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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–820
_________________
MANUEL JOSE LOZANO, PETITIONER v. DIANALUCIA
MONTOYA ALVAREZ
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit
[March 5, 2014]
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a parent abducts a
child and flees to another country, the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction generally requires
that country to return the child immediately if the other parent
requests return within one year. The question in this case is
whether that 1-year period is subject to equitable tolling when the
abducting parent conceals the child’s location from the other
parent. We hold that equitable tolling is not available.
I
To address “the
problem of international child abductions during domestic
disputes,” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 8 (2010) , in
1980 the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
(Hague Convention or Convention), T. I. A. S. No.
11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11 (Treaty Doc.). The Convention
states two primary objectives: “to secure the prompt return
of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting
State,” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States.” Art. 1, id.,at
7.
To those ends, the
Convention’s “central operating feature” is the
return of the child. Abbott, 560 U. S., at 9. That remedy, in
effect, lays venue for the ultimate custody determination in the
child’s country of habitual residence rather than the country
to which the child is abducted. See id., at 20 (“The
Convention is based on the principle that the best interests of the
child are well served when de-cisions regarding custody rights are
made in the countryof habitual residence”).
The return remedy is
not absolute. Article 13 excuses return where, for example, the
left-behind parent was not “actually exercising”
custody rights when the abducting parent removed the child, or
where there is a “grave risk” that return would
“place the child in an intolerable situation.” Hague
Convention, Arts. 13(a)–(b), Treaty Doc., at 10. A state may
also refuse to return the child if doingso would contravene
“fundamental principles . . . relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Art.
20, id., at 11.
This case concerns
another exception to the return remedy. Article 12 of the
Convention states the general rule that when a court receives a
petition for return within one year after the child’s
wrongful removal, the court “shall order the return of the
child forthwith.” Id., at 9. Article 12 further provides that
the court,
“where the proceedings have been
commenced after the expiration of the period of one year [from the
date of the wrongful removal], shall also order the return of the
child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in
its new environment.” Ibid.
Thus, at least in some cases, failure to file a
petitionfor return within one year renders the return remedy
unavailable.
The United States
ratified the Hague Convention in 1988, and Congress implemented the
Convention that same year through the International Child
Abduc-tion Remedies Act (ICARA). 102Stat. 437, 42
U. S. C. §§11601–11610. That statute
instructs courts to “decide the case in accordance with the
Convention.” §11603(d). Echoing the Convention, ICARA
further provides that “[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed
. . . are to be promptly returned unless one of the
narrow exceptions set forth in the Convention applies.”
§11601(a)(4). Finally, ICARA requires the abducting parent to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Article
12’s exception to return applies. §11603(e)(2)(B).
II
Diana Lucia Montoya
Alvarez and Manuel Jose Lozano are the parents of the girl at the
center of this dispute.[
1]
Montoya Alvarez and Lozano met and began dating in London in early
2004. Montoya Alvarez gave birth to a daughter in October 2005.
Montoya Alvarez and
Lozano describe their relationship in starkly different terms.
Lozano stated that they were “ ‘very happy
together,’ ” albeit with “normal couple
problems.” In re Lozano, 809 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204
(SDNY 2011). Montoya Alvarez described a pattern of physical and
emotional abuse that included multiple incidents of rape and
battery. The District Court found insufficient evidence to make
specific findings about domestic violence but determined that
Lozano’s claim that he never mistreated Montoya Alvarez was
“not credible.” Id., at 206.
The parties also differ
as to the child’s well-being during the first three years of
her life. Lozano stated that he and the child had a very good
relationship, and that the child was generally happy. Montoya
Alvarez believed otherwise. In October 2008, Montoya Alvarez
reported to the child’s doctor that she refused to speak at
the nursery she attended, cried often, and wet the bed. Montoya
Alvarez also stated that the child refused to speak when Lozano was
present. The child’s nursery manager wrote that the girl was
“ ‘very withdrawn,’ ” and noted
that the home “ ‘environment obviously had a
negative effect’ ” on her. Id., at 207. The
District Court found insufficient evidence that Lozano had
physically abused the child, but did conclude that the child had
seen and heard her parents arguing at home.
In November 2008, when
the child was just over three years old, Montoya Alvarez went to
New York to visit her sister Maria. During that time, the child
remained in London with Lozano and his visiting mother. When
Montoya Alvarez returned on November 18, she became acutely
concerned about the child’s fearful behavior around Lo-zano.
The next day, Montoya Alvarez left with the child and never
returned.
Montoya Alvarez and the
child lived at a women’s shelter for the next seven months.
After Montoya Alvarez was unable to find suitable long-term
accommodations in the United Kingdom, she and the child left for
France on July 3, 2009, and then for the United States, arriving
five days later. Since their arrival, Montoya Alvarez and the child
have lived with Montoya Alvarez’ sister Maria and her family
in New York.
When they arrived in
New York, Montoya Alvarez and the child began seeing a therapist at
a family medical clinic. The therapist testified that, at first,
the child was withdrawn and would wet herself. The therapist
diagnosed her with posttraumatic stress disorder. Within six
months, however, the therapist described her as
“ ‘a completely different
child,’ ” who had stopped wetting herself, was
excited to play with friends, and was able to speak freely about
her emotions. Id., at 212. When Montoya Alvarez and the child
returned to the therapist after Lo-zano filed a petition for the
child’s return, the therapist noted that the child was doing
well but did not wish to see her father.
In the meantime, Lozano
attempted to find Montoya Alvarez and the child. Shortly after
Montoya Alvarez left in November 2008, he called her sister Gloria
in London, but eventually received legal advice not to speak with
Montoya Alvarez’ family. A mediation service also sent
several letters to Montoya Alvarez on Lozano’s behalf without
receiving a response. In July 2009, Lozano filed an application for
a court order in the United Kingdom “ ‘to ensure
that he obtains regular contact with his [child] and plays an
active role in [her] life.’ ” Id., at 210. He also
sought court orders to compel Montoya Alvarez’ sisters and
legal counsel, the child’s doctor and nursery, and various
government offices in London to disclose the child’s
whereabouts.
On March 15, 2010,
after determining that the child was not in the United Kingdom (and
suspecting that the child was in New York), Lozano filed a form
with the Hague Convention Central Authority for England and Wales
seeking to have the child returned.[
2] The United States Central Authority—the Office of
Children’s Issues in the Department of State, see 22 CFR
§94.2 (2013)—received the application on March 23, 2010.
After the Office of Children’s Issues confirmed that Montoya
Alvarez had entered the United States, Lozano located Montoya
Alvarez’ address in New York. On November 10, 2010, more than
16 months after Montoya Alvarez and the child left the United
Kingdom, Lozano filed a Petition for Return of Child pursuant to
the Hague Convention and ICARA, 42 U. S. C. §11603,
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
After a 2-day
evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Lozano’s
petition. 809 F. Supp. 2d 197. The District Court concluded
that Lozano had stated a prima facie case of wrongful removal under
the Hague Convention. Id., at 219–220. Prior to her removal,
the child was a habitual resident of the United Kingdom, see Hague
Convention, Art. 4, and Lozano had custody rights that hewas
actually exercising at the time of removal, see Arts.
3(a)–(b).
Because the petition
was filed more than one year after the child’s wrongful
removal, however, the District Court denied the petition on the
basis that the child was now settled in New York. Id., at 230, 234.
“Viewing the total-ity of the circumstances,” the court
found sufficient indicia of “stability in her family,
educational, social, and most importantly, home life,” id.,
at 233, to conclude that the child was settled in her current
environment and that repatriation would be “extremely
disruptive,” id., at 234. Lozano argued that the child should
be returned forthwith because the 1-year period in Article 12
should be equitably tolled during the period that Montoya Alvarez
concealed the child. The court rejected that argument, holding that
the 1-year period could not be extended by equitable
tolling.[
3] Id., at
228–229.
On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed. 697 F. 3d 41 (2012). The Court of Appeals
agreed that the 1-year per-iod in Article 12 is not subject to
equitable tolling. According to the court, unlike a statute of
limitations that would prohibit the filing of a return petition
after one year, the1-year period in Article 12 merely permits
courts, after that period has run, to consider the interests of the
child in settlement. Id., at 52. The Second Circuit concluded that
allowing equitable tolling to delay consideration of the
child’s interests would undermine the purpose of the Hague
Convention. Id., at 54.
We granted certiorari
to decide whether Article 12’s1-year period is subject to
equitable tolling. 570 U. S. ___ (2013). Compare 697
F. 3d, at 50–55 (equitable tolling not available); and
Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F. 3d 1, 12–16 (CA1 2013) (same),
with Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F. 3d 563, 568–570 (CA9
2008) (equitable tolling available); and Furnes v. Reeves, 362
F. 3d 702, 723–724 (CA11 2004) (same). We hold that
equitable tolling is not available, and therefore affirm.
III
Although this case
concerns the application of equitable tolling to a treaty, we begin
with a more familiar context: equitable tolling of federal statutes
of limitations. As a general matter, equitable tolling pauses the
running of, or “tolls,” a statute of limitations when a
litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary
circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action. See, e.g.,
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408, 418 (2005) . Because the
doctrine effectively extends an otherwise discrete limitations
period set by Congress, whether equitable tolling is available is
fundamentally a question of statutory intent. See, e.g., Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990) ;
Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467 –480 (1986);
Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 (1967) .
As applied to federal
statutes of limitations, the inquiry begins with the understanding
that Congress “legislate[s] against a background of
common-law adjudicatory principles.” Astoria Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U. S. 104, 108 (1991) . Equitable
tolling, a long-established feature of American jurisprudence
derived from “the old chancery rule,” Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 397 (1946) , is just such a
principle. See Young v. United States, 535 U. S. 43 –50
(2002) (“Congress must be presumed to draft limitations
periods in light of this background principle”); Bailey v.
Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 349–350 (1875). We therefore presume
that equitable tolling applies if the period in question is a
statute of limitations and if tolling is consistent with the
statute. Young, supra, at 49–50 (“It is hornbook law
that limitations periods are ‘customarily subject to
“equitable tolling,” ’ unless tolling would
be ‘inconsistent with the text of the relevant
statute’ ” (citation omitted)).
IV
The Hague Convention,
of course, is a treaty, not a federal statute. For treaties, which
are primarily “ ‘compact[s] between independent
nations,’ ” Medellín v. Texas, 552
U. S. 491, 505 (2008) , our “duty [i]s to ascertain the
intent of the parties” by looking to the document’s
text and context, United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S.
494, 535 (1900) ; see also BG Group plc v. Republic of Argen-tina,
post, at 10.
We conclude that the
parties to the Hague Convention did not intend equitable tolling to
apply to the 1-year period in Article 12. Unlike federal statutes
of limitations, the Convention was not adopted against a shared
background of equitable tolling. Even if the Convention were
subject to a presumption that statutes of limitations may be
tolled, the 1-year period in Article 12 is not a statute of
limitations. And absent a presumption in favor of equitable
tolling, nothing in the Convention warrants tolling the 1-year
period.
A
First, there is no
general presumption that equitable tolling applies to treaties.
Congress is presumed to incorporate equitable tolling into federal
statutes of limitations because equitable tolling is part of the
established backdrop of American law. Rotella v. Wood, 528
U. S. 549, 560 (2000) (“[F]ederal statutes of
limitations are generally subject to equitable principles of
tolling”). It does not follow, however, that we can export
such background principles of United States law to contexts outside
their jurisprudential home.
It is particularly
inappropriate to deploy this background principle of American law
automatically when interpreting a treaty. “A treaty is in its
nature a contract between . . . nations, not a
legislative act.” Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829)
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court); see also 2 Debates on the
Federal Constitution 506 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1863) (James Wilson)
(“[I]n their nature treaties originate differently from laws.
They are made by equal parties, and each side has half of the
bargain to make . . . ”). That distinction has
been reflected in the way we interpret treaties. It is our
“responsibility to read the treaty in a manner
‘consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting
parties.’ ” Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540
U. S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470
U. S. 392, 399 (1985) ; emphasis added). Even if a background
principle is relevant to the interpretation of federal statutes, it
has no proper role in the interpretation of treaties unless that
principle is shared by the parties to “an agreement among
sovereign powers,” Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516
U. S. 217, 226 (1996) .
Lozano has not
identified a background principle of equitable tolling that is
shared by the signatories to the Hague Convention. To the contrary,
Lozano concedes that in the context of the Convention,
“foreign courts have failed to adopt equitable tolling
. . . because they lac[k] the presumption that we
[have].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 19–20. While no signatory
state’s court of last resort has resolved the question,
intermediate courts of appeals in several states have rejected
equitable tolling. See Cannon v. Cannon, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1330,
[2005] 1 W. L. R. 32, ¶51 (Eng.), (rejecting the
“tolling rule” as “too crude an approach”
for the Convention); Kubera v. Kubera, 3 B. C. L. R.
(5th) 121, ¶64, 317 D. L. R. (4th) 307, ¶64 (2010)
(Can.) (equitable tolling “has not been adopted in other
jurisdictions, including Canada”); see also HJ v. Secretary
for Justice, [2006] NZFLR 1005, ¶53 (CA), appeal dism’d
on other grounds, [2007] 2 NZLR 289; A. C. v. P. C.,
[2005] HKEC 839, 2005 WL 836263, ¶55, (Hong Kong Ct. 1st
Instance).[
4] The American
presumption that federal statutes of limitations can be equitably
tolled therefore does not apply to this multilateral treaty. Cf.
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U. S. 530 –545, and
n. 10 (1991) (declining to adopt liability for psychic injury
under the Warsaw Convention because “the unavailability of
compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and civil law
countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference persuades us that
the signatories had no specific intentto include such a remedy in
the Convention” (footnote omitted)).
It does not matter to
this conclusion that Congress enacted a statute to implement the
Hague Convention. See ICARA, 42 U. S. C.
§§11601–11610. ICARA does not address the
availability of equitable tolling. Nor does it purport to alter the
Convention. See §11601(b)(2) (“The provisions of [ICARA]
are in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of the
Convention”). In fact, Congress explicitly recognized
“the need for uniform international interpretation of the
Convention.” §11601(b)(3)(B). Congress’ mere
enactment of implementing legislation did not somehow import
background principles of American law into the treaty
interpretation process, thereby altering our understanding of the
treaty itself.
B
Even if the
presumption in favor of equitable tolling had force outside of
domestic law, we have only applied that presumption to statutes of
limitations. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20,
27 (1989) (no equitable tolling of a 60-day presuit notice
requirement that does not operate as a statute of limitations). The
1-year period in Article 12 is not a statute of limitations.
As a general matter,
“[s]tatutes of limitations establish the period of time
within which a claimant must bring an action.” Heimeshoff v.
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U. S. ___, ___
(2013) (slip op., at 4). They characteristically embody a
“policy of repose, designed to protect defendants.”
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965)
. And they foster the “elimination of stale claims, and
certainty about a plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery and a
defendant’s potential liabilities.” Rotella, supra, at
555.
In Young, 535
U. S. 43 , we evaluated whether those characteristics of
statutes of limitations were present in the “three-year
lookback period” for tax liabilities in bankruptcy
proceedings. The Bankruptcy Code favors tax claims less than three
years old in two respects: Such claims cannot be discharged, and
they have priority over certain others in bankruptcy proceedings.
See 11 U. S. C. §§507(a)(8)(A)(i),
523(a)(1)(A). If the Internal Revenue Service “sleeps on its
rights” by failing to prosecute those claims within three
years, however, then those mechanisms for enforcing claims against
bankrupt taxpayers are eliminated. Young, 535 U. S., at 47. We
concluded that the lookback period “serves the same
‘basic policies [furthered by] all limitations
provisions,’ ” ibid. (quoting Ro-tella, 528
U. S., at 555), i.e., certainty and repose. We accordingly
held that it was a limitations periodpresumptively subject to
equitable tolling. 535 U. S.,at 47.
Unlike the 3-year
lookback period in Young, expiration of the 1-year period in
Article 12 does not eliminate the remedy the Convention affords the
left-behind parent—namely, the return of the child. Before
one year has elapsed, Article 12 provides that the court
“shall order the return of the child forthwith.” Treaty
Doc., at 9. But even after that period has expired, the court
“shall also order the return of the child, unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled.” Ibid. The
continued availability of the return remedy after one year
preserves the possibility of relief for the left-behind parent and
prevents reposefor the abducting parent.[
5] Rather than establishing any certainty about the
respective rights of the parties, the expiration of the 1-year
period opens the door to consideration of a third party’s
interests, i.e., the child’s interest in settlement. Because
that is not the sort of interest addressed by a statute of
limitations, we decline to treat the 1-year period as a statute of
limitations.[
6]
C
Without a presumption
of equitable tolling, the Convention does not support extending the
1-year period during concealment. Article 12 explicitly provides
that the 1-year period commences on “the date of the wrongful
removal or retention,” and makes no provision for an
extension of that period. Id., at 9. Further, the practical effect
of the tolling that Lozano requests would be to delay the
commencement of the 1-year period until the left-behind parent
discovers the child’s location. Commencing the 1-year period
upon discovery is the obvious alternative to the commencement date
the drafters actually adopted because the subject of the Hague
Convention, child abduction, is naturally associated with the sort
of concealment that might justify equitable tolling under other
circumstances. See 697 F. 3d, at 51, n. 8 (“It
would have been a simple matter, if the state parties to the
Convention wished to take account of the possibility that an
abducting parent might make it difficult for the petitioning parent
to discover the child’s whereabouts, to run the period
‘from the date that the petitioning parent learned [or, could
reasonably have learned] of the child’s
whereabouts’ ” (alterations in original)). Given
that the drafters did not adopt that alternative, the natural
implication is that they did not intend the 1-year period to
commence on that later date. Cf. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
Medical Center, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at
10–11). We cannot revisit that choice.
Lozano contends that
equitable tolling is nevertheless consistent with the purpose of
the Hague Convention because it is necessary to deter child
abductions. In his view, “absent equitable tolling,
concealment ‘probably will’ result in
non-return,” which will in turn encourage abduction. Reply
Brief 14–15; see also Duarte, 526 F. 3d, at 570.
We agree, of course,
that the Convention reflects a design to discourage child
abduction. But the Convention does not pursue that goal at any
cost. The child’s interest in choosing to remain, Art. 13, or
in avoiding physical or psychological harm, Art. 13(b), may
overcome the return remedy. The same is true of the child’s
interest in settlement. See supra, at 2; see also In re M,
[2008] 1 A. C. 1288, 1310 (Eng. 2007) (opinion of Baroness Hale of
Richmond) (“These children should not be made to suffer for
the sake of general deterrence of the evil of child abduction world
wide”). We are unwilling to apply equitable tolling
principles that would, in practice, rewrite the treaty. See Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U. S. 122 –135 (1989)
(“ ‘[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty by
inserting any clause, whether small or great, importantor trivial,
would be . . . to make, and not to construe a
treaty’ ” (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat.
1, 71 (1821) (Story, J., for the Court))).
Nor is it true that an
abducting parent who conceals a child’s whereabouts will
necessarily profit by running out the clock on the 1-year period.
American courts have found as a factual matter that steps taken to
promote concealment can also prevent the stable attachments that
make a child “settled.” See, e.g., Mendez Lynch v.
Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1363–1364 (MD Fla.
2002) (children not settled when they “lived in seven
different locations” in 18 months); Wigley v. Hares, 82
So. 3d 932, 942 (Fla. App. 2011) (“The mother purposely
kept him out of all community activities, sports, and even church
to avoid detection by the father”); In re Coffield, 96
Ohio App. 3d 52, 58, 644 N. E. 2d 662, 666 (1994) (child not
settled when the abducting parent “was attempting to hide
[child’s] identity” by withholding child from school
and other organized activities). Other signatories to the Hague
Convention have likewise recognized that concealment may be taken
into account in the factual determination whether the child is
settled. See, e.g., Cannon, [2005] 1 W. L. R.,
¶¶52–61. See also Kubera, 3 B. C. L. R.
(5th), ¶47, 317 D. L. R. (4th), ¶47; A. C. v.
P. C., [2005] HKEC 839, ¶39, 2005 WL 836263, ¶39.
Equitable tolling is therefore neither required by the Convention
nor the only available means to advance its objectives.
D
Finally, Lozano
contends that the Hague Convention leaves room for United States
courts to apply their own “common law doctrine of equitable
tolling” to the 1-year period in Article 12 without regard to
whether the drafters of the Convention intended equitable tolling
to apply. Brief for Petitioner 25. Specifically, Lozano contends
that the Convention recognizes additional sources of law that
permit signatory states to return abducted children even when
return is not available or required pursuant to the Convention.
Article 34 of the Convention provides that “for the purpos[e]
of obtaining the return of a child,” the Convention
“shall not restrict the application of an international
instrument in force between the State of origin and the State
addressed” or the application of “other law of the
State addressed.” Treaty Doc., at 13; see also Art. 18, id.,
at 11 (“The provisions of this Chapter do not limit the power
of a judicial or administrative authority to order the return of
the child at any time”). In Lozano’s view, equitable
tolling principles constitute “other law” that should
apply here.
That contention
mistakes the nature of equitable tolling as this Court has applied
it. We do not apply equitable tolling as a matter of some
independent authority to reconsider the fairness of legislative
judgments balancing the needs for relief and repose. See supra, at
7–8. To the contrary, we may apply equitable tolling to the
Hague Convention only if we determine that the treaty drafters so
intended. See Choctaw Nation, 179 U. S., at 535. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that they did not.
V
The Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that the 1-year period in Article 12 of the
Hague Convention is not subject to equitable tolling. We therefore
affirm that court’s judgment.
It is so ordered.