SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JOHN MARSHALL, WARDEN
v. OTIS LEE
RODGERS
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 12–382. Decided April 1, 2013
Per Curiam.
Respondent Otis Lee Rodgers, challenging his
state con- viction, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United
States District Court for the Central District of California. He
claimed the state courts violated his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel by declining to ap- point an
attorney to assist in filing a motion for a new trial
notwithstanding his three prior waivers of the right to counseled
representation. The District Court denied respondent’s petition,
and he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which granted habeas relief. 678 F.3d 1149, 1163 (2012). Because
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent’s claim is
supported by “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1), its judgment must be reversed.
I
In 2001, the State of California charged
respondent with making criminal threats, assault with a firearm,
and be- ing a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Before his arraignment, respondent executed a valid waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, electing to represent himself.
See
Faretta v.
California,
422
U.S. 806, 807 (1975). By the time of his preliminary hearing,
however, respondent changed his mind and retained counsel. Then,
two months later, he fired his lawyer and again waived his right to
counsel. Two months after that, respondent again changed his mind
and asked the court to appoint an attorney. The court did so.
Shortly before trial, however, respondent for the third time
surrendered his right to counsel. He proceeded to trial
pro se. On June 27, 2003, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty.
After the verdict was read, respondent asked the
state trial court to provide an attorney to help him file a motion
for a new trial. The trial judge deferred ruling on the motion to
appoint counsel, and respondent later renewed the request in
writing. Neither the oral nor the written motion included reasons
in support of his request; and when offered a chance to supplement
or explain his motion at a later hearing, respondent declined to do
so. The trial court denied the request for counsel. Respondent’s
pro se motion for a new trial was likewise denied.
On direct review the California Court of Appeal
affirmed respondent’s convictions and sentence. As relevant here,
it concluded that his history of vacillating between counseled and
self-representation, the lack of support for his motion, his
demonstrated competence in defending his case, and his insistence
that he “ ‘c[ould] do the motion [him]self’ ” but
“ ‘just need[ed] time to perfect it,’ ” App. to Pet. for
Cert. 129–130, justified the trial court’s denial of his post-trial
request for counsel. The state appellate court also distinguished
its decision from that of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in
Menefield v.
Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (1989),
reasoning that the habeas petitioner in
Menefield had stated
reasons justifying his request for counsel, whereas respondent’s
request was unreasoned and unexplained. The state appellate court
concluded that “[b]ecause the [trial] court was not given any
reason to grant [respondent’s] motion, we cannot find that the
court abused its discretion in declining to do so.” App. to Pet.
for Cert. 130.
Having failed to obtain relief in state court,
respondent filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the
California courts had violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by not providing an attorney to help with his new-trial motion. The
District Court denied the petition but granted a certificate of
appealability. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
respondent’s “ Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when
the trial court denied his timely request for representation for a
new trial motion.” 678 F. 3d, at 1163.
To reach the conclusion that respondent’s right
to counsel in these circumstances was clearly established by the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit invoked certain Sixth Amendment precedents from its
own earlier cases and from cases in other Circuits. From those
precedents, the panel identified two relevant principles that it
deemed to have been clearly established by this Court’s cases:
first, that a defendant’s waiver of his right to trial counsel does
not bar his later election to receive assistance of counsel at a
later critical stage of the prosecution, absent proof by the State
that the reappointment request was made in bad faith, see
id., at 1159–1162; and, second, that a new-trial motion is a
critical stage, see
id., at 1156–1159. Combining these two
propositions, the court held that respondent had a clearly
established right to the reappointment of counsel for purposes of
his new-trial motion, and that the California courts—which vest the
trial judge with discretion to approve or deny such requests based
on the totality of the circumstances, see
People v.
Lawley,
27 Cal. 4th 102, 147–151, 38 P.3d 461, 493–495 (2002)—violated
that right by refusing to order the reappointment of counsel. 678
F. 3d, at 1162–1163.
II
The starting point for cases subject to
§2254(d)(1) is to identify the “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” that governs
the habeas petitioner’s claims. See
Williams v.
Taylor,
529 U.S.
362, 412 (2000);
Knowles v.
Mirzayance,
556 U.S.
111, 122 (2009). As indicated above, the parties here dispute
whether two principles of law are clearly established under this
framework. One is whether, after a defendant’s valid waiver of his
right to trial counsel under
Faretta, a post-trial,
preappeal motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the
prosecution. For purposes of analysis here, it will be assumed,
without so holding, that it is.
The other disputed question is whether, after a
defendant’s valid waiver of counsel, a trial judge has discretion
to deny the defendant’s later request for reappointment of counsel.
In resolving this question in respondent’s favor, the Court of
Appeals first concluded (correctly) that “the Supreme Court has
never explicitly addressed a criminal defendant’s ability to
re-assert his right to counsel” once he has validly waived it. 678
F. 3d, at 1159 (internal quotation marks omitted). It then
(also correctly) recognized that the lack of a Supreme Court
decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that
there is no clearly established federal law, since “a general
standard” from this Court’s cases can supply such law.
Yarborough v.
Alvarado,
541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004). The Court of Appeals erred, however, in its
application of this latter proposition to the controlling issues
here.
It is beyond dispute that “[t]he Sixth Amendment
safeguards to an accused who faces incarceration the right to
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process.”
Iowa v.
Tovar,
541 U.S.
77, 80–81 (2004); see
United States v.
Cronic,
466 U.S.
648, 653–654 (1984);
Gideon v.
Wainwright,
372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963). It is just as well settled, however, that a
defendant also has the right to “proceed
without counsel
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.”
Faretta, 422 U. S., at 807.
There can be some tension in these two
principles. As the
Faretta Court observed, “[t]here can be
no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his
own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court’s
decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused
can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the
right to the assistance of counsel.”
Id., at 832. California
has resolved this tension by adopting the framework under review.
Under that approach, trial judges are afforded discretion when
considering postwaiver requests for counsel; their decisions on
such requests must be based on the totality of the circumstances,
“includ[ing] ‘the quality of [the defendant’s] representation of
[himself], the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel,
the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the
proceedings, and the disruption or delay [that] might reasonably be
expected to follow the granting of such a motion.’ ”
Lawley,
supra, at 149, 38 P. 3d, at 494 (quoting
People v.
Windham,
19 Cal. 3d 121, 128, 560 P.2d 1187, 1191–1192 (1977); final
alteration in original). The state appellate court applied those
rules to the case at bar, concluding that the totality of the
circumstances—and especially the shifting nature of respondent’s
preferences, the unexplained nature of his motion, and his
demonstrated capacity to handle the incidents of trial—supported
the trial court’s decision. App. to Pet. for Cert. 128–131.
The Court of Appeals, however, has resolved that
tension differently in its own direct-review cases. It has adopted
a “ ‘strong presumption that a defendant’s post-trial request
for the assistance of an attorney should not be refused,’ ”
678 F. 3d, at 1160 (quoting
Robinson v.
Ignacio,
360 F.3d 1044, 1058 (CA9 2004); emphasis deleted), as well as a
default rule that, “ ‘in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances,’ a defendant’s post-trial revocation of his waiver
should be allowed unless the government can show that the request
is made ‘for a bad faith purpose,’ ”
id., at 1058
(quoting
Menefield, 881 F. 2d
, at 701; emphasis
deleted).
It is unnecessary for present purposes to judge
the merits of these two approaches or determine what rule the Sixth
Amendment in fact establishes for postwaiver requests of
appointment of counsel. All this case requires—and all the Court of
Appeals was empowered to do under §2254(d)(1)—is to observe that,
in light of the tension between the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
“the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal
process,”
Tovar,
supra, at 80–81, and its concurrent
promise of “a constitutional right to proceed
without
counsel when [a criminal defendant] voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so,”
Faretta,
supra, at 807, it cannot
be said that California’s approach is contrary to or an
unreasonable ap- plication of the “general standard[s]” established
by the Court’s assistance-of-counsel cases.
Alvarado,
supra, at 664.
The Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion rested
in part on the mistaken belief that circuit precedent may be used
to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that this Court has not
announced.
Parker v.
Matthews, 567 U. S. ___,
___ (2012) (
per curiam) (slip op., at 12–13) (“The
highly generalized standard for evaluating claims of prosecutorial
misconduct set forth in
Darden [v.
Wainwright,
477 U.S.
168 (1986)] bears scant resemblance to the elaborate, multistep
test employed by the Sixth Circuit here”); see 678 F. 3d, at
1155, 1157. The error in this approach is subtle, yet substantial.
Although an appellate panel may, in accordance with its usual
law-of-the-circuit procedures, look to circuit precedent to
ascertain whether it has already held that the particular point in
issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent, see,
e.g., Tolliver v.
Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 916,
n. 6 (CA6 2010) (“We are bound by prior Sixth Circuit
determinations that a rule has been clearly established”);
Chambers v.
McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1199 (CA9 2008),
it may not canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a
particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal
Circuits that it would, if presented to this Court, be accepted as
correct. See
Parker,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at
12–13);
Renico v.
Lett,
559 U.S.
766, 778–779 (2010). The Court of Appeals failed to abide by
that limitation here. Its resulting holding was erroneous and must
be reversed.
III
The Court expresses no view on the merits of
the underlying Sixth Amendment principle the respondent urges. And
it does not suggest or imply that the underlying issue, if
presented on direct review, would be insubstantial. This opinion is
instead confined to the determination that the conclusion of the
California courts that there was no Sixth Amendment violation is
not contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” §2254(d)(1).
The petition for a writ of certiorari and
respondent’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis are
granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.