NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 11–45
_________________
MICHAEL B. ELGIN, et al., PETITIONERS
v. DEPART- MENT OF THE TREASURY et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the first circuit
[June 11, 2012]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
(CSRA), 5 U. S. C. §1101
et seq.,
certain federal employees may obtain administrative and judicial
review of specified ad- verse employment actions. The question
before us is whether the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to
judicial review when a qualifying employee challenges an adverse
employment action by arguing that a federal sta- tute is
unconstitutional. We hold that it does.
I
The CSRA “established a comprehensive
system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal
employees.”
United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S.
439, 455 (1988). As relevant here, Subchapter II of Chapter 75
governs review of major adverse actions taken against employees
“for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service.” 5 U. S. C. §§7503(a), 7513(a).
Employees entitled to review are those in the “competitive
service” and “excepted service” who meet certain
requirements regarding probationary periods and years of
service.[
1] §7511(a)(1).
The re- viewable agency actions are removal, suspension for more
than 14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30 days or
less. §7512.
When an employing agency proposes a covered
action against a covered employee, the CSRA gives the employee the
right to notice, representation by counsel, an opportunity to
respond, and a written, reasoned decision from the agency.
§7513(b). If the agency takes final adverse action against the
employee, the CSRA gives the employee the right to a hearing and to
be represented by an attorney or other representative before the
Merit Systems Pro- tection Board (MSPB). §§7513(d),
7701(a)(1)–(2). The MSPB is authorized to order relief to
prevailing employees, including reinstatement, backpay, and
attorney’s fees. §§1204(a)(2), 7701(g).
An employee who is dissatisfied with the
MSPB’s decision is entitled to judicial review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court
“shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any
agency action, findings, or conclusions” that are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law,” “obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed,” or “unsupported by substantial
evidence.” §§7703(a)(1), (c). The Federal Circuit
has “exclusive jurisdiction” over appeals from a final
decision of the MSPB. 28 U. S. C. §1295(a)(9); see
also 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1) (judicial review of an
MSPB decision “shall be” in the Federal Circuit).
II
Petitioners are former federal competitive
service employees who failed to comply with the Military Selective
Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §453. That Act
requires male citizens and permanent-resident aliens of the United
States between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the Selective
Service. Another federal statute, 5 U. S. C. §3328
(hereinafter Section 3328), bars from employment by an Executive
agency anyone who has knowingly and willfully failed to register.
Pursuant to Section 3328, petitioners were discharged (or allegedly
constructively discharged) by respondents, their employing
agencies.
Among petitioners, only Michael Elgin appealed
his removal to the MSPB. Elgin argued that Section 3328 is an
unconstitutional bill of attainder and unconstitution-ally
discriminates on the basis of sex when combined with the
registration requirement of the Military Selective Service Act. The
MSPB referred Elgin’s appeal to an ad- ministrative law judge
(ALJ) for an initial decision.[
2] The ALJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
concluding that an employee is not entitled to MSPB review of
agency action that is based on an absolute statutory bar to
employment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a–101a. The ALJ also
held that Elgin’s constitutional claims could not
“confer jurisdiction” on the MSPB because it
“lacks authority to determine the constitutionality of a
statute.”
Id., at 101a.
Elgin neither petitioned for review by the full
MSPB nor appealed to the Federal Circuit. Instead, he joined the
other petitioners in filing suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, raising the same
constitutional challenges to Section 3328 and the Military
Selective Service Act. App. 4, 26–28, 29. Petitioners sought
equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the
challenged statutes are unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting
enforcement of Section 3328, reinstatement to their former
positions, backpay, benefits, and attorney’s fees.
Id., at 29–30.
The District Court rejected respondents’
argument that it lacked jurisdiction and denied petitioners’
constitutional claims on the merits. See
Elgin v.
United
States, 697 F. Supp. 2d 187 (Mass. 2010). The District Court
held that the CSRA did not preclude it from hearing
petitioners’ claims, because the MSPB had no authority to
determine the constitutionality of a federal statute.
Id.,
at 193. Hence, the District Court concluded that it retained
jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question
jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C. §1331. 697 F. Supp.
2d, at 194.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See 641 F.3d 6 (2011). The Court
of Appeals held that challenges to a removal are not exempted from
the CSRA review scheme simply because the employee argues that the
statute authorizing the removal is unconstitutional.
Id., at
11–12. According to the Court of Appeals, the CSRA provides a
forum—the Federal Circuit—that may adjudicate the
constitutionality of a federal statute, and petitioners “were
obliged to use it.”
Id., at 12–13.
We granted certiorari to decide whether the CSRA
pre- cludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’
claims even though they are constitutional claims for equitable
relief. See 565 U. S. ___ (2011). We conclude that it does,
and we therefore affirm.
III
We begin with the appropriate standard for
determining whether a statutory scheme of administrative and
judicial review provides the exclusive means of review for
constitutional claims. Petitioners argue that even if they may
obtain judicial review of their constitutional claims before the
Federal Circuit, they are not precluded from pursuing their claims
in federal district court. According to petitioners, the general
grant of federal-question jurisdiction in 28 U. S. C.
§1331, which gives district courts authority over
constitutional claims, remains undisturbed unless Congress
explicitly directs otherwise. In support of this argument,
petitioners rely on
Webster v.
Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603 (1988), which held that “where Congress
intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims[,] its
intent to do so must be clear.” The
Webster Court
noted that this “heightened showing” was required
“to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’
that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any
judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.”
Ibid. (quoting
Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family
Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 681, n. 12 (1986)). Petitioners contend that the CSRA
does not meet this standard because it does not expressly bar suits
in district court.
Petitioners’ argument overlooks a
necessary predicate to the application of
Webster’s
heightened standard: a statute that purports to “deny any
judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim.” 486
U. S., at 603.
Webster’s standard does not apply
where Congress simply channels judicial review of a constitutional
claim to a particular court. We held as much in
Thunder Basin
Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S.
200 (1994). In that case, we considered whether a statutory
scheme of administrative review followed by judicial review in a
federal appellate court precluded district court jurisdiction over
a plaintiff’s statutory and constitutional claims.
Id., at 206. We noted that the plaintiff’s claims
could be “meaningfully addressed in the Court of
Appeals” and that the case therefore did “not present
the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise
if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial review
of a constitutional claim.”
Id., at 215, and
n. 20 (quoting
Bowen, supra, at 681, n. 12).
Accordingly, we did not require
Webster’s
“heightened showing,” but instead asked only whether
Congress’ intent to preclude district court jurisdiction was
“ ‘fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme.’ ” 510 U. S., at 207 (quoting
Block v.
Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S.
340, 351 (1984)).
Like the statute in
Thunder Basin, the
CSRA does not foreclose all judicial review of petitioners’
constitutional claims, but merely directs that judicial review
shall occur in the Federal Circuit. Moreover, as we explain below,
the Federal Circuit is fully capable of providing meaningful review
of petitioners’ claims. See
infra, at 12–17.
Accordingly, the appropriate inquiry is whether it is “fairly
discernible” from the CSRA that Congress intended covered
employees appealing covered agency actions to proceed exclusively
through the statutory review scheme, even in cases in which the
employees raise constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
IV
To determine whether it is “fairly
discernible” that Congress precluded district court
jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims, we examine the
CSRA’s text, structure, and purpose. See
Thunder Basin,
supra, at 207;
Fausto, 484 U. S., at 443.
A
This is not the first time we have addressed
the impact of the CSRA’s text and structure on the
availability of judicial review of a federal employee’s
challenge to an employment decision. In
Fausto, we
considered whether a so-called “nonpreference excepted
service employe[e]” could challenge his suspension in the
United States Claims Court, even though the CSRA did not then
afford him a right to review in the MSPB or the Federal
Circuit.[
3]
Id., at
440–441, 448. Citing “[t]he comprehensive nature of the
CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the rights of
nonpreference excepted service employees, and the fact that it does
not include them in provisions for administrative and judicial
review contained in Chapter 75,” the Court concluded that
“the absence of provision for these employees to obtain
judicial review” was a “considered congressional
judgment.”
Id., at 448. The Court thus found it
“fairly discernible” that Congress intended to preclude
all judicial review of Fausto’s statutory claims.[
4]
Id., at 452 (citing
Block,
supra, at 349).
Just as the CSRA’s “elaborate”
framework, 484 U. S., at 443, demonstrates Congress’
intent to entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to whom
the CSRA
denies statutory review, it similarly indicates
that extrastatutory review is not available to those employees to
whom the CSRA
grants administrative and judicial review.
Indeed, in
Fausto we expressly assumed that
“competitive service employees, who
are given review
rights by Chapter 75, cannot expand these rights by resort
to” judicial review outside of the CSRA scheme. See
id., at 450, n. 3. As
Fausto explained, the CSRA
“prescribes in great detail the protections and remedies
applicable to” adverse personnel actions against federal
employees.
Id., at 443. For example, Subchapter II of
Chapter 75, the portion of the CSRA relevant to petitioners,
specifically enumerates the major adverse actions and employee
classifications to which the CSRA’s procedural protections
and review provisions apply. 5 U. S. C. §§7511,
7512. The subchapter then sets out the procedures due an employee
prior to final agency action. §7513. And, Chapter 77 of the
CSRA exhaustively details the system of review before the MSPB and
the Federal Circuit. §§7701, 7703; see also
Fausto,
supra, at 449 (emphasizing that the CSRA’s structure
evinces “the primacy” of review by the MSPB and the
Federal Circuit). Given the painstaking detail with which the CSRA
sets out the method for covered employees to obtain review of
adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that Congress
intended to deny such employees an additional avenue of review in
district court.
Petitioners do not dispute that they are
employees who suffered adverse actions covered by the foregoing
provisions of the CSRA. Nor do they contest that the CSRA’s
text and structure support implied preclusion of district court
jurisdiction, at least as a general matter. Petitioners even
acknowledge that the MSPB routinely adjudicates some constitutional
claims, such as claims that an agency took adverse employment
action in violation of an em- ployee’s First or Fourth
Amendment rights, and that these claims must be brought within the
CSRA scheme. See Brief for Petitioners 33; Tr. of Oral Arg.
7–11, 15, 21; see also,
e.g., Smith v.
Department
of Transp., 106 MSPR 59, 78–79 (2007) (applying
Pickering v.
Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist.
205, Will Cty., 391 U.S.
563 (1968), to an employee’s claim that he was suspended
in retal- iation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights);
Garrison v.
Department of Justice, 67 MSPR 154 (1995)
(considering whether an order directing an employee to submit to a
drug test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Nevertheless,
petitioners seek to carve out an exception to CSRA exclusivity for
facial or as-applied constitutional challenges to federal
statutes.
The text and structure of the CSRA, however,
provide no support for such an exception. The availability of ad-
ministrative and judicial review under the CSRA gen- erally turns
on the type of civil service employee and adverse employment action
at issue. See,
e.g., 5 U. S. C.
§§7511(a)(1) (defining “employee”), 7512
(defining “[a]c- tions covered”), 7513(d) (providing
that “[a]n employee against whom an action is taken under
this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection
Board”), 7703(a)(1) (providing that “[a]ny employee
. . . adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or
decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial
review of the order or decision” in the Federal Circuit).
Nothing in the CSRA’s text suggests that its exclusive review
scheme is inapplicable simply because a covered employee challenges
a covered action on the ground that the statute authorizing that
action is unconstitutional. As the Government correctly notes,
“[t]he plain language of [the CSRA’s] provisions
applies to an employee who challenges his removal on the ground
that the statute requiring it is unconstitutional no less than it
applies to an employee who challenges his removal on any other
ground.” Brief for Respondents 33–34.
In only one situation does the CSRA expressly
exempt a covered employee’s appeal of a covered action from
Federal Circuit review based on the type of claim at issue. When a
covered employee “alleges that a basis for the action was
discrimination” prohibited by enumerated federal employment
laws, 5 U. S. C. §7702(a)(1)(B), the CSRA allows the
employee to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable MSPB decision
by filing a civil action as provided by the applicable employment
law. See §7703(b)(2). Each of the cross-referenced employment
laws authorizes an action in federal district court. See 42
U. S. C. §2000e–5(f); 29 U. S. C.
§633a(c); §216(b). Title 5 U. S. C.
§7703(b)(2) demonstrates that Congress knew how to provide
alternative forums for judicial review based on the nature of an
employee’s claim. That Congress declined to include an
exemption from Federal Circuit review for challenges to a
statute’s constitutionality indicates that Congress intended
no such exception.
B
The purpose of the CSRA also supports our
conclusion that the statutory review scheme is exclusive, even for
employees who bring constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
As we have previously explained, the CSRA’s “integrated
scheme of administrative and judicial review” for aggrieved
federal employees was designed to replace an
“ ‘outdated patchwork of statutes and
rules’ ” that afforded employees the right to
challenge employing agency actions in district courts across the
country.
Fausto, 484 U. S.
, at 444–445.
Such widespread judicial review, which included appeals in all of
the Federal Courts of Appeals produced “wide variations in
the kinds of decisions . . . issued on the same or
similar matters” and a double layer of judicial review that
was “wasteful and irrational.”
Id., at 445
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The CSRA’s objective of creating an
integrated scheme of review would be seriously undermined if, as
petitioners would have it, a covered employee could challenge a
covered employment action first in a district court, and then again
in one of the courts of appeals, simply by alleging that the
statutory authorization for such action is unconstitutional. Such
suits would reintroduce the very po- tential for inconsistent
decisionmaking and duplicative judicial review that the CSRA was
designed to avoid. Moreover, petitioners’ position would
create the possibility of parallel litigation regarding the same
agency action before the MSPB and a district court. An employee
could challenge the constitutionality of the statute authorizing an
agency’s action in district court, but the MSPB would remain
the exclusive forum for other types of challenges to the
agency’s decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 9,
15–16.
Petitioners counter that doctrines regarding
claim splitting and preclusion would bar parallel suits before the
MSPB and the district court. But such doctrines would not
invariably eliminate the possibility of simultaneous proceedings,
for a tribunal generally has discretion to decide whether to
dismiss a suit when a similar suit is pending elsewhere. See 18 C.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §4406 (2d ed.
2002 and Supp. 2011). In any event, petitioners point to nothing in
the CSRA to support the odd notion that Congress intended to allow
employees to pursue constitutional claims in district court at the
cost of forgoing other, potentially meritorious claims before the
MSPB.
Finally, we note that a jurisdictional rule
based on the nature of an employee’s constitutional claim
would deprive the aggrieved employee, the MSPB, and the district
court of clear guidance about the proper forum for the
employee’s claims at the outset of the case. For example,
petitioners contend that facial and as-applied constitutional
challenges to statutes may be brought in district court, while
other constitutional challenges must be heard by the MSPB. See
supra, at 8–9;
infra, at 13, n. 5. But, as
we explain below, that line is hazy at best and incoherent at
worst. See
ibid. The dissent’s approach fares no
better. The dissent carves out for district court adjudication only
facial constitutional challenges to statutes, but we have
previously stated that “the distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some
automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and
disposition in every case involving a constitutional
challenge.”
Citizens United v.
Federal Election
Comm’n, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 14).
By contrast, a jurisdictional rule based on the type of em- ployee
and adverse agency action at issue does not involve such amorphous
distinctions. Accordingly, we conclude that the better
interpretation of the CSRA is that its exclusivity does not turn on
the constitutional nature of an employee’s claim, but rather
on the type of the employee and the challenged employment
action.
V
Petitioners raise three additional factors in
arguing that their claims are not the type that Congress intended
to be reviewed within the CSRA scheme. Specifically, petitioners
invoke our “presum[ption] that Congress does not intend to
limit [district court] jurisdiction if ‘a finding of
preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review’;
if the suit is ‘wholly collateral to a statute’s review
provisions’; and if the claims are ‘outside the
agency’s expertise.’ ”
Free Enterprise
Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 8) (quoting
Thunder
Basin, 510 U. S., at 212–213). Contrary to
petitioners’ suggestion, none of those characteristics are
present here.
A
First, petitioners argue that the CSRA review
scheme provides no meaningful review of their claims because the
MSPB lacks authority to declare a federal statute un-
constitutional. Petitioners are correct that the MSPB has
repeatedly refused to pass upon the constitutionality of
legislation. See,
e.g., Malone v.
Department of
Justice, 13 M. S. P. B. 81, 83 (1983)
(“[I]t is well settled that administrative agencies are
without authority to determine the constitutionality of
statutes”). This Court has also stated that
“adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional
enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of
administrative agencies.”
Thunder Basin, 510
U. S., at 215 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).[
5]
We need not, and do not, decide whether the
MSPB’s view of its power is correct, or whether the
oft-stated principle that agencies cannot declare a statute
unconstitutional is truly a matter of jurisdiction. See
ibid. (describing this rule as “not mandatory”).
In
Thunder Basin, we held that Congress’ intent to
preclude district court jurisdiction was fairly discernible in the
statutory scheme “[e]ven if” the administrative body
could not decide the constitutionality of a federal law.
Ibid. That issue, we reasoned, could be “meaningfully
addressed in the Court of Appeals” that Congress had
authorized to conduct judicial review.
Ibid.[
6] Likewise, the CSRA provides review in the
Federal Circuit, an Article III court fully competent to adjudicate
petitioners’ claims that Section 3328 and the Military
Selective Service Act’s registration requirement are
unconstitutional.
Petitioners insist, however, that the Federal
Circuit cannot decide their constitutional claims either.
Emphasizing the Federal Circuit’s holdings that its
jurisdiction over employee appeals is coextensive with the
MSPB’s jurisdiction, petitioners argue that the Federal
Circuit likewise lacks jurisdiction to decide their challenge to
the constitutionality of a federal statute. Petitioners are
incorrect.
As we have explained, the CSRA makes MSPB
jurisdiction over an appeal dependent only on the nature of the
employee and the employment action at issue. See
supra, at
1–2, 8–9; see also 5 CFR §1201.3(a) (stating that
“[t]he Board has jurisdiction over appeals from agency
actions” and enumerating covered actions);
Todd v.
Merit Systems Protection Bd.,
55 F.3d 1574, 1576 (CA Fed. 1995) (explaining that the employee
“has the burden of establishing that she and the action she
seeks to appeal [are] within the [MSPB’s]
jurisdiction”). Accordingly, as the cases cited by
petitioners demonstrate, the Federal Circuit has questioned its
jurisdiction when an employee appeals from a type of adverse action
over which the MSPB lacked jurisdiction.[
7] But the Federal Circuit has never held, in an appeal
from agency action within the MSPB’s jurisdiction, that its
authority to decide particular legal questions is derivative of the
MSPB’s authority. To the contrary, in
Briggs v.
MSPB,
331 F.3d 1307, 1312–1313 (2003), the Federal Circuit
concluded that it could determine the constitutionality of a
statute upon which an employee’s removal was based,
notwithstanding the MSPB’s professed lack of authority to
decide the question.[
8]
Petitioners next contend that even if the
Federal Circuit could consider their claims in the first instance,
resolution of the claims requires a factual record that neither the
MSPB (because it lacks authority to decide the legal question) nor
the Federal Circuit (because it is an appellate court) can create.
To the contrary, we think the CSRA review scheme fully accommodates
an employee’s potential need to establish facts relevant to
his constitutional challenge to a federal statute. Even without
factfinding capabilities, the Federal Circuit may take judicial
notice of facts relevant to the constitutional question. See,
e.g., Rothe Development Corp. v.
Department of
Defense, 545 F.3d 1023, 1045–1046 (CA Fed. 2008)
(judicially noticing facts relevant to equal protection challenge).
And, if resolution of a constitutional claim requires the
development of facts beyond those that the Federal Circuit may
judicially notice, the CSRA empowers the MSPB to take evidence and
find facts for Federal Circuit review. See 5 U. S. C.
§§1204(b)(1)–(2) (providing that the MSPB may
administer oaths, examine witnesses, take depositions, issue
interrogatories, subpoena testimony and documents, and otherwise
receive evidence when a covered employee appeals a covered adverse
employment action). Unlike petitioners, we see nothing
extraordinary in a statutory scheme that vests reviewable
factfinding authority in a non-Article III entity that has
jurisdiction over an action but cannot finally decide the legal
question to which the facts pertain. Congress has authorized
magistrate judges, for example, to conduct evidentiary hearings and
make findings of fact relevant to dispositive pretrial motions,
although they are powerless to issue a final ruling on such
motions. See 28 U. S. C.
§§636(b)(1)(A)–(B);
United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 673 (1980).[
9]
Petitioners nonetheless insist that the MSPB
will never reach the factfinding stage in an appeal challenging the
constitutionality of a federal statute, pointing to the ALJ’s
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in petitioner Elgin’s
case. Again, petitioners are incorrect. When a covered employee
appeals a covered adverse action, the CSRA grants the MSPB
jurisdiction over the appeal. See
supra, at 14. If the
employee attacks the adverse action on the ground that a statute is
unconstitutional, the MSPB may determine that it lacks authority to
decide that particular issue; but absent another infirmity in the
adverse action, the MSPB will affirm the employing agency’s
decision rather than dismiss the appeal. See,
e.g., Briggs,
supra, at 1311. The Federal Circuit can then review the MSPB
decision, including any factual record developed by the MSPB in the
course of its decision on the merits.
Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion,
Elgin’s case does not illustrate that the MSPB will
invariably dismiss an appeal challenging the constitutionality of a
federal statute before reaching the factfinding stage. The ALJ
dismissed Elgin’s case on the threshold jurisdictional ground
that he was not an “employee” with a right to appeal to
the MSPB because his employment was absolutely barred by statute.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a–101a. The Government conceded
before the First Circuit that this jurisdictional argument was
incorrect, see Brief for United States 10, and the Court of Appeals
agreed, see 641 F. 3d, at 10–11. The parties do not
raise that issue here, and we do not address it. What matters for
present purposes is that the particular circumstances of
Elgin’s case do not demonstrate that the MSPB will dismiss an
appeal that is otherwise within its jurisdiction merely because it
lacks the authority to decide a particular claim.[
10]
In sum, the CSRA grants the MSPB and the Federal
Circuit jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal because they
are covered employees challenging a covered adverse employment
action. Within the CSRA review scheme, the Federal Circuit has
authority to consider and decide petitioners’ constitutional
claims. To the extent such challenges require factual development,
the CSRA equips the MSPB with tools to create the necessary record.
Thus, petitioners’ constitutional claims can receive
meaningful review within the CSRA scheme.[
11]
B
Petitioners next contend that the CSRA does
not preclude district court jurisdiction over their claims because
they are “wholly collateral” to the CSRA scheme.
According to petitioners, their bill-of-attainder and sex
discrimination claims “have nothing to do with the types of
day-to-day personnel actions adjudicated by the MSPB,” Brief
for Petitioners 29, and petitioners “are not seeking the
CSRA’s ‘protections and remedies.’ ”
Reply Brief for Petitioners 3. We disagree.
As evidenced by their district court complaint,
petitioners’ constitutional claims are the vehicle by which
they seek to reverse the removal decisions, to return to federal
employment, and to receive the compensation they would have earned
but for the adverse employment action. See App. 29–30. A
challenge to removal is precisely the type of personnel action
regularly adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within
the CSRA scheme. Likewise, reinstatement, backpay, and
attorney’s fees are precisely the kinds of relief that the
CSRA empowers the MSPB and the Federal Circuit to provide. See
supra, at 2; see also
Heckler v.
Ringer,
466 U.S.
602, 614 (1984) (holding that plaintiffs’ claims were not
wholly collateral to a statutory scheme of administrative and
judicial review of Medicare payment decisions, where
plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory challenge to an
agency’s procedure for reaching payment decisions was
“at bottom” an attempt to reverse the agency’s
decision to deny payment). Far from a suit wholly collateral to the
CSRA scheme, the case before us is a challenge to CSRA-covered
employment action brought by CSRA-covered employees requesting
relief that the CSRA routinely affords.
C
Relatedly, petitioners argue that their
constitutional claims are not the sort that Congress intended to
channel through the MSPB because they are outside the MSPB’s
expertise. But petitioners overlook the many threshold questions
that may accompany a constitutional claim and to which the MSPB can
apply its expertise. Of particular relevance here, preliminary
questions unique to the employment context may obviate the need to
address the constitutional challenge. For example, petitioner Henry
Tucker asserts that his resignation amounted to a constructive
discharge. That issue falls squarely within the MSPB’s
expertise, and its resolution against Tucker would avoid the need
to reach his constitutional claims. In addition, the challenged
statute may be one that the MSPB regularly construes, and its
statutory interpretation could alleviate constitutional concerns.
Or, an employee’s appeal may involve other statutory or
constitutional claims that the MSPB routinely considers, in
addition to a constitutional challenge to a federal statute. The
MSPB’s resolution of those claims in the employee’s
favor might fully dispose of the case. Thus, because the
MSPB’s expertise can otherwise be “brought to
bear” on employee appeals that challenge the
constitutionality of a statute, we see no reason to conclude that
Congress intended to exempt such claims from exclusive review
before the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. See
Thunder Basin,
510 U. S., at 214–215 (concluding that, where
administrative Commission’s expertise “could be brought
to bear” on appeal, Commission’s exclusive review of
alleged statutory violation was appropriate despite its lack of
expertise in interpreting a particular statute (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that it
is fairly discernible that the CSRA review scheme was intended to
preclude district court jurisdiction over petitioners’
claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.