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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–820
_________________
MANUEL JOSE LOZANO, PETITIONER v. DIANALUCIA
MONTOYA ALVAREZ
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[March 5, 2014]
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a parent abducts a
child and flees to another country, the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction generally requires
that country to return the child immediately if the other parent
requests return within one year. The question in this case is
whether that 1-year period is subject to equitable tolling when the
abducting parent conceals the child’s location from the other
parent. We hold that equitable tolling is not available.
I
To address “the
problem of international child abductions during domestic
disputes,” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 8 (2010) , in 1980
the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Convention or Convention), T. I. A. S. No.
11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.). The Convention
states two primary objectives: “to secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State,” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under
the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
other Contracting States.” Art. 1, id.,at 7.
To those ends, the
Convention’s “central operating feature” is the return of the
child. Abbott, 560 U. S., at 9. That remedy, in effect, lays
venue for the ultimate custody determination in the child’s country
of habitual residence rather than the country to which the child is
abducted. See id., at 20 (“The Convention is based on the principle
that the best interests of the child are well served when
de-cisions regarding custody rights are made in the countryof
habitual residence”).
The return remedy is
not absolute. Article 13 excuses return where, for example, the
left-behind parent was not “actually exercising” custody rights
when the abducting parent removed the child, or where there is a
“grave risk” that return would “place the child in an intolerable
situation.” Hague Convention, Arts. 13(a)–(b), Treaty Doc., at 10.
A state may also refuse to return the child if doingso would
contravene “fundamental principles . . . relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Art. 20, id.,
at 11.
This case concerns
another exception to the return remedy. Article 12 of the
Convention states the general rule that when a court receives a
petition for return within one year after the child’s wrongful
removal, the court “shall order the return of the child forthwith.”
Id., at 9. Article 12 further provides that the court,
“where the proceedings have been commenced
after the expiration of the period of one year [from the date of
the wrongful removal], shall also order the return of the child,
unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new
environment.” Ibid.
Thus, at least in some cases, failure to file a
petitionfor return within one year renders the return remedy
unavailable.
The United States
ratified the Hague Convention in 1988, and Congress implemented the
Convention that same year through the International Child
Abduc-tion Remedies Act (ICARA). 102Stat. 437, 42
U. S. C. §§11601–11610. That statute instructs courts to
“decide the case in accordance with the Convention.” §11603(d).
Echoing the Convention, ICARA further provides that “[c]hildren who
are wrongfully removed . . . are to be promptly returned
unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention
applies.” §11601(a)(4). Finally, ICARA requires the abducting
parent to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Article
12’s exception to return applies. §11603(e)(2)(B).
II
Diana Lucia Montoya
Alvarez and Manuel Jose Lozano are the parents of the girl at the
center of this dispute.[
1]
Montoya Alvarez and Lozano met and began dating in London in early
2004. Montoya Alvarez gave birth to a daughter in October 2005.
Montoya Alvarez and
Lozano describe their relationship in starkly different terms.
Lozano stated that they were “ ‘very happy together,’ ”
albeit with “normal couple problems.” In re Lozano, 809
F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 (SDNY 2011). Montoya Alvarez described a
pattern of physical and emotional abuse that included multiple
incidents of rape and battery. The District Court found
insufficient evidence to make specific findings about domestic
violence but determined that Lozano’s claim that he never
mistreated Montoya Alvarez was “not credible.” Id., at 206.
The parties also differ
as to the child’s well-being during the first three years of her
life. Lozano stated that he and the child had a very good
relationship, and that the child was generally happy. Montoya
Alvarez believed otherwise. In October 2008, Montoya Alvarez
reported to the child’s doctor that she refused to speak at the
nursery she attended, cried often, and wet the bed. Montoya Alvarez
also stated that the child refused to speak when Lozano was
present. The child’s nursery manager wrote that the girl was
“ ‘very withdrawn,’ ” and noted that the home
“ ‘environment obviously had a negative effect’ ” on her.
Id., at 207. The District Court found insufficient evidence that
Lozano had physically abused the child, but did conclude that the
child had seen and heard her parents arguing at home.
In November 2008, when
the child was just over three years old, Montoya Alvarez went to
New York to visit her sister Maria. During that time, the child
remained in London with Lozano and his visiting mother. When
Montoya Alvarez returned on November 18, she became acutely
concerned about the child’s fearful behavior around Lo-zano. The
next day, Montoya Alvarez left with the child and never
returned.
Montoya Alvarez and the
child lived at a women’s shelter for the next seven months. After
Montoya Alvarez was unable to find suitable long-term
accommodations in the United Kingdom, she and the child left for
France on July 3, 2009, and then for the United States, arriving
five days later. Since their arrival, Montoya Alvarez and the child
have lived with Montoya Alvarez’ sister Maria and her family in New
York.
When they arrived in
New York, Montoya Alvarez and the child began seeing a therapist at
a family medical clinic. The therapist testified that, at first,
the child was withdrawn and would wet herself. The therapist
diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder. Within six
months, however, the therapist described her as “ ‘a
completely different child,’ ” who had stopped wetting
herself, was excited to play with friends, and was able to speak
freely about her emotions. Id., at 212. When Montoya Alvarez and
the child returned to the therapist after Lo-zano filed a petition
for the child’s return, the therapist noted that the child was
doing well but did not wish to see her father.
In the meantime, Lozano
attempted to find Montoya Alvarez and the child. Shortly after
Montoya Alvarez left in November 2008, he called her sister Gloria
in London, but eventually received legal advice not to speak with
Montoya Alvarez’ family. A mediation service also sent several
letters to Montoya Alvarez on Lozano’s behalf without receiving a
response. In July 2009, Lozano filed an application for a court
order in the United Kingdom “ ‘to ensure that he obtains
regular contact with his [child] and plays an active role in [her]
life.’ ” Id., at 210. He also sought court orders to compel
Montoya Alvarez’ sisters and legal counsel, the child’s doctor and
nursery, and various government offices in London to disclose the
child’s whereabouts.
On March 15, 2010,
after determining that the child was not in the United Kingdom (and
suspecting that the child was in New York), Lozano filed a form
with the Hague Convention Central Authority for England and Wales
seeking to have the child returned.[
2] The United States Central Authority—the Office of
Children’s Issues in the Department of State, see 22 CFR §94.2
(2013)—received the application on March 23, 2010. After the Office
of Children’s Issues confirmed that Montoya Alvarez had entered the
United States, Lozano located Montoya Alvarez’ address in New York.
On November 10, 2010, more than 16 months after Montoya Alvarez and
the child left the United Kingdom, Lozano filed a Petition for
Return of Child pursuant to the Hague Convention and ICARA, 42
U. S. C. §11603, in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
After a 2-day
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Lozano’s petition.
809 F. Supp. 2d 197. The District Court concluded that Lozano
had stated a prima facie case of wrongful removal under the Hague
Convention. Id., at 219–220. Prior to her removal, the child was a
habitual resident of the United Kingdom, see Hague Convention, Art.
4, and Lozano had custody rights that hewas actually exercising at
the time of removal, see Arts. 3(a)–(b).
Because the petition
was filed more than one year after the child’s wrongful removal,
however, the District Court denied the petition on the basis that
the child was now settled in New York. Id., at 230, 234. “Viewing
the total-ity of the circumstances,” the court found sufficient
indicia of “stability in her family, educational, social, and most
importantly, home life,” id., at 233, to conclude that the child
was settled in her current environment and that repatriation would
be “extremely disruptive,” id., at 234. Lozano argued that the
child should be returned forthwith because the 1-year period in
Article 12 should be equitably tolled during the period that
Montoya Alvarez concealed the child. The court rejected that
argument, holding that the 1-year period could not be extended by
equitable tolling.[
3] Id., at
228–229.
On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed. 697 F. 3d 41 (2012). The Court of Appeals
agreed that the 1-year per-iod in Article 12 is not subject to
equitable tolling. According to the court, unlike a statute of
limitations that would prohibit the filing of a return petition
after one year, the1-year period in Article 12 merely permits
courts, after that period has run, to consider the interests of the
child in settlement. Id., at 52. The Second Circuit concluded that
allowing equitable tolling to delay consideration of the child’s
interests would undermine the purpose of the Hague Convention. Id.,
at 54.
We granted certiorari
to decide whether Article 12’s1-year period is subject to equitable
tolling. 570 U. S. ___ (2013). Compare 697 F. 3d, at
50–55 (equitable tolling not available); and Yaman v. Yaman, 730
F. 3d 1, 12–16 (CA1 2013) (same), with Duarte v. Bardales, 526
F. 3d 563, 568–570 (CA9 2008) (equitable tolling available);
and Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F. 3d 702, 723–724 (CA11 2004)
(same). We hold that equitable tolling is not available, and
therefore affirm.
III
Although this case
concerns the application of equitable tolling to a treaty, we begin
with a more familiar context: equitable tolling of federal statutes
of limitations. As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the
running of, or “tolls,” a statute of limitations when a litigant
has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary
circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action. See, e.g.,
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418 (2005) . Because the
doctrine effectively extends an otherwise discrete limitations
period set by Congress, whether equitable tolling is available is
fundamentally a question of statutory intent. See, e.g., Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990) ;
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467 –480 (1986); Honda v.
Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967) .
As applied to federal
statutes of limitations, the inquiry begins with the understanding
that Congress “legislate[s] against a background of common-law
adjudicatory principles.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v.
Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) . Equitable tolling, a
long-established feature of American jurisprudence derived from
“the old chancery rule,” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392,
397 (1946) , is just such a principle. See Young v. United States,
535 U. S. 43 –50 (2002) (“Congress must be presumed to draft
limitations periods in light of this background principle”); Bailey
v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 349–350 (1875). We therefore presume that
equitable tolling applies if the period in question is a statute of
limitations and if tolling is consistent with the statute. Young,
supra, at 49–50 (“It is hornbook law that limitations periods are
‘customarily subject to “equitable tolling,” ’ unless tolling
would be ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant
statute’ ” (citation omitted)).
IV
The Hague Convention,
of course, is a treaty, not a federal statute. For treaties, which
are primarily “ ‘compact[s] between independent
nations,’ ” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 505 (2008)
, our “duty [i]s to ascertain the intent of the parties” by looking
to the document’s text and context, United States v. Choctaw
Nation, 179 U. S. 494, 535 (1900) ; see also BG Group plc v.
Republic of Argen-tina, post, at 10.
We conclude that the
parties to the Hague Convention did not intend equitable tolling to
apply to the 1-year period in Article 12. Unlike federal statutes
of limitations, the Convention was not adopted against a shared
background of equitable tolling. Even if the Convention were
subject to a presumption that statutes of limitations may be
tolled, the 1-year period in Article 12 is not a statute of
limitations. And absent a presumption in favor of equitable
tolling, nothing in the Convention warrants tolling the 1-year
period.
A
First, there is no
general presumption that equitable tolling applies to treaties.
Congress is presumed to incorporate equitable tolling into federal
statutes of limitations because equitable tolling is part of the
established backdrop of American law. Rotella v. Wood, 528
U. S. 549, 560 (2000) (“[F]ederal statutes of limitations are
generally subject to equitable principles of tolling”). It does not
follow, however, that we can export such background principles of
United States law to contexts outside their jurisprudential
home.
It is particularly
inappropriate to deploy this background principle of American law
automatically when interpreting a treaty. “A treaty is in its
nature a contract between . . . nations, not a
legislative act.” Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829)
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court); see also 2 Debates on the
Federal Constitution 506 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863) (James Wilson)
(“[I]n their nature treaties originate differently from laws. They
are made by equal parties, and each side has half of the bargain to
make . . . ”). That distinction has been reflected
in the way we interpret treaties. It is our “responsibility to read
the treaty in a manner ‘consistent with the shared expectations of
the contracting parties.’ ” Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540
U. S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470
U. S. 392, 399 (1985) ; emphasis added). Even if a background
principle is relevant to the interpretation of federal statutes, it
has no proper role in the interpretation of treaties unless that
principle is shared by the parties to “an agreement among sovereign
powers,” Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217, 226
(1996) .
Lozano has not
identified a background principle of equitable tolling that is
shared by the signatories to the Hague Convention. To the contrary,
Lozano concedes that in the context of the Convention, “foreign
courts have failed to adopt equitable tolling . . .
because they lac[k] the presumption that we [have].” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 19–20. While no signatory state’s court of last resort has
resolved the question, intermediate courts of appeals in several
states have rejected equitable tolling. See Cannon v. Cannon,
[2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330, [2005] 1 W. L. R. 32, ¶51 (Eng.),
(rejecting the “tolling rule” as “too crude an approach” for the
Convention); Kubera v. Kubera, 3 B. C. L. R. (5th) 121,
¶64, 317 D. L. R. (4th) 307, ¶64 (2010) (Can.) (equitable
tolling “has not been adopted in other jurisdictions, including
Canada”); see also HJ v. Secretary for Justice, [2006] NZFLR 1005,
¶53 (CA), appeal dism’d on other grounds, [2007] 2 NZLR 289;
A. C. v. P. C., [2005] HKEC 839, 2005 WL 836263, ¶55,
(Hong Kong Ct. 1st Instance).[
4] The American presumption that federal statutes of
limitations can be equitably tolled therefore does not apply to
this multilateral treaty. Cf. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499
U. S. 530 –545, and n. 10 (1991) (declining to adopt
liability for psychic injury under the Warsaw Convention because
“the unavailability of compensation for purely psychic injury in
many common and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw
Conference persuades us that the signatories had no specific
intentto include such a remedy in the Convention” (footnote
omitted)).
It does not matter to
this conclusion that Congress enacted a statute to implement the
Hague Convention. See ICARA, 42 U. S. C. §§11601–11610.
ICARA does not address the availability of equitable tolling. Nor
does it purport to alter the Convention. See §11601(b)(2) (“The
provisions of [ICARA] are in addition to and not in lieu of the
provisions of the Convention”). In fact, Congress explicitly
recognized “the need for uniform international interpretation of
the Convention.” §11601(b)(3)(B). Congress’ mere enactment of
implementing legislation did not somehow import background
principles of American law into the treaty interpretation process,
thereby altering our understanding of the treaty itself.
B
Even if the
presumption in favor of equitable tolling had force outside of
domestic law, we have only applied that presumption to statutes of
limitations. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20,
27 (1989) (no equitable tolling of a 60-day presuit notice
requirement that does not operate as a statute of limitations). The
1-year period in Article 12 is not a statute of limitations.
As a general matter,
“[s]tatutes of limitations establish the period of time within
which a claimant must bring an action.” Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at
4). They characteristically embody a “policy of repose, designed to
protect defendants.” Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380
U. S. 424, 428 (1965) . And they foster the “elimination of
stale claims, and certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for
recovery and a defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella, supra,
at 555.
In Young, 535
U. S. 43 , we evaluated whether those characteristics of
statutes of limitations were present in the “three-year lookback
period” for tax liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings. The
Bankruptcy Code favors tax claims less than three years old in two
respects: Such claims cannot be discharged, and they have priority
over certain others in bankruptcy proceedings. See 11
U. S. C. §§507(a)(8)(A)(i), 523(a)(1)(A). If the Internal
Revenue Service “sleeps on its rights” by failing to prosecute
those claims within three years, however, then those mechanisms for
enforcing claims against bankrupt taxpayers are eliminated. Young,
535 U. S., at 47. We concluded that the lookback period
“serves the same ‘basic policies [furthered by] all limitations
provisions,’ ” ibid. (quoting Ro-tella, 528 U. S., at
555), i.e., certainty and repose. We accordingly held that it was a
limitations periodpresumptively subject to equitable tolling. 535
U. S.,at 47.
Unlike the 3-year
lookback period in Young, expiration of the 1-year period in
Article 12 does not eliminate the remedy the Convention affords the
left-behind parent—namely, the return of the child. Before one year
has elapsed, Article 12 provides that the court “shall order the
return of the child forthwith.” Treaty Doc., at 9. But even after
that period has expired, the court “shall also order the return of
the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled.” Ibid. The continued availability of the return remedy
after one year preserves the possibility of relief for the
left-behind parent and prevents reposefor the abducting
parent.[
5] Rather than
establishing any certainty about the respective rights of the
parties, the expiration of the 1-year period opens the door to
consideration of a third party’s interests, i.e., the child’s
interest in settlement. Because that is not the sort of interest
addressed by a statute of limitations, we decline to treat the
1-year period as a statute of limitations.[
6]
C
Without a presumption
of equitable tolling, the Convention does not support extending the
1-year period during concealment. Article 12 explicitly provides
that the 1-year period commences on “the date of the wrongful
removal or retention,” and makes no provision for an extension of
that period. Id., at 9. Further, the practical effect of the
tolling that Lozano requests would be to delay the commencement of
the 1-year period until the left-behind parent discovers the
child’s location. Commencing the 1-year period upon discovery is
the obvious alternative to the commencement date the drafters
actually adopted because the subject of the Hague Convention, child
abduction, is naturally associated with the sort of concealment
that might justify equitable tolling under other circumstances. See
697 F. 3d, at 51, n. 8 (“It would have been a simple
matter, if the state parties to the Convention wished to take
account of the possibility that an abducting parent might make it
difficult for the petitioning parent to discover the child’s
whereabouts, to run the period ‘from the date that the petitioning
parent learned [or, could reasonably have learned] of the child’s
whereabouts’ ” (alterations in original)). Given that the
drafters did not adopt that alternative, the natural implication is
that they did not intend the 1-year period to commence on that
later date. Cf. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568
U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 10–11). We cannot revisit
that choice.
Lozano contends that
equitable tolling is nevertheless consistent with the purpose of
the Hague Convention because it is necessary to deter child
abductions. In his view, “absent equitable tolling, concealment
‘probably will’ result in non-return,” which will in turn encourage
abduction. Reply Brief 14–15; see also Duarte, 526 F. 3d, at
570.
We agree, of course,
that the Convention reflects a design to discourage child
abduction. But the Convention does not pursue that goal at any
cost. The child’s interest in choosing to remain, Art. 13, or in
avoiding physical or psychological harm, Art. 13(b), may overcome
the return remedy. The same is true of the child’s interest in
settlement. See supra, at 2; see also In re M, [2008] 1 A. C.
1288, 1310 (Eng. 2007) (opinion of Baroness Hale of Richmond)
(“These children should not be made to suffer for the sake of
general deterrence of the evil of child abduction world wide”). We
are unwilling to apply equitable tolling principles that would, in
practice, rewrite the treaty. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,
490 U. S. 122 –135 (1989) (“ ‘[T]o alter, amend, or add
to any treaty by inserting any clause, whether small or great,
importantor trivial, would be . . . to make, and not to
construe a treaty’ ” (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat.
1, 71 (1821) (Story, J., for the Court))).
Nor is it true that an
abducting parent who conceals a child’s whereabouts will
necessarily profit by running out the clock on the 1-year period.
American courts have found as a factual matter that steps taken to
promote concealment can also prevent the stable attachments that
make a child “settled.” See, e.g., Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch,
220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363–1364 (MD Fla. 2002) (children not
settled when they “lived in seven different locations” in 18
months); Wigley v. Hares, 82 So. 3d 932, 942 (Fla. App. 2011)
(“The mother purposely kept him out of all community activities,
sports, and even church to avoid detection by the father”);
In re Coffield, 96 Ohio App. 3d 52, 58, 644 N. E. 2d 662,
666 (1994) (child not settled when the abducting parent “was
attempting to hide [child’s] identity” by withholding child from
school and other organized activities). Other signatories to the
Hague Convention have likewise recognized that concealment may be
taken into account in the factual determination whether the child
is settled. See, e.g., Cannon, [2005] 1 W. L. R., ¶¶52–61. See
also Kubera, 3 B. C. L. R. (5th), ¶47, 317 D. L. R.
(4th), ¶47; A. C. v. P. C., [2005] HKEC 839, ¶39, 2005 WL
836263, ¶39. Equitable tolling is therefore neither required by the
Convention nor the only available means to advance its
objectives.
D
Finally, Lozano
contends that the Hague Convention leaves room for United States
courts to apply their own “common law doctrine of equitable
tolling” to the 1-year period in Article 12 without regard to
whether the drafters of the Convention intended equitable tolling
to apply. Brief for Petitioner 25. Specifically, Lozano contends
that the Convention recognizes additional sources of law that
permit signatory states to return abducted children even when
return is not available or required pursuant to the Convention.
Article 34 of the Convention provides that “for the purpos[e] of
obtaining the return of a child,” the Convention “shall not
restrict the application of an international instrument in force
between the State of origin and the State addressed” or the
application of “other law of the State addressed.” Treaty Doc., at
13; see also Art. 18, id., at 11 (“The provisions of this Chapter
do not limit the power of a judicial or administrative authority to
order the return of the child at any time”). In Lozano’s view,
equitable tolling principles constitute “other law” that should
apply here.
That contention
mistakes the nature of equitable tolling as this Court has applied
it. We do not apply equitable tolling as a matter of some
independent authority to reconsider the fairness of legislative
judgments balancing the needs for relief and repose. See supra, at
7–8. To the contrary, we may apply equitable tolling to the Hague
Convention only if we determine that the treaty drafters so
intended. See Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S., at 535. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that they did not.
V
The Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that the 1-year period in Article 12 of the
Hague Convention is not subject to equitable tolling. We therefore
affirm that court’s judgment.
It is so ordered.