SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–682
_________________
BILL SCHUETTE, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHI-GAN,
PETITIONER v. COALITION TO DEFEND AF-FIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION
AND IMMI-GRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITYBY ANY MEANS NECESSARY
(BAMN), et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[April 22, 2014]
Justice Sotomayor,
with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
We are fortunate to
live in a democratic society. But without checks, democratically
approved legislation can oppress minority groups. For that reason,
our Constitution places limits on what a majority of the people may
do. This case implicates one such limit: the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws. Although that guarantee is traditionally
understood to prohibit intentional discrimination under existing
laws, equal protection does not end there. Another fundamental
strand of our equal protection jurisprudence focuses on process,
securing to all citizens the right to participate meaningfully and
equally in self-government. That right is the bedrock of our
democracy, for it preserves all other rights.
Yet to know the history
of our Nation is to understand its long and lamentable record of
stymieing the right of racial minorities to participate in the
political process. At first, the majority acted with an open,
invidious purpose. Notwithstanding the command of the Fifteenth
Amendment, certain States shut racial minorities out of the
political process altogether by withholding the right to vote. This
Court intervened to preserve that right. The majority tried again,
replacing outright bans on voting with literacy tests, good
character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering. The Court
was not fooled; it invalidated those measures, too. The majority
persisted. This time, although it allowed the minority access to
the political process, the majority changed the ground rules of the
process so as to make it more difficult for the minority, and the
minority alone, to obtain policies designed to foster racial
integration. Although these political restructurings may not have
been discriminatory in purpose, the Court reaffirmed the right of
minority members of our society to participate meaningfully and
equally in the political process.
This case involves this
last chapter of discrimination: A majority of the Michigan
electorate changed the basic rules of the political process in that
State in a manner that uniquely disadvantaged racial
minorities.[
1] Prior to the
enactment of the constitutional initiative at issue here,all of the
admissions policies of Michigan’s public colleges and
universities—including race-sensitive admissions
poli-cies[
2]—were in the
hands of each institution’s governing board. The members of
those boards are nominated by political parties and elected by the
citizenry in statewide elections. After over a century of being
shut out of Michigan’s institutions of higher education,
racial minorities in Michigan had succeeded in persuading the
elected board representatives to adopt admissions policies that
took into account the benefits of racial diversity. And this Court
twice blessed such efforts—first in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978) , and again in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003) , a case that itself concerned
a Michigan admissions policy.
In the wake of Grutter,
some voters in Michigan set out to eliminate the use of
race-sensitive admissions policies. Those voters were of course
free to pursue this end in any number of ways. For example, they
could have persuaded existing board members to change their minds
through individual or grassroots lobbying efforts, or through
general public awareness campaigns. Or they could have mobilized
efforts to vote uncooperative board members out of office,
replacing them with members who would share their desire to abolish
race-sensitive admissions policies. When this Court holds that the
Constitution permits a particular policy, nothing prevents a
majority of a State’s voters from choosing not to adopt that
policy. Our system of government encourages—and indeed,
depends on—that type of democratic action.
But instead, the
majority of Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the
game, reconfiguring the existing political process in Michigan in a
manner that burdened racial minorities. They did so in the 2006
election by amending the Michigan Constitution to enact Art. I,
§26, which provides in relevant part that Michigan’s
public universities “shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public
contracting.”
As a result of
§26, there are now two very different processes through which
a Michigan citizen is permitted to influence the admissions
policies of the State’s universities: one for persons
interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for
everyone else. A citizen who is a University of Michigan alumnus,
for instance, can advocate for an admissions policy that considers
an applicant’s legacy status by meeting individually with
members of the Board of Regents to convince them of her views, by
joining with other legacy parents to lobby the Board, or by voting
for and supporting Board candidates who share her position. The
same options are available to a citizen who wants the Board to
adopt admissions policies that consider athleticism, geography,
area of study, and so on. The one and only policy a Michigan
citizen may not seek through this long-established process is a
race-sensitive admissions policy that considers race in an
individualized manner when it is clear that race-neutral
alternatives are not adequate to achieve diversity. For that policy
alone, the citizens of Michigan must undertake the daunting task of
amending the State Constitution.
Our precedents do not
permit political restructurings that create one process for racial
minorities and a separate, less burdensome process for everyone
else. This Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
tolerate “a political structure that treats all individuals
as equals, yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such
a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups
to achieve beneficial legislation.” Washington v. Seattle
School Dist. No. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 467 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Such restructuring, the Court explained,
“is no more permissible than denying [the minority] the
[right to] vote, on an equal basis with others.” Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 391 (1969) . In those
cases—Hunter and Seattle—the Court recognized what is
now known as the “political-process doctrine”: When the
majority reconfigures the political process in a manner that
burdens only a racial minority, that alteration triggers strict
judicial scrutiny.
Today, disregarding
stare decisis, a majority of the Court effectively discards those
precedents. The plurality does so, it tells us, because the freedom
actually secured by the Constitution is the freedom of
self-government—because the majority of Michigan citizens
“exercised their privilege to enact laws as a basic exercise
of their democratic power.” Ante, at 15. It would be
“demeaning to the democratic process,” the plurality
concludes, to disturb that decision in any way. Ante, at 17. This
logic embraces majority rule without an important constitutional
limit.
The plurality’s
decision fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the injustice
worked by §26. This case is not, as the plurality imagines,
about “who may resolve” the debate over the use of race
in higher education admissions. Ante, at 18. I agree wholeheartedly
that nothing vests the resolution of that debate exclusively in the
courts or requires that we remove it from the reach of the
electorate. Rather, this case is about how the debate over the use
of race-sensitive admissions policies may be resolved, contra,
ibid.—that is, it must be resolved in constitution-ally
permissible ways. While our Constitution does not guarantee
minority groups victory in the political process, it does guarantee
them meaningful and equal access to that process. It guarantees
that the majority may not win by stacking the political process
against minority groups permanently, forcing the minority alone to
surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals—here,
educational diversity that cannot reasonably be accomplished
through race-neutral measures. Today, by permitting a majority of
the voters in Michigan to do what our Constitution forbids, the
Court ends the debate over race-sensitive admissions policies in
Michigan in a manner that contravenes constitutional protections
long recognized in our precedents.
Like the plurality, I
have faith that our citizenry will continue to learn from this
Nation’s regrettable history; that it will strive to move
beyond those injustices towards a future of equality. And I, too,
believe in the importance of public discourse on matters of public
policy. But I part ways with the plurality when it suggests that
judicial intervention in this case “impede[s]” rather
than “advance[s]” the democratic process and the
ultimate hope of equality. Ante, at 16. I firmly believe that our
role as judges includes policing the process of self-government and
stepping in when necessary to secure the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. Because I would do so here, I respectfully
dissent.
I
For much of its
history, our Nation has denied to many of its citizens the right to
participate meaningfully and equally in its politics. This is a
history we strive to put behind us. But it is a history that still
informs the society we live in, and so it is one we must address
with candor. Because the political-process doctrine is best
understood against the backdrop of this history, I will briefly
trace its course.
The Fifteenth
Amendment, ratified after the Civil War, promised to racial
minorities the right to vote. But many States ignored this promise.
In addition to outright tactics of fraud, intimidation, and
violence, there are countless examples of States categorically
denying to racial minorities access to the political process.
Consider Texas; there, a 1923 statute prevented racial minorities
from participating in primary elections. After this Court declared
that statute unconstitutional, Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536
–541 (1927), Texas responded by changing the rules. It
enacted a new statute that gave political parties themselves the
right to determine who could participate in their primaries.
Predictably, the Democratic Party specified that only white
Democrats could participate in its primaries. Nixon v. Condon, 286
U. S. 73 –82 (1932). The Court invalidated that scheme,
too. Id., at 89; see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649
(1944) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) .
Some States were less
direct. Oklahoma was one of many that required all voters to pass a
literacy test. But the test did not apply equally to all voters.
Under a “grandfather clause,” voters were exempt if
their grand-fathers had been voters or had served as soldiers
before 1866. This meant, of course, that black voters had to pass
the test, but many white voters did not. The Court held the scheme
unconstitutional. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915)
. In response, Oklahoma changed the rules. It enacted a new statute
under which all voters who were qualified to vote in 1914 (under
the unconstitutional grandfather clause) remained qualified, and
the remaining voters had to apply for registration within a 12-day
period. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 –271 (1939). The
Court struck down that statute as well. Id., at 275.
Racial minorities were
occasionally able to surmount the hurdles to their political
participation. Indeed, in some States, minority citizens were even
able to win elective office. But just as many States responded to
the Fifteenth Amendment by subverting minorities’ access to
the polls, many States responded to the prospect of elected
minority officials by undermining the ability of minorities to win
and hold elective office. Some States blatantly removed black
officials from local offices. See, e.g., H. Rabinowitz, Race
Relations in the Urban South, 1865–1890, pp. 267,
269–270 (1978) (describing events in Tennessee and Virginia).
Others changed the processes by which local officials were elected.
See, e.g., Extension of the Voting Rights Act, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp.
2016–2017 (1981) (hereinafter 1981 Hearings) (statement of
Professor J. Morgan Kousser) (after a black judge refused to resign
in Alabama, the legislature abolished the court on which he served
and replaced it with one whose judges were appointed by the
Governor); Rabinowitz, supra, at 269–270 (the North Carolina
Legislature divested voters ofthe right to elect justices of the
peace and county commissioners, then arrogated to itself the
authority to select justices of the peace and gave them the power
to select commissioners).
This Court did not
stand idly by. In Alabama, for example, the legislature responded
to increased black voter registration in the city of Tuskegee by
amending the State Constitution to authorize legislative abolition
of the county in which Tuskegee was located, Ala. Const. Amdt. 132
(1957), repealed by Ala. Const. Amdt. 406 (1982), and by redrawing
the city’s boundaries to remove all the black voters
“while not removing a single white voter,” Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960) . The Court intervened,
finding it “inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
Constitution” could be “manipulated out of
existence” by being “cloaked in the garb of [political]
realignment.” Id., at 345 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
This Court’s
landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954) , triggered a new era of political restructuring, this time
in the context of education. In Virginia, the General Assembly
transferred control of student assignment from local school
districts to a State Pupil Placement Board. See B. Muse,
Virginia’s Massive Resistance 34, 74 (1961). And when the
legislature learned that the Arlington County school board had
prepared a desegregation plan, the General Assembly “swiftly
retaliated” by stripping the county of its right to elect its
school board by popular vote and instead making the board an
appointed body. Id., at 24; see also B. Smith, They Closed Their
Schools 142–143 (1965).
Other States similarly
disregarded this Court’s mandate by changing their political
process. See, e.g., Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187
F. Supp. 42, 44–45 (ED La. 1960) (the Louisiana
Legislature gave the Governor the authority to supersede any school
board’s decision to integrate); Extension of the Voting
Rights Act, Hearings on H. R. 4249 et al. before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 146–149 (1969) (statement of Thomas E.
Harris, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations) (the Mississippi Legislature
removed from the people the right to elect superintendents of
education in 11 counties and instead made those positions
appointive).
The Court remained true
to its command in Brown. In Arkansas, for example, it enforced a
desegregation order against the Little Rock school board. Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 5 (1958) . On the very day the Court
announced that ruling, the Arkansas Legislature responded by
changing the rules. It enacted a law permitting the Governor to
close any public school in the State, and stripping local school
districts of their decisionmaking authority so long as the Governor
determined that local officials could not maintain
“ ‘a general, suitable, and efficient educational
system.’ ” Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F. 2d 97, 99
(CA8 1958) (per curiam) (quoting Arkansas statute). The
then-Governor immediately closed all of Little Rock’s high
schools. Id., at 99–100; see also S. Breyer, Making Our
Democracy Work 49–67 (2010) (discussing the events in Little
Rock).
The States’
political restructuring efforts in the 1960’s and
1970’s went beyond the context of education. Many States
tried to suppress the political voice of racial minorities more
generally by reconfiguring the manner in which they filled
vacancies in local offices, often transferring authority from the
electorate (where minority citizens had a voice at the local level)
to the States’ executive branch (where minorities wielded
little if any influence). See, e.g., 1981 Hearings, pt. 1, at 815
(report of J. Cox & A. Turner) (the Alabama Legislature changed
all municipal judgeships from elective to appointive offices); id.,
at 1955 (report of R. Hudlin & K. Brimah, Voter Educ. Project,
Inc.) (the Georgia Legislature eliminated some elective offices and
made others appointive when it appeared that a minority candidate
would be victorious); id., at 501 (statement of Frank R. Parker,
Director, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law) (the
Mississippi Legislature changed the manner of filling vacancies for
various public offices from election to appointment).
II
It was in this
historical context that the Court intervened in Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U. S. 385 (1969) , and Washington v. Seattle School Dist.
No. 1, 458 U. S. 457 (1982) . Together, Hunter and Seattle
recognized a fundamental strand of this Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence: the political-process doctrine. To
understand that doctrine fully, it is necessary to set forth in
detail precisely what the Court had before it, and precisely what
it said. For to understand Hunter and Seattle is to understand why
those cases straightforwardly resolve this one.
A
In Hunter, the City
Council of Akron, Ohio, enacted a fair housing ordinance to
“assure equal opportunity to all persons to live in decent
housing facilities regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry,
or national origin.” 393 U. S., at 386 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A majority of the citizens of Akron
disagreed with the ordinance and overturned it. But the majority
did not stop there; it also amended the city charter to prevent the
City Council from implementing any future ordinance dealing with
racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without
the approval of the majority of the Akron electorate. Ibid. That
amendment changed the rules of the political process in Akron. The
Court described the result of the change as follows:
“[T]o enact an ordinance barring
housing discrimination on the basis of race or religion, proponents
had to obtain the approval of the City Council and of a majority of
the voters citywide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing
discrimination on other grounds, or to enact any other type of
housing ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the City
Council.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 468 (describing Hunter;
emphasis deleted).
The Court invalidated
the Akron charter amendment under the Equal Protection Clause. It
concluded that the amendment unjustifiably “place[d] special
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental
process,” thus effecting “a real, substantial, and
invidious denial of the equal protection of the laws.”
Hunter, 393 U. S., at 391, 393. The Court characterized the
amendment as “no more permissible” than denying racial
minorities the right to vote on an equal basis with the majority.
Id., at 391. For a “State may no more disadvantage any
particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation
in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give
any group a smaller representation than another of comparable
size.” Id., at 392–393. The vehicle for the
change—a popular referendum—did not move the Court:
“The sovereignty of the people,” it explained,
“is itself subject to . . . constitutional
limitations.” Id., at 392.
Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Stewart, wrote in his concurrence that although a State
can normally allocate political power according to any general
principle, it bears a “far heavier burden of
justification” when it reallocates political power based on
race, because the selective reallocation necessarily makes it far
more difficult for racial minorities to “achieve legislation
that is in their interest.” Id., at 395 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In Seattle, a case that
mirrors the one before us, the Court applied Hunter to invalidate a
statute, enacted by a majority of Washington State’s
citizens, that prohibited racially integrative busing in the wake
of Brown. As early as 1963, Seattle’s School District No. 1
began taking steps to cure the de facto racial segregation in its
schools. 458 U. S., at 460–461. Among other measures, it
enacted a desegregation plan that made extensive use of busing and
mandatory assignments. Id., at 461. The district was under no
obligation to adopt the plan; Brown charged school boards with a
duty to integrate schools that were segregated because of
de jure racial discrimination, but there had been no finding
that the de facto segregation in Seattle’s schools was the
product of de jure discrimination. 458 U. S., at 472,
n. 15. Several residents who opposed the desegregation efforts
formed a committee and sued to enjoin implementation of the plan.
Id., at 461. When these efforts failed, the committee sought to
change the rules of the political process. It drafted a statewide
initiative “designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing
for purposes of racial integration.” Id., at 462. A major-ity
of the State’s citizens approved the initiative. Id., at
463–464.
The Court invalidated
the initiative under the Equal Protection Clause. It began by
observing that equal protection of the laws “guarantees
racial minorities the right to full participation in the political
life of the community.” Id., at 467. “It is beyond
dispute,” the Court explained, “that given racial or
ethnic groups may not be denied the franchise, or precluded from
entering into the political process in a reliable and meaningful
manner.” Ibid. But the Equal Protection Clause reaches
further, the Court stated, reaffirming the principle espoused in
Hunter—that while “laws structuring political
institutions or allocating political power according to neutral
principles” do not violate the Constitution, “a
different analysis is required when the State allocates
governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial
nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking
process.” 458 U. S., at 470. That kind of state action,
it observed, “places special burdens on racial minorities
within the governmental process,” by making it “more
difficult for certain racial and religious minorities” than
for other members of the community “to achieve legislation
. . . in their interest.” Ibid.
Rejecting the argument
that the initiative had no racial focus, the Court found that the
desegregation of public schools, like the Akron housing ordinance,
“inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the minority, and [was]
designed for that purpose.” Id., at 472. Because minorities
had good reason to “consider busing for integration to be
‘legislation that is in their interest,’ ”
the Court concluded that the “racial focus of [the
initiative] . . . suffice[d] to trigger application of
the Hunter doctrine.” Id., at 474 (quoting Hunter, 393
U. S., at 395) (Harlan, J. concurring)).
The Court next
concluded that “the practical effect of [the initiative was]
to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned in
Hunter.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 474. It explained:
“Those favoring the elimination of de facto school
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature, or
from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all other student
assignment decisions, as well as over most other areas of
educational policy, remains vested in the local school
board.” Ibid. Thus, the initiative required those in favor of
racial integration in public schools to “surmount a
considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable
legislative action” in different contexts. Ibid.
The Court reaffirmed
that the “ ‘simple repeal or modification of
desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has
been viewed as embodying a presump-tively invalid racial
classification.’ ” Id., at 483 (quoting Crawford
v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527, 539 (1982) ).
But because the initiative burdened future attempts to integrate by
lodging the decisionmaking authority at a “new and remote
level of government,” it was more than a “mere
repeal”; it was an unconstitutionally discriminatory change
to the political process.[
3]
Seattle, 458 U. S., at 483–484.
B
Hunter and Seattle
vindicated a principle that is as elementary to our equal
protection jurisprudence as it is essential: The majority may not
suppress the minority’s right to participate on equal terms
in the political process. Under this doctrine, governmental action
deprives minor-ity groups of equal protection when it (1) has
a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that “inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority,” Seattle, 458
U. S., at 472; and (2) alters the political process in a
manner that uniquely burdens racial minorities’ ability to
achieve their goals through that process. A faithful application of
the doctrine resoundingly resolves this case in respondents’
favor.
1
Section 26 has a
“racial focus.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at 474. That
is clear from its text, which prohibits Michigan’s public
colleges and universities from “grant[ing] preferential
treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race.”
Mich. Const., Art. I, §26. Like desegregation of public
schools, race-sensitive admissions policies “inur[e]
primarily to the benefit of the minority,” 458 U. S., at
472, as they are designed to increase minorities’ access to
institutions of higher education.[
4]
Petitioner argues that
race-sensitive admissions policies cannot “inur[e] primarily
to the benefit of the minority,” ibid., as the Court has
upheld such policies only insofar as they further “the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,”
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 343. But there is no conflict between
this Court’s pronouncement in Grutter and the common-sense
reality that race-sensitive admissions policies benefit minorities.
Rather, race-sensitive admissions policies further a compelling
state interest in achieving a diverse student body precisely
because they increase minority enrollment, which necessarily
benefits minority groups. In other words, constitutionally
permissible race-sensitive admissions policies can both serve the
compelling interest of obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body, and inure to the benefit of racial
minorities. There is nothing mutually exclusive about the two. Cf.
Seattle, 458 U. S., at 472 (concluding that the desegregation
plan had a racial focus even though “white as well as Negro
children bene-fit from exposure to ‘ethnic and racial
diversity in the classroom’ ”).
It is worth
emphasizing, moreover, that §26 is relevant only to admissions
policies that have survived strict scrutiny under Grutter; other
policies, under this Court’s rulings, would be forbidden with
or without §26. A Grutter-compliant admissions policy must use
race flexibly, not maintain a quota; must be limited in time; and
must be employed only after “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives,” 539
U. S., at 339. The policies banned by §26 meet all these
requirements and thus already constitute the least restrictive ways
to advance Michigan’s compelling interest in diversity in
higher education.
2
Section 26
restructures the political process in Michigan in a manner that
places unique burdens on racial minorities. It establishes a
distinct and more burdensome political process for the enactment of
admissions plans that consider racial diversity.
Long before the
enactment of §26, the Michigan Constitution granted plenary
authority over all matters relating to Michigan’s public
universities, including admissions criteria, to each
university’s eight-member governing board. See Mich. Const.,
Art. VIII, §5 (establishing the Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State
University, and the Board of Governors of Wayne State University).
The boards have the “power to enact ordinances, by-laws and
regulations for the government of the university.” Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §390.5 (West 2010); see also §390.3
(“The government of the university is vested in the board of
regents”). They are “ ‘constitutional
corporation[s] of independent authority, which, within the scope of
[their] functions, [are] co-ordinate with and equal to
. . . the legislature.’ ” Federated
Publications, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Mich. State Univ., 460
Mich. 75, 84, n. 8, 594 N. W. 2d 491, 496, n. 8
(1999).
The boards are
indisputably a part of the political process in Michigan. Each
political party nominates two candidates for membership to each
board, and board members are elected to 8-year terms in the general
statewide election. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§168.282,
168.286 (West 2008); Mich. Const., Art. VIII, §5. Prior to
§26, board candidates frequently included their views on
race-sensitive admissions in their campaigns. For example, in 2005,
one candidate pledged to “work to end so-called
‘Affirmative-Action,’ a racist, degrading
system.” See League of Women Voters, 2005 General Election
Voter Guide, online at http://www.lwvka.org/guide04/regents/html
(all Internet materials as visited Apr. 18, 2014, and available in
Clerk of Court’s case file); see also George, U-M Regents
Race Tests Policy, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 26, 2000, p. 2B (noting
that one candidate “opposes affirmative action admissions
policies” because they “ ‘basically sa[y]
minority students are not qualified’ ”).
Before the enactment of
§26, Michigan’s political structure permitted both
supporters and opponents of race-sensitive admissions policies to
vote for their candidates of choice and to lobby the elected and
politically accountable boards. Section 26 reconfigured that
structure. After §26, the boards retain plenary authority over
all admissions criteria except for race-sensitive admissions
policies.[
5] To change
admissions policies on this one issue, a Michigan citizen must
instead amend the Michigan Constitution. That is no small task. To
place a proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot requires
either the support of two-thirds of both Houses of the Michigan
Legislature or a vast number of signatures from Michigan
voters—10 percent of the total number of votes cast in the
preceding gubernatorial election. See Mich. Const., Art. XII,
§§1, 2. Since more than 3.2 million votes were cast in
the 2010 election for Governor, more than 320,000 signatures are
currently needed to win a ballot spot. See Brief for Gary Segura
et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (hereinafter Segura Brief). Moreover,
“[t]o account for invalid and duplicative signatures,
initiative sponsors ‘need to obtain substantially more than
the actual required number of signatures, typically by a 25% to 50%
margin.’ ” Id., at 10 (quoting Tolbert,
Lowenstein, & Donovan, Election Law and Rules for Using
Initiatives, in Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the
United States 27, 37 (S. Bowler, T. Donovan, & C. Tolbert eds.,
1998)).
And the costs of
qualifying an amendment are significant. For example, “[t]he
vast majority of petition efforts . . . require
initiative sponsors to hire paid petition circulators, at
significant expense.” Segura Brief 10; see also T. Donovan,
C. Mooney, & D. Smith, State and Local Politics: Institutions
and Reform 96 (2012) (hereinafter Donovan) (“In many states,
it is difficult to place a measure on the ballot unless
professional petition firms are paid to collect some or all the
signatures required for qualification”); Tolbert, supra, at
35 (“ ‘Qualifying an initiative for the statewide
ballot is . . . no longer so much a measure of general citizen
interest as it is a test of fundraising
ability’ ”). In addition to the cost of collecting
signatures, campaigning for a majority of votes is an expensive
endeavor, and “organizations advocating on behalf of
marginalized groups remain . . . outmoneyed by corporate,
business, and professional organizations.” Strolovitch &
Forrest, Social and Economic Justice Movements and Organizations,
in The Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest
Groups 468, 471 (L. Maisel & J. Berry eds., 2010). In 2008, for
instance, over $800 million was spent nationally on state-level
initiative and referendum campaigns, nearly $300 million more than
was spent in the 2006 cycle. Donovan 98. “In several states,
more money [is] spent on ballot initiative campaigns than for all
other races for political office combined.” Ibid. Indeed, the
amount spent on state-level initiative and referendum campaigns in
2008 eclipsed the $740.6 million spent by President Obama in his
2008 presidential campaign, Salant, Spending Doubled as Obama Led
Billion-Dollar Campaign, Bloomberg News, Dec. 27, 2008, online at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anLDS9WWPQW8.
Michigan’s
Constitution has only rarely been amended through the initiative
process. Between 1914 and 2000, voters have placed only 60
statewide initiatives on the Michigan ballot, of which only 20 have
passed. See Segura Brief 12. Minority groups face an especially
uphill battle. See Donovan 106 (“[O]n issues dealing with
racial and ethnic matters, studies show that racial and ethnic
minorities do end up more on the losing side of the popular
vote”). In fact, “[i]t is difficult to find even a
single statewide initiative in any State in which voters approved
policies that explicitly favor racial or ethnic minority
groups.”[
6] Segura Brief
13.
This is the onerous
task that §26 forces a Michigan citizen to complete in order
to change the admissions policies of Michigan’s public
colleges and universities with respect to racial sensitivity. While
substantially less grueling paths remain open to those advocating
for any other admissions policies, a constitutional amendment is
the only avenue by which race-sensitive admissions policies may be
obtained. The effect of §26 is that a white graduate of a
public Michigan university who wishes to pass his historical
privilege on to his children may freely lobby the board of that
university in favor of an expanded legacy admissions policy,
whereas a black Michigander who was denied the opportunity to
attend that very university cannot lobby the board in favor of a
policy that might give his children a chance that he never had and
that they might never have absent that policy.
Such reordering of the
political process contravenes Hunter and Seattle.[
7] See Seattle, 458 U. S., at 467 (the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits “ ‘a political
structure that treats all individuals as equals,’ yet more
subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve
beneficial legislation” (citation omitted)). Where, as here,
the majority alters the political process to the detriment of a
racial minority, the governmental action is subject to strict
scrutiny. See id., at 485, n. 28. Michigan does not assert
that §26 satisfies a compelling state interest. That should
settle the matter.
C
1
The plurality sees it
differently. Disregarding the language used in Hunter, the
plurality asks us to contort that case into one that “rests
on the unremarkable principle that the State may not alter the
procedures of government to target racial minorities.” Ante,
at 8. And the plurality recasts Seattle “as a case in which
the state action in question . . . had the serious risk,
if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of
race.” Ante, at 8–9. According to the plurality, the
Hunter and Seattle Courts were not concerned with efforts to
reconfigure the political process to the detriment of racial
minorities; rather, those cases invalidated governmental actions
merely because they reflected an invidious purpose to discriminate.
This is not a tenable reading of those cases.
The plurality
identifies “invidious discrimination” as the
“necessary result” of the restructuring in Hunter.
Ante, at 8. It is impossible to assess whether the housing
amendment in Hunter was motivated by discriminatory purpose, for
the opinion does not discuss the question of intent.[
8] What is obvious, however, is that the
possibility of invidious discrimination played no role in the
Court’s reasoning. We ordinarily understand our precedents to
mean what they actually say, not what we later think they could or
should have said. The Hunter Court was clear about why it
invalidated the Akron charter amendment: It was impermissible as a
restructuring of the political process, not as an action motivated
by discriminatory intent. See 393 U. S., at 391 (striking down
the Akron charter amendment because it “places a special
burden on racial minorities within the governmental
process”).
Similarly, the
plurality disregards what Seattle actually says and instead opines
that “the political restriction in question was designed to
be used, or was likely to be used, to encourage infliction of
injury by reason of race.” Ante, at 17. Here, the plurality
derives its conclusion not from Seattle itself, but from evidence
unearthed more than a quarter-century later in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701
(2007) : “Although there had been no judicial finding of
de jure segregation with respect to Seattle’s school
district, it appears as though school desegregation in the district
in the 1940’s and 1950’s may have been the partial
result of school board policies that ‘permitted white
students to transfer out of black schools while restricting the
transfer of black students into white
schools.’ ”[
9]
Ante, at 9 (quoting Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 807–808
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It follows, according to
the plurality, that Seattle’s desegregation plan was
constitutionally required, so that the initiative halting the plan
was an instance of invidious discrimination aimed at inflicting a
racial injury.
Again, the plurality
might prefer that the Seattle Court had said that, but it plainly
did not. Not once did the Court suggest the presence of
de jure segregation in Seattle. Quite the opposite: The
opinion explicitly suggested the desegregation plan was adopted to
remedy de facto rather than de jure segregation. See 458
U. S., at 472, n. 15 (referring to the
“absen[ce]” of “a finding of prior de jure
segregation”). The Court, moreover, assumed that no
“constitutional violation” through de jure
segregation had occurred. Id., at 474. And it unmistakably rested
its decision on Hunter, holding Seattle’s initiative invalid
because it “use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define
the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d]
substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.” 458
U. S., at 470.
It is nothing short of
baffling, then, for the plurality to insist—in the face of
clear language in Hunter and Seattle saying otherwise—that
those cases were about nothing more than the intentional and
invidious infliction of a racial injury. Ante, at 8 (describing the
injury in Hunter as “a demonstrated injury on the basis of
race”); ante, at 8–9 (describing the injury in Seattle
as an “injur[y] on account of race”). The
plurality’s attempt to rewrite Hunter and Seattle so as to
cast aside the political-process doctrine sub silentio is
impermissible as a matter of stare decisis. Under the doctrine of
stare decisis, we usually stand by our decisions, even if we
disagree with them, because people rely on what we say, and they
believe they can take us at our word.
And what now of the
political-process doctrine? After the plurality’s revision of
Hunter and Seattle, it is unclear what is left. The plurality
certainly does not tell us. On this point, and this point only, I
agree with Justice Scalia that the plurality has rewritten those
precedents beyond recognition. See ante, at 5–7 (opinion
concurring in judgment).
2
Justice Breyer
concludes that Hunter and Seattle do not apply. Section 26, he
reasons, did not move the relevant decisionmaking authority from
one political level to another; rather, it removed that authority
from “unelected actors and placed it in the hands of the
voters.” Ante, at 5 (opinion concurring in judgment). He
bases this conclusion on the premise that Michigan’s elected
boards “delegated admissions-related decisionmaking authority
to unelected university faculty members and administrators.”
Ibid. But this premise is simply incorrect.
For one thing, it is
undeniable that prior to §26, board candidates often pledged
to end or carry on the use of race-sensitive admissions policies at
Michigan’s public universities. See supra, at 18. Surely
those were not empty promises. Indeed, the issue of race-sensitive
admissions policies often dominated board elections. See, e.g.,
George, Detroit Free Press, at 2B (observing that “[t]he race
for the University of Michigan Board of Regents could determine . .
. the future of [the University’s] affirmative action
policies”); Kosseff, UM Policy May Hang On Election,
Crain’s Detroit Business, Sept. 18, 2000, p. 1 (noting
that an upcoming election could determine whether the University
would continue to defend its affirmative action policies);
University of Michigan’s Admissions Policy Still an Issue for
Regents’ Election, Black Issues in Higher Education, Oct. 21,
2004, p. 17 (commenting that although “the Supreme Court
struck down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate
admissions policy as too formulaic,” the issue “remains
an important [one] to several peo-ple running” in an upcoming
election for the Board of Regents).
Moreover, a careful
examination of the boards and their governing structure reveals
that they remain actively involved in setting admissions policies
and procedures. Take Wayne State University, for example. Its Board
of Governors has enacted university statutes that govern the
day-to-day running of the institution. See Wayne State Univ. Stat.,
online at http://bog.wayne.edu/code. A number of those statutes
establish general admissions procedures, see §2.34.09
(establishing undergraduate admissions procedures); §2.34.12
(establishing graduate admissions procedures), and some set out
more specific instructions for university officials, see, e.g.,
§2.34.09.030 (“Admissions decisions will be based on a
full evaluation of each student’s academic record, and on
empirical data reflecting the characteristics of students who have
successfully graduated from [the university] within the four years
prior to the year in which the student applies”);
§§2.34.12.080, 2.34.12.090 (setting the requisite grade
point average for graduate applicants).
The Board of Governors
does give primary responsibility over day-to-day admissions matters
to the university’s President. §2.34.09.080. But the
President is “elected by and answerable to the Board.”
Brief for Respondent Board of Governors of Wayne State University
et al. 15. And while university officials and faculty members
“serv[e] an important advisory role in recommending
educational policy,” id., at 14, the Board alone ultimately
controls educational policy and decides whether to adopt (or
reject) program-specific admissions recommendations. For example,
the Board has voted on recommendations “to revise guidelines
for establishment of honors curricula, including admissions
criteria”; “to modify the honor point criteria for
graduate admission”; and “to modify the maximum number
of transfer credits that the university would allow in certain
cases where articulation agreements rendered modification
appropriate.” Id., at 17; see also id., at 18–20
(providing examples of the Board’s “review[ing] and
pass[ing] upon admissions requirements in the course of voting on
broader issues, such as the implementation of new academic
programs”). The Board also “engages in robust and
regular review of administrative actions involving admissions
policy and related matters.” Id., at 16.
Other public
universities more clearly entrust admissions policy to university
officials. The Board of Regents of the
University of Michigan, for example, gives primary responsibility
for admissions to the Associate Vice Provost, Executive Director of
Undergraduate Admissions, and Directors of Admissions. Bylaws
§8.01, online at http://www.regents.umich.edu/bylaws. And the
Board of Trustees of Michigan State University relies on the
President to make recommendations regarding admissions policies.
Bylaws, Art. 8, online at http://www.trustees.msu.edu/bylaws. But
the bylaws of the Board of Regents and the Board of Trustees
“make clear that all university operations remain subject to
their control.” Brief for Respondents Regents of the
University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State
University et al. 13–14.
The boards retain
ultimate authority to adopt or reject admissions policies in at
least three ways. First, they routinely meet with university
officials to review admissions policies, including race-sensitive
admissions policies. For example, shortly after this Court’s
decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244 (2003) , and
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 306, the President of the University of
Michigan appeared before the University’s Board of Regents to
discuss the impact of those decisions on the University.
SeeProceedings 2003–2004, pp. 10–12 (July 2003),
onlineat http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACW7513.2003.001. Six members
of the Board voiced strong support for the University’s use
of race as a factor in admissions. Id., at 11–12. In June
2004, the President again appeared before the Board to discuss
changes to undergraduate admissions policies. Id., at 301 (June
2004). And in March 2007, the University’s Provost appeared
before the Board of Regents to present strategies to increase
diversity in light of the passage of Proposal 2. Proceedings
2006–2007, pp. 264–265 (Mar. 2007), online at
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/ACW7513.2006.001.
Second, the boards may
enact bylaws with respect to specific admissions policies and may
alter any admissions policies set by university officials. The
Board of Regents may amend any bylaw “at any regular meeting
of the board, or at any special meeting, provided notice is given
to each regent one week in advance.” Bylaws §14.03. And
Michigan State University’s Board of Trustees may,
“[u]pon the recommendation of the President[,]
. . . determine and establish the qualifications of
students for admissions at any level.” Bylaws, Art. 8. The
boards may also permanently remove certain admissions decisions
from university officials.[
10] This authority is not merely theoretical. Between
2008 and 2012, the University of Michigan’s Board of Regents
“revised more than two dozen of its bylaws, two of which fall
within Chapter VIII, the section regulating admissions
practices.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.
Finally, the boards may
appoint university officials who share their admissions goals, and
they may remove those officials if the officials’ goals
diverge from those of the boards. The University of
Michigan’s Board of Regents “directly appoints [the
University’s] Associate Vice Provost and Executive Director
of Undergraduate Admissions,” and Michigan State
University’s Board of Trustees elects that
institution’s President. Brief for Respondents Regents of the
University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan State
University et al. 14.
The salient point is
this: Although the elected and politically accountable boards may
well entrust university officials with certain day-to-day
admissions responsibilities, they often weigh in on admissions
policies themselves and, at all times, they retain complete
supervisory authority over university officials and over all
admissionsdecisions.
There is no question,
then, that the elected boards in Michigan had the power to
eliminate or adopt race-sensitive admissions policies prior to
§26. There is also no question that §26 worked an
impermissible reordering of the political process; it removed that
power from the elected boards and placed it instead at a higher
level of thepolitical process in Michigan. See supra, at
17–22. This case is no different from Hunter and Seattle in
that respect. Just as in Hunter and Seattle, minorities in Michigan
“participated in the political process and won.” Ante,
at 5 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). And just as in Hunter
and Seattle, “the majority’s subsequent reordering of
the political process repealed the minority’s successes and
made it more difficult for the minority to succeed in the
future,” thereby “diminish[ing] the minority’s
ability to participate meaningfully in the electoral
process.” Ibid. There is therefore no need to consider
“extend[ing] the holding of Hunter and Seattle to reach
situations in which decisionmaking authority is moved from an
administrative body to a political one,” ibid. Such a
scenario is not be-fore us.
III
The political-process
doctrine not only resolves this case as a matter of stare decisis;
it is correct as a matter of first principles.
A
Under our
Constitution, majority rule is not without limit. Our system of
government is predicated on an equilibrium between the notion that
a majority of citizens may determine governmental policy through
legislation enacted by their elected representatives, and the
overriding principle that there are nonetheless some things the
Constitution forbids even a majority of citizens to do. The
political-process doctrine, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment,
is a central check on majority rule.
The Fourteenth
Amendment instructs that all who act for the government may not
“deny to any person . . . the equal protection of
the laws.” We often think of equal protection as a guarantee
that the government will apply the law in an equal
fashion—that it will not intentionally discriminate against
minority groups. But equal protection of the laws means more than
that; it also secures the right of all citizens to participate
meaningfully and equally in the process through which laws are
created.
Few rights are as
fundamental as the right to participate meaningfully and equally in
the process of government. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.
356, 370 (1886) (political rights are “fundamental”
because they are “preservative of all rights”). That
right is the bedrock of our democracy, recognized from its very
inception. See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 87 (1980) (the
Constitution “is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand,
with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual
disputes,” and on the other, “with ensuring broad
participation in the processes and distributions of
government”).
This should come as no
surprise. The political process is the channel of change. Id., at
103 (describing the importance of the judiciary in policing the
“channels of political change”). It is the means by
which citizens may both obtain desirable legislation and repeal
undesirable legislation. Of course, we do not expect minority
members of our society to obtain every single result they seek
through the political process—not, at least, when their views
conflict with those of the majority. The minority plainly does not
have a right to prevail over majority groups in any given political
contest. But the minority does have a right to play by the same
rules as the majority. It is this right that Hunter and Seattle so
boldly vindicated.
This right was hardly
novel at the time of Hunter and Seattle. For example, this Court
focused on the vital importance of safeguarding minority
groups’ access to the political process in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938) , a case that
predated Hunter by 30 years. In a now-famous footnote, the Court
explained that while ordinary social and economic legislation
carries a presumption of constitutionality, the same may not be
true of legislation that offends fundamental rights or targets
minority groups. Citing cases involving restrictions on the right
to vote, restraints on the dissemination of information,
interferences with political organizations, and prohibition of
peaceable assembly, the Court recognized that “legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation”
could be worthy of “more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation.” Id., at 152, n. 4; see also
Ely, supra, at 76 (explaining that “[p]aragraph two [of
Carolene Products footnote 4] suggests that it is an appropriate
function of the Court to keep the machinery of democratic
government running as it should, to make sure the channels of
political participation and communication are kept open”).
The Court also noted that “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-cesses
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more search-ing judicial inquiry.”
Carolene Products, 304 U. S., at 153, n. 4, see also Ely,
supra, at 76 (explaining that “[p]aragraph three [of Carolene
Products footnote 4] suggests that the Court should also concern
itself with what majorities do to minorities, particularly
mentioning laws ‘directed at’ religious, national and
racial minorities and those infected by prejudice against
them”).
The values identified
in Carolene Products lie at the heart of the political-process
doctrine. Indeed, Seattle explicitly relied on Carolene Products.
See 458 U. S., at 486 (“[W]hen the State’s
allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial
groups to enact legisla-tion specifically designed to overcome the
‘special condition’ of prejudice, the governmental
action seriously‘curtail[s] the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities’ ” (quoting Carolene Products, 304
U. S., at 153, n. 4)). These values are central tenets of
our equal protection jurisprudence.
Our cases recognize at
least three features of the right to meaningful participation in
the political process. Two of them, thankfully, are
uncontroversial. First, every eligible citizen has a right to vote.
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 639 (1993) . This, woefully,
has not always been the case. But it is a right no one would take
issue with today. Second, the majority may not make it more
difficult for the minority to exercise the right to vote. This,
too, is widely accepted. After all, the Court has invalidated
grandfather clauses, good character requirements, poll taxes, and
gerrymandering provisions.[
11] The third feature, the one the plurality dismantles
today, is that a majority may not reconfigure the existing
political process in a manner that creates a two-tiered system of
political change, subjecting laws designed to protect or benefit
discrete and insular minorities to a more burdensome political
process than all other laws. This is the political-process doctrine
of Hunter and Seattle.
My colleagues would
stop at the second. The plurality embraces the freedom of
“self-government” without limits. See ante, at 13. And
Justice Scalia values a “near-limitless” notion of
state sovereignty. See ante, at 13 (opinion concurring in
judgment). The wrong sought to be corrected by the
political-process doctrine, they say, is not one that should
concern us and is in any event beyond the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As they see it, the Court’s role in protecting the
political process ends once we have removed certain barriers to the
minority’s participation in that process. Then, they say, we
must sit back and let the majority rule without the key
constitutional limit recognized in Hunter and Seattle.
That view drains the
Fourteenth Amendment of one of its core teachings. Contrary to
today’s decision, protecting the right to meaningful
participation in the political process must mean more than simply
removing barriers to participation. It must mean vigilantly
policing the political process to ensure that the majority does not
use other methods to prevent minority groups from partaking in that
process on equal footing. Why? For the same reason we guard the
right of every citizen to vote. If “[e]fforts to reduce the
impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct attempts to block
access to the ballot,” were
“ ‘second-generation barriers’ ”
to minority voting, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. ___, ___
(2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 5), efforts to
reconfigure the political process in ways that uniquely
disadvantage minority groups who have already long been
disadvantaged are third-generation barriers. For as the Court
recognized in Seattle, “minorities are no less powerless with
the vote than without it when a racial criterion is used to assign
governmental power in such a way as to exclude particular racial
groups ‘from effective participation in the political
proces[s].’ ”[
12] 458 U. S., at 486.
To accept the first two
features of the right to meaningful participation in the political
process, while renouncing the third, paves the way for the majority
to do what it has done time and again throughout our Nation’s
history: afford the minority the opportunity to participate, yet
manipulate the ground rules so as to ensure the minority’s
defeat. This is entirely at odds with our idea of equality under
the law.
To reiterate, none of
this is to say that the political-process doctrine prohibits the
exercise of democratic self-government. Nothing prevents a majority
of citizens from pursuing or obtaining its preferred outcome in a
political contest. Here, for instance, I agree with the plurality
that Michiganders who were unhappy with Grutter were free to pursue
an end to race-sensitive admissions policies in their State. See
ante, at 16–17. They were free to elect governing boards that
opposed race-sensitive admissions policies or, through public
discourse and dialogue, to lobby the existing boards toward that
end. They were also free to remove from the boards the authority to
make any decisions with respect to admissions policies, as opposed
to only decisions concerning race-sensitive admissions policies.
But what the majority could not do, consistent with the
Constitution, is change the ground rules of the political process
in a manner that makes it more difficult for racial minorities
alone to achieve their goals. In doing so, the majority effectively
rigs the contest to guarantee a particular outcome. That is the
very wrong the political-process doctrine seeks to remedy. The
doctrine “hews to the unremarkable notion that when two
competitors are running a race, one may not require the other to
run twice as far or to scale obstacles not present in the first
runner’s course.” BAMN v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan,
701 F. 3d 466, 474 (CA6 2012).
B
The political-process
doctrine also follows from the rest of our equal protection
jurisprudence—in particular, our reapportionment and vote
dilution cases. In those cases, the Court described the right to
vote as “ ‘the essence of a democratic
society.’ ” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 639. It
rejected States’ use of ostensibly race-neutral measures to
prevent minorities from exercising their political rights. See id.,
at 639–640. And it invalidated practices such as at-large
electoral systems that reduce or nullify a minority group’s
ability to vote as a cohesive unit, when those practices were
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 641. These cases,
like the political-process doctrine, all sought to preserve the
political rights of the minority.
Two more recent cases
involving discriminatory restructurings of the political process
are also worthy of mention: Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620
(1996) , and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548
U. S. 399 (2006) (LULAC).
Romer involved a
Colorado constitutional amendment that removed from the local
political process an issue primarily affecting gay and lesbian
citizens. The amendment, enacted in response to a number of local
ordinances prohibiting discrimination against gay citizens,
repealed these ordinances and effectively prohibited the adoption
of similar ordinances in the future without another amendment to
the State Constitution. 517 U. S., at 623–624. Although
the Court did not apply the political-process doctrine in
Romer,[
13] the case
resonates with the principles undergirding the political-process
doctrine. The Court rejected an attempt by the majority to transfer
decision-making authority from localities (where the targeted
minority group could influence the process) to state government
(where it had less ability to participate effec-tively). See id.,
at 632 (describing this type of political restructuring as a
“disability” on the minority group). Rather than being
able to appeal to municipalities for policy changes, the Court
commented, the minority was forced to “enlis[t] the citizenry
of Colorado to amend the State Constitution,” id., at
631—just as in this case.
LULAC, a Voting Rights
Act case, involved an enactment by the Texas Legislature that
redrew district lines for a number of Texas seats in the House of
Representatives. 548 U. S., at 409 (plurality opinion). In
striking down the enactment, the Court acknowledged the
“ ‘long, well-documented history of
discrimination’ ” in Texas that
“ ‘touched upon the rights of . . .
Hispanics to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise in the
electoral process,’ ” id., at 439, and it observed
that that the “ ‘political, social, and economic
legacy of past discrimination’ . . . may well
[have] ‘hinder[ed] their ability to participate effectively
in the political process,’ ” id., at 440. Against
this backdrop, the Court found that just as “Latino voters
were poised to elect their candidate of choice,” id., at 438,
the State’s enactment “took away [their] opportunity
because [they] were about to exercise it,” id., at 440. The
Court refused to sustain “the resulting vote dilution of a
group that was beginning to achieve [the] goal of overcoming prior
electoral discrimination.” Id., at 442.
As in Romer, the LULAC
Court—while using a different analytic
framework—applied the core teaching of Hunter and Seattle:
The political process cannot be restructured in a manner that makes
it more difficult for a traditionally excluded group to work
through the existing process to seek beneficial policies. And the
events giving rise to LULAC are strikingly similar to those here.
Just as redistricting prevented Latinos in Texas from attaining a
benefit they had fought for and were poised to enjoy,
§26prevents racial minorities in Michigan from enjoying a
last-resort benefit that they, too, had fought for through the
existing political processes.
IV
My colleagues claim
that the political-process doctrine is unadministrable and contrary
to our more recent equal protection precedents. See ante, at
11–15 (plurality opinion); ante, at 7–17 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). It is only by not acknowledging certain
strands of our jurisprudence that they can reach such a
conclusion.
A
Start with the claim
that Hunter and Seattle are no longer viable because of the cases
that have come after them. I note that in the view of many, it is
those precedents that have departed from the mandate of the Equal
Protection Clause in the first place, by applying strict scrutiny
to actions designed to benefit rather than burden the minority. See
Gratz, 539 U. S., at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[A]s I see it, government decisionmakers may properly
distinguish between policies of exclusion and inclusion. Actions
designed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are
not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten the day when
entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been
extirpated” (citation omitted)); id., at 282 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“I agree . . . that, in
implementing the Constitution’s equality instruction,
government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies
of inclusion and exclusion, for the former are more likely to prove
consistent with the basic constitutional obligation that the law
respect each individual equally” (citation omitted)); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 243 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression,
subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of
the majority. Remedial race-based preferences reflect the opposite
impulse: a desire to foster equality in society”); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 –302 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (when dealing with an action to eliminate
“pernicious vestiges of past discrimination,” a
“less exacting standard of review is appropriate”);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 –519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (race-based governmental
action designed to “remed[y] the continuing effects of past
racial discrimination . . . should not be subjected to
conventional ‘strict scrutiny’ ”); Bakke,
438 U. S., at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(“racial classifications designed to further remedial
purposes” should be subjected only to intermediate
scrutiny).
But even assuming that
strict scrutiny should apply to policies designed to benefit racial
minorities, that view is not inconsistent with Hunter and Seattle.
For nothing the Court has said in the last 32 years undermines the
principles announced in those cases.
1
Justice Scalia first
argues that the political-process doctrine “misreads the
Equal Protection Clause to protect ‘particular
group[s],’ ” running counter to a line of cases
that treat “ ‘equal protection as a personal
right.’ ” Ante, at 9 (opinion concurring in
judgment) (quoting Adarand, 515 U. S., at 230). Equal
protection, he says, protects “ ‘persons, not
groups.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting Adarand, 515
U. S., at 227). This criticism ignores the obvious:
Discrimination against an individual occurs because of that
individual’s membership in a particular group. Yes, equal
protection is a personal right, but there can be no equal
protection violation unless the injured individual is a member of a
protected group or a class of individuals. It is membership in the
group—here the racial minority—that gives rise to an
equal protection violation.
Relatedly, Justice
Scalia argues that the political-process doctrine is inconsistent
with our precedents because it protects only the minority from
political restructurings. This aspect of the doctrine, he says,
cannot be tolerated because our precedents have rejected
“ ‘a reading of the guarantee of equal protection
under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the ability
of different groups to defend their interests in the representative
process.’ ” Ante, at 10 (quoting Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co., 488 U. S., 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
Equal protection, he continues, “ ‘cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a person of another color.’ ” Ante, at
10 (quoting Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289–290) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
Justice Scalia is
troubled that the political-process doctrine has not been applied
to trigger strict scrutiny for political restructurings that burden
the majority. But the doctrine is inapplicable to the majority. The
minority cannot achieve such restructurings against the majority,
for the majority is, well, the majority. As the Seattle Court
explained, “ ‘[t]he majority needs no protection
against discriminat[ory restructurings], and if it did, a
referendum, [for instance], might be bothersome but no more than
that.’ ” 458 U. S., at 468. Stated
differently, the doctrine protects only the minority because it
implicates a problem that affects only the minority. Nothing in my
opinion suggests, as Justice Scalia says, that under the
political-process doctrine, “the Constitution prohibits
discrimination against minority groups, but not against majority
groups.” Ante, at 10, n. 7. If the minority somehow managed
to effectuate a political restructuring that burdened only the
majority, we could decide then whether to apply the
political-process doctrine to safeguard the political right of the
majority. But such a restructuring is not before us, and I cannot
fathom how it could be achieved.
2
Justice Scalia next
invokes state sovereignty, arguing that “we have emphasized
the near-limitless sovereignty of each State to design its
governing structure as it sees fit.” Ante, at 13 (opinion
concurring in judgment). But state sovereignty is not absolute; it
is subject to constitutional limits. The Court surely did not
offend state sovereignty by barring States from changing their
voting procedures to exclude racial minorities. So why does
thepolitical-process doctrine offend state sovereignty? The
doctrine takes nothing away from state sovereignty that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require. All it says is that a State may
not reconfigure its existing political processes in a manner that
establishes a distinct and more burdensome process for minority
members of our society alone to obtain legislation in their
interests.
More broadly, Justice
Scalia is troubled that the political-process doctrine would create
supposed “affirmative-action safe havens” in places
where the ordinary political process has thus far produced
race-sensitive admissions policies. Ante, at 13–14. It would
not. As explained previously, the voters in Michigan who opposed
race-sensitive admissions policies had any number of options
available to them to challenge those policies. See supra, at
34–35. And in States where decisions regarding race-sensitive
admissions policies are not subject to the political process in the
first place, voters are entirely free to eliminate such policies
via a constitutional amendment because that action would not
reallocate power in the manner condemned in Hunter and Seattle
(and, of course, present here). The Seattle Court recognized this
careful balance between state sovereignty and constitutional
protections:
“[W]e do not undervalue the
magnitude of the State’s interest in its system of education.
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to make
all decisions in the areas of education and student assignment. It
has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate system; having done
so, the State is obligated to operate that system within the
confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 458 U. S., at
487.
The same is true of Michigan.
3
Finally, Justice
Scalia disagrees with “the proposition that a facially
neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a
disparate racial impact.” Ante,at 15 (opinion concurring in
judgment). He would acknowledge, however, that an act that draws
racial distinctions or makes racial classifications triggers strict
scrutiny regardless of whether discriminatory intent is shown. See
Adarand, 515 U. S., at 213. That should settle the matter:
Section 26 draws a racial distinction. As the Seattle Court
explained, “when the political process or the decisionmaking
mechanism used to address racially conscious legislation—and
only such legislation—is singled out for peculiar and
disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly rests on
‘distinctions based on race.’ ” 458
U. S., at 485 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id., at 470 (noting that although a State may
“ ‘allocate governmental power on the basis of any
general principle,’ ” it may not use racial
considerations “to define the governmental decisionmaking
structure”).
But in Justice
Scalia’s view, cases like Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
229 (1976) , and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) , call Seattle into
question. It is odd to suggest that prior precedents call into
question a later one. Seattle (decided in 1982) postdated both
Washington v. Davis (1976) and Arlington Heights (1977). Justice
Scalia’s suggestion that Seattle runs afoul of the principles
established in Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights would come
as a surprise to Justice Blackmun, who joined the majority opinions
in all three cases. Indeed, the Seattle Court explicitly rejected
the argument that Hunter had been effectively overruled by
Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights:
“There is one immediate and crucial
difference between Hunter and [those cases]. While decisions such
as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights considered
classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter amendment
at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms with
legislation designed to benefit minorities ‘as
minorities,’ not legislation intended to benefit some larger
group of underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were
disproportionately represented.” 458 U. S., at 485.
And it concluded that both the Hunter amendment
and the Seattle initiative rested on distinctions based on race.
458 U. S., at 485. So does §26.[
14]
B
My colleagues also
attack the first prong of the doctrine as “rais[ing] serious
constitutional concerns,” ante, at 11 (plurality opinion),
and being “unadministrable,” ante, at 7 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia wonders whether judges are
equipped to weigh in on what constitutes a “racial
issue.” See ante, at 8. The plurality, too, thinks courts
would be “with no clear legal standards or accepted sources
to guide judicial decision.” Ante, at 12. Yet as Justice
Scalia recognizes, Hunter and Seattle provide a standard: Does the
public policy at issue “inur[e] primarily to the benefit of
the minority, and [was it] designed for that purpose”?
Seattle, 458 U. S., at 472; see ante, at 8. Surely this is the
kind of factual inquiry that judges are capable of making. Justice
Scalia, for instance, accepts the standard announced in Washington
v. Davis, which requires judges to determine whether discrimination
is intentional or whether it merely has a discriminatory effect.
Such an inquiry is at least as difficult for judges as the one
called for by Hunter and Seattle. In any event, it is clear that
the constitutional amendment in this case has a racial focus; it is
facially race-based and, by operation of law, disadvantages only
minorities. See supra, at 15–16.
“No good can
come” from these inquiries, Justice Scalia responds, because
they divide the Nation along racial lines and perpetuate racial
stereotypes. Ante, at 9. The plurality shares that view; it tells
us that we must not assume all individuals of the same race think
alike. See ante, at 11–12. The same could have been said
about desegregation: Not all members of a racial minority in
Seattle necessarily regarded the integration of public schools as
good policy. Yet the Seattle Court had little difficulty saying
that school integration as a general matter “inure[d]
. . . to the benefit of” the minority. 458
U. S., at 472.
My colleagues are of
the view that we should leave race out of the picture entirely and
let the voters sort it out. See ante, at 13 (plurality opinion)
(“Racial division would be validated, not discouraged, were
the Seattle formulation . . . to remain in force”);
ante, at 9 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(“ ‘[R]acial stereotyping [is] at odds with equal
protection mandates’ ”). We have seen this
reasoning before. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 748
(“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race”). It is a sentiment
out of touch with reality, one not required by our Constitution,
and one that has properly been rejected as “not
sufficient” to resolve cases of this nature. Id., at 788
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While
“[t]he enduring hope is that race should not matter[,] the
reality is that too often it does.” Id., at 787.
“[R]acial discrimination . . . [is] not ancient
history.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 25 (2009)
(plurality opinion).
Race matters. Race
matters in part because of the long history of racial
minorities’ being denied access to the political process. See
Part I, supra; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U. S. 301, 309 (1966) (describingracial discrimination in
voting as “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and
ingenious defiance of the Constitution”). And although we
have made great strides, “voting discrimination still exists;
no one doubts that.” Shelby County, 570 U. S., at __ (slip
op., at 2).
Race also matters
because of persistent racial inequality in society—inequality
that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark socioeconomic
disparities. See Gratz, 539 U. S., at 298–300 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (cataloging the many ways in which “the
effects of centuries of law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully
evident in our communities and schools,” in areas like
employment, poverty, access to health care, housing, consumer
transactions, and education); Adarand, 515 U. S., at 273
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the “lingering
effects” of discrimination, “reflective of a system of
racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces,
markets, and neighborhoods”).
And race matters for
reasons that really are only skin deep, that cannot be discussed
any other way, and that cannot be wished away. Race matters to a
young man’s view of society when he spends his teenage years
watching others tense up as he passes, no matter the neighborhood
where he grew up. Race matters to a young woman’s sense of
self when she states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No,
where are you really from?”, regardless of how many
generations her family has been in the country. Race matters to a
young person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which
he does not understand because only English was spoken at home.
Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, the silent
judgments that reinforce that most crippling of thoughts: “I
do not belong here.”
In my colleagues’
view, examining the racial impact of legislation only perpetuates
racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality
that race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of
race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the
unfortunate effects of centuries of racial discrimination. As
members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the
guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away,
rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our
society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the
facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the
simple truth that race does matter.
V
Although the only
constitutional rights at stake in this case are process-based
rights, the substantive policy at issue is undeniably of some
relevance to my colleagues. See ante, at 18 (plurality opinion)
(suggesting that race-sensitive admissions policies have the
“potential to become . . . the source of the
very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation
seeks to put behind it”). I will therefore speak in
response.
A
For over a century,
racial minorities in Michigan fought to bring diversity to their
State’s public colleges and universities. Before the advent
of race-sensitive admissions policies, those institutions, like
others around the country, were essentially segregated. In 1868,
two black students were admitted to the University of Michigan, the
first of their race. See Expert Report of James D. Anderson 4, in
Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 97–75231 (ED Mich.). In 1935, over
six decades later, there were still only 35 black students at the
University. Ibid. By 1954, this number had risen to slightly below
200. Ibid. And by 1966, to around 400, among a total student
population of roughly 32,500—barely over 1 percent. Ibid. The
numbers at the University of Michigan Law School are even more
telling. Duringthe 1960’s, the Law School produced 9 black
graduates among a total of 3,041—less than three-tenths of 1
percent. See App. in Grutter v. Bollinger, O. T. 2002, No.
02–241, p. 204.
The housing and
extracurricular policies at these institutions also perpetuated
open segregation. For instance, incoming students were permitted to
opt out of rooming with black students. Anderson, supra, at
7–8. And some fraternities and sororities excluded black
students from membership. Id., at 6–7.
In 1966, the Defense
Department conducted an investigation into the University’s
compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and made 25
recommendations for increasing opportunities for minority students.
Id., at 9. In 1970, a student group launched a number of protests,
including a strike, demanding that the University increase its
minority enrollment. Id., at 16–23. The University’s
Board of Regents responded, adopting a goal of 10 percent black
admissions by the fall of 1973. Id., at 23.
During the
1970’s, the University continued to improve its admissions
policies,[
15] encouraged by
this Court’s 1978 decision in Bakke. In that case, the Court
told our Nation’s colleges and universities that they could
consider race in admissions as part of a broader goal to create a
diverse student body, in which students of different backgrounds
would learn together, and thereby learn to live together. A little
more than a decade ago, in Grutter, the Court reaffirmed this
understanding. In upholding the admissions policy of the Law
School, the Court laid to rest any doubt whether student body
diversity is a compelling interest that may justify the use of
race.
Race-sensitive
admissions policies are now a thing of the past in Michigan after
§26, even though—as experts agree and as research
shows—those policies were making a difference in achieving
educational diversity. In Grutter, Michigan’s Law School
spoke candidly about the strides the institution had taken
successfully because of race-sensitive admissions. One expert
retained by the Law School opined that a race-blind admissions
system would have a “very dramatic, negative effect on
underrepresented minority admissions.” Grutter, 539
U. S., at 320 (inter-nal quotation marks omitted). He
testified that the school had admitted 35 percent of
underrepresented minority students who had applied in 2000, as
opposed to only 10 percent who would have been admitted had race
not been considered. Ibid. Underrepresented minority students would
thus have constituted 4 percent, as opposed to the actual 14.5
percent, of the class that entered in 2000. Ibid.
Michigan’s public
colleges and universities tell us the same today. The Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan and the Board of Trustees of
Michigan State University inform us that those institutions cannot
achieve the benefits of a diverse student body without
race-sensitive admissions plans. See Brief for Respondents Regents
of the University of Michigan, the Board of Trustees of Michigan
State University et al. 18–25. During proceedings before
the lower courts, several university officials testified that
§26 would depress minority enrollment at Michigan’s
public universities. The Director of Undergraduate Admissions at
the University of Michigan “expressed doubts over the ability
to maintain minority enrollment through the use of a proxy, like
socioeconomic status.” Supp. App. to Pet. for Cert. 285a. He
explained that university officials in States with laws similar to
§26 had not “ ‘achieve[d] the same sort of
racial and ethnic diversity that they had prior to such measures
. . . without considering race.’ ” Ibid.
Similarly, the Law School’s Dean of Admissions testified that
she expected “a decline in minority admissions because, in
her view, it is impossible ‘to get a critical mass of
underrepresented minorities . . . without
considering race.’ ” Ibid. And the Dean of Wayne
State University Law School stated that “although some
creative approaches might mitigate the effects of [§26], he
‘did not think that any one of these proposals or any
combination of these proposals was reasonably likely to result in
the admission of a class that had the same or similar or higher
numbers of African Americans, Latinos and Native Americans as the
prior policy.’ ” Ibid.
Michigan tells a
different story. It asserts that although the statistics are
difficult to track, “the number of underrepresented
minorities . . . [in] the entering freshman class at
Michigan as a percentage changed very little” after §26.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 15. It also claims that “the statistics in
California across the 17 campuses in the University of California
system show that today the underrepresented minority percentage is
better on 16 out of those 17 campuses”—all except
Berkeley—than before California’s equivalent initiative
took effect. Id., at 16. As it turns out, these statistics
weren’t “ ‘even good enough to be
wrong.’ ” Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
4 (2d ed. 2000) (Introduction by Stephen G. Breyer (quoting
Wolfgang Pauli)).
Section 26 has already
led to decreased minority enrollment at Michigan’s public
colleges and universities. In 2006 (before §26 took effect),
underrepresented minorities made up 12.15 percent of the University
of Michigan’s freshman class, compared to 9.54 percent in
2012—a roughly 25 percent decline. See University of
Michigan—New Freshman Enrollment Overview, Office of the
Registrar, online at
http://www.ro.umich.edu/report/10enrolloverview.pdf and
http://www.ro.umich.edu/report/12enrollmentsummary.pdf.[
16] Moreover, the total number of
college-aged underrepresented minorities in Michigan has increased
even as the number of underrepresented minorities admitted to the
University has decreased. For example, between 2006 and 2011, the
proportion of black freshmen among those enrolled at the University
of Michigan declined from 7 percent to 5 percent, even though the
proportion of black college-aged persons in Michigan increased from
16 to 19 percent. See Fessenden and Keller, How Minorities Have
Fared in States with Affirmative Action Bans, N. Y. Times,
June 24, 2013, online at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative-action-bans.html.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Black Students[
17]
A recent study also
confirms that §26 has decreased minority degree attainment in
Michigan. The University of Michigan’s graduating class of
2012, the first admitted after §26 took effect, is quite
different from previous classes. The proportion of black students
among those attaining bachelor’s degrees was 4.4 percent, the
lowest since 1991; the proportion of black students among those
attaining master’s degrees was 5.1 percent, the lowest since
1989; the proportion of black students among those attaining
doctoral degrees was 3.9 percent, the lowest since 1993; and the
proportion of black students among those attaining professional
school degrees was 3.5 percent, the lowest since the
mid-1970’s. See Kidder, Restructuring Higher Education
Opportunity?: African American Degree Attainment After
Michigan’s Ban on Affirmative Action, p. 1 (Aug. 2013),
online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=2318523.
The President and
Chancellors of the University of California (which has 10 campuses,
not 17) inform us that “[t]he abandonment of race-conscious
admissions policies resulted in an immediate and precipitous
decline in the rates at which underrepresented-minority students
applied to, were admitted to, and enrolled at” the
university. Brief for President and Chancellors of the University
of California as Amici Curiae 10 (hereinafter President and
Chancellors Brief). At the University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), for example, admission rates for underrepresented
minorities plummeted from 52.4 percent in 1995 (before
California’s ban took effect) to 24 percentin 1998. Id., at
12. As a result, the percentage of underrepresented minorities fell
by more than half: from 30.1 percent of the entering class in 1995
to 14.3 percent in 1998. Ibid. The admissions rate for
underrepresented minorities at UCLA reached a new low of 13.6
percent in 2012. See Brief for California Social Science
Researchers and Admissions Experts as Amici Curiae 28.
The elimination of
race-sensitive admissions policies in California has been
especially harmful to black students. In 2006, for example, there
were fewer than 100 black students in UCLA’s incoming class
of roughly 5,000, the lowest number since at least 1973. See id.,
at 24.
The University of
California also saw declines in minor-ity representation at its
graduate programs and professional schools. In 2005,
underrepresented minorities made up 17 percent of the
university’s new medical students, which is actually a lower
rate than the 17.4 percent reported in 1975, three years before
Bakke. President and Chancellors Brief 13. The numbers at the law
schools are even more alarming. In 2005, underrepresented
minorities made up 12 percent of entering law students, well below
the 20.1 percent in 1975. Id., at 14.
As in Michigan, the
declines in minority representation at the University of California
have come even as the minority population in California has
increased. At UCLA, for example, the proportion of Hispanic
freshmen among those enrolled declined from 23 percent in 1995 to
17 percent in 2011, even though the proportion of Hispanic
college-aged persons in California increased from 41 percent to 49
percent during that same period. See Fessenden and Keller.
UCLA
Hispanic Students[
18]
And the proportion of
black freshmen among those enrolled at UCLA declined from 8 percent
in 1995 to 3 percent in 2011, even though the proportion of
blackcollege-aged persons in California increased from 8 percent to
9 percent during that same period. See ibid.
UCLA
Black Students[
19]
While the minority
admissions rates at UCLA and Berkeley have decreased, the number of
minorities enrolled at colleges across the county has increased.
See Phillips, Colleges Straining to Restore Diversity: Bans on
Race-Conscious Admissions Upend Racial Makeup at California
Schools, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 7, 2014,p. A3.
BERKELEY AND UCLA[
20]
The President and
Chancellors assure us that they have tried. They tell us that
notwithstanding the university’s efforts for the past 15
years “to increase diversity on [the University of
California’s] campuses through the use of race-neutral
initiatives,” enrollment rates have “not rebounded
. . . [or] kept pace with the demographic changes among
California’s graduating high-school population.”
President and Chancellors Brief 14. Since Proposition 209 took
effect, the university has spent over a half-billion dollars on
programs and policies designed to increase diversity. Phillips,
supra, at A3. Still, it has been unable to meet its diversity
goals. Ibid. Proposition 209, it says, has
“ ‘completely changed the character’ of the
university.” Ibid. (quoting the Associate President and Chief
Policy Advisor of the University of California).
B
These statistics may
not influence the views of some of my colleagues, as they question
the wisdom of adopting race-sensitive admissions policies and would
prefer if our Nation’s colleges and universities were to
discard those policies altogether. See ante, at 2 (Roberts,
C. J., concurring) (suggesting that race-sensitive admissions
policies might “do more harm than good”); ante, at 9,
n. 6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Grutter, 539
U. S., at 371–373 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id., at 347–348 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). That view is at odds with our
recognition in Grutter, and more recently in Fisher v. University
of Texas at Austin, 570 U. S. ___ (2013), that race-sensitive
admissions policies are necessary to achieve a diverse student body
when race-neutral alternatives have failed. More fundamentally, it
ignores the importance of diversity in institutions of higher
education and reveals how little my colleagues understand about the
reality of race in America.
This Court has
recognized that diversity in education is paramount. With good
reason. Diversity ensures that the next generation moves beyond the
stereotypes, the assumptions, and the superficial perceptions that
students coming from less-heterogeneous communities may harbor,
consciously or not, about people who do not look like them.
Recognizing the need for diversity acknowledges that, “[j]ust
as growing up in a particular region or having particular
professional experiences is likely to affect an individual’s
views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a
racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters.” Grutter, 539 U. S., at
333. And it acknowledges that “to cultivate a set of leaders
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that
the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity.” Id., at 332.
Colleges and
universities must be free to prioritize the goal of diversity. They
must be free to immerse their students in a multiracial environment
that fosters frequent and meaningful interactions with students of
other races, and thereby pushes such students to transcend any
assumptions they may hold on the basis of skin color. Without
race-sensitive admissions policies, this might well be impossible.
The statistics I have described make that fact glaringly obvious.
We should not turn a blind eye to something we cannot help but
see.
To be clear, I do not
mean to suggest that the virtues of adopting race-sensitive
admissions policies should inform the legal question before the
Court today regarding the constitutionality of §26. But I
cannot ignore the unfortunate outcome of today’s decision:
Short of amending the State Constitution, a Herculean task, racial
minorities in Michigan are deprived of even an opportunity to
convince Michigan’s public colleges and universities to
consider race in their admissions plans when other attempts to
achieve racial diversity have proved unworkable, and those
institutions are unnecessarily hobbled in their pursuit of a
diverse student body.
* * *
The Constitution does
not protect racial minorities from political defeat. But neither
does it give the majority free rein to erect selective barriers
against racial minorities. The political-process doctrine polices
the channels of change to ensure that the majority, when it wins,
does so without rigging the rules of the game to ensure its
success. Today, the Court discards that doctrine without good
reason.
In doing so, it permits
the decision of a majority of the voters in Michigan to strip
Michigan’s elected university boards of their authority to
make decisions with respect to constitutionally permissible
race-sensitive admissions policies, while preserving the
boards’ plenary authority to make all other educational
decisions. “In a most direct sense, this implicates the
judiciary’s special role in safeguarding the interests of
those groups that are relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.” Seattle, 458 U. S., at
486 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court abdicates that
role, permitting the majority to use its numerical advantage to
change the rules mid-contest and forever stack the deck against
racial minorities in Michigan. The result is that Michigan’s
public colleges and universities are less equipped to do their part
in ensuring that students of all races are “better prepare[d]
. . . for an increasingly diverse workforce and society
. . .” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 330 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Today’s decision
eviscerates an important strand of our equal protection
jurisprudence. For members of historically marginalized groups,
which rely on the federal courts to protect their constitutional
rights, the decision can hardly bolster hope for a vision of
democracy that preserves for all the right to participate
meaningfully and equally in self-government.
I respectfully
dissent.