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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10–637
_________________
ERIC GREENE, aka JARMAINE Q. TRICE, PETI-
TIONER v. JON FISHER, SUPERINTENDENT, STATE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTION AT SMITHFIELD, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit
[November 8, 2011]
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court
may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to any
claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings” unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1). We consider whether “clearly established Federal law”
includes decisions of this Court that are announced after the last
adjudication of the merits in state court but before the
defendant’s conviction becomes final.
I
In December 1993,
petitioner Eric Greene and four co-conspirators robbed a grocery
store in North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During the robbery, one
of the men shot and killed the store’s owner. The five were
apprehended, and two of them confessed to taking part in the
robbery. Greene did not confess, but he was implicated by the
others’ statements.
When the Commonwealth
sought to try all of the co-conspirators jointly, Greene sought
severance, arguing, inter alia, that the confessions of his
nontestifying codefendants should not be introduced at his trial.
The trial court denied the motion to sever, but agreed to require
redaction of the confessions to eliminate proper names. As
redacted, the confessions replaced names with words like “this
guy,” “someone,” and “other guys,” or with the word “blank,” or
simply omitted the names without substitution.
A jury convicted Greene
of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. He appealed to
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing that severance of his
trial was demanded by the rule announced in Bruton v. United
States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), that the Confrontation Clause
forbids the prosecution to introduce a nontestifying co-
defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in the crime. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction, holding that
the redaction had cured any problem under Bruton.
Greene filed a petition
for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising
the same Bruton claim. While that petition was pending, we held in
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 195 (1998), that “considered
as a class, redactions that replace a proper name with an obvious
blank, the word ‘delete,’ a symbol, or similarly notify the jury
that a name has been deleted are similar enough to Bruton’s
unredacted confessions as to warrant the same legal results.” The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of
appeal, limited to the question whether admission of the redacted
confessions violated Greene’s Sixth Amendment rights. After the
parties filed merits briefs, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted.
Greene then filed a
federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging, inter alia,
that the introduction of his nontestifying codefendants’ statements
violated the Confrontation Clause. Adopting the report and
recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court denied the
petition. It concluded that since our decision in Gray was not
“clearly established Federal law” when the Pennsylvania Superior
Court adjudicated Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim, that court’s
decision was not “contrary to,” or “an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1).
A divided panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F. 3d 85 (2010). The majority held
that the “clearly established Federal law” referred to in
§2254(d)(1) is the law at the time of the state-court adjudication
on the merits. Id., at 99. The dissenting judge contended that it
is the law at the time the conviction becomes final. Id., at 108.
We granted certiorari. 563 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
Section 2254(d) of
Title 28, U. S. C., as amended by AEDPA, provides:
“An application for a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
“(1) resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”
The issue here pertains to the first exception.
We have said that its standard of “contrary to, or involv[ing] an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” is
“difficult to meet,” because the purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that
federal habeas relief functions as a “ ‘guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’ ” and not
as a means of error correction. Harrington v. Richter, 562
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12–13) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
In light of that
objective, and relying upon the text of the provision, we held last
Term, in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___ (2011), that
review under §2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the prisoner’s claim on the
merits. We said that the provision’s “backward-looking language
requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it
was made.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). The reasoning of Cullen
determines the result here. As we explained, §2254(d)(1) requires
federal courts to “focu[s] on what a state court knew and did,” and
to measure state-court decisions “against this Court’s precedents
as of ‘the time the state court renders its decision.’ ” Id.,
at __ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S.
63, 71–72 (2003); emphasis added).
Greene resists that
conclusion by appealing to our decision in Teague v. Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989). Teague held that, with two exceptions not
pertinent here, a prisoner seeking federal habeas relief may rely
on new constitutional rules of criminal procedure announced before
the prisoner’s conviction became final. Id., at 310 (plurality
opinion); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313 (1989)
(affirming and applying Teague rule). Finality occurs when direct
state appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of
certiorari from this Court has become time barred or has been
disposed of. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 321, n. 6
(1987). Greene contends that, because finality marks the temporal
cutoff for Teague purposes, it must mark the temporal cutoff for
“clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA.
The analogy has been
rejected by our cases. We have explained that AEDPA did not codify
Teague, and that “the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.”
Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam). The
retroactivity rules that govern federal habeas review on the
merits—which include Teague—are quite separate from the
relitigation bar imposed by AEDPA; neither abrogates or qualifies
the other. If §2254(d)(1) was, indeed, pegged to Teague, it would
authorize relief when a state-court merits adjudication “resulted
in a decision that became contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, before the
conviction became final.” The statute says no such thing, and we
see no reason why Teague should alter AEDPA’s plain meaning.
Greene alternatively
contends that the relevant “decision” to which the “clearly
established Federal law” criterion must be applied is the decision
of the state supreme court that disposes of a direct appeal from a
defendant’s conviction or sentence, even when (as here) that
decision does not adjudicate the relevant claim on the merits. This
is an implausible reading of §2254(d)(1). The text, we repeat,
provides that habeas relief
“shall not be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law
. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The words “the adjudication” in the “unless”
clause obviously refer back to the “adjudicat[ion] on the merits,”
and the phrase “resulted in a decision” in the “unless” clause
obviously refers to the decision produced by that same adjudication
on the merits. A later affirmance of that decision on alternative
procedural grounds, for example, would not be a decision resulting
from the merits adjudication. And much less would be (what is at
issue here) a decision by the state supreme court not to hear the
appeal—that is, not to decide at all.
III
The Third Circuit
held, and the parties do not dispute, that the last state-court
adjudication on the merits of Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim
occurred on direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. 606
F. 3d, at 92, and n. 1. The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s
decision predated our decision in Gray by nearly three months. The
Third Circuit thus correctly held that Gray was not “clearly
established Federal law” against which it could measure the
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision. 606 F. 3d, at 99. The
panel then concluded (and the parties do not dispute) that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision neither was “contrary to,”
nor “involved an unreasonable application of,” any “clearly
established Federal law” that existed at the time. Id., at 106.
Consequently, §2254(d)(1) bars the federal courts from granting
Greene’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.
We must observe that
Greene’s predicament is an unusual one of his own creation. Before
applying for federal habeas, he missed two opportunities to obtain
relief under Gray: After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed
his appeal, he did not file a petition for writ of certiorari from
this Court, which would almost certainly have produced a remand in
light of the intervening Gray decision. “Where intervening
developments . . . reveal a reasonable probability that
the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower court would
reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and
where it appears that such a redetermination may determine the
ultimate outcome of the litigation, [an order granting the
petition, vacating the judgment below, and remanding the case
(GVR)] is, we believe, potentially appropriate.” Lawrence v.
Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam). See, e.g.,
Stanbridge v. New York, 395 U. S. 709 (1969) (per curiam) (GVR
in light of Bruton). Nor did Greene assert his Gray claim in a
petition for state postconviction relief. Having forgone two
obvious means of asserting his claim, Greene asks us to provide him
relief by interpreting AEDPA in a manner contrary to both its text
and our precedents. We decline to do so, and affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
