SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., fka
WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., et al.
v. STEVE
BULLOCK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MONTANA, et al.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the
supreme court of montana
No. 11–1179. Decided June 25, 2012
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.
In
Citizens United v.
Federal Election
Commission, the Court concluded that “independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to
corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 558 U. S. ___,
___ (2010) (slip op., at 42). I disagree with the Court’s hold- ing
for the reasons expressed in Justice Stevens’ dissent in that case.
As Justice Stevens explained, “technically independent expenditures
can be corrupting in much the same way as direct contributions.”
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 67–68). Indeed, Justice Stevens
recounted a “substantial body of evidence” suggesting that “[m]any
corporate independent expenditures . . . had become
essentially interchangeable with direct contributions in their
capacity to generate
quid pro quo arrangements.”
Id.,
at ___ (slip op., at 64–65).
Moreover, even if I were to accept
Citizens
United, this Court’s legal conclusion should not bar the
Montana Supreme Court’s finding, made on the record before it, that
independent expenditures by corporations did in fact lead to
corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana. Given the
history and political landscape in Montana, that court concluded
that the State had a compelling interest in limiting independent
expenditures by corporations. 2011 MT 328, ¶¶ 36–37, 363 Mont. 220,
235–236, 271 P.3d 1, 36–37. Thus, Montana’s experience, like
considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in
Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s
supposition that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear
to do so.
Were the matter up to me, I would vote to grant
the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider
Citizens
United or, at least, its application in this case. But given
the Court’s
per curiam disposition, I do not see a
significant possibility of reconsideration. Consequently, I vote
instead to deny the petition.