By the Tariff Act of 1846, a duty of thirty percent
ad
valorem is imposed upon articles included within schedule C,
amongst which are
"clothing ready made and wearing apparel of every description,
of whatever material composed, made up, or manufactured, wholly or
in part by the tailor, sempstress, or manufacturer."
By schedule D, a duty of twenty-five percent only is imposed on
manufactures of silk, or of which silk shall be a component
material, not otherwise provided for; manufactures of worsted, or
of which worsted is a component material not otherwise provided
for.
Shawls, whether worsted shawls, worsted and cotton shawls, silk
and worsted shawls, barage shawls, merino shawls, silk shawls,
worsted scarfs, silk scarfs, and mouseline de laine shawls, are
wearing apparel, and therefore subject to a duty of thirty percent
under schedule C.
The popular or received import of words furnishes the general
rule for the interpretation of public laws as well as of private
and social transactions.
It was an action brought by the plaintiffs in error against
Lawrence, the collector of the port of New York, for a return of
duties alleged to have been improperly exacted upon certain
importations of shawls.
The circumstances of the case and the various prayers to the
circuit court, both on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendant, are
fully stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 57 U. S. 256
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs in error instituted in the court aforesaid
against the defendant an action of trespass on the case for the
recovery of an alleged excess of duties charged by the defendant as
collector of the port of New York, and paid to him under protest by
the plaintiffs upon certain goods imported by them from Havre in
France, and described by them in the invoices and entries thereof
as
"worsted shawls, worsted and cotton shawls, silk and worsted
shawls, barege shawls, merino shawls, silk shawls, worsted scarfs,
silk scarfs, and mousseline de laine shawls."
There appear to have been nineteen different importations by the
plaintiffs, comprised within the description just given, but a
particular or separate enumeration of them is not necessary, it
being admitted that the protest of the plaintiffs embraced the
whole of them, and that the correctness or incorrectness of the
proceeding in reference to each of them depends upon the
construction of the same statute. Upon the articles thus described,
the collector charged the duty of thirty percentum
ad
valorem as being wearing apparel within the meaning
Page 57 U. S. 257
of schedule C, in the Act of Congress of the 30th of July, 1846.
Vid. 9 Stat. c. 74, 44. The plaintiffs insist that
according to schedule D, in the same statute, they were bound to
pay at the rate of twenty-five percentum
ad valorem only,
and for a recovery of the difference between this last rate and
that at which they have made payment, their action has been
brought.
Upon issue joined on the plea of nonassumpsit and under
instructions from the court as to the import of the provisions of
the statute of July 30, 1846, a verdict was found for the
defendant, and a judgment entered in accordance therewith. This
case is comprehended within narrow limits, and its decision must
depend entirely upon the interpretation of those portions of the
statute of 1846, designated as schedules C and D, as to the
description and enumeration of the articles subjected to duties and
the rate of impost prescribed by these schedules.
In schedule C, which imposes a duty of thirty percentum
ad
valorem, are comprised the following articles, in the literal
terms of the law,
"clothing ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description,
of whatever material composed, made up, or manufactured, wholly or
in part by the tailor, sempstress, or manufacturer."
By schedule D, of the same act, it is declared that an impost of
twenty-five percentum only shall be levied on
"manufactures of silk, or of which silk shall be a component
material, not otherwise provided for; manufactures of worsted, or
of which worsted is a component material, not otherwise provided
for."
Several witnesses were examined by the plaintiffs, with the view
of showing that in a mercantile sense the term shawls, under which
descriptive name the goods of the plaintiffs were entered, did not
include "wearing apparel," and
a fortiori not wearing
apparel either made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the
tailor, sempstress, or manufacturer, and that therefore under the
provision of schedule D they were subject to an impost of
twenty-five percentum only as manufactures of silk or worsted, "not
otherwise provided for." Countervailing evidence was adduced on the
part of the defendant to show that, in a mercantile sense, and by
generally received and notorious acceptation, and by the plain and
even imperative language of the statute, shawls were established to
be wearing apparel; and consequently came within the rates imposed
by schedule C, and could not be brought within the description in
schedule D, as articles "not otherwise provided for." The character
of the evidence, or more properly the points it was designed to
bear upon, most plainly appear from the several prayers submitted
at the trial, and by the rulings of the court upon those
prayers.
Page 57 U. S. 258
The counsel for the plaintiffs moved the court to charge and
instruct the jury:
1st. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that the
shawls in question were known at the date of the passage of the
said Act of 30 July, 1846, in trade and commerce as "manufactures
of worsted," or of which worsted was a component material, that
then they are embraced in schedule D, and are only liable to a duty
of twenty-five percentum
ad valorem, and no more.
Second. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that the
shawls in question were not, at the date of the said last-mentioned
act, in a commercial sense, and according to the meaning of the
term among merchants, either:
1st. Articles worn by men, women, or children "made up," or made
wholly or in part by hand. 2d. Nor clothing ready-made, or wearing
apparel "made up," or manufactured wholly or in part by the tailor,
sempstress, or manufacturer. 3d. Nor manufactures of cotton, linen,
silk, wool, or worsted, embroidered or tamboured in the loom, or
otherwise by machinery, or with the needle, or other process; then
in either of said cases the articles in question are liable only to
a duty of twenty-five percentum
ad valorem.
Third. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that the
articles in question were charged, under the act of 1842, with duty
as "manufactures of combed wool or worsted," "manufactures of
worsted, and manufactures of worsted and silk combined," under
section 1, subdivision 1 of said act, and as
"manufactures of cotton, or of which cotton shall be a component
part under section 2, subdivision 2 of said act, then the articles
in question are, under the act of 1846, liable to a duty of
twenty-five percent
ad valorem, and no more."
Fourth. That if the jury shall find from the evidence that, at
the date of the passage of the said Act of the 30th of July, 1846,
the shawls in question were commercially known as "manufactures of
worsted," or of which worsted was a component material, and that
they were not known in trade and commerce as clothing ready-made,
or as "wearing apparel" made up, or manufactured wholly or in part
by the tailor, sempstress, or manufacturer, nor as articles worn by
men, women, and children, made up, or made wholly or in part by
hand, then they are chargeable with a duty of twenty-five percent
ad valorem, and no more.
Whereupon his honor, the presiding judge, refused so to instruct
the jury in accordance with all or any of the said several prayers,
whereby the plaintiffs, by their counsel, had prayed the court to
instruct the jury.
And thereupon the counsel for the plaintiffs then and there
Page 57 U. S. 259
excepted to the refusal of the said judge to instruct the jury
in conformity with the said several prayers of the said plaintiffs,
and also to the charge and instructing the jury by the said judge,
in conformity with all, any, and every of the several prayers
wherein the defendant's counsel had so prayed the court to instruct
the jury as matter of law.
The counsel for the defendant insisted, as matter of law, and
prayed the court to charge and instruct the jury as follows:
First. That shawls and scarfs suitable and adapted in the state
they are imported, to be worn by women on the person, as an article
of dress, and usually so worn by women in the United States, are
"wearing apparel," "made up" or manufactured wholly or in part, by
the tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, within the true meaning of
schedule C, of the Tariff Act of the 30th of July, 1846, and are
properly chargeable with the duty of thirty percentum
ad
valorem, prescribed by said schedule C.
Second. That shawls and scarfs of the description above named
are not the less wearing apparel, made up or manufactured wholly or
in part by the tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, within the true
meaning of the said schedule, though sometimes purchased by
clothiers and tailors to be made up into vests, dressing gowns, and
other garments, as testified to by the witnesses for the plaintiffs
in this case.
Third. That shawls and scarfs of the description above named are
wearing apparel, made up or manufactured wholly or in part by the
tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, within the true meaning of the
said schedule C, notwithstanding, at the date of the passage of the
said act of July, 1846, they may not have been called or known by
commercial men in trade and commerce by the name of wearing
apparel.
Fourth. That whatever may have been, at the date of the said
act, the definition given by commercial men to the term "wearing
apparel," shawls and scarfs of the description above named are
nevertheless wearing apparel, made up in whole or in part by the
tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, within the true meaning of the
said schedule C.
Fifth. That shawls or scarfs suitable and adapted in their state
as imported, to be worn by women and children, of whatever material
composed, having fringes added by hand to the body of the shawls
after the same has come from the loom, with sticks or needles, or
other such implements, although according to commercial usage and
understanding that said articles are not thereby charged in their
commercial sense or acceptation, are articles worn by women and
children made up or made wholly or in part by hand within the true
meaning of the said schedule C, and are therefore chargeable with
the duty of thirty percentum
ad valorem, prescribed by
said schedule C.
Page 57 U. S. 260
Sixth. That shawls and scarfs of the description above named, in
the fringes of which, after the body of the shawls has come from
the loom, knots are made by hand as a part of such fringes, or the
fringes of which are twisted or otherwise completed by hand,
although according to commercial usage and understanding the said
articles are not, hereby changed in their commercial sense or
acceptation, are nevertheless articles worn by women and children,
made up or made wholly or in part by hand, within the true meaning
of the said schedule C, and are therefore chargeable with the duty
of thirty percentum
ad valorem, prescribed by the said
schedule C.
And thereupon his honor, the presiding judge, charged the jury
in accordance with the several prayers in conformity with which the
defendant's counsel had insisted as matter of law.
And thereupon the counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to said
ruling of the court upon each of the said prayers.
In construing the provision of schedule C, we think that its
meaning cannot be easily misconceived, if the rule of
interpretation be drawn from the ordinary and received acceptation
of its language, or from any regard to the sensible and consistent
application of its words. It is obvious that by the phrase
"clothing ready-made, and wearing apparel of every description,"
the legislature did not mean to limit the enumeration to such
habiliments as were either by necessity or by a regard to comfort
or utility required to be changed from their original shape or
fashion, and reshaped and reconstructed in order to adapt them to
the human body, or to the purposes of life. Such a construction
would render the member of the sentence immediately following and
connected with the former by the copulative conjunction, and
designing to introduce a new class of subjects, altogether absurd
and wholly inoperative. It must be understood as being the
intention of the legislature to add to "clothing ready-made," in
the acceptation above given, every article which in its design and
completion and received uses, is an article of wearing apparel, and
to comprise such article within schedule C of the act of 1846, no
matter of what material composed, either in whole or in part, or by
whom composed or made up, whether by the tailor, sempstress, or
manufacturer. The question to be determined has no relation either
to material, or process, or agent, but exclusively to the origin
and purposes of the subject of the duty imposed as being in its
design and in its finished condition "wearing apparel." Simply, in
other words, whether shawls are wearing apparel.
By the several prayers pressed upon the circuit court for
instructions to the jury, the object to which they are all directed
has been the diversion of the jury from this the only
legitimate
Page 57 U. S. 261
inquiry before them. The effort has been to substitute for the
literal and lexicographical and popular meaning of the phrase
"wearing apparel," some supposed mercantile or commercial
signification of these words, and to render subservient to that
signification what was clearly accordant with the etymology of the
language of the statute, with the essential purposes and action of
the government, and with the wide-spread if not the universal
understanding of all who may not happen to fall within the range of
a limited and interested class. In instances in which words or
phrases are novel or obscure, as in terms of art, where they are
peculiar or exclusive in their signification, it may be proper to
explain or elucidate them by reference to the art or science to
which they are appropriate; but if language which is familiar to
all classes and grades and occupations -- language, the meaning of
which is impressed upon all by the daily habits and necessities of
all, may be wrested from its established and popular import in
reference to the common concerns of life, there can be little
stability or safety in the regulations of society. Perhaps within
the compass of the English language, and certainly within the
popular comprehension of the inhabitants of this country, there can
scarcely be found terms the import of which is better understood
than is that of the words "shawl" and "wearing apparel," or of
"shawl" as a familiar, every day and indispensable part of wearing
apparel. And it would seem to be a most extravagant supposition
which could hold that, in the enactment of a law affecting the
interests of the nation at large, the legislature should select for
that purpose language by which the nation or the mass of the people
must necessarily be misled. The popular or received import of words
furnishes the general rule for the interpretation of public laws as
well as of private and social transactions; and wherever the
legislature adopts such language in order to define and promulge
their action or their will, the just conclusion from such a course
must be, that they not only themselves comprehended the meaning of
the language they have selected, but have chosen it with reference
to the known apprehension of those to whom the legislative language
is addressed, and for whom it is designed to constitute a rule of
conduct, namely, the community at large. If therefore the strange
concession were admissible that, in the opinion of a portion of the
mercantile men, shawls were not considered wearing apparel, it
would still remain to be proved that this opinion was sustained by
the judgment of the community generally, or that the legislature
designed a departure from the natural and popular acceptation of
language.
Another position pressed upon the circuit court in behalf of the
plaintiffs in error, as is shown by the evidence and by one
Page 57 U. S. 262
of the prayers to the court, was this: that shawls, in the form
in which they are fashioned and finished by the manufacturer, could
not properly be termed wearing apparel, because they are by tailors
and clothiers frequently purchased to be worked up into vests and
other garments. This position might, with equal propriety, be urged
with reference to any article of wearing apparel whatsoever which
should be diverted from its primal and regular use and design. The
consistency and force of this argument, if such it deserves to be
called, may be aptly illustrated by the account of the varied uses
of a familiar article of wearing apparel found in a poetical
description of the privations and expedients of a needy author, in
which we read that,
"A stocking decked his brow instead of bay,"
"A cap by night, a stocking all the day."
According to the logic of the position last referred to, a
stocking transferred into a night-cap is shown never to have been a
stocking, and therefore never wearing apparel, notwithstanding its
primitive denomination, the design for which it was knit or woven
or the offices to which it may have been usually applied.
To the rulings of the circuit court upon the prayers presented
on behalf of the plaintiffs and defendants respectively we deem it
unnecessary to apply a separate comment. It is sufficient here to
remark that upon a deliberate examination of those rulings, in
reference to the facts and features of the case, we accord to the
former our entire sanction as being coincident with the principles
laid down in this opinion and with a just interpretation of those
clauses of the statute under color of which this action was
instituted. We therefore adjudge that the decision of the circuit
court be, and the same is hereby,
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the
judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same
is hereby, affirmed with costs.