could or should have said. The Hunter Court was clear about why it invalidated the Akron charter amendment: It was impermissible as a restructuring of the political process, not as an action motivated by discriminatory intent. See 393 U. S., at 391 (striking down the Akron charter amendment because it “places a special burden on racial minorities within the governmental process”).
Similarly, the plurality disregards what Seattle actually says and instead opines that “the political restriction in question was designed to be used, or was likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race.” Ante, at 17. Here, the plurality derives its conclusion not from Seattle itself, but from evidence unearthed more than a quarter-century later in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
551 U. S. 701 (2007)
: “Although there had been no judicial finding of de jure segregation with respect to Seattle’s school district, it appears as though school desegregation in the district in the 1940’s and 1950’s may have been the partial result of school board policies that ‘permitted white students to transfer out of black schools while restricting the transfer of black students into white schools.’ ”[9
] Ante, at 9 (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 807–808 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It follows, according to the plurality, that Seattle’s desegregation plan was constitutionally required, so that the initiative halting the plan was an instance of invidious discrimination aimed at inflicting a racial injury.
Again, the plurality might prefer that the Seattle Court had said that, but it plainly did not. Not once did the Court suggest the presence of de jure segregation in Seattle. Quite the opposite: The opinion explicitly suggested the desegregation plan was adopted to remedy de facto rather than de jure segregation. See 458 U. S., at 472, n. 15 (referring to the “absen[ce]” of “a finding of prior de jure segregation”). The Court, moreover, assumed that no “constitutional violation” through de jure segregation had occurred. Id., at 474. And it unmistakably rested its decision on Hunter, holding Seattle’s initiative invalid because it “use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.” 458 U. S., at 470.
It is nothing short of baffling, then, for the plurality to insist—in the face of clear language in Hunter and Seattle saying otherwise—that those cases were about nothing more than the intentional and invidious infliction of a racial injury. Ante, at 8 (describing the injury in Hunter as “a demonstrated injury on the basis of race”); ante, at 8–9 (describing the injury in Seattle as an “injur[y] on account of race”). The plurality’s attempt to rewrite Hunter and Seattle so as to cast aside the political-process doctrine sub silentio is impermissible as a matter of stare decisis. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we usually stand by our decisions, even if we disagree with them, because people rely on what we say, and they believe they can take us at our word.
And what now of the political-process doctrine? After the plurality’s revision of Hunter and Seattle, it is unclear what is left. The plurality certainly does not tell us. On this point, and this point only, I agree with Justice Scalia that the plurality has rewritten those precedents beyond recognition. See ante, at 5–7 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Justice Breyer concludes that Hunter and Seattle do not apply. Section 26, he reasons, did not move the relevant decisionmaking authority from one political level to another; rather, it removed that authority from “unelected actors and placed it in the hands of the voters.” Ante, at 5 (opinion concurring in judgment). He bases this conclusion on the premise that Michigan’s elected boards “delegated admissions-related decisionmaking authority to unelected university faculty members and administrators.” Ibid. But this premise is simply incorrect.
For one thing, it is undeniable that prior to §26, board candidates often pledged to end or carry on the use of race-sensitive admissions policies at Michigan’s public universities. See supra, at 18. Surely those were not empty promises. Indeed, the issue of race-sensitive admissions policies often dominated board elections. See, e.g., George, Detroit Free Press, at 2B (observing that “[t]he race for the University of Michigan Board of Regents could determine . . . the future of [the University’s] affirmative action policies”); Kosseff, UM Policy May Hang On Election, Crain’s Detroit Business, Sept. 18, 2000, p. 1 (noting that an upcoming election could determine whether the University would continue to defend its affirmative action policies); University of Michigan’s Admissions Policy Still an Issue for Regents’ Election, Black Issues in Higher Education, Oct. 21, 2004, p. 17 (commenting that although “the Supreme Court struck down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy as too formulaic,” the issue “remains an important [one] to several peo-ple running” in an upcoming election for the Board of Regents).
Moreover, a careful examination of the boards and their governing structure reveals that they remain actively involved in setting admissions policies and procedures. Take Wayne State University, for example. Its Board of Governors has enacted university statutes that govern the day-to-day running of the institution. See Wayne State Univ. Stat., online at http://bog.wayne.edu/code. A number of those statutes establish general admissions procedures, see §2.34.09 (establishing undergraduate admissions procedures); §2.34.12 (establishing graduate admissions procedures), and some set out more specific instructions for university officials, see, e.g., §2.34.09.030 (“Admissions decisions will be based on a full evaluation of each student’s academic record, and on empirical data reflecting the characteristics of students who have successfully graduated from [the university] within the four years prior to the year in which the student applies”); §§2.34.12.080, 2.34.12.090 (setting the requisite grade point average for graduate applicants).
The Board of Governors does give primary responsibility over day-to-day admissions matters to the university’s President. §2.34.09.080. But the President is “elected by and answerable to the Board.” Brief for Respondent Board of Governors of Wayne State University et al. 15. And while university officials and faculty members “serv[e] an important advisory role in recommending educational policy,” id., at 14, the Board alone ultimately controls educational policy and decides whether to adopt (or reject) program-specific admissions recommendations. For example, the Board has voted on recommendations “to revise guidelines for establishment of honors curricula, including admissions criteria”; “to modify the honor point criteria for graduate admission”; and “to modify the maximum number of transfer credits that the university would allow in certain cases where articulation agreements rendered modification appropriate.” Id., at 17; see also id., at 18–20 (providing examples of the Board’s “review[ing] and pass[ing] upon admissions requirements in the course of voting on broader issues, such as the implementation of new academic programs”). The Board also “engages in robust and regular review of administrative actions involving admissions policy and related matters.” Id., at 16.
Other public universities more clearly entrust admissions policy to university officials.
The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, for example, gives primary responsibility for admissions to the Associate Vice Provost, Executive Director of Undergraduate Admissions, and Directors of Admissions. Bylaws §8.01, online at http://www.regents.umich.edu/bylaws. And the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University relies on the President to make recommendations regarding admissions policies. Bylaws, Art. 8, online at http://www.trustees.msu.edu/bylaws. But the bylaws of the Board of Regents and the Board of Trustees “make clear that all university operations remain subject to their control.” Brief for Respondents Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University et al. 13–14.
The boards retain ultimate authority to adopt or reject admissions policies in at least three ways. First, they routinely meet with university officials to review admissions policies, including race-sensitive admissions policies. For example, shortly after this Court’s decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 244 (2003)
, and Grutter, 539 U. S., at 306, the President of the University of Michigan appeared before the University’s Board of Regents to discuss the impact of those decisions on the University. SeeProceedings 2003–2004, pp. 10–12 (July 2003), onlineat http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACW7513.2003.001. Six members of the Board voiced strong support for the University’s use of race as a factor in admissions. Id., at 11–12. In June 2004, the President again appeared before the Board to discuss changes to undergraduate admissions policies. Id., at 301 (June 2004). And in March 2007, the University’s Provost appeared before the Board of Regents to present strategies to increase diversity in light of the passage of Proposal 2. Proceedings 2006–2007, pp. 264–265 (Mar. 2007), online at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACW7513.2006.001.
Second, the boards may enact bylaws with respect to specific admissions policies and may alter any admissions policies set by university officials. The Board of Regents may amend any bylaw “at any regular meeting of the board, or at any special meeting, provided notice is given to each regent one week in advance.” Bylaws §14.03. And Michigan State University’s Board of Trustees may, “[u]pon the recommendation of the President[,] . . . determine and establish the qualifications of students for admissions at any level.” Bylaws, Art. 8. The boards may also permanently remove certain admissions decisions from university officials.[10
] This authority is not merely theoretical. Between 2008 and 2012, the University of Michigan’s Board of Regents “revised more than two dozen of its bylaws, two of which fall within Chapter VIII, the section regulating admissions practices.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.
Finally, the boards may appoint university officials who share their admissions goals, and they may remove those officials if the officials’ goals diverge from those of the boards. The University of Michigan’s Board of Regents “directly appoints [the University’s] Associate Vice Provost and Executive Director of Undergraduate Admissions,” and Michigan State University’s Board of Trustees elects that institution’s President. Brief for Respondents Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University et al. 14.
The salient point is this: Although the elected and politically accountable boards may well entrust university officials with certain day-to-day admissions responsibilities, they often weigh in on admissions policies themselves and, at all times, they retain complete supervisory authority over university officials and over all admissionsdecisions.
There is no question, then, that the elected boards in Michigan had the power to eliminate or adopt race-sensitive admissions policies prior to §26. There is also no question that §26 worked an impermissible reordering of the political process; it removed that power from the elected boards and placed it instead at a higher level of thepolitical process in Michigan. See supra, at 17–22. This case is no different from Hunter and Seattle in that respect. Just as in Hunter and Seattle, minorities in Michigan “participated in the political process and won.” Ante, at 5 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). And just as in Hunter and Seattle, “the majority’s subsequent reordering of the political process repealed the minority’s successes and made it more difficult for the minority to succeed in the future,” thereby “diminish[ing] the minority’s ability to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.” Ibid. There is therefore no need to consider “extend[ing] the holding of Hunter and Seattle to reach situations in which decisionmaking authority is moved from an administrative body to a political one,” ibid. Such a scenario is not be-fore us.
The political-process doctrine not only resolves this case as a matter of stare decisis; it is correct as a matter of first principles.
Under our Constitution, majority rule is not without limit. Our system of government is predicated on an equilibrium between the notion that a majority of citizens may determine governmental policy through legislation enacted by their elected representatives, and the overriding principle that there are nonetheless some things the Constitution forbids even a majority of citizens to do. The political-process doctrine, grounded in the
Fourteenth Amendment, is a central check on majority rule.
Fourteenth Amendment instructs that all who act for the government may not “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” We often think of equal protection as a guarantee that the government will apply the law in an equal fashion—that it will not intentionally discriminate against minority groups. But equal protection of the laws means more than that; it also secures the right of all citizens to participate meaningfully and equally in the process through which laws are created.
Few rights are as fundamental as the right to participate meaningfully and equally in the process of government. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356,
(political rights are “fundamental” because they are “preservative of all rights”). That right is the bedrock of our democracy, recognized from its very inception. See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980) (the Constitution “is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes,” and on the other, “with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government”).
This should come as no surprise. The political process is the channel of change. Id., at 103 (describing the importance of the judiciary in policing the “channels of political change”). It is the means by which citizens may both obtain desirable legislation and repeal undesirable legislation. Of course, we do not expect minority members of our society to obtain every single result they seek through the political process—not, at least, when their views conflict with those of the majority. The minority plainly does not have a right to prevail over majority groups in any given political contest. But the minority does have a right to play by the same rules as the majority. It is this right that Hunter and Seattle so boldly vindicated.
This right was hardly novel at the time of Hunter and Seattle. For example, this Court focused on the vital importance of safeguarding minority groups’ access to the political process in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144 (1938)
, a case that predated Hunter by 30 years. In a now-famous footnote, the Court explained that while ordinary social and economic legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality, the same may not be true of legislation that offends fundamental rights or targets minority groups. Citing cases involving restrictions on the right to vote, restraints on the dissemination of information, interferences with political organizations, and prohibition of peaceable assembly, the Court recognized that “legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” could be worthy of “more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.” Id., at 152, n. 4; see also Ely, supra, at 76 (explaining that “[p]aragraph two [of Carolene Products footnote 4] suggests that it is an appropriate function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open”). The Court also noted that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-ing judicial inquiry.” Carolene Products, 304 U. S., at 153, n. 4, see also Ely, supra, at 76 (explaining that “[p]aragraph three [of Carolene Products footnote 4] suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to minorities, particularly mentioning laws ‘directed at’ religious, national and racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against them”).
The values identified in Carolene Products lie at the heart of the political-process doctrine. Indeed, Seattle explicitly relied on Carolene Products. See 458 U. S., at 486 (“[W]hen the State’s allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial groups to enact legisla-tion specifically designed to overcome the ‘special condition’ of prejudice, the governmental action seriously‘curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities’ ” (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U. S., at 153, n. 4)). These values are central tenets of our equal protection jurisprudence.
Our cases recognize at least three features of the right to meaningful participation in the political process. Two of them, thankfully, are uncontroversial. First, every eligible citizen has a right to vote. See Shaw v. Reno,
509 U. S. 630,
. This, woefully, has not always been the case. But it is a right no one would take issue with today. Second, the majority may not make it more difficult for the minority to exercise the right to vote. This, too, is widely accepted. After all, the Court has invalidated grandfather clauses, good character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering provisions.[11
] The third feature, the one the plurality dismantles today, is that a majority may not reconfigure the existing political process in a manner that creates a two-tiered system of political change, subjecting laws designed to protect or benefit discrete and insular minorities to a more burdensome political process than all other laws. This is the political-process doctrine of Hunter and Seattle.
My colleagues would stop at the second. The plurality embraces the freedom of “self-government” without limits. See ante, at 13. And Justice Scalia values a “near-limitless” notion of state sovereignty. See ante, at 13 (opinion concurring in judgment). The wrong sought to be corrected by the political-process doctrine, they say, is not one that should concern us and is in any event beyond the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As they see it, the Court’s role in protecting the political process ends once we have removed certain barriers to the minority’s participation in that process. Then, they say, we must sit back and let the majority rule without the key constitutional limit recognized in Hunter and Seattle.
That view drains the
Fourteenth Amendment of one of its core teachings. Contrary to today’s decision, protecting the right to meaningful participation in the political process must mean more than simply removing barriers to participation. It must mean vigilantly policing the political process to ensure that the majority does not use other methods to prevent minority groups from partaking in that process on equal footing. Why? For the same reason we guard the right of every citizen to vote. If “[e]fforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the ballot,” were “ ‘second-generation barriers’ ” to minority voting, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5), efforts to reconfigure the political process in ways that uniquely disadvantage minority groups who have already long been disadvantaged are third-generation barriers. For as the Court recognized in Seattle, “minorities are no less powerless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is used to assign governmental power in such a way as to exclude particular racial groups ‘from effective participation in the political proces[s].’ ”[12
] 458 U. S., at 486.
To accept the first two features of the right to meaningful participation in the political process, while renouncing the third, paves the way for the majority to do what it has done time and again throughout our Nation’s history: afford the minority the opportunity to participate, yet manipulate the ground rules so as to ensure the minority’s defeat. This is entirely at odds with our idea of equality under the law.
To reiterate, none of this is to say that the political-process doctrine prohibits the exercise of democratic self-government. Nothing prevents a majority of citizens from pursuing or obtaining its preferred outcome in a political contest. Here, for instance, I agree with the plurality that Michiganders who were unhappy with Grutter were free to pursue an end to race-sensitive admissions policies in their State. See ante, at 16–17. They were free to elect governing boards that opposed race-sensitive admissions policies or, through public discourse and dialogue, to lobby the existing boards toward that end. They were also free to remove from the boards the authority to make any decisions with respect to admissions policies, as opposed to only decisions concerning race-sensitive admissions policies. But what the majority could not do, consistent with the Constitution, is change the ground rules of the political process in a manner that makes it more difficult for racial minorities alone to achieve their goals. In doing so, the majority effectively rigs the contest to guarantee a particular outcome. That is the very wrong the political-process doctrine seeks to remedy. The doctrine “hews to the unremarkable notion that when two competitors are running a race, one may not require the other to run twice as far or to scale obstacles not present in the first runner’s course.” BAMN v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 701 F. 3d 466, 474 (CA6 2012).
The political-process doctrine also follows from the rest of our equal protection jurisprudence—in particular, our reapportionment and vote dilution cases. In those cases, the Court described the right to vote as “ ‘the essence of a democratic society.’ ” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 639. It rejected States’ use of ostensibly race-neutral measures to prevent minorities from exercising their political rights. See id., at 639–640. And it invalidated practices such as at-large electoral systems that reduce or nullify a minority group’s ability to vote as a cohesive unit, when those practices were adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 641. These cases, like the political-process doctrine, all sought to preserve the political rights of the minority.
Two more recent cases involving discriminatory restructurings of the political process are also worthy of mention: Romer v. Evans,
517 U. S. 620 (1996)
, and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,
548 U. S. 399 (2006)
Romer involved a Colorado constitutional amendment that removed from the local political process an issue primarily affecting gay and lesbian citizens. The amendment, enacted in response to a number of local ordinances prohibiting discrimination against gay citizens, repealed these ordinances and effectively prohibited the adoption of similar ordinances in the future without another amendment to the State Constitution. 517 U. S., at 623–624. Although the Court did not apply the political-process doctrine in Romer,[13
] the case resonates with the principles undergirding the political-process doctrine. The Court rejected an attempt by the majority to transfer decision-making authority from localities (where the targeted minority group could influence the process) to state government (where it had less ability to participate effec-tively). See id., at 632 (describing this type of political restructuring as a “disability” on the minority group). Rather than being able to appeal to municipalities for policy changes, the Court commented, the minority was forced to “enlis[t] the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution,” id., at 631—just as in this case.
LULAC, a Voting Rights Act case, involved an enactment by the Texas Legislature that redrew district lines for a number of Texas seats in the House of Representatives. 548 U. S., at 409 (plurality opinion). In striking down the enactment, the Court acknowledged the “ ‘long, well-documented history of discrimination’ ” in Texas that “ ‘touched upon the rights of . . . Hispanics to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise in the electoral process,’ ” id., at 439, and it observed that that the “ ‘political, social, and economic legacy of past discrimination’ . . . may well [have] ‘hinder[ed] their ability to participate effectively in the political process,’ ” id., at 440. Against this backdrop, the Court found that just as “Latino voters were poised to elect their candidate of choice,” id., at 438, the State’s enactment “took away [their] opportunity because [they] were about to exercise it,” id., at 440. The Court refused to sustain “the resulting vote dilution of a group that was beginning to achieve [the] goal of overcoming prior electoral discrimination.” Id., at 442.
As in Romer, the LULAC Court—while using a different analytic framework—applied the core teaching of Hunter and Seattle: The political process cannot be restructured in a manner that makes it more difficult for a traditionally excluded group to work through the existing process to seek beneficial policies. And the events giving rise to LULAC are strikingly similar to those here. Just as redistricting prevented Latinos in Texas from attaining a benefit they had fought for and were poised to enjoy, §26prevents racial minorities in Michigan from enjoying a last-resort benefit that they, too, had fought for through the existing political processes.
My colleagues claim that the political-process doctrine is unadministrable and contrary to our more recent equal protection precedents. See ante, at 11–15 (plurality opinion); ante, at 7–17 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). It is only by not acknowledging certain strands of our jurisprudence that they can reach such a conclusion.
Start with the claim that Hunter and Seattle are no longer viable because of the cases that have come after them. I note that in the view of many, it is those precedents that have departed from the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause in the first place, by applying strict scrutiny to actions designed to benefit rather than burden the minority. See Gratz, 539 U. S., at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[A]s I see it, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion. Actions designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated” (citation omitted)); id., at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (“I agree . . . that, in implementing the Constitution’s equality instruction, government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of inclusion and exclusion, for the former are more likely to prove consistent with the basic constitutional obligation that the law respect each individual equally” (citation omitted)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña,
515 U. S. 200,
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed.,
476 U. S. 267
–302 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (when dealing with an action to eliminate “pernicious vestiges of past discrimination,” a “less exacting standard of review is appropriate”); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U. S. 448
–519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (race-based governmental action designed to “remed[y] the continuing effects of past racial discrimination . . . should not be subjected to conventional ‘strict scrutiny’ ”); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes” should be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny).
But even assuming that strict scrutiny should apply to policies designed to benefit racial minorities, that view is not inconsistent with Hunter and Seattle. For nothing the Court has said in the last 32 years undermines the principles announced in those cases.
Justice Scalia first argues that the political-process doctrine “misreads the Equal Protection Clause to protect ‘particular group[s],’ ” running counter to a line of cases that treat “ ‘equal protection as a personal right.’ ” Ante, at 9 (opinion concurring in judgment) (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 230). Equal protection, he says, protects “ ‘persons, not groups.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227). This criticism ignores the obvious: Discrimination against an individual occurs because of that individual’s membership in a particular group. Yes, equal protection is a personal right, but there can be no equal protection violation unless the injured individual is a member of a protected group or a class of individuals. It is membership in the group—here the racial minority—that gives rise to an equal protection violation.
Relatedly, Justice Scalia argues that the political-process doctrine is inconsistent with our precedents because it protects only the minority from political restructurings. This aspect of the doctrine, he says, cannot be tolerated because our precedents have rejected “ ‘a reading of the guarantee of equal protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative process.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S., 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion)). Equal protection, he continues, “ ‘cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289–290) (opinion of Powell, J.).
Justice Scalia is troubled that the political-process doctrine has not been applied to trigger strict scrutiny for political restructurings that burden the majority. But the doctrine is inapplicable to the majority. The minority cannot achieve such restructurings against the majority, for the majority is, well, the majority. As the Seattle Court explained, “ ‘[t]he majority needs no protection against discriminat[ory restructurings], and if it did, a referendum, [for instance], might be bothersome but no more than that.’ ” 458 U. S., at 468. Stated differently, the doctrine protects only the minority because it implicates a problem that affects only the minority. Nothing in my opinion suggests, as Justice Scalia says, that under the political-process doctrine, “the Constitution prohibits discrimination against minority groups, but not against majority groups.” Ante, at 10, n. 7. If the minority somehow managed to effectuate a political restructuring that burdened only the majority, we could decide then whether to apply the political-process doctrine to safeguard the political right of the majority. But such a restructuring is not before us, and I cannot fathom how it could be achieved.
Justice Scalia next invokes state sovereignty, arguing that “we have emphasized the near-limitless sovereignty of each State to design its governing structure as it sees fit.” Ante, at 13 (opinion concurring in judgment). But state sovereignty is not absolute; it is subject to constitutional limits. The Court surely did not offend state sovereignty by barring States from changing their voting procedures to exclude racial minorities. So why does thepolitical-process doctrine offend state sovereignty? The doctrine takes nothing away from state sovereignty that the Equal Protection Clause does not require. All it says is that a State may not reconfigure its existing political processes in a manner that establishes a distinct and more burdensome process for minority members of our society alone to obtain legislation in their interests.
More broadly, Justice Scalia is troubled that the political-process doctrine would create supposed “affirmative-action safe havens” in places where the ordinary political process has thus far produced race-sensitive admissions policies. Ante, at 13–14. It would not. As explained previously, the voters in Michigan who opposed race-sensitive admissions policies had any number of options available to them to challenge those policies. See supra, at 34–35. And in States where decisions regarding race-sensitive admissions policies are not subject to the political process in the first place, voters are entirely free to eliminate such policies via a constitutional amendment because that action would not reallocate power in the manner condemned in Hunter and Seattle (and, of course, present here). The Seattle Court recognized this careful balance between state sovereignty and constitutional protections:
“[W]e do not undervalue the magnitude of the State’s interest in its system of education. Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to make all decisions in the areas of education and student assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate that system within the confines of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 458 U. S., at 487.
The same is true of Michigan.
Finally, Justice Scalia disagrees with “the proposition that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact.” Ante,at 15 (opinion concurring in judgment). He would acknowledge, however, that an act that draws racial distinctions or makes racial classifications triggers strict scrutiny regardless of whether discriminatory intent is shown. See Adarand, 515 U. S., at 213. That should settle the matter: Section 26 draws a racial distinction. As the Seattle Court explained, “when the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious legislation—and only such legislation—is singled out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly rests on ‘distinctions based on race.’ ” 458 U. S., at 485 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 470 (noting that although a State may “ ‘allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle,’ ” it may not use racial considerations “to define the governmental decisionmaking structure”).
But in Justice Scalia’s view, cases like Washington v. Davis,
426 U. S. 229 (1976)
, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U. S. 252 (1977)
, call Seattle into question. It is odd to suggest that prior precedents call into question a later one. Seattle (decided in 1982) postdated both Washington v. Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights (1977). Justice Scalia’s suggestion that Seattle runs afoul of the principles established in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights would come as a surprise to Justice Blackmun, who joined the majority opinions in all three cases. Indeed, the Seattle Court explicitly rejected the argument that Hunter had been effectively overruled by Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights:
“There is one immediate and crucial difference between Hunter and [those cases]. While decisions such as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights considered classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter amendment at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms with legislation designed to benefit minorities ‘as minorities,’ not legislation intended to benefit some larger group of underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were disproportionately represented.” 458 U. S., at 485.
And it concluded that both the Hunter amendment and the Seattle initiative rested on distinctions based on race. 458 U. S., at 485. So does §26.[14
My colleagues also attack the first prong of the doctrine as “rais[ing] serious constitutional concerns,” ante, at 11 (plurality opinion), and being “unadministrable,” ante, at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia wonders whether judges are equipped to weigh in on what constitutes a “racial issue.” See ante, at 8. The plurality, too, thinks courts would be “with no clear legal standards or accepted sources to guide judicial decision.” Ante, at 12. Yet as Justice Scalia recognizes, Hunter and Seattle provide a standard: Does the public policy at issue “inur[e] primarily to the benefit of the minority, and [was it] designed for that purpose”? Seattle, 458 U. S., at 472; see ante, at 8. Surely this is the kind of factual inquiry that judges are capable of making. Justice Scalia, for instance, accepts the standard announced in Washington v. Davis, which requires judges to determine whether discrimination is intentional or whether it merely has a discriminatory effect. Such an inquiry is at least as difficult for judges as the one called for by Hunter and Seattle. In any event, it is clear that the constitutional amendment in this case has a racial focus; it is facially race-based and, by operation of law, disadvantages only minorities. See supra, at 15–16.
“No good can come” from these inquiries, Justice Scalia responds, because they divide the Nation along racial lines and perpetuate racial stereotypes. Ante, at 9. The plurality shares that view; it tells us that we must not assume all individuals of the same race think alike. See ante, at 11–12. The same could have been said about desegregation: Not all members of a racial minority in Seattle necessarily regarded the integration of public schools as good policy. Yet the Seattle Court had little difficulty saying that school integration as a general matter “inure[d] . . . to the benefit of” the minority. 458 U. S., at 472.
My colleagues are of the view that we should leave race out of the picture entirely and let the voters sort it out. See ante, at 13 (plurality opinion) (“Racial division would be validated, not discouraged, were the Seattle formulation . . . to remain in force”); ante, at 9 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“ ‘[R]acial stereotyping [is] at odds with equal protection mandates’ ”). We have seen this reasoning before. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 748 (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”). It is a sentiment out of touch with reality, one not required by our Constitution, and one that has properly been rejected as “not sufficient” to resolve cases of this nature. Id., at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While “[t]he enduring hope is that race should not matter[,] the reality is that too often it does.” Id., at 787. “[R]acial discrimination . . . [is] not ancient history.” Bartlett v. Strickland,
556 U. S. 1,
Race matters. Race matters in part because of the long history of racial minorities’ being denied access to the political process. See Part I, supra; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U. S. 301,
(describingracial discrimination in voting as “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution”). And although we have made great strides, “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” Shelby County, 570 U. S., at __ (slip op., at 2).
Race also matters because of persistent racial inequality in society—inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic disparities. See Gratz, 539 U. S., at 298–300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cataloging the many ways in which “the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools,” in areas like employment, poverty, access to health care, housing, consumer transactions, and education); Adarand, 515 U. S., at 273 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the “lingering effects” of discrimination, “reflective of a system of racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets, and neighborhoods”).
And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot be wished away. Race matters to a young man’s view of society when he spends his teenage years watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of self when she states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are you really from?”, regardless of how many generations her family has been in the country. Race matters to a young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which he does not understand because only English was spoken at home. Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I do not belong here.”
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality that race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race does matter.
Although the only constitutional rights at stake in this case are process-based rights, the substantive policy at issue is undeniably of some relevance to my colleagues. See ante, at 18 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that race-sensitive admissions policies have the “potential to become . . . the source of the very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation seeks to put behind it”). I will therefore speak in response.
For over a century, racial minorities in Michigan fought to bring diversity to their State’s public colleges and universities. Before the advent of race-sensitive admissions policies, those institutions, like others around the country, were essentially segregated. In 1868, two black students were admitted to the University of Michigan, the first of their race. See Expert Report of James D. Anderson 4, in Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97–75231 (ED Mich.). In 1935, over six decades later, there were still only 35 black students at the University. Ibid. By 1954, this number had risen to slightly below 200. Ibid. And by 1966, to around 400, among a total student population of roughly 32,500—barely over 1 percent. Ibid. The numbers at the University of Michigan Law School are even more telling. Duringthe 1960’s, the Law School produced 9 black graduates among a total of 3,041—less than three-tenths of 1 percent. See App. in Grutter v. Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No. 02–241, p. 204.
The housing and extracurricular policies at these institutions also perpetuated open segregation. For instance, incoming students were permitted to opt out of rooming with black students. Anderson, supra, at 7–8. And some fraternities and sororities excluded black students from membership. Id., at 6–7.
In 1966, the Defense Department conducted an investigation into the University’s compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and made 25 recommendations for increasing opportunities for minority students. Id., at 9. In 1970, a student group launched a number of protests, including a strike, demanding that the University increase its minority enrollment. Id., at 16–23. The University’s Board of Regents responded, adopting a goal of 10 percent black admissions by the fall of 1973. Id., at 23.
During the 1970’s, the University continued to improve its admissions policies,[15
] encouraged by this Court’s 1978 decision in Bakke. In that case, the Court told our Nation’s colleges and universities that they could consider race in admissions as part of a broader goal to create a diverse student body, in which students of different backgrounds would learn together, and thereby learn to live together. A little more than a decade ago, in Grutter, the Court reaffirmed this understanding. In upholding the admissions policy of the Law School, the Court laid to rest any doubt whether student body diversity is a compelling interest that may justify the use of race.
Race-sensitive admissions policies are now a thing of the past in Michigan after §26, even though—as experts agree and as research shows—those policies were making a difference in achieving educational diversity. In Grutter, Michigan’s Law School spoke candidly about the strides the institution had taken successfully because of race-sensitive admissions. One expert retained by the Law School opined that a race-blind admissions system would have a “very dramatic, negative effect on underrepresented minority admissions.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 320 (inter-nal quotation marks omitted). He testified that the school had admitted 35 percent of underrepresented minority students who had applied in 2000, as opposed to only 10 percent who would have been admitted had race not been considered. Ibid. Underrepresented minority students would thus have constituted 4 percent, as opposed to the actual 14.5 percent, of the class that entered in 2000. Ibid.
Michigan’s public colleges and universities tell us the same today. The Board of Regents of the University of Michigan and the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University inform us that those institutions cannot achieve the benefits of a diverse student body without race-sensitive admissions plans. See Brief for Respondents Regents of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State University et al. 18–25. During proceedings before the lower courts, several university officials testified that §26 would depress minority enrollment at Michigan’s public universities. The Director of Undergraduate Admissions at the University of Michigan “expressed doubts over the ability to maintain minority enrollment through the use of a proxy, like socioeconomic status.” Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 285a. He explained that university officials in States with laws similar to §26 had not “ ‘achieve[d] the same sort of racial and ethnic diversity that they had prior to such measures . . . without considering race.’ ” Ibid. Similarly, the Law School’s Dean of Admissions testified that she expected “a decline in minority admissions because, in her view, it is impossible ‘to get a critical mass of underrepresented minorities . . . without considering race.’ ” Ibid. And the Dean of Wayne State University Law School stated that “although some creative approaches might mitigate the effects of [§26], he ‘did not think that any one of these proposals or any combination of these proposals was reasonably likely to result in the admission of a class that had the same or similar or higher numbers of African Americans, Latinos and Native Americans as the prior policy.’ ” Ibid.
Michigan tells a different story. It asserts that although the statistics are difficult to track, “the number of underrepresented minorities . . . [in] the entering freshman class at Michigan as a percentage changed very little” after §26. Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. It also claims that “the statistics in California across the 17 campuses in the University of California system show that today the underrepresented minority percentage is better on 16 out of those 17 campuses”—all except Berkeley—than before California’s equivalent initiative took effect. Id., at 16. As it turns out, these statistics weren’t “ ‘even good enough to be wrong.’ ” Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 4 (2d ed. 2000) (Introduction by Stephen G. Breyer (quoting Wolfgang Pauli)).
Section 26 has already led to decreased minority enrollment at Michigan’s public colleges and universities. In 2006 (before §26 took effect), underrepresented minorities made up 12.15 percent of the University of Michigan’s freshman class, compared to 9.54 percent in 2012—a roughly 25 percent decline. See University of Michigan—New Freshman Enrollment Overview, Office of the Registrar, online at http://www.ro.umich.edu/report/10enrolloverview.pdf and http://www.ro.umich.edu/report/12enrollmentsummary.pdf.[16
] Moreover, the total number of college-aged underrepresented minorities in Michigan has increased even as the number of underrepresented minorities admitted to the University has decreased. For example, between 2006 and 2011, the proportion of black freshmen among those enrolled at the University of Michigan declined from 7 percent to 5 percent, even though the proportion of black college-aged persons in Michigan increased from 16 to 19 percent. See Fessenden and Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with Affirmative Action Bans, N. Y. Times, June 24, 2013, online at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative-action-bans.html.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
A recent study also confirms that §26 has decreased minority degree attainment in Michigan. The University of Michigan’s graduating class of 2012, the first admitted after §26 took effect, is quite different from previous classes. The proportion of black students among those attaining bachelor’s degrees was 4.4 percent, the lowest since 1991; the proportion of black students among those attaining master’s degrees was 5.1 percent, the lowest since 1989; the proportion of black students among those attaining doctoral degrees was 3.9 percent, the lowest since 1993; and the proportion of black students among those attaining professional school degrees was 3.5 percent, the lowest since the mid-1970’s. See Kidder, Restructuring Higher Education Opportunity?: African American Degree Attainment After Michigan’s Ban on Affirmative Action, p. 1 (Aug. 2013), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=2318523.
The President and Chancellors of the University of California (which has 10 campuses, not 17) inform us that “[t]he abandonment of race-conscious admissions policies resulted in an immediate and precipitous decline in the rates at which underrepresented-minority students applied to, were admitted to, and enrolled at” the university. Brief for President and Chancellors of the University of California as Amici Curiae 10 (hereinafter President and Chancellors Brief). At the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), for example, admission rates for underrepresented minorities plummeted from 52.4 percent in 1995 (before California’s ban took effect) to 24 percentin 1998. Id., at 12. As a result, the percentage of underrepresented minorities fell by more than half: from 30.1 percent of the entering class in 1995 to 14.3 percent in 1998. Ibid. The admissions rate for underrepresented minorities at UCLA reached a new low of 13.6 percent in 2012. See Brief for California Social Science Researchers and Admissions Experts as Amici Curiae 28.
The elimination of race-sensitive admissions policies in California has been especially harmful to black students. In 2006, for example, there were fewer than 100 black students in UCLA’s incoming class of roughly 5,000, the lowest number since at least 1973. See id., at 24.
The University of California also saw declines in minor-ity representation at its graduate programs and professional schools. In 2005, underrepresented minorities made up 17 percent of the university’s new medical students, which is actually a lower rate than the 17.4 percent reported in 1975, three years before Bakke. President and Chancellors Brief 13. The numbers at the law schools are even more alarming. In 2005, underrepresented minorities made up 12 percent of entering law students, well below the 20.1 percent in 1975. Id., at 14.
As in Michigan, the declines in minority representation at the University of California have come even as the minority population in California has increased. At UCLA, for example, the proportion of Hispanic freshmen among those enrolled declined from 23 percent in 1995 to 17 percent in 2011, even though the proportion of Hispanic college-aged persons in California increased from 41 percent to 49 percent during that same period. See Fessenden and Keller.
And the proportion of black freshmen among those enrolled at UCLA declined from 8 percent in 1995 to 3 percent in 2011, even though the proportion of blackcollege-aged persons in California increased from 8 percent to 9 percent during that same period. See ibid.
While the minority admissions rates at UCLA and Berkeley have decreased, the number of minorities enrolled at colleges across the county has increased. See Phillips, Colleges Straining to Restore Diversity: Bans on Race-Conscious Admissions Upend Racial Makeup at California Schools, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 7, 2014,p. A3.
BERKELEY AND UCLA[20
The President and Chancellors assure us that they have tried. They tell us that notwithstanding the university’s efforts for the past 15 years “to increase diversity on [the University of California’s] campuses through the use of race-neutral initiatives,” enrollment rates have “not rebounded . . . [or] kept pace with the demographic changes among California’s graduating high-school population.” President and Chancellors Brief 14. Since Proposition 209 took effect, the university has spent over a half-billion dollars on programs and policies designed to increase diversity. Phillips, supra, at A3. Still, it has been unable to meet its diversity goals. Ibid. Proposition 209, it says, has “ ‘completely changed the character’ of the university.” Ibid. (quoting the Associate President and Chief Policy Advisor of the University of California).
These statistics may not influence the views of some of my colleagues, as they question the wisdom of adopting race-sensitive admissions policies and would prefer if our Nation’s colleges and universities were to discard those policies altogether. See ante, at 2 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (suggesting that race-sensitive admissions policies might “do more harm than good”); ante, at 9, n. 6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 371–373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 347–348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That view is at odds with our recognition in Grutter, and more recently in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U. S. ___ (2013), that race-sensitive admissions policies are necessary to achieve a diverse student body when race-neutral alternatives have failed. More fundamentally, it ignores the importance of diversity in institutions of higher education and reveals how little my colleagues understand about the reality of race in America.
This Court has recognized that diversity in education is paramount. With good reason. Diversity ensures that the next generation moves beyond the stereotypes, the assumptions, and the superficial perceptions that students coming from less-heterogeneous communities may harbor, consciously or not, about people who do not look like them. Recognizing the need for diversity acknowledges that, “[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 333. And it acknowledges that “to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.” Id., at 332.
Colleges and universities must be free to prioritize the goal of diversity. They must be free to immerse their students in a multiracial environment that fosters frequent and meaningful interactions with students of other races, and thereby pushes such students to transcend any assumptions they may hold on the basis of skin color. Without race-sensitive admissions policies, this might well be impossible. The statistics I have described make that fact glaringly obvious. We should not turn a blind eye to something we cannot help but see.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the virtues of adopting race-sensitive admissions policies should inform the legal question before the Court today regarding the constitutionality of §26. But I cannot ignore the unfortunate outcome of today’s decision: Short of amending the State Constitution, a Herculean task, racial minorities in Michigan are deprived of even an opportunity to convince Michigan’s public colleges and universities to consider race in their admissions plans when other attempts to achieve racial diversity have proved unworkable, and those institutions are unnecessarily hobbled in their pursuit of a diverse student body.
* * *
The Constitution does not protect racial minorities from political defeat. But neither does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers against racial minorities. The political-process doctrine polices the channels of change to ensure that the majority, when it wins, does so without rigging the rules of the game to ensure its success. Today, the Court discards that doctrine without good reason.
In doing so, it permits the decision of a majority of the voters in Michigan to strip Michigan’s elected university boards of their authority to make decisions with respect to constitutionally permissible race-sensitive admissions policies, while preserving the boards’ plenary authority to make all other educational decisions. “In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary’s special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that are relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court abdicates that role, permitting the majority to use its numerical advantage to change the rules mid-contest and forever stack the deck against racial minorities in Michigan. The result is that Michigan’s public colleges and universities are less equipped to do their part in ensuring that students of all races are “better prepare[d] . . . for an increasingly diverse workforce and society . . .” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Today’s decision eviscerates an important strand of our equal protection jurisprudence. For members of historically marginalized groups, which rely on the federal courts to protect their constitutional rights, the decision can hardly bolster hope for a vision of democracy that preserves for all the right to participate meaningfully and equally in self-government.
I respectfully dissent.