Whenever the parties to a suit and the subject in controversy
between them are within the regular jurisdiction of a court of
equity, the decree of that court is to every intent as binding as
would be the judgment of a court of law.
Whenever, therefore, an action of debt can be maintained upon a
judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the
like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for
a specific amount, and the records of the two courts are of equal
dignity and binding obligation.
A declaration was sufficient which averred that "at a general
term of the supreme court in equity for the State of New York,"
&c. Being thus averred to be a court of general jurisdiction,
no averment was necessary that the subject matter in question was
within its jurisdiction. And the courts of the United States will
take notice of the judicial decisions in the several states, in the
same manner as the courts of those states.
Page 57 U. S. 66
The facts of the case are set forth in the opinion of the
Court.
Page 57 U. S. 74
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant in error, a citizen of the State of New York,
instituted in the circuit court an action of debt against the
plaintiff in error, a citizen of the State of Maryland, to recover
the amount of a decree, with the costs thereon, which had been
rendered in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff in error
by the supreme court in equity in the State of New York. The
averments in the declaration are as follows:
That at a general term of the Supreme Court in Equity of the
State of New York, one of the United States of America, held at the
courthouse in the Village of Cooperstown, in the County of Otsego,
in the State of New York, on the first Monday in November in the
year 1848, present William H. Shankland and others justices, it was
ordered, adjudged and decreed by the said court in a certain suit
therein pending wherein the said Lyman Gibson was complainant and
the said Josias Pennington and others were defendants that the said
Lyman Gibson recover against the said Josias Pennington and that
the said Josias Pennington pay to the said Lyman Gibson, the amount
of the consideration money paid by the said Lyman Gibson to a
certain Samuel Boyer, as agent and attorney of the said Josias
Pennington as should appear by the several endorsements upon the
contract mentioned and set forth in the bill of complaint, and
produced and proved as an exhibit in said suit, with interest on
the several payments and endorsements respectively, amounting in
the aggregate on the 25th day of November, 1848, to the sum of
$5,473.18, and also that the said Josias Pennington pay to
Page 57 U. S. 75
the said complainant his costs in said suit, which were taxed at
the sum of $661.68, as by the said decree duly signed and enrolled
at a special term of the supreme court in equity aforesaid, held on
the 30th day of April in the year 1849, at the Village of Bath, in
the County of Steuben, in the State of New York, and now remaining
in the office of the Clerk of Steuben County aforesaid, will on
reference appear.
To the declaration as above stated, the defendant, the now
plaintiff in error, demurred, and upon a joinder in demurrer, the
court overruled the demurrer of the said defendant, and gave
judgment for the plaintiff, the now defendant in error, for the
debt and costs in the declaration set forth, together with costs of
suit.
The defendant in the circuit court assigned for causes of
demurrer the three following:
1. For that it appears from the said declaration that the cause
of action in this case is an alleged decree of an alleged court of
equity, as set forth in the said declaration, whereas an action at
law cannot be maintained in this Court on such a decree; at least
without an averment in pleading that said decree within the limits
of its territorial jurisdiction is of equal efficacy with a
judgment at law.
2. For even if an action at law can be maintained for the
recovery of the sums of money directed by such alleged decree to be
paid, as stated in said declaration, yet the form of action adopted
in this case is not the proper form of action for the enforcement
of such a recovery.
3. For that it does not appear in and by the said declaration,
nor is it averred in any manner, that the said alleged court of
equity had any jurisdiction to pass a decree against this defendant
for payment to the plaintiff of any of the sums of money in the
said declaration mentioned.
In considering these causes of demurrer, the attention is
necessarily directed to the ambiguous terms assumed in the first
assignment, by propounding a proposition general or universal in
its character, and afterwards conceding a modification or change in
that proposition inconsistent not merely with its scope and extent,
but with its essential force and operation. For instance, it is
first stated that "the cause of action is an alleged decree of an
alleged court of equity, whereas an action at law cannot be
maintained in this Court on such a decree." We can interpret this
proposition to have no other intelligible meaning than this, and to
be comprehended in no sense more restricted than this, namely, that
an action at law cannot be maintained in a court of law when the
cause of action shall be a decree of the court of equity. In other
words, that the character of the
Page 57 U. S. 76
foundation, or cause of action -- namely, its being a decree of
a court of equity, must, in every such instance, deprive the court
of law of cognizance of the cause. The proposition, thus generally
put, is then followed by a qualification in these words, "at least
without an averment in pleading, that the decree within its
territorial jurisdiction is of equal efficacy with a judgment at
law." By this language, the universality of the previous
proposition is modified, or rather contradicted, for it contains an
obvious concession, that provided a particular efficiency can be
affirmed with regard to it, an action at law may be maintained even
upon a decree of a court of equity.
We will first examine the correctness of the general position
that an action at law cannot be maintained upon a decree in equity,
and will in the next place inquire how far the jurisdiction of the
court pronouncing this decree, and the efficiency of its
proceedings with reference to the parties before it, may be
inferred or rightfully taken notice of, from its style or
character, or from proper judicial knowledge of the subject matter
of its cognizance, independently of a particular special
averment.
We are aware that at one period, courts of equity were said not
to be courts of record, and their decrees were not allowed to rank
with judgments at law, with respect to conflicting claims of
creditors, or in the administration of estates, but these opinions,
the fruits of jealousy in the old common lawyers, would now hardly
be seriously urged, and much less seriously admitted, after a
practice so long and so well settled, as that which confers on
courts of equity in cases of difficulty and intricacy in the
administration of estates, the power of marshaling assets, and in
the exercise of that power the right of controlling the order in
which creditors, either legal or equitable, shall be ranked in the
prosecution of their claims. The relative dignity of courts of
equity, and the binding effect of their decrees, when given within
the pale of their regular Constitution and jurisdiction, are no
longer subjects for doubt or question.
We hold no doctrine to be better settled than this that whenever
the parties to a suit and the subject in controversy between them
are within the regular jurisdiction of a court of equity, the
decree of that court solemnly and finally pronounced, is to every
intent as binding as would be the judgment of a court of law, upon
parties and their interests regularly within its cognizance. It
would follow, therefore, that wherever the latter, received with
regard to its dignity and conclusiveness as a record, would
constitute the foundation for proceedings to enforce it, the former
must be held as of equal authority. These are conclusions which
reason and justice and consistency sustain, and an investigation
will show them to be supported by express adjudication.
Page 57 U. S. 77
It is true that, owing to the peculiar character of equity
jurisprudence, there are instances of decisions by courts of equity
which can be enforced only by the authority and proceedings of
these courts. Such, for example, is the class of cases for specific
performances, or wherever the decision of the court is to be
fulfilled by some personal act of a party, and not by the mere
payment of an ascertained sum of money. But this arises from the
nature of the decreed to be performed, and from the peculiar or
extraordinary power of the court to enforce it, and has no relation
whatsoever to the comparative dignity or authority between
judgments at law and decrees in equity.
We lay it down, therefore, as the general rule, that in every
instance in which an action of debt can be maintained upon a
judgment at law for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the
like action can be maintained upon a decree in equity which is for
an ascertained and specific amount, and nothing more, and that the
record of the proceedings in the one case must be ranked with and
responded to as of the same dignity and binding obligation with the
record in the other.
The case of
Sadler v. Robins, 1 Campbell 253, was an
action upon a decree of the High Court of Chancery in the Island of
Jamaica, for a sum of money,
"first deducting thereout the full costs of the said defendants
expended in the said suit, to be taxed by one of the masters of the
said court, and also deducting thereout all and every other payment
which S. & R., or either of them, might on or before the 1st
day of January, 1806, show to the satisfaction of the said master,
they or either of them had paid &c."
In this case, Lord Ellenborough said,
"had the decree been perfected, I would have given effect to it
as to a judgment at law. The one may be the consideration for an
assumpsit equally with the other. But the law implies a promise to
pay a definite, not an indefinite sum."
The case of
Henly v. Soper, 8 Barn. & Cress. 16; of
Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cowen 496, and of
McKim v.
Odom, 3 Fairfield 94, are all expressly to the point that the
action of debt may be maintained equally upon a decree in chancery
as upon a judgment at law. But if this question had been left in
doubt by other tribunals, it must be regarded as settled for itself
by this Court, in the explicit language of its decision in the case
of
Hopkins v.
Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, where it is declared as a
general rule
"That a fact which has been directly tried and decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction cannot be contested again between
the same parties in the same or in any other court. Hence a verdict
and judgment of a court of record, or a decree in chancery,
although not binding on strangers, puts an end to all
Page 57 U. S. 78
farther controversy concerning the points decided between the
parties to such suit. In this there is and ought to be no
difference between a verdict and judgment in a court at law and a
decree of a court of equity. They both stand upon the same footing,
and may be offered in evidence under the same limitations, and it
would be difficult to assign a reason why it should be otherwise.
The rule has found its way into every system of jurisprudence, not
only from its obvious fitness and propriety, but because, without
it, an end could never be put to litigation. It is therefore not
confined in England or in this country to judgments of the same
court or to the decisions of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, but
extends to matters litigated before competent tribunals in foreign
countries."
The case of
Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cowen, was an action of
debt upon a decree for a specific sum, by a surrogate of one of the
counties of the State of New York.
One of the objections in that case was that the action of debt
could not be maintained, and another that no jurisdiction was shown
by the declaration. The supreme court, in its opinion, said:
"The principal question raised is whether debt will lie. The
general rule is that this form of action is proper for any debt of
record, or by specialty, or for any sum certain. It has been
decided that debt lies upon a decree for the payment of money made
by a court of chancery in another state, and no doubt the action
will lie upon such a decree in our domestic courts of equity. The
decree of the surrogate, unappealed from, is conclusive, and
determines forever the rights of the parties. It may be enforced by
imprisonment, and is certainly evidence of a debt due; whether the
surrogate's court be a court of record need not be decided. It has
often been said that a court of chancery is not a court of record.
It is sufficient that a decree in either court, unappealed from, is
final -- debt will lie."
In opposition to the doctrine we have laid down, the case of
Carpenter v. Thornton, from 3 Barn. & Ald. 52, has
been cited, to show that the action of debt will not lie upon a
decree of a court of equity. But with respect to the case of
Carpenter v. Thornton, it must be remarked that Lord
Tenterden, who decided that case, has, in the subsequent case of
Henly v. Soper, 8 Barn. & Cress. 20, explicitly denied
that the former case can be correctly understood as ruling any such
doctrine or principle as that for which it has been here adduced.
In
Henly v. Soper, his lordship says of
Carpenter v.
Thornton,
"I think it does not establish the broad principle for which it
is cited. It appears by the report that I then expressed myself
with much caution, and I do not find that I ever said that a decree
of a court of equity fixing the balance due on a partnership
account could not be enforced in a court of law
Page 57 U. S. 79
unless the items of the account could be sued for. My judgment
proceeded on the particular circumstances of that case; the bill
was for the specific performance of an agreement, which is a matter
entirely of equitable jurisdiction. But it is a general rule that
if a partnership account be settled, and a balance struck by due
authority, that balance may be recovered in an action at law."
In support of the objection that the action in this case is
founded on a decree in chancery could not be maintained, the
counsel for the plaintiff in error has cited the case of
Hugh v. Higgs,
reported in 8 Wheat. 697. This is a short case, presenting no
precise statement of the facts involved in it, and as far as the
facts are disclosed by the report, they are given in a somewhat
confused and ambiguous form. It is true that the objection to the
action, as founded on a decree in chancery, is said by the court to
have been urged in its broadest extent. But if we look to the
decision of this Court, and the reasoning upon which that decision
is rested, we find the objection to the judgment of the circuit
court, or rather the principle of that objection, narrowed and
brought considerably within the extent of the objection itself. For
this Court says that the judgment of the circuit court must be
reversed for error in the opinion which declares, that the action
is maintainable on the decretal order of the court of chancery. It
might very well be error to allow the action of debt upon a
decretal order of the chancery, and yet perfectly regular to
sustain such an action upon the final decree. The former is subject
to revision and modification, the latter is conclusive upon the
rights of the parties. There is yet another ground on which this
case of
Hugh v. Higgs, so imperfectly stated, might form
an exception to the rule which authorizes actions of debt upon
decrees in equity. In the case last mentioned, the action at law
was brought and the judgment rendered within the regular limits of
the equity jurisdiction of the court, and to the full extent of
which limits the court of equity had the power to enforce its
decrees. Under these circumstances, it might well be ruled that a
party having the right to avail himself directly of the power and
process of the court, should not capriciously relinquish that right
and harass his adversary by a new and useless litigation. An
exception like this is perfectly consistent with the rule that
where the decree of the court of equity cannot be enforced by its
own process, and within the regular bounds of its jurisdiction,
such decree when regular and final, and when especially it
ascertains and declares the simple pecuniary responsibility of a
party may, and for the purposes of justice must be, the foundation
of an action at law against that party whose responsibility has
been thus ascertained. Upon
Page 57 U. S. 80
this principle it is that the courts of law in England, whilst
they have been inclined to restrict the plaintiff to the proper
process of the court of equity for the purpose of enforcing the
decrees of the court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, have
undeviatingly maintained the right of action upon decrees
pronounced by the colonial courts. The process of the colonial
courts could not run into the mother country, but this fact did not
impair the rights settled by the decrees of those courts or render
them less binding or final as between the parties. On the contrary,
it is assigned as the special reason why the courts of law should
take cognizance of such causes without which an entire failure of
justice would ensue.
For this rule of decision in the English courts, the cases of
Sadler v. Robins and of
Henly v. Soper, may again
be recurred to, and, for its adoption by courts in our own country,
may be cited
Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22, and
Dubois
v. Dubois and
McKim v. Odom, already mentioned.
Having disposed of the general proposition in the first
assignment of causes of demurrer by the plaintiff in error, we will
next inquire into the force of the condition or modification he has
annexed to it, in the alleged necessity for an express averment in
pleading of the efficacy or legal obligation of the decree within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court by whom the decree has
been pronounced.
Of the binding obligation and conclusiveness of decrees in
equity where the parties and the subject matter of such decrees are
within the regular cognizance of the court pronouncing them, and of
their equality in dignity and authority with judgments at law, we
have already spoken. It remains for us only to consider what may be
legally intended or concluded from the pleadings in this cause as
to the territorial extent of jurisdiction in the court whose decree
is made the foundation of this action.
The declaration avers,
"That at a general term of the supreme court in equity for the
State of New York, one of United States of America, held at the
village of Cooperstown in the State of New York, on the 1st Monday
in November, in the year 1848, it was ordered, adjudged, and
decreed &c., and farther, that on the 25th of November, 1848,
the complainant's costs were taxed &c., as by the said decree
duly signed and enrolled at a special term of the said supreme
court &c., and now remaining in the office &c., reference
being thereto had, will appear."
It is undeniably true in pleading that where a suit is
instituted in a court of limited and special jurisdiction, it is
indispensable to aver that the cause of action arose within such
restricted jurisdiction, but it is equally true, with regard to
Page 57 U. S. 81
superior courts, or courts of general jurisdiction, that every
presumption is in favor of their right to hold pleas, and that if
an exception to their power or jurisdiction is designed, it must be
averred, and shown as matter of defense. Such is the general rule
as laid down by Chitty, vol. 1, 442. So too in the case of
Shumway v. Stillman, in 4 Cowen 296. The supreme court of
New York, speaking with reference to a judgment rendered in another
state, says:
"every presumption is in favor of the judgment. The record is
prima facie evidence of it, and will be held conclusive
until clearly and explicitly disproved."
And in farther affirmation of the doctrine here laid down, we
hold that the courts of the United States can and should take
notice of the laws and judicial decisions of the several states of
this Union, and that with respect to these, nothing is required to
be specially averred in pleading which would not be so required by
the tribunals of those states respectively. In the case before us,
the declaration avers that the decree on which the action is
founded was a decree of the supreme court in equity of the State of
New York -- of a court whose jurisdiction in equity was supreme,
not over a section of the state; but that it was the supreme court
as to subjects of equity of the state -- that is, of the entire
state, and its decrees being ranked, in our opinion, as equal in
dignity and obligation with judgments at law, its decree in the
case before us was of equal efficacy with any such judgment
throughout its territorial jurisdiction -- or in other words
throughout the extent of the state.
The second and third causes of demurrer assigned by the
plaintiff in error, are essentially comprised in the first
assignment, and are mere subdivisions of that assignment, and in
disposing therefore of the first, the second, and third causes of
demurrer are in effect necessarily passed upon. We are of the
opinion that the demurrer of the plaintiff in error was properly
overruled, and that the judgment of the circuit court be, as it is
hereby, affirmed, with costs.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it
is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment
of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs and interest until paid at the same rate per
annum that similar judgments bear in the courts of the State of
Maryland.