The statute of limitations of New York allows ten years within
which an action must be brought by the heirs of a person under
disability after that disability is removed.
But the right of entry would be barred if an adverse possession,
including those ten years, had then continued twenty years, and the
right of title would be barred if the adverse possession had
continued twenty-five years, including those ten years. Cumulative
disabilities are not allowed in the one case or in the other.
Therefore, where a right of entry accrued to a person who was in
a state of insanity, the limitation did not begin to run until the
death of that person, but began to run then, although the heir was
under coverture.
The circumstances of the case are fully stated in the opinion of
the Court.
Page 57 U. S. 248
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff brought an action of ejectment in the court below
against the defendant to recover the one-twentieth part of a mill
seat and the erections thereon, together with some eighteen acres
of land, situate on the River Bronx in the Town and County of
Westchester in said state, and, on the trial, gave evidence tending
to prove that the premises were owned in fee in 1726 by one
Nicholas Brouwer, and that he continued seised of the same as owner
down to his death, in 1749; that his heir at law was a grandchild
Hannah, then the wife of
Page 57 U. S. 249
Edmund Turner; that said Turner died in 1805, leaving his wife
surviving, but who had been for some years previously, and then was
insane, and so continued till her death, in 1822; that at her death
she left, as heirs at law surviving her, several children and
grandchildren; that one of her surviving children was Jemima Thorp,
the mother of the present plaintiff, who was married to Peter Thorp
when nineteen years of age; the said Peter died in 1832, and said
Jemima, who survived him, died in 1842, leaving the plaintiff and
other children surviving. The plaintiff, also, proved the defendant
in possession of the premises and rested.
The defendant then proved that, before the year 1801, the
premises in question were in the actual possession of one Oliver De
Lancy claiming as owner, who in the same year by indenture of lease
demised the same to one James Bathgate, for the term of fourteen
years; that the said Bathgate entered into possession, and
continued to hold and occupy the premises under this lease till
1804, when one David Lydig entered, claiming to be the owner in
fee; that said Bathgate attorneyed to, and held and occupied under
him, as tenant, down to 1840, when the defendant succeeded as
tenant of the premises under the said Lydig; that David Lydig died
in 1840, leaving Philip, his only child and heir at law, surviving,
and that from the date of the lease to Bathgate, 1st May 1801, down
to the commencement of this suit, the premises had been continually
held and possessed by De Lancy and the Lydigs, father and son, by
their several tenants, claiming to be the owners in fee, and
exclusive of any other right or title; and occupied and enjoyed the
same in all respects as such owners.
Both parties having rested, the court charged the jury that
Hannah Turner took the title to the premises on the death of her
grandfather, Nicholas Brouwer, in 1749, as his heir at law, but,
that as she was then a
feme covert, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run against her till 1805, on the
death of Edmund Turner, her husband, and as she was also under the
disability of insanity, in 1801, when the adverse possession
commenced, the statute did not begin to run against her estate
until her death, this latter disability having continued till then;
and, that her heirs had ten years after this period to bring the
action. But that the right of entry would be barred if the adverse
possession, including these ten years, had continued twenty years,
and the right of title would also be barred if the adverse
possession had continued twenty-five years, including these ten
years. That the ten years having expired in 1832, and the action
not having been brought by the plaintiff till 1850, it was barred
by the statute of limitations in both respects as
Page 57 U. S. 250
an ejectment, or writ of right, and that, upon the law of the
case, the defendant was entitled to their verdict.
We think the ruling of the court below was right, and that the
judgment should be affirmed.
It is admitted, that, if this suit should be regarded in the
light of an action of ejectment to recover possession of the
premises, the right of entry would have been barred by the statute
of New York, the twenty years bar having elapsed since the right
accrued, before suit brought. 1 R. Laws of 1813, 185, ยง 3.
The right of entry of Hannah Turner accrued in 1801, but at that
time she was laboring under the disability of coverture, and also
of insanity, which latter survived the former, and continued till
her death, in 1822. By the saving clause in the third section of
the act, the heirs had ten years from the time of her death within
which to bring the ejectment, and no longer, notwithstanding they
may have been minors, or were laboring under other disabilities, as
it is admitted, successive or cumulative disabilities are not
allowable under this section. 6 Cow. 74; 3 Johns.Ch. 129, 135. The
ten years expired in 1832, which, with the time that had elapsed
after the adverse possession commenced, exceeded the twenty years
given by the statute. The suit was brought in 1850.
But it is supposed that the saving clause in the second section
of this act, which prescribes a limitation of twenty-five years as
a bar to a writ of right, is different, and allows cumulative
disabilities, and as ejectment is a substituted remedy in the court
below for the writ of right, it is claimed the defendant is bound
to make out an adverse possession of twenty-five years, deducting
successive or cumulative disabilities. This, however, is a mistake.
The saving clause in this second section, though somewhat different
in phraseology, has received the same construction in the courts of
New York as that given to the third section. 12 Wend. 602, 619,
620, 635, 636, 656, 676.
The judgment of the court below is therefore
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record,
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York, and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the
judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs.