It belongs exclusively to the political department of the
government to recognize or to refuse to recognize a new government
in a foreign country, claiming to have displaced the old and
established a new one.
Until the political department of the government acknowledged
the independence of Texas, the Judiciary were bound to consider the
old order of things as having continued.
While the government of the United States acknowledged its
treaty of limits and of amity and friendship with Mexico as still
subsisting and obligatory, no citizen of the United States could
lawfully furnish supplies to Texas to enable it to carry on the war
against Mexico.
A contract, made in Cincinnati, after Texas declared itself
independent, but before its independence was acknowledged by the
United States, whereby the complainants agreed to furnish, and did
furnish money to a general in the Texan army, to enable him to
raise and equip troops to be employed against Mexico, was illegal
and void, and cannot be enforced in a court of the United
States.
The circumstance that the Texan officer agreed, in consideration
of these advances of money, to convey to them certain lands in
Texas, of which he covenanted that he was then the owner, will not
make the contract valid when it appears upon the face of it, and by
the averments in the bill, that the object and intention of the
complainants in advancing the money was to assist Texas in its
military operations.
Page 55 U. S. 39
A contract made in the United States at that time for the
purchase of land in Texas would have been valid even if the money
was afterwards used to support hostilities with Mexico. But in this
case it was not an ordinary purchase, but the object of the
complainants, as avowed in the contract and the bill, was to aid
Texas in its war with Mexico.
The contract being absolutely void by the laws of the United
States at the time it was made, the circumstance that it was valid
in Texas and that Texas has since become a member of the Union,
does not entitle the complainants to enforce it in the courts of
the United States.
No contract can be enforced in the courts of the United States,
no matter where made or where to be executed, if it is in violation
of the laws of the United States or is in contravention of the
public policy of the government or in conflict with subsisting
treaties.
In this cause Mr. Justice Catron was absent because of
indisposition during the hearing before the court, and took no part
in the decision.
The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
There were several causes of demurrer filed in the court below,
but it is necessary to notice only the following, because the
decision in this Court turned entirely upon them.
1. The said bill, if the facts therein were true, which is in no
sort admitted, contains no matter or thing of equity upon which to
ground any decree or give the complainants any aid or relief.
2. The complainants' said bill shows no legal or valid agreement
upon which to ask the aid or decree of the court, but, to the
contrary, sets out and shows an agreement which was in violation of
the neutrality of the United States towards the Republic of Mexico
in her contest with Texas.
3. The complainants' said bill seeks the aid or assistance of
the Court to enforce the specific execution of an agreement made in
the State of Kentucky between citizens thereof and this defendant
in violation of the policy of the government of the United States
in her intercourse with foreign governments.
The demurrer was sustained generally by the court below, and
therefore all the points were open to argument in this Court, but
it is not necessary to notice any except those upon which the
judgment of the Court rested.
Page 55 U. S. 44
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 55 U. S. 45
The appellants filed a bill in that court against the appellee
to obtain the specific execution of an agreement which is set out
in full in the bill, and which they allege was executed at the City
of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, on or about the 16th of
September, 1836. Some of the complainants claim as original parties
to the contract and the others as assignees of original parties who
have sold and assigned to them their interest.
The contract, after stating that it was entered into on the day
and year above mentioned between General T. Jefferson Chambers, of
the Texan army, of the first part, and Morgan Neville and six
others, who are named in the agreement, of the City of Cincinnati,
of the second part, proceeds to recite the motives and inducements
of the parties in the following words:
"That the said party of the second part, being desirous of
assisting the said General T. Jefferson Chambers, who is now
engaged in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas, and
who is in want of means therefor, and being extremely desirous to
advance the cause of freedom and the independence of Texas, have
agreed to purchase of the said T. Jefferson Chambers, of his
private estate, the lands hereinafter described."
And after this recital follows the agreement of Chambers to sell
and convey to them the land described in the agreement, situated in
Texas, for the sum of twelve thousand five hundred dollars, which
he acknowledged that he had received in their notes, payable in
equal installments of four, six, and twelve months, and he
covenanted that he had a good title to this land and would convey
it with general warranty. There are other stipulations on the part
of Chambers to secure the title to the parties which it is
unnecessary to state, as they are not material to the questions
before the Court.
After setting out the contract at large, the bill avers that the
notes given as aforesaid were all paid, and sets forth the manner
in which the complainants, who were not parties to the original
contract, had acquired their interest as assignees, and charges
that notwithstanding the full payment of the money, Chambers, under
different pretexts, refuses to convey the land according to the
terms of his agreement.
If further states that they are informed and believe that he
received full compensation in money, scrip, land, or other valuable
property for the supplies furnished by him, and in arming and
equipping the Texan army referred to in the said contract, and
which it was in part the object of the said parties of the second
part to assist him to do by the said advances made by them as
before stated, and which said advances did enable the said Chambers
so to do.
Page 55 U. S. 46
To this bill the respondent Chambers demurred, and the principal
question which arises on the demurrer is whether the contract was a
legal and valid one and such as can be enforced by either party in
a court of the United States. It appears on the face of it and by
the averments of the appellants in their bill that it was made in
Cincinnati with a general in the Texan army, who was then engaged
in raising, arming, and equipping volunteers for Texas to carry on
hostilities with Mexico, and that one of the inducements of the
appellants in entering into this contract and advancing the money
was to assist him in accomplishing these objects.
The district court decided that the contract was illegal and
void and sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill, and we
think that the decision was right.
The validity of this contract depends upon the relation in which
this country then stood to Mexico and Texas and the duties which
these relations imposed upon the government and citizens of the
United States.
Texas had declared itself independent a few months previous to
this agreement. But it had not been acknowledged by the United
States, and the constituted authorities charged with our foreign
relations regarded the treaties we had made with Mexico as still in
full force and obligatory upon both nations. By the treaty of
limits, Texas had been admitted by our government to be a part of
the Mexican territory, and by the first article of the treaty of
amity, commerce, and navigation it was declared
"That there should be a firm, inviolable, and universal peace,
and a true and sincere friendship between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States in all the extent of their
possessions and territories, and between their people and citizens
respectively, without distinction of persons or place."
These treaties, while they remained in force, were, by the
Constitution of the United States, the supreme law, and binding not
only upon the government but upon every citizen. No contract could
lawfully be made in violation of their provisions.
Undoubtedly when Texas had achieved her independence, no
previous treaty could bind this country to regard it as a part of
the Mexican territory. But it belonged to the government, and not
to individual citizens, to decide when that event had taken place.
And that decision, according to the laws of nations, depended upon
the question whether she had or had not a civil government in
successful operation, capable of performing the duties and
fulfilling the obligations of an independent power. It depended
upon the state of the fact, and not upon the right which was in
contest between the parties. And the
Page 55 U. S. 47
President, in his message to the Senate of December 22, 1836, in
relation to the conflict between Mexico and Texas, which was still
pending, says:
"All questions relative to the government of foreign nations,
whether of the old or the new world, have been treated by the
United States as questions of fact only, and our predecessors have
cautiously abstained from deciding upon them until the clearest
evidence was in their possession to enable them not only to decide
correctly, but to shield their decision from every unworthy
imputation."
Senate Journal of 1836-1837, p. 54.
Acting upon these principles, the independence of Texas was not
acknowledged by the government of the United States until the
beginning of March, 1837. Up to that time, it was regarded as a
part of the territory of Mexico. The treaty which admitted it to be
so was held to be still in force and binding on both parties, and
every effort made by the government to fulfill its neutral
obligations and prevent our citizens from taking part in the
conflict. This is evident from an official communication from the
President to the Governor of Tennessee in reply to an inquiry in
relation to a requisition for militia made by General Gaines. The
dispatch is dated in August, 1836, and the President uses the
following language:
"The obligations of our treaty with Mexico, as well as the
general principles which govern our intercourse with foreign
powers, require us to maintain a strict neutrality in the contest
which now agitates a part of that republic. So long as Mexico
fulfills her duties to us as they are defined by the treaty and
violates none of the rights which are secured by it to our
citizens, any act on the part of the government of the United
States which would tend to foster a spirit of resistance to her
government and laws, whatever may be their character or form, when
administered within her own limits and jurisdiction, would be
unauthorized and highly improper."
Ex.Doc. 1836-1837, Vol. 1, Doc. 2, p. 58.
And on the very day on which the agreement of which we are
speaking was made, September 16, 1836, Mr. Forsyth, the Secretary
of State, in a note to the Mexican Minister, assured him that the
government had taken measures to secure the execution of the laws
for preserving the neutrality of the United States, and that the
public officers were vigilant in the discharge of that duty.
Ex.Doc. Vol. 1, Doc. 2, pp. 63-64.
And still later the President, in his message to the Senate of
December 22, 1836, before referred to, says:
"The acknowledgment of a new state as independent and entitled
to a place in the family of nations is at all times an act of great
delicacy and responsibility, but more especially so when such a
state has
Page 55 U. S. 48
forcibly separated itself from another of which it formed an
integral part and which still claims dominion over it."
And after speaking of the policy which our government had always
adopted on such occasions and the duty of maintaining the
established character of the United States for fair and impartial
dealing, he proceeds to express his opinion against the
acknowledgment of the independence of Texas at that time in the
following words:
"It is true, with regard to Texas, the civil authority of Mexico
has been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the
republic himself captured, and all present power to control the
newly organized government of Texas annihilated within its
confines. But on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least,
an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Mexico. The
Mexican Republic, under another executive, is rallying its forces
under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its
lost dominion. Upon the issue of this threatened invasion, the
independence of Texas may be considered as suspended, and were
there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United
States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a
crisis would scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent
reserve with which we have heretofore held ourselves bound to treat
all similar questions."
The whole object of this message appears to have been to impress
upon Congress the impropriety of acknowledging the independence of
Texas at that time, and the more especially as the American
character of her population and her known desire to become a state
of this Union might, if prematurely acknowledged, bring suspicion
upon the motives by which we were governed.
We have given these extracts from the public documents not only
to show that in the judgment of our government, Texas had not
established its independence when this contract was made, but to
show also how anxiously the constituted authorities were
endeavoring to maintain untarnished the honor of the country and to
place it above the suspicion of taking any part in the
conflict.
This being the attitude in which the government stood, and this
its open and avowed policy, upon what grounds can the parties to
such a contract as this come into a court of justice of the United
States and ask for its specific execution? It was made in direct
opposition to the policy of the government, to which it was the
duty of every citizen to conform. And, while they saw it exerting
all its power to fulfill in good faith its neutral obligations,
they made themselves parties to the war by
Page 55 U. S. 49
furnishing means to a general of the Texan army for the avowed
purpose of aiding and assisting him in his military operations.
It might indeed fairly be inferred from the language of the
contract and the statements in the appellants' bill, that the
volunteers were to be raised, armed, and equipped within the limits
of the United States. The language of the contract is:
"That the said party of the second part (that is, the
complainants), being desirous of assisting the said General T.
Jefferson Chambers, who is now engaged in raising, arming, and
equipping volunteers for Texas, and is in want of means
therefor."
And as General Chambers was then in the United States, and was,
as the contract states, actually engaged at that time in raising,
arming, and equipping volunteers, and was in want of means to
accomplish his object, the inference would seem to be almost
irresistible that these preparations were making at or near the
place where the agreement was made, and that the money was advanced
to enable him to raise and equip a military force in the United
States. And this inference is the stronger because no place is
mentioned where these preparations are to be made, and the
agreement contains no engagement on his part or proviso on theirs
which prohibited him from using these means and making these
military preparations within the limits of the United States.
If this be the correct interpretation of the agreement, the
contract is not only void, but the parties who advanced the money
were liable to be punished in a criminal prosecution for a
violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. And
certainly, with such strong indications of a criminal intent and
without any averment in the bill from which their innocence can be
inferred, a court of chancery would never lend its aid to carry the
agreement into specific execution, but would leave the parties to
seek their remedy at law. And this ground would of itself be
sufficient to justify the decree of the district court dismissing
the bill.
But the decision stands on broader and firmer ground, and this
agreement cannot be sustained either at law or in equity. The
question is not whether the parties to this contract violated the
neutrality laws of the United States or subjected themselves to a
criminal prosecution, but whether such a contract, made at that
time, within the United States, for the purposes stated in the
contract and the bill of complaint, was a legal and valid contract
and such as to entitle either party to the aid of the courts of
justice of the United States to enforce its execution.
The intercourse of this country with foreign nations and its
policy in regard to them are placed by the Constitution of the
Page 55 U. S. 50
United States in the hands of the government, and its decisions
upon these subjects are obligatory upon every citizen of the Union.
He is bound to be at war with the nation against which the
warmaking power has declared war, and equally bound to commit no
act of hostility against a nation with which the government is in
amity and friendship. This principle is universally acknowledged by
the laws of nations. It lies at the foundation of all government,
as there could be no social order or peaceful relations between the
citizens of different countries without it. It is, however, more
emphatically true in relation to citizens of the United States. For
as the sovereignty resides in the people, every citizen is a
portion of it, and is himself personally bound by the laws which
the representatives of the sovereignty may pass, or the treaties
into which they may enter, within the scope of their delegated
authority. And when that authority has plighted its faith to
another nation that there shall be peace and friendship between the
citizens of the two countries, every citizen of the United States
is equally and personally pledged. The compact is made by the
department of the government upon which he himself has agreed to
confer the power. It is his own personal compact as a portion of
the sovereignty in whose behalf it is made. And he can do no act,
nor enter into any agreement to promote or encourage revolt or
hostilities against the territories of a country with which our
government is pledged by treaty to be at peace, without a breach of
his duty as a citizen and the breach of the faith pledged to the
foreign nation. And if he does so, he cannot claim the aid of a
court of justice to enforce it. The appellants say in their
contract that they were induced to advance the money by the desire
to promote the cause of freedom. But our own freedom cannot be
preserved without obedience to our own laws, nor social order
preserved if the judicial branch of the government countenanced and
sustained contracts made in violation of the duties which the law
imposes or in contravention of the known and established policy of
the political department, acting within the limits of its
constitutional power.
But it has been urged in the argument that Texas was in fact
independent, and a sovereign state at the time of this agreement,
and that the citizen of a neutral nation may lawfully lend money to
one that is engaged in war to enable it to carry on hostilities
against its enemy.
It is not necessary in the case before us to decide how far the
judicial tribunals of the United States would enforce a contract
like this when two states, acknowledged to be independent, were at
war and this country neutral. It is a sufficient answer to the
argument to say that the question whether Texas had or
Page 55 U. S. 51
had not at that time become an independent state, was a question
for that department of our government exclusively which is charged
with our foreign relations. And until the period when that
department recognized it as an independent state, the judicial
tribunals of the country were bound to consider the old order of
things as having continued, and to regard Texas as a part of the
Mexican territory. And if we undertook to inquire whether she had
not in fact become an independent sovereign state before she was
recognized as such by the treatymaking power, we should take upon
ourselves the exercise of political authority for which a judicial
tribunal is wholly unfit and which the Constitution has conferred
exclusively upon another department.
This is not a new question. It came before the court in the case
of
Rose v.
Himely, 4 Cranch 272, and again in
Hoyt
v. Gelston, 3 Wheat. 324. And in both of these
cases, the Court said that it belongs exclusively to governments to
recognize new states in the revolutions which may occur in the
world, and until such recognition, either by our own government or
the government to which the new state belonged, courts of justice
are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining
unaltered.
It was upon this ground that the Court of Common Pleas in
England, in the case of
De Wutz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore's
C.B. 586, decided that it was contrary to the law of nations for
persons residing in England to enter into engagements to raise
money by way of loan for the purpose of supporting subjects of a
foreign state in arms against a government in friendship with
England, and that no right of action attached upon any such
contract. And this decision is quoted with approbation by
Chancellor Kent in 1 Kent's Com. 116.
Nor can the subsequent acknowledgment of the independence of
Texas and her admission into the Union as a sovereign state affect
the question. The agreement being illegal and absolutely void at
the time it was made, it can derive no force or validity from
events which afterwards happened.
But it is insisted on the part of the appellants that this
contract was to be executed in Texas and was valid by the laws of
Texas, and that the district court for that state, in a controversy
between individuals, was bound to administer the laws of the state
and ought therefore to have enforced this agreement.
This argument is founded in part on a mistake of the fact. The
contract was not only made in Cincinnati, but all the stipulations
on the part of the appellants were to be performed there, and not
in Texas. And the advance of money which they
Page 55 U. S. 52
agreed to make for military purposes was in fact made and
intended to be made in Cincinnati by the delivery of their
promissory notes, which were accepted by the appellee as payment of
the money. This appears on the face of the contract. And it is this
advance of money for the purposes mentioned in the agreement, in
contravention of the neutral obligations and policy of the United
States, that avoids the contract. The mere agreement to accept a
conveyance of land lying in Texas for a valuable consideration paid
by them would have been free from objection.
But had the fact been otherwise, certainly no law of Texas then
or now in force could absolve a citizen of the United States, while
he continued such, from his duty to this government, nor compel a
court of the United States to support a contract, no matter where
made or where to be executed, if that contract was in violation of
their laws or contravened the public policy of the government or
was in conflict with subsisting treaties with a foreign nation.
We therefore hold this contract to be illegal and void, and
affirm the decree of the district court.
MR. JUSTICE DANIEL and MR. JUSTICE GRIER dissented.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the District of
Texas and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now
here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that the decree
of the said district court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, affirmed with costs.