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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 12–236
_________________
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER
v. MELISSA CLOER
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit
[May 20, 2013]
Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.[
1]*
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 (NCVIA or Act), 100Stat. 3756, 42 U. S. C. §300aa–1
et seq., provides that a court may award attorney’s
fees and costs “incurred [by a claimant] in any proceeding on” an
unsuccessful vaccine-injury “petition filed under section
300aa–11,” if that petition “was brought in good faith and there
was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was
brought.” §300aa–15(e)(1). The Act’s limitations provision states
that “no petition may be filed for compensation” more than 36
months after the claimant’s initial symptoms occur.
§300aa–16(a)(2). The question before us is whether an untimely
petition can garner an award of attorney’s fees. We agree with a
majority of the en banc Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
that it can.
I
A
The NCVIA “establishes a no-fault compensation
program ‘designed to work faster and with greater ease than the
civil tort system.’ ”
Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC,
562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3) (quoting
Shalala v.
White-
cotton,
514 U.S.
268, 269 (1995)). Congress enacted the NCVIA to stabilize the
vaccine market and expedite compensation to injured parties after
complaints mounted regarding the inefficiencies and costs borne by
both injured consumers and vaccine manufacturers under the pre-
vious civil tort compensation regime. 562 U. S., at ___–___
(slip op., at 2–3); H. R. Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, pp. 6–7
(1986) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).
The compensation program’s procedures are
straightforward. First, “[a] proceeding for compensation under the
Program for a vaccine-related injury or death shall be initiated by
service upon the Secretary [for the Department of Health and Human
Services] and the filing of a petition containing the matter
prescribed by subsection (c) of this section with the United States
Court of Federal Claims.” 42 U. S. C. §300aa–11(a)(1).
Subsection (c) pro- vides in relevant part that a petition must
include “an affidavit, and supporting documentation, demonstrating
that the person who suffered such injury” was actually vaccinated
and suffered an injury. §300aa–11(c)(1). Next, upon receipt of an
NCVIA petition, “[t]he clerk of the United States Court of Federal
Claims shall immediately forward the filed petition to the chief
special master for assignment to a special master.”
§300aa–11(a)(1). This special master then “makes an informal
adjudication of the petition.”
Bruesewitz, 562 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 3) (citing §300aa–12(d)(3)). A successful
claimant may recover medical costs, lost earning capacity, and an
award for pain and suffering, 42 U. S. C. §300aa–15(a),
with compensation paid out from a federal trust fund supported by
an excise tax levied on each dose of certain covered vaccines, see
26 U. S. C. §§4131, 4132, 9510; 42 U. S. C.
§300aa–15(f)(4)(A). But under the Act’s limitations provision, “no
petition may be filed for compensation under the Program for [a
vaccine-related] injury after the expiration of 36 months after the
date of the occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of
onset or of the significant aggravation of” the alleged injury.
§300aa–16(a)(2).
The Act also includes an unusual scheme for
compensating attorneys who work on NCVIA petitions. See
§300aa–15(e).[
2] “No attorney
may charge any fee for services in connection with a petition filed
under section 300aa–11 of this title.” §300aa–15(e)(3).[
3] But a court may award attorney’s
fees in certain circumstances. In the case of successful petitions,
the award of attorney’s fees is automatic. §300aa–15(e)(1) (“In
awarding compensation on a petition filed under section 300aa–11 of
this title the special master or court shall also award as part of
such compensation an amount to cover . . . reasonable
attorneys’ fees, and . . . other costs”). For
unsuccessful petitions, “the special master or court may award an
amount of compensation to cover petitioner’s reasonable attorneys’
fees and other costs incurred in any proceeding on such petition if
the special master or court determines that the petition was
brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the
claim for which the petition was brought.”
Ibid. In other
words, “[a]ttorney’s fees are provided, not only for successful
cases, but even for unsuccessful claims that are not frivolous.”
Bruesewitz, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).
B
Respondent, Dr. Melissa Cloer, received three
Hepatitis-B immunizations from September 1996 to April 1997.
Shortly after receiving the third vaccine, Dr. Cloer began to
experience numbness and strange sensations in her left forearm and
hand. She sought treatment in 1998 and 1999, but the diagnoses she
received were inconclusive. By then, Dr. Cloer was experiencing
numbness in her face, arms, and legs, and she had difficulty
walking. She intermittently suffered these symptoms until 2003,
when she began to experience the full manifestations of, and was
eventually diagnosed with, multiple sclerosis (MS). In 2004, Dr.
Cloer became aware of a link between MS and the Hepatitis-B
vaccine, and in September 2005, she filed a claim for compensation
under the NCVIA, alleging that the vaccinations she received had
caused or exacerbated her MS.
Dr. Cloer’s petition was sent by the clerk of
the Court of Federal Claims to the Chief Special Master, who went
on to adjudicate it. After reviewing the petition and its
supporting documentation, the Chief Special Master concluded that
Dr. Cloer’s claim was untimely because the Act’s 36-month
limitations period began to run when she first experienced the
symptoms of MS in 1997.
Cloer v.
Secretary of Dept. of
Health and Human Servs., No. 05–1002V, 2008 WL 2275574, *1, *10
(Fed. Cl., May 15, 2008) (opinion of Golkiewicz, Chief Special
Master) (citing §300aa–16(a)(2) (NCVIA’s limitations provision)).
Relying on Federal Circuit precedent, the Chief Special Master also
rejected Dr. Cloer’s argument that the NCVIA’s limitations period
should be subject to equitable tolling.
Id., at *9 (citing
Brice v.
Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
240 F.3d 1367, 1373 (2001)). A divided panel of the Federal
Circuit reversed the Chief Special Master, concluding that the
NCVIA’s limitations period did not commence until “the medical
community at large objectively recognize[d] a link between the
vaccine and the injury.”
Cloer v.
Secretary of Health and
Human Servs., 603 F.3d 1341, 1346 (2010).
The en banc court then reversed the panel’s
decision,
Cloer v.
Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., 654 F.3d 1322 (2011), cert. denied, 566 U. S. ___
(2012), and held that the statute’s limitations period begins to
run on “the calendar date of the occurrence of the first medically
recognized symptom or manifestation of onset of the injury claimed
by the petitioner.” 654 F. 3d
, at 1324–1325. The Court
of Appeals also held that the Act’s limitations provision was
nonjurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling in limited
circumstances, overruling its prior holding in
Brice. 654
F. 3d
, at 1341–1344. The court concluded, however, that
Dr. Cloer was ineligible for tolling and that her petition was
untimely.
Id., at 1344–1345.
Following this decision, Dr. Cloer moved for an
award of attorney’s fees. The en banc Federal Circuit agreed with
her that a person who files an untimely NCVIA petition “assert[ing]
a reasonable limitations argument” may re- cover fees and costs so
long as “ ‘the petition was brought in good faith and there
was a reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was
brought.’ ” 675 F.3d 1358, 1359–1361 (2012) (quoting
§300aa–15(e)(1)). Six judges disagreed with this conclusion and
instead read the NCVIA to bar such awards for untimely petitions.
Id., at 1364–1368 (Bryson, J., dissenting). We granted the
Government’s petition for writ of certiorari. 568 U. S. ___
(2012). We now affirm.
II
A
As in any statutory construction case, “[w]e
start, of course, with the statutory text,” and proceed from the
understanding that “[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are
generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning.”
BP America Production Co. v.
Burton,
549 U.S.
84, 91 (2006). The Act’s fees provision ties eligibility for
attorney’s fees broadly to “any proceeding on such petition,”
referring specifically to “a petition filed under section
300aa–11.” 42 U. S. C. §§300aa–15(e)(1), (3). Section
300aa–11 provides that “[a] proceeding for compensation” is
“initiated” by “service upon the Secretary” and “the filing of a
petition containing” certain documentation with the clerk of the
Court of Federal Claims who then “immediately forward[s] the filed
petition” for assignment to a special master. §300aa–11(a)(1). See
supra, at 2.
Nothing in these two provisions suggests that
the reason for the subsequent dismissal of a petition, such as its
untimeliness, nullifies the initial filing of that petition. We
have explained that “[a]n application is ‘filed,’ as that term is
commonly understood, when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the
appropriate court officer for placement into the official record.”
Artuz v.
Bennett,
531 U.S.
4, 8 (2000). When this ordinary meaning is applied to the text
of the statute, it is clear that an NCVIA petition which is
delivered to the clerk of the court, forwarded for processing, and
adjudicated in a proceeding before a special master is a “petition
filed under section 300aa–11.” 42 U. S. C.
§300aa–15(e)(1). And so long as such a petition was brought in good
faith and with a reasonable basis, it is eligible for an award of
attorney’s fees, even if it is ultimately unsuccessful.
Ibid. If Congress had intended to limit fee awards to timely
petitions, it could easily have done so. But the NCVIA instead
authorizes courts to award attorney’s fees for those unsuccessful
petitions “brought in good faith and [for which] there was a
reasonable basis.”
Ibid.[
4]
The Government argues that the Act’s limitations
provision, which states that “no petition may be filed for
compensation” 36 months after a claimant’s initial symptoms began,
§300aa–16(a)(2), constitutes “a statutory prerequisite to the
filing of a petition ‘for compensation under the Program,’ ”
Brief for Petitioner 16. Thus, the Government contends, a petition
that fails to comply with these time limits is not “a petition
filed under section 300aa–11” and is therefore ineligible for fees
under §300aa–15(e)(1). See 675 F. 3d, at 1364–1366 (Bryson,
J., dissenting).
The Government’s argument lacks textual support.
First, as noted, there is no cross-reference to the Act’s
limitations provision in its fees provision, §300aa–15(e), or the
other section it references, §300aa–11(a)(1). When these two linked
sections are read in tandem they simply indicate that petitions
filed with the clerk of the court are eligible for attorney’s fees
so long as they comply with the other requirements of the Act’s
fees provision. By its terms, the NCVIA requires nothing more for
the award of attorney’s fees. A petition filed in violation of the
limitations period will not result in the payment of compensation,
of course, but it is still a petition filed under
§300aa–11(a)(1).[
5]
When the Act does require compliance with the
limitations period, it provides so expressly. For example,
§300aa–11(a)(2)(A) prevents claimants from bringing suit against
vaccine manufacturers “unless a petition has been filed,
in
accordance with section 300aa–16 of this title [the limitations
provision], for compensation under the Program for such injury or
death.” (Emphasis added.) We have long held that “[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.”
Bates v.
United States,
522 U.S.
23, 29–30 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
absence of any cross-reference to the limitations provision in
either the fees provision, §300aa–15(e)(1), or the instructions for
initiating a compensation proceeding, §300aa–11(a)(1), indicates
that a petition can be “filed” without being “in accordance with
[the limitations provision].” Tellingly, nothing in §300aa–11(a)(1)
requires a petitioner to allege or demonstrate the timeliness of
his or her petition to initiate such a proceeding.[
6]
Second, to adopt the Government’s position, we
would have to conclude that a petition like Dr. Cloer’s, which was
“filed” under the ordinary meaning of that term but was later found
to be untimely, was never filed at all because, on the Government’s
reading, “no petition may be
filed for compensation” late.
§300aa–16(a)(2) (emphasis added). Yet the court below identified
numerous instances throughout the NCVIA where the word “filed” is
given its ordinary meaning, 675 F. 3d, at 1361, and the
Government does not challenge this aspect of its decision. Indeed,
the Government’s reading would produce anomalous results with
respect to these other NCVIA provisions. Consider §300aa–12(b)(2),
which provides that “[w]ithin 30 days after the Secretary receives
service of any petition filed under section 300aa–11 of this title
the Secretary shall publish notice of such petition in the Federal
Register.” If the NCVIA’s limitations provision worked to void the
filing of an untimely petition, then one would expect the Secretary
to make timeliness determinations prior to publishing such notice
or to strike any petitions found to be untimely from the Federal
Register. But there is no indication that the Secretary does either
of these things.[
7]
The Government asks us to adopt a different
definition of the term “filed” for a single subsection so that for
fees purposes, and only for fees purposes, a petition filed out of
time must be treated retroactively as though it was never filed in
the first place. Nothing in the text or structure of the statute
requires the unusual result the Government asks us to accept. In
the NCVIA, the word “filed” carries its common meaning. See
Artuz, 531 U. S., at 8. That “no petition may be filed
for compensation” after the limitations period has run does not
mean that a late petition was never filed at all.
Our “inquiry ceases [in a statutory construction
case] if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent.”
Barnhart v.
Sigmon
Coal Co.,
534 U.S.
438, 450 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of
the statute is clear: like any other unsuccessful petition, an
untimely petition brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis
that is filed with—meaning delivered to and received by—the clerk
of the Court of Federal Claims is eligible for an award of
attorney’s fees.
B
The Government’s position is also inconsistent
with the goals of the fees provision itself. A stated purpose of
the Act’s fees scheme was to avoid “limit[ing] petitioners’ ability
to obtain qualified assistance” by making fees awards available for
“non-prevailing, good-faith claims.” H. R. Rep., at 22. The
Government does not explain why Congress would have intended to
discourage counsel from representing petitioners who, because of
the difficulty of distinguishing between the initial symptoms of a
vaccine-related injury and an unrelated malady, see,
e.g.,
Smith v.
Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human
Servs., No. 02–93V, 2006 WL 5610517, *6–*7 (Fed. Cl., July 21,
2006) (opinion of Golkiewicz, Chief Special Master), may have
good-faith claims with a reasonable basis that will only later be
found untimely.
III
The Government offers two additional lines of
argument for barring the award of attorney’s fees for untimely
petitions. It first invokes two canons of construction: the canon
favoring strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity and
the “ ‘presumption favoring the retention of long-established
and familiar [common-law] principles.’ ” Brief for Petitioner
32 (quoting
United States v.
Texas,
507 U.S.
529, 534 (1993)). Similarly, the Government also argues that
the NCVIA should be construed so as to minimize complex and costly
fees litigation. But as the Government acknowledges, such canons
and policy arguments come into play only “[t]o the extent that the
Vaccine Act is ambiguous.” Brief for Petitioner 28. These “rules of
thumb” give way when “the words of a statute are unambiguous,” as
they are here.
Connecticut Nat. Bank v.
Germain,
503 U.S.
249, 253–254 (1992).
Second, the Government argues that permitting
the recovery of attorney’s fees for untimely petitions will force
special masters to carry out costly and wasteful “shadow trials,”
with no benefit to claimants, in order to determine whether these
late petitions were brought in good faith and with a reasonable
basis. We reiterate that “when [a] statute’s language is plain, the
sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank,
N. A.,
530 U.S.
1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently,
even if the plain text of the NCVIA requires that special masters
occasionally carry out such “shadow trials,” that is not such an
absurd burden as to require departure from the words of the Act.
This is particularly true here because Congress has specifically
provided for such “shadow trials” by permitting the award of
attorney’s fees “in
any proceeding [on an unsuccessful]
petition” if such petition was brought in good faith and with a
reasonable basis, 42 U. S. C. §300aa–15(e)(1) (emphasis
added), irrespective of the reasons for the petition’s failure,
see,
e.g., Caves v.
Secretary of Health and Human
Servs., No. 07–443V, 2012 WL 6951286, *2, *13 (Fed. Cl., Dec.
20, 2012) (opinion of Moran, Special Master) (awarding attorney’s
fees despite petitioner’s failure to prove causation).
In any event, the Government’s fears appear to
us exaggerated. Special masters consistently make fee deter-
minations on the basis of the extensive documentation required by
§300aa–11(c) and included with the petition.[
8] Indeed, when adjudicating the timeliness of a
petition, the special master may often have to develop a good sense
of the merits of a case, and will therefore be able to determine if
a reasonable basis exists for the petitioner’s claim, including
whether there is a good-faith reason for the untimely filing. In
this case, for example, the Chief Special Master conducted a
“review of the record as a whole,” including the medical evidence
that would have supported the merits of Dr. Cloer’s claim, before
determining that her petition was untimely.
Cloer, 2008 WL
2275574, *1–*2, *10.
The Government also argues that permitting
attorney’s fees on untimely petitions will lead to the filing of
more untimely petitions. But the Government offers no evidence to
support its speculation. Additionally, this argument is premised on
the assumption that in the pursuit of fees, attorneys will choose
to bring claims lacking good faith or a reasonable basis in
derogation of their ethical duties. There is no basis for such an
assumption. Finally, the special masters have shown themselves more
than capable of discerning untimely claims supported by good faith
and a reasonable basis from those that are specious.
Supra,
at 12.
* * *
We hold that an NCVIA petition found to be
untimely may qualify for an award of attorney’s fees if it is filed
in good faith and there is a reasonable basis for its claim.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.